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THE LAW Off A COUNTRY AND KB W O  I 1
- if
In the principles which follow, the law of a country, 
e.g. the law of the domicile, means the law which the Courts 
of that country would apply in the case in question, 
including both its internal rules of law and its rules for 
choice of law, and does not mean the law which the Courts 
of that country would have applied in the case of a person 
having his domicile and nationality there, in respect of a 
transaction occurring there. /~Collier v. Hivaz 1841 2 Curt.; 
855; Maltass v. Maltass 1844 1 Robertson 67 per Dr.
Lushington at p. 72; Prere v. Prere 1847 5 .Notes Qf Cases
595; Connel’s Trs. v. Connel 1872 10 M. 627; In the Goods 
of -Lacroix 1877 2 2. 94; In re Irufort 1887 56 Ch- D. 600;
In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency C o . 1892 1 Ch. 219;
In re Johnson 1905 1 Ch. 821; Armitage v. Attorney-General
1906 2. 155; Casdagli v. Casdagli 1918 2. 89 per Scrutton 
1..J. at p. Ill; Approved 1919 A.C. 145; In re Anne si ey
1926 1 Ch. 692; In re Achillopoulos 1928 1 Ch. at p. 445;
In re Ross 1950 1 Ch. 577; In re AsXew 1950 2 Ch. 259; 
Collins v. Attorney-General 1951 145 L.f. 551; In re Q ’Keefe
1940 1 Ch. 124; Jaber Elias Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Kahas
1941 A.C. 405; Dicey pp. 60 et sequ; A.B. Keith 1942 Jo.
Comp. Leg. 69; Westlake chap. II; Rabel, i, pp. 70 et sequ;
Bentwicto, "Domicile & Succession" chap. 8; W.J. Brown 1909
L.Q..R. 145; 1941 LIII J.R.; Breslauer, ’International
Private Law of Succession’ p. 15; Griswold, ’Renvoi
Revisited’ 1958 51 Harvard Law Rev. 1165. Bremer v.
Preeman 1857 10 Moo. 2.C. 506 and Hamilton v. Dallas 1875
1 Ch. D. 257 have been claimed as authority for this
thoT
proposition, (iii re Ross, supra) and as authority w-hioh 
the law of a country means the internal law of that country, 
(j.D. Palcoribridge XLVI L.^.R. 465, Cheshire pp. 48, 66;
E.H. Abbott 1908 XXIV L.q .R. 155; Wolff p. 194) but the 
cases are in inconclusive^ • Thus when a Lebanese subject, 
domiciled/
domiciled there, died leaving land in Palestine; and the 
question of succession to the land came to he considered 
in the Palestine Courts, where the appropriate rule of 
International Private Law wa3 that the succession was 
to be governed by the national law of the deceased; this 
meant, not the law which the courts of the nationality 
would have applied in the case of its own national, 
domiciled in its own country with regard to property in 
its own country, hut the law which the Courts of that 
country would apply to the particular case of the 
propositus, having regard to what, in their view, was his 
domicile, (if they considered that to he relevant) and 
having regard to the situation of the land in question,
(if they considered that to he relevant). /~Jaber Elias 
Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Mahas, supra._/ According to 
the evidence, the Courts of the Lebanon,in the case of a 
Lebanese subject domiciled there who died intestate owning 
land in Palestine,would have applied the law of the situs 
of the land, the law of Palestine as applicable to a 
Palestinian citizen, and this accordingly was applied.
When our Courts are referred by our principles for the 
choice of law to the law of Belgium they must decide the 
question as the Courts of Belgium would decide it.
L ColTier v. Rivaz, supra, at pp. 859, 862_/^
There are two other views of the meaning of the law 
of a country.
In the United States it is held to mean the internal 
law of the country, exclusive of its rules for choice of 
law; i.e. the law which would have been applied by the 
Courts of the country referred to in a case arising there 
which did not involve a conflict of laws. </"~Lorenzen,
1910 10 Col. Law Rev. 190; American Restatement of the 
Law: Conflict of L a w s ^ 7; Beale i, p. 55; Goodrich 
’Conflict of Laws* ^  7; Re Tallmadge K.Y. Law Jour. Oct. 
17, 1919. /
17, 1919. The wider meaning of 'law of a country’ may 
exceptionally be ascribed, e.g. in title to land and the 
validity of a decree of divorce - Restatement/8;
W.W. Cook, Logical and negal bases of the Conflict of Laws, 
pp. 19-kl, 259-285; J.L. Palconbridge 1957 LIII L.Q,.R. 
559-567 . Contra University of Chicago v. Pater 1956,
277 Mich. 658, 270 II. W. 17 5 (referred to by Griswold,
51 Harv . Law Rev. 1207)__/
The effect of Erie Railroad C o . v. Tompkins 
/""1958 504 U.S. 64__7 and Klaxon Co . v. Stentor Electric 
M anufacturing Co. /~1941 515 U.S. 487J  will be to confirm 
the United States in their view. These cases decided 
that there was no federal general common law /~as had been 
believed to be the case since Swift v. Tyson 1842 U.S.
16 Pet. 1_/ but that it is the duty of the federal Courts 
to apply the law of the State in which they are sitting 
and of the Supreme Court to apply the law of the State 
from which the appeal comes, and that thi3 applies to the 
conflict of laws as well as municipal rules. There are 
thus as many systems of International Private Law in the 
United States as there are systems of law, and not, as 
had formerly been believed, simply a number of inter­
pretations of what was theoretically the one system.
United States Courts will be compelled therefore to regard 
the law of a country as meaning its internal law, for if 
they took our view, they would be involved in the circulus 
inextricabilis which must arise when more than one Court 
adopts this view. /~see postJ
The third view, which is adopted in some countries, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden, Hungary, China, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, and Palestine - Rabel i, 81, 1945 S.L.R.168; 
and Prance - In re Annesley 1926 1 Ch. 692J  is the doctrise
of renvoi. If the question of the capacity of a Scotsman
in
domiciled in Prance is adjudicated upon^the Prench Courts,
%
they find themselves referred by their system of Inter: 
national/
International Private Law to the law of the nationality 
of the propositus, i.e. Scots law. Scots law however says 
that the law oi the domicile of the propositus, namely 
French law, should apply. when this reference back is 
made by the foreign law referred to, the French Courts, 
in order to prevent a circulus inextricabilis. accept it, 
and apply the internal law of France, i.e. the law which 
would have been applied in the French Courts in the case of 
a subject of France domiciled there. Some of the countries 
which recognise renvoi, or reference back, also recognise 
transmission, or reference to a third system of law- Thus 
ii an English testator died domiciled in Germany leaving 
immoveables in Georgia, U.S.A., the German rule refers to 
English law, which refers to the lex situs, so the German 
Courts would apply the statute of distribution of Georgia. 
/~~Rabel, i, 78. Mote that an effect similar to transmission 
can occur from our view - In re Achillopoulos 1928 1 Ch. 
at p. 443; In re Trufort 1887 36 Ch. D . 600; Armi ta&e v. 
Attorney-General 1906 P. 135 - but the peculiarity of the 
Continental view is they stop at the internal law to which 
they are transmitted by the first law referred to._7 
This doctrine of "renvoi" or ’'transmission" is not recognisec 
by our Courts. Our Courts determine the matter as the 
Courts of the country referred to would have done. In 
doing so our Courts may have to apply the doctrine of renvoi 
or transmission recognised by the foreign law, but that is 
the only way in which our Courts are concerned with renvoi 
or transmission. Thus when an Englishwoman died domiciled 
in France, and the question arose in the English Courts as to 
how her estate should be divided, the principle was that 
the law of her domicile, France, should govern. According 
to the law of France applicable to her case it was the lav; 
of her nationality, English law, which governed; which 
referred back to French law. The English Courts held, 
on the evidence of the French lawyers, that the French
Courts would have accepted this renvoi and applied French 
internal law, and accordingly that was applied.
/~~In re Annesley 1926 1 Ch. 692_y — _______________ _ ______
— —  But when an Englishwoman died domiciled in Italy 
and the same rule came to be applied in the English Courts, 
namely that the law of her domicile should govern, and it 
was i ound that the law oi Itauy applicable to her case was 
that the law of her nationality should govern, it was held 
on the evidence of the Italian lawyers that the Italian 
Courts did not recognise the doctrine of renvoi, and that 
they wouxd have applied the internal law of England, 
was therefore applied. /~~In re Ross 1950 1 Ch. 377J
"  an English Court can never have anything to do with
it (renvoi), except so far as foreign experts may expound 
the doctrine as being part of the lex domicilii.w 
f ~In re Askew 1930 2 Ch. 259, per Maugham J. at p. 268J  
The first view, which our Courts adopt, has the 
advantage that the same substantive rules of law will be 
applied to the decision of the question whether the case is 
litigated in our Courts or in the foreign Courts. It 
secures the object for which International Private Law 
was designed. This however may be an illogical result, 
for since the systems of International Private Law of the 
two countries differ, the actual rules of law which are 
applied should differ according to the forum in which the 
cause is litigated* Since the first view has been 
authoritatively approved by the Privy Council^ Jaber Elias 
Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Mahas, supraJ  it would be 
fruitless to criticize it at any length. This has already 
been done in a large number of books and articles. ^f~Bate, 
"hotes on the Doctrine of Renvoi in Private International 
Law"; E.H. Abbott 1908 XXIV L.q.R. 133; Baty, "Polarized 
Law" pp. 11b et sequ; Pollock, 1915 XXI L.'^.R. 106, and 
1920 XXXVI L.q.R. 91; XLII L.q.R. 435; J.D. Faleonbridge 
XLVI L.q,.R. 465, and XLVII L.^.R. 271; Mendelssohn-Barthoidy,
"Renvoi in modern English Law"; Morris 1937 18 B.Y.IL
/
>/
3k;; Cheshire pp. -45 et sequ; LVI L.Q,.R. 144; J.H.C. 
Morris and Cheshire in 1940 L.^.R. 355; to detail only 
some which have been published in England .J 
Briefly the criticisms are these: Eirst, "A rule for the
choice of law has already "been applied, namely our own.
To proceed to adopt a foreign rule is to decide the same 
question twice over.” /"Baty, Eolarized Law p. 116_/ 
Secondly,our rules for the choice of law are abandoned 
merely because a foreign country has a different rule.
This however may be begging the question of what is our 
rule: if our rule f©«*the choice of law is that the matter
should be decided exactly as the Courts of the foreign 
country would have decided it, to act accordingly is not 
to abandon our rule for choice of law but to apply it. 
i~cp. Griswold, ’Renvoi Revisited* 1938 51 Harv. haw Rev. 
1177,8J  Thirdly, that the law of^country meant the 
internal law of that country has tacitly been assumed to 
be the rule in hundreds of cases where the matter has not
been raised. ^"Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, ’Renvoi in Modern
\
English Law* examines some of these cases pp. 44 et sequ J 
The narrow meaning of the law of a countryvrfbs the one on 
which our rules for the choice of lawwree evolved and there 
is no justification in principle or reason for many of 
our rules except on the premise that the law of a country 
means the internal law of that country. Thus it has been 
said that "it is peculiarly illogical to construe a 
reference to the lex loci celebrationis as meaning anything 
but the local law, because the reason of the locus regit 
actum rule, historically and practically, is that it 
permits a person to use the forms which are immediately 
available or familiar to him at the place where he is, or 
as to which he can readily procure professional advice 
there." Ealconbridge, XLVI L.C£.R. 483J  But
nevertheless, when a British subject died domiciled in 
Eranc e/
Irance leaving a. will executed in France, which was valid 
by English internal law, but not by French internal law, it 
was held to be valid because Lord Kingsdown's Act said that 
a will is valid if* valid by the law of the place where made, 
and the evidence of French law was that the will of a 
British subject made in France would be valid if it was 
in the form required by the law of England to give validity 
to wills executed by Englishmen in England. : /~In the Goods 
of Lacroix 1877 2 1. 94; C p . Cormel's Trs. v. Connel 1872 
10 M. 627_/ ^However this criticism is not so strong if the 
reason for the locus regit acturn rule is that the deed 
obtains its validity from the force of the law of the
country in which it is made. In Re 0*Keefe /f 1940 1 Ch.124/
a British subject died intestate domiciled in Italy where 
she had lived continuously for forty-seven years. Her 
father had been born in Ireland, but she was born in British 
India, and had. lived in England, France, and Spain, before 
settling down in Italy. In applying Italian law as the 
law of the domicile, the English Court heard the evidence 
of Italian lawyers to the effect that Italian law gave effect 
to the law of the nationality; Italian law however was 
silent as to what law was indicated when the nationality 
was British; Italian lawyers said that the law of the 
country to which she belonged would be applied and the Court
held this to be the law of the British country in which she
had her domicile of origin, namely Eire,' which-.-was therefore 
held to govern the distribution of her estate. .She had 
only visited Ireland, on a short visit with her father, and 
she could not be a citizen of Eire by Art. 5 of the First 
Schedule to the Constitution of the Irish Free State Act 1922 
/fCriticised in LVI L.Q..R. 144J  How the reason for applying 
the law of the domicile is that every person must be presumed 
to have had in mind that if he made no will his estate would 
devolve in a certain way, and the way in which he would think 
that it would devolve, would be according to the law with 
which/
which he was familiar, which would be the law of the place 
where he was domiciled; to give effect therefore to the 
domicilii is to divide the estate in accordance with 
what is presumed to be the deceasedTs intention. The 
meaning of the lex domicilii which was taken in Re O ’Keefe 
resulted in the application of a law with which the deceased 
had hardly any connection at all. If it is correct to say 
that the reason for applying the law of the domicile is' the 
presumed intention of the deceased, the meaning which was 
ascribed to the law of the domicile in Re 0 ’Keefe must be 
wrong, and the correct meaning must be the internal law 
of the domicile. However it is possible to reply that 
this objection begs the question of what was the deceased’s 
intention. In Re Askew Maugham 1. reasons thus: "John Doe, 
by acquiring a permanent home in Utopia, has attracted to 
himself the system of personal law which Utopia would apply 
to him, and it may be added that this would be in accordance 
with his presumed intention" . £ 1950 2 Ch. at p. 266J
Fourthly, the view adopted by our Courts involves a 
different decision according to whether the law of the
or does
country referred to does^not recognise renvoi . The estate 
of an Englishwoman domiciled in France was distributed 
according to French internal law and that of an Englishwoman 
domiciled in Italy according to English internal law, simply 
because the French Courts recognised and the Italian Courts 
did not recognise the doctrine of renvoi. / “In re Annesley, 
and In re Ross, supra J  This is the more unsatisfactory 
because either the Italian or the French view of renvoi
must be wrong.-------— -----— - — ........ .. ..—  -...
 Fifthly, litigants are abandoned to the uncertainty
which exists in foreign systems of law on the question of 
renvoi. The evidence of foreign jurists as to whether 
this is a part of their law will usually be conflicting, 
since this is one of the most disputed points of International
Private Law .    — - “ _
—  Sixthly/
Sixthly, our view contains no provision for the case 
when the Courts of the lav* referred to would have dis­
claimed jurisdiction. Suppose a person dies domiciled 
in the U.S.S.R* leaving moveaole property in Scotland, 
and our pourts come to apply the law of the domicile in 
a question of the succession to this property. Our 
Courts have to decide the matter exactly as the Soviet 
Courts would have uone« But the Soviet view is that 
every case of succession to assets situated within the 
U.S.S.R. is governed by Soviet law, and Soviet law and 
the Soviet Courts disclaim any authority over devolution 
of assets situated abroad, irrespective of the domicile 
or nationality of the deceased. Our Courts therefore 
cannot decide the matter exactly as the Soviet Courts 
would have decided the same matter, since the Soviet 
Courts would have refused to decide it. It has been 
suggested that in such a dilemma our Courts would apply 
the Soviet internal law, i.e. the Soviet law which would 
have been applicable if the goods had been situated in 
the U.S.S.R. / S. Bobrin, 1934, 15 B.Y.I.L. 56 
There is however no logical necessity for this. It is 
difficult to hold that Soviet law has a wider application 
than it claims to have. Our Courts might well decide the 
matter according to our own internal law on the ground 
that that is what the Soviet Courts would expect to happen. 
Z"Is re Trufort 1887 36 Ch. D. 600 at p. 611. Cp. Griswold, 
’Renvoi Revisited’ LI Harv. Law Rev. 1173_7
The last, and greatest difficulty of all is that if. 
another country adopted the same view as our Courts, 
namely that a question should be decided exactly as the 
other Courts would have decided it, the circulus 
inextricabilis which our theory is said to avoid, wouud 
arise. Our view could -Land us now in a circulus 
inextricabilis within the British Empire. Suppose a 
British subject with an English domicile of origin dies 
leaving/
leaving j.and in Palestine and the succession to it is 
disputed in the English Courts. The English Courts say 
that the lex situs, the law of Palestine, applies, and 
they have to determine the matter exactly as a Court in 
Palestine would determine the question. The law of 
Palestine says by statute that the law of the nationality 
of the deceased applies and this means that the Palestine 
Court have to determine the matter exactly as the English 
Court would have determined that matter- / ~Jaber Elias 
Kotia v. Katr hint oiryes Lahas 1941 A.C. 4Q3_7 It is 
impossible to forecast what solution will be given to 
this problem when it arises. rerhaps the Court seised 
of the case would accept the renvoi. ^ C p . Wolff p. 20o j  
This might then be eauied the "Advanced Renvoi Doctrine" .
The doctrine of renvoi, and our interpretation of 
"the law of a country" may" be regarded as m means of 
resolving the conflict between differing systems of 
International Private D a w . There are three levels: 
a )  internal systems of law, each of which is very 
different from the others (2) systems of International 
Private Law for resolving the conflicts of internal systems 
of law; there are slight differences between systems of 
International Private Law. (3) Renvoi and ’Law of a 
Country’ doctrines for resolving the conflict between 
systems of International Private Law. Our view of the 
’law of a country’ is certainly an excellent method of 
resolving conflicts between systems of International 
Private Law - by applying our own system only where it 
agrees with the foreign system, and always deferring to 
the foreign system when ours disagrees with it*
It must be admitted that this meaning of "the law 
of a country" has only been held to be the correct meaning 
in two instances, namely "the law of the domicile" in the 
rule about succession,/~Ali the cases cited at the 
commencement, except Cormel’s Trs. v. Connel 1872 10 M.627, 
and/
In_the_jrood8_ of, Lacroix 1877 2 P. 94_7and the lex loci 
actus in the rule about the formal validity of deeds.
L Qonnel* s Trs., and In the Goods of Lacroix, supra ~J 
Professor Vv.V*. Cook / nogical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws", pp. 239 - 251J  maxes a case for defining 
the word Tlawf separately in each rule of the conflict of 
laws so as to carry out the purpose of the rule in question. 
This course however w o u m  result in too much uncertainty 
and confusion, and since the two instances in which the 
broad meaning of the law of a country has been adopted are 
the most unfavourable for that meaning which could have been 
picked, l_ Lee the -third criticism, above__/ there does not 
seem to be any room for doubt. £ Contra Wolff pp. 193,198,_/ 
There is much mpre e.g. to be said for taking the lex situs, 
in the rule about immoveables being governed by the lex 
situs, to mean the whole of the law of the situs.
That the law of a country includes any law which the 
Courts of that country would apply to the case in question 
is true whether the law referred to is the law of a foreign 
country or the law of the forum. When the law of the 
forum is referred to, of course, the rule means that it is 
the internal law of the forum which has to be applied.
This is not an exception to the rule as to the meaning of 
the law of a country, but an application of it. Unless 
it is kept in view,that the law of the forum means the 
internal law of the forum, it is only too easy co slip into 
meaningless processes of reasoning like this excerpt from a 
judgement of Lord Justice Lindley in a case about a bill of 
exchange: "The contract on the part of the acceptor was to
pay the bill to the lawful holder. That is said to mean, 
the lawful holder according to the law of England. I agree.
But we must not ignore what took place in Norway ......
If the mode and circumstances under which he got it (the 
bill), were such as to give him a title in Norway, not only 
to the bill but to the benefit of the contract, then 
Kopinans bank/
Kopmans'bank are the lawful holders by the law of England, 
and there would be no deience to an action•" /Aleoch v •
Omith 189*i 1 Ch. at p. 264__/* To start v«itla the proposition 
that the contract oi the acceptor in certain circumstances - 
is to pay the bill to the holder according to the law of 
England ana then to ascribe the wide meaning to the phrase
the lavv of England, is to state a meaningless truism, for
the contract of the acceptor in every case is to pay to
the holder according to the law of England in that sense.
But this form of language is not uncommon. /f~Cp. The 
language of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Justice Cleric Inglis 
and Lord Cowan in PurvisT Trs. v. Purvis * Exrs. 1861 LB D . 
£12; Hirschfield v. Smith 1866 L.R. 1 C.p. 540; M.V. Aw it: 
Hop Tong Handel Maatschaapi.i v . James Finlay & Co. 1927 
A.C. 604 per Viscount Finlay at p. 608; Vita Food Products 
v. Unus Shipping Co . 1959 A.C. at p. 291 (criticised by 
J.Ii.C. Morris and Cheshire in 19^0 jLj.vt^ .R* 555. But they 
go too far for they do not accept the view that a reference 
to a foreign law means the whole law of the country referred 
to - J
A provision in an Act of Parliament that the law of a 
country should apply, prima facie means the whole law of 
that country, whether the law referred to is the law of the 
forum or a foreign law,^ Connells Trs. v. Connel 1872 lc m. 
627 i In the Goods of -Lacroix 1877 2 P . 94; Jaber Elias 
iiotia v. Aatr Bint Jiryes Pahas 19,41 A.C. 403_/subject to 
rebuttal if an intention to the contrary appears from the 
construction of the statute as a.whole. Thus The Titles 
to Land .Consolidation Act 1868 sec. 20 which dispensed with 
the necessity of a de praesenti conveyance for the settle- 
:me'nt of Scottish heritage provided that a will of Scottish 
heritage should be valid 11 if duly executed in the manner 
required or permitted in the case of any testamentary writing 
by the law of Scotland". By the internal law of Scotland
Cer"f<ain
a will was invalid, but was valid by the law of England,
A '
where/
where it was executed. The Court held that since it was 
part of the law of Scotland that a will was validly 
executed if executed according to the lex loci actus, 
the will was valid under the Act. In short, ’the law 
of Scotland’ was given the wide meaning. An example 
oi the rebuttal oi the presumption is to be found in the 
Rules of the Supreme Court in England, Order XI r. 1 (ej 
(iii), which provide that service of a writ out of the 
jurisdiction may be allowed by the Court whenever the 
action is in respect of a contract "by its terms or by 
implication to be governed by English law.” This can 
only mean English law in the narrow sense, for every 
contract considered by the English Courts is governed by 
English law in the wide sense. / But see the language 
of Viscount Dunedin in D.V. itwik hoo Tong Handel Maatschaapij 
v * James Finlay & Co . 1927 A.C. 604, at p. 608_j
The Earl of Stair v. head, a decision of the whole 
Court, 1844 6 D. 904_/ appears to be an exception to the 
rule that the law of a country means the whole law of that 
country applicable to the case, but on examination this 
will be found not to be the case. By an antenuptial 
marriage contract, made by two Scots persons who were then 
domiciled in England;itAprovided that on the predecease 
of the wife without issue, part of the estate should, on 
the death of her husband, be paid to her heirs, executors, 
and assignees whomsoever, and it was also proviued generally 
that the import and effect of the contract should be con­
strued and regulated by the law of Scotland. The wife 
predeceased, intestate, and without issue, while the spouses 
were domiciled in England. it was held that her next of 
Jcin by the internal law of Scotland and not by the internal 
law of Engla,nd was entitled to the part oi her estate 
destined to her heirs, executors, and assignees whomsoever. 
The minority judges. /_ Lords Fullerton, Jerrfey, and 
Cockburn_y argued that the funds should go to the persons 
who/
who were the deceased's heirs by the law of Scotland, and 
that the law of Scotland is that a person5 s heirs are 
determined by the law of the domicile, namely English law.
In the later case of Lister1 s J .f. v . Byrne /fl914 S.G.2U4_yr 
a similar destination occurred in a marriage contract, and 
the law oi Bcot-Land was held to— be applicable, not because 
of any stipulation in the contract, but because the whole 
circumstances surrounding the contract pointed to Scotland, 
and again the deceased died domiciled in England. The 
argument which had been advanced by the minority judges in 
Earl of Stair v . liead was again advanced, and was supported 
in the Inner house by Lord Johnston. in Lister’s j . F . v .
Syme the destination was expressly treated as a testa­
mentary disposition. /_ Contrast Lord justice Clerk hope 
i-n Earl of Btair v . head, who thought that the question 
was the construction of a contractual stipulatioiny The 
majority of the judges in both cases however elected to 
apply the internal law of Scotland, and at first sight this 
appears to be an authority for the proposition that a 
declaration that a contract is to be governed by the law 
of a  iiieans the internal law of X.
The decision however is consistent with the rule that
a reference to the law of a country means the whole law of
that country that is applicable to the case in question and
that the Courts seised of the matter must decide the question
just as a Court sitting in the country referred to wouia have
decided it, because, firstly, the case was decided by the
Courts of the country the law of whichwas referred to, and
therefore it is impossible to say that the case was not
decided as the Courts of the country referred to would have
decided it, and secondly because of this consideration:
if a testator declares that his will is to be construed
according to the law of 1 and dies domiciled in X, that does
not mean that his will is to be construed by the internal
law of X, as being the law of the domicile, by which the 
law/
law of i consider that testaments should be governed: a
ref erence i»o the law oi i means the Vi/hole law of Y applicable 
to the exact case in quesx-ion, i.e. the law which the Courts 
of Y would have applied to a will which said that the law ' 
of Y was to govern, not the law which the Courts of Y would 
have applied to the will if the will had contained no clause 
to the effect that the law of Y should govern.
Suppose the parties to a contract provide that it is 
to be governed by the law of X. The fact that the Contract 
has only a tenuous connection with X will not, according to 
our system of International Private Law, prevent the law of 
X being applicable to both the interpretation and the 
essential validity of the con tract. Vita Food Products v.
Unus Shipping G o . 1959 A.C. 2 7 7 But the law? of X may not 
recognise the same ’autonomy’ of the parties as to choice 
of law, and may say that where a certain law is stipulated 
for, which is not the law with which the contract has most 
connection, the stipulation is to be disregarded, and the 
true proper law applied. In such a case our Courts would 
apply whatever law the Courts of X would have regarded as 
applicable.
"The Incidental Q.uestion1’ / ‘This is the name given by 
Wolff,’p. 206. It has usually been called"The Preliminary 
Q,uestion"__/
Once the Court seised of the case has decided which 
system of internal law is applicable, i.e. after it has 
applied its rule for choice of law, then considered itself 
as sitting in the foreign country referred to and considered 
renvoi, and found itself finally referred to certain 
municipal rules of law, an "incidental question" may arise 
which can be illustrated by a slight alteration of the facts 
JLii Coodman Trusts y! 1881 17 Ch. D * 266. The 
alteration is in taking an initial reference to a foreign 
law, instead of to the law of the forum, as there._/
A person dies intestate domiciled in a foreign country X.
The/
The rule is that the law ol his domicile, X, governs the
succession to his moveaule estate. After full consideration
of the T law oi a country’ it is decided that the internal
law of X has to apply. now according to the internal
law of a  the estate is divisible equally among the
deceased’s legitimate children, and there is a dispute as
to which of the children are legitimate. The rules of
international Private Law of X might say that the
legitimacy of children is governed by the law of A, while
our rules of International private Law would have said
that their legitimacy was to be governed by the law of L .
which system for choice of law has to be followed? ■The-’
same problem arises when a will has to be interpreted
according to the law of Y and a question arises as to
whether a person is truly the wife of another, and so a
beneficiary under the will. will our rules of Inter-
.'national Private Law for determining the validity of
marriages be applied, or those of Y? v/olff gives another
example, of a case of adoption, when our Courts are
referred by our rules for choice of law to the law of the
adopter’s domicile. if that law is the law of France or
Germany and it is the internal law of either of those
countries' which has to be applied, our Courts will be
faced^by their rule that an adoption is only valid if the
adopter has no legitimate children. If the incidental
question arises as to whether a certain child of the
adopter is legitimate, will that be decided according to
our rules for choice of law or those of the domicile oi 
*
the adopter? /.~P * 208. Some of Wolff s examples, it is 
submitted,'do not really raise the incidental question - 
particularly examples (a) and (c,, pp. 207, 8_/
It is the rules for choice of law of that legaP 
system which governs the principal question, and not our 
ovvn rules for choice of law which have to govern these 
incidental questions, </ To Iff pp. 206 - 212) A.H. Robertson, 
1939/
1939 iV L .<4 R . 571, ’Characterization in the Conflict of
x^aws PP • 135 “ 156. iireslauer, "private- Internation Law 
//
of buccession pp. 18 - 21, and. pp. 61 et sequ.. submits 
that a general answer can not be given. 3-haw v. Could 
I860 i-i.R. 3 ii.L. 05 is not an authority contrary to this 
proposition as Vi/oTif. appears to thini» There are no 
precedents of our Courts in point._/ otherwise our Courts 
would not be deciding the matter exactly as the foreign 
Court would have decided it. The result of this may be 
that when a man dies domiciled in X leaving land in Y, 
and our two rules for choice of law come to be applied, 
namely (i) the law of the domicile of the deceased 
governs the succession to his moveables, and (ii) the 
law of the situs governs the succession to immoveables,
-t-hoHs his children might be considered as illegitimate 
for the purpose of succeeding to moveables (because they 
are illegitimate according to the International Private 
Law of X) and legitimate for the purpose of succeeding to 
his land (because they are legitimate according to the 
International'Private nav* of X j. There is nothing 
objectionadle’ in this- / Op. Robertson, 1939 LV L.4 .R. 
at p . 572
There are no precedents of our Courts to support the 
view that the incidental question is governed oy the 
International Private Law of that foreign country, the 
law of which governs the principal question. A.h.
Robertson cites In re Stirling; / 1908 2 Ch. 344_/ where 
the linglish Court had to determine who was entitled to 
certain Scotch land. This in turn involved the legitimacy 
of a child born of his mother’s second marriage, the f irst. 
having been dissolved by a decree of divorce oi the Courts 
of north Laicota when neither of the parties were domiciled 
there (the divorce consequently being invalid}- The boots 
doctrine of putative marriage was relied on and considered, 
namely that a child is legitimate even alt no ugh the marriage 
of/
of his parents is invalid, if one parent bona fide
C w w r t
oelieved the marriage to oe valid. Row the English^did 
not, as Robertson says, Characterization in the Conflict 
of maws'' p. 149; 19.59 IN L.q.R. 57b_y examine aiid apply
the Bcots conflicts rules on putative marriage, 'for the 
Bcots conflicts rules on putative marriage are the same 
as the English, namely that the doctrine of putative 
marriage is enforced if it is part of the law of the 
domicile of the parent who is in bona fide ignorance* 
g Bee ’ negi timacy ’ _y what the English Court did was to 
consider the internal law of Bcotland on putative, 
marriage without having decided what was the domicile 
-of the parents, (it probaoly was Canadian/ and consequently 
without xnowiug whether the rule for choice of law which 
is common to both England and Scotland, would have 
referred to the internal law of Scotland. The case seems 
to have been decided on a wrong ratio, being inconsistent 
with In re Coodman' s Trusts, 1881 17 Ch. 1). 266_/ 
but in any event it is not an authority on the 
’incidental question’.
SELECT I On, and RE - CLABB Iff I CAT I OR -
In applying the rules for choice of law,difficulty 
occur3 in determining into what legal category the issue 
between the parties falls. Different rules of Inter­
national Private Law may he applicable according 
as the juridical question which is in issue is classified 
as relating to succession or matrimonial property, to 
formal validity or capacity, to substance or procedure.
The law of the forum may classify the juridical question 
in one way and the laws of the other countries which may 
be. applicable may classify it in another. Which 
classification is to be adopted? Further, ’domicile’, 
lex loci contractus, lex loci solutionis etc., have 
different meanings in different systems of International 
Private L a w .
Thus.in the application bf the rule that the law of 
the domicile of the deceased governs intestate succession 
to moveables, it may transpire that the deceased is^ 
according to our law;domiciled in X, but according to the 
law of X is not domiciled there but domiciled in this 
country. Where then,is X domiciled? Or in applying 
the rule that in the interpretation of a contract it is 
presumed that the parties intended that the lex loci 
contractus should govern^it may be that of the two systems 
of law, X and Y, with which the contract has a connection, 
the law of X says that the contract is made in X because 
that is where the letter of acceptance was posted, while 
the law of Y says that the contract is made in Y because 
that is where the letter of acceptance was delivered.
V'/hich then is the lex loci contractus?
These problems have given rise to an immense amount 
of logomachy. So far from being agreed on a solution, 
jurists are not even agreed on what the problem truly is. 
Two views on what the problem is have gained sufficient 
currency to male it necessary to criticise them.
The/
The problem has been said to be one of the inter­
pretation of the terras in a rule for choice of law. 
yRabel, i, pp. 49 et sequ; Lorenzen, 20 Col. Law Rev.
247 J
It is true that the problem can always be stated, 
in this way. / A.H. Robertson ’’Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws” p. V2J  The problem of what meaning 
3hould be ascribed to ’domicile” and lex loci contractus 
is obviously the interpretation of these words in our 
rule for choice of law. And it can oe said that,in 
deciding whether a plea brought on a foreign law raises 
a question of capacity or formalities^is simply the 
interpretation of the w ord ’ capacity ’ in the rule that 
capacity is governed by the lex domicilii?and ’formality’ 
in the rule that formalities are governed by the lex loci 
actus * But it is far more helpful in deciding whether a 
plea based on a foreign lav* raises a question of capacity 
or formalities^ to approach the matter as the classification 
of the right claimed and the law on which it is based, 
into the one category or the other.
The second doctrine which it is desired to criticise 
is that advanced by Cheshire, / pp. 24 -4b__/ A.H. Robertson^ 
/ ’’Characterization in the Conflict of Laws”_7 and Joseph 
Unger, "^"*1937 nell Yard 3 These writers distinguish three 
stages. Robertson says that the first stage is when the 
judge is called on to characterize the factual situation, 
or question presented to the Court, in a certain way, as 
being for example contract,tort, matrimonial property,or 
succession. This is allotting the question to its correct 
legal category. Cheshire calls this primary classification 
pp. 30-37_J7 and Unger ’’legal characterization of the 
circumstances of the case’! /""1937 Bell Yard at pp. 16 et 
sequ__7 Primary characterization or classification is in 
their view performed whenever it is impossible to choose 
the/
the appropriate law until the true character of the issue 
raised, anci consequently the appropriate rule for choice 
of .taw, has been determined. The second stage, according 
to Rooertson, is that after the judge has done the first 
step lie is referred by a rule of International irivate 
Law to a certain law by a ’connecting, factor’ such as 
Mthe law of the domicile” or the lex loci contractus; 
and. he has to decide uy what law to determine the meaning 
of the connecting factor. Cheshire calls this 
’’Classification (’interpretation’ would ue better) of 
a rule of Private International Law itself", ^f*pp.29,30J  
and Unger "localisation of the elements of introduction". 
^ 1 9 5 7  Bell Yard at p. 4J  The third stage, according to 
Robertson,arises after performing 1 and 2, when the judge 
is referred to the lex causae, and he has to decide how 
much of the foreign lex causae is referred to. Thus the 
judge ma,y have decided that the question is one of contract 
and that in accordance with his rules for choice of law 
the law of Prance has to govern the substantial validity 
of the contract but the lex fori has still to govern 
evidence. In deciding whether a certain rule of French 
law raises a question of substance or evidence,and so 
whether it is to be applied as part of the lex causae or 
not, the judge is performing what Rooertson and'Cheshire 
call "secondary" characterization or classification,
Cheshire pp • 37-45_/* and J * Unger calls "delimitation".
C 1937 19 Bell Yard 3J  Robertson and Cheshire say 
that primary classification must of necessity be done 
according to the lex fori because at that stage the Box 
causae is not known,and. secondary classification according 
to the lex causae, the law which has already been found 
by the judge to govern the cause*
It is submitted that the division uf classification 
or characterization into primary and secondary is 
fallacious •/
fallacious. Robertson says that primary characterization 
is concerned with the allocation of a "factual situation" 
to its correct legal category. L~loc' cit. pp. 59-66J  
Intei'national Private Law however is not concerned with 
"factual situations", but with disputed rights or duties 
or status, v  C p . Falconbridge, LIII L.Q..R. 556J7 ■ No 
right, duty, or status can exist unless it arises from a 
system of law,and it is impossible to divorce consideration 
of their nature from the system of law’ which gives rise to 
or is claimed to give rise to them. E.g. suppose a French 
couple marry in France without a marriage contract;so 
that according to French law their property is governed 
- by the rule of community of goods, by which on the pre­
decease of the husband without children the wife is 
entitled to one half of the goods in communion, and the 
couple later acquire a domicile in England,where the 
husband j>redeceases, leaving a will which ignores the 
wife. This raises a question of what Robertson and 
Cheshire would call primary classification, for it is 
impossible to say what rule of International Private Law 
is applicable until it has been decided whether a question 
of matrimonial property or succession is involved. See 
Cheshire p. 32; De Hicols v. Curlier 1900 A.C. 121;
Lashley v. Hog, 1792 3 Pat. 247; Baty, "Polarized Law" 
p. 102_/ But how is it possible to.classify the factual 
situation here as one of succession or matrimonial 
property? The factual situation is that the parties 
are French, married in France, and later settled in 
England where the husband predeceased leaving a will, 
and that the widow wants half of his estate* This 
cannot be classified* It is the widow’s legal claim 
which is classified, and this involves consideration of 
the rules of French law on which it is based* It is only 
by considering the nature of the French law of community
of goods that the question can be classified as one 
involving succession or matrimonial property. now this 
is exactly the process which is carried on in what Cheshire 
and Robertson call secondary classification.
Cheshire gives several examples of secondary 
classification. ihe first example is an action in the 
English Courts for breach of a contract between A and B, 
and the Court has decided that French law is the lex 
causae, i.e. that all matters in issue between the parties 
except those relating to procedure, are to be governed by 
the law of France. B pleads that he is a partner, and that 
by a rule of French law he cannot be sued separately until 
proceedings have been taken against the partnership property. 
This raises a problem of classification, as to whether the 
rule relied on relates to substance or procedure, and, says 
Cheshire, it is a problem of secondary classification because 
the lex causae has already been ascertained; consequently 
classification has to be carried out by the lex causae. 
how the issue between the parties is whether or not B can 
be sued separately, and it is impossible to choose the 
appropriate law for this issue (lex causae) until it lias
i/
been decided whether; the question is one of procedure or 
substance. Therefore, this truly raises a question of 
primary classification. All the other examples which 
Cheshire gives7/~pp .37-45J  can also be stated as problems 
of ’primary classification’ as he understands the term.
The distinction between primary and secondary classification 
is a distinction without a difference.
Robertson says that the determination whether a rule of 
law relates to capacity or formality should be included in 
secondary classification, but that classification of 
property into moveable and immoveable should be treated as 
primary classif i c a t i o n , " b e c a u s e  different rules relate 
to moveables and immoveables, and it is impossible lor the 
judge to xnow vvhich rule to apply until he has made this 
determination -"/
determination." J~p-d8_7 But it is just as impossible 
for the judge to know which rule to apply until he has 
decided whether the question is one of capacity or formality.
The flaw in Cheshire’s description of the situation 
out of which secondary classification arises is that the 
judge, in his example,lias not decided'1 the'lex causae, 
hut has decided two proper laws, namely that the law to 
govern substance is French law, and that to govern procedure 
is English law. Robertson admits this. /"pp • 56 et sequ/7 
how in deciding whether a rule of law rexates to evidence 
or .to substance there is no particular reason why it should 
be decided by "the" lex causae, meaning presumably the lex 
causae as to substance, instead of the lex causae as to 
evidence. When the judge has performed the process which 
Cheshire describes as primary classification, namely saying 
that this is a question of contract, one might say that he 
chooses four proper laws, namely the lex fori to govern 
evidence, the proper law of the contract to govern 
interpretation, the lex loci contractus to govern formal 
validity, and the lex domicilii to govern capacity* 
/"Assuming for the same of argument that these systems of 
law do govern these matters./ One can not say that the 
judge is any nearer to xnowing the J-ex causae which maxes 
it so necessary that subsidiary classification between 
formal validity and capacity, Cheshire admittedly however 
calls classification between formal validity and capacity 
primary classification. But not so Robertson - p.119 
interpretation and evidence, should be decided by it.
It is submitted that there are three stages, namely;
(l) Classificationt(2) Selection ( 3) Re-classification'.
/"These stages are described by Falconbridge, 1937 LIII
L.Q,.R. 23b, continued ibid 537, as (l) Characterization
(2/ Selection (3) Application. Falconbridge however, like
most of the other writers on classification who have been
referred to, did not accept the meaning of the ’law of a 
country’/
country’ (see Falconbridge in jLLVI L.q.R. 465, and XLVII '
271) which is now binding on us as a result of the Privy 
Council s decision in Jaber Elias Kotia v» Aatr B int Jiryes 
A.C. 405, and so his remarks on the three stages 
are only correct, for our purposes, as regards his clear 
exposition of the process, and not as regards his conclusions^
(1) Classilication is the process of determining the 
juridical nature ol the question. This is the same problem 
which Beckett describes as the characterization of internal 
rules of the forum or of a foreign law, /~1934 JCV B .Y.I .L.46_7 
and includes both the "primary" and "secondary" classification 
of Cheshire and Robertson, which are really the same process.
(2) is selection of the law indicated by the appropriate rule 
for choice of law, and in this process the judge has to
determine the meaning to ascribe to ’domicile’, lex loci
contractus etc. (and also has to determine the mixed question 
of law and fact of where' the person is domiciled) Beckett 
called this characterization not involving any characterizatior 
of a rule or institution of internal law. It is what other 
writers have described as the interpretation of these terms
.in a rule for choice of law. / See Cheshire pp. 2 9, 30 J  
Under (3) comes the re-classification which is necessary 
because of the meaning which our Courts ascribe to the ’law 
of a country’ • This stage has not been noticed much by 
writers on classification, possibly because they did not 
accept the curious meaning which our Courts ascribe to the 
’law of a country’. If ’the law of a country’ is taken to
mean the internal law of that country, this stage is not
necessary.
(l) Classification 
It has been variously argued that classiiication should 
be performed according to the law governing the legal 
relationship in question (lex causae); /""bespagnet: "Des 
conflits de lois relatifs a la qualification des rapports 
juridiques" 1898 Jour.du dr. inter, prive 255; Wolff pp.
155 et sequ.; Cheshire/
Cheshire pp • 37-45, aud Robertson, loc. cit•, apply-this 
law in ' secondary” classification*according to the lex 
fori_, /_ Bar tin: "Be 1 ’ impo ssibilite d ’arriver d la
suppression definitive des conflits des lois” 1897 Jour, 
du dr. inter, prive^ American Restatement ^7; Beale i 55; 
Dicey p. 44; Lorenzen 1920 20 Col. Law Rev. 247; Cheshire 
p. 34 and Rooertson pp. 66-80 for"primary" classification; 
Unger 1937 Bell Yard at p . 6; Breslauer, ’Private Inter­
national Law of Succession’ pp. 10-14__/^ and by the general 
principles of analytical jurisprudence and comparative law. 
^fBecLett, 1934 XV B.f.I.L. 46; Rabel, 1, pp. 49 et sequ.J7 
Any opinion- that the proper law or lex causae of a 
legal relation should govern its classification may be 
rejected on the ground that it is impossible to determine 
what the lex, causae is until one classifies, /~BeeLett,
1934 XV B.Y.I.L. 5ij
and that where the forum has to apjjly one of two foreign 
law3 which conflict on classification, there is no reason 
why the forum should choose the classification of one in 
preference to the other. £  Becxett, ibid J
The proponents of the lex causae view often fail to 
distinguish between classification according to the lex 
causae and classification of a rule of law according to the 
legal system to which it belongs. For example, Robertson 
says:- "secondary characterization should be performed by 
the proper law already chosen as applicable to the question 
which has to be characterized. Thus if the substantive 
rights of a contract are to oe governed by French law, and 
the procedure for enforcing those rights by English law, 
then the question whether a French rule of ' prescription 
is substantive or procedural should be determined by French 
law, and the same question with regard to the English 
Statute of Limitations should be determined by English law". 
</~pp. 130,131 J The second sentence amounts to saying that 
a rule of law should be classified as the system of which
it forms part classifies it, and is a different method
from that proposed in the first sentence. Contrast also
"secondary characterization by the proper law" (p. 133)
with secondary characterization should be performed by
the law of that xegal system of which the rules to be
characterized form a .art." (p. 238)J  Again, Wolff states
that classii ication should be of a rule of law according to
the legal system to which it belongs, /~p. lbbj7 but in
illustrating how this principle should be applied, ixi one
instance he classifies according to the lex causae contrary
to the classification of the rule according to the legal
system to which it belongs . /~pp . lob, 9, examp I e (d ) J
The proposition that a foreign rule of lavs, should be
classified according to the legal system to which it belongs,
is just as impossible in practice as classification according
to the lex causae, as can be demonstrated from the facts of
m s  eg.5
In; Re Cohn: /~1944 171 L.T. 377^^7 two ladies, a mother and 
daughter, both domiciled in Germany, were killed in a common 
calamity in London and it was uncertaiu^who had survived the 
other. If thedaughter survived her mother, she was entitled 
to property under her mother’s will. A rule of English law, 
sec., 184 of the Law of Property Act 192b, provided that they 
should be presumed to have died in order of seniority, while 
the German Civil Code said that they were presumed to have 
died simultaneously. If the judge had classified each rule 
of law according to the law of which it was a part, he might 
conceivably have found that English law classified the 
English rule as matter of evidence, in which event the English 
rule 3hould apply because the lex fori governs evidence, and 
that German law classified the German rule as matter of 
substance, in which event the German rule should apply because 
the lex domicilii governs the substance of rights of succession. 
This would have solved nothing. Alternatively, if English 
law had classified the English rule as relating to substaxice, 
and German law had classified the German rule as relating to 
evidence/j’
evidence,neither rule would have applied. A similar 
difficulty may arise from this method when the Court .seised 
of an action on a debt is faced with two statutes of 
limitation, one of the proper law of the contract, and one 
of its own law, each of which provides that no action shall 
be brought on any debt which has not been enforced for 20 
years.
If the proper law classifies its prescription as 
relating to procedure, and the law of the forum classifies 
its prescription as relating to substance, then classifi- 
:cation of a rule of law according to the system to which 
it belongs would give the curious result that both 
prescriptions were inapplicable. / note that both 
prescriptions in the case figured are according to their 
terms of the same nature and effect.^/ The prescription 
of the proper law would be inapplicable because procedural 
and the lex f ori governs procedure, while the prescription 
of the lex fori would oe inapplicable because substantive 
and the proper law governs substance. Z~See Wolff p. 161 
and decision of the German Supreme Court, 1882, Offic. 
Collect. 7, 21, there referred to. Lorenzen, 1941 50 
Yale L . J . at p. 549_y Again, suppose a Court seised of an 
action on a delict classified its rule as to onus of proof 
as substantive, and suppose the lex loci delicti classified 
its rule as procedural, then the Court would have no rule 
for onus of proof, or if matters were the other way round 
it would have two rules for onus of proof. / Lorenzen, 
ibid. But see W.W. Coox, Logical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws pp. 219 et sequ._/
The lex fori has been said to be applicable on the 
principle of sovereignty • The argument is that our 
Courts apply a foreign law not because they must, but 
because they consider it j us t and voluntarily do so in 
cases chosen by them. To classify according to a foreign 
law would mean that the application, of a foreign law would 
no longer depend on the will of the forum^but on the will 
of/
vMwT. L c  cpf. i (vtfl-rruCt . p -f^ rt
of the foreign law. /hartin, 1897 C±u»et,A225; Lorenzen 
1920 Coi. Law Rev. 259_/ It can be redargued' however that 
ii a Court can voluntarily determine to apply foreign law 
in certain case3 compatibly with its sovereignty, to 
determine to do so ,when that foreign law deems itself to 
be applicable is no greater abandonment of sovereignty.
More recent writers have advocated the lex fori on the 
ground of practical necessity: some law must be applied,
and there is no other law available at this initial stage 
of all, of classifying the issue. '/"Robertson, pp.66-80; 
Cheshire p . 34_/
Beckett advocated classification according to the 
general principles of jurisprudence because classification 
is simply an application of the rules of International 
Private Law, which apply to all systems of law, and 
accordingly the conception of' these rules must be of an 
entirely general character* The method has been criticised 
on the ground that it is idealistic,/ Lorenzen, 1920 20 Col 
Law Rev. 269J  and that in the science of jurisprudence at 
present the principles on which there is general agreement 
are not remarkable for their number. /"Cheshire p. 28; 
Unger 1937 Bell Yard 8_J?
Many of the differences between lex fori view and the 
comparative jurisprudence view are purely verbal. In the 
first place Beckett does not deny that even analytical 
jurisprudence may have something of a national character, 
'/"ibid. Cp. Ealconbridge j-.HI L.^.R. 245J 7 and that an 
English Court, being bound oy precedents of superior Courts 
must accept propositions of analytical jurisprudence which 
have been adopted as general principles in previous cases. 
/~1934 B.Y.I •L- at p . r z j  On the other hand, jthe law of 
the forum can not mean the internal law of the to rum. If 
an English judge is confronted with an undertaking given ^ 
in country X,without consideration , where consideration is 
not essential for a binding contract, and is deciding 
whether/
whether to classify this as a case of contract or not, he 
can not say that it should not he classified as contract 
because it is not a contract according to English internal 
law since there had been no consideration, for that would 
be deciding the merits of the case (whether or not there 
was a binding contract j according to the law of the forum 
under the guise of classifying according to the law of the 
forum. That method would result in the stultification 
of all rules of International Private Law. /"v/.W. Cook 
♦Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws’ PP«L16,7_7 
There must be some generality about the principles which 
are applied as the law of the forum. Pur ther, the laws 
of the forum have also to be classified for the purposes 
of International Law^and laws can not he classified 
according to themselves* they must be classified according 
to some extraneous principles of general jurisprudence. 
'/“Beckett, 1934 XV B.Y.I.L. 59; Unger 1937 Bell Yard 
at p » 7i7 One of Beckett’s .objections to classification 
according to the lex for! is that it ”would result in an 
English court, through,classifying a Preach rule in a 
manner different from that in which it is classified in 
its country of origin, not merely refusing to apply French 
law when according to French ideas it should be applied, 
hut also applying French law in cases where, according to 
French ideas, that law is not applicable at all.” ^ 1934 
XV B.Y.I.L. at p. 54__7 the first contingency may
occur, but not the second, owing to Re-classification
It is submitted that the process of classification is 
the allocation of the issue to a category of the rules for 
choice of law of the forum. /~Cp. the language of Robertson 
in describing primary characterization, p. 86; Beckett,
1934 XV B.Y.I.L. 46^17 and Unger 1937 Bell Yard 
This entails the application of. the notions of general 
jurisprudence of the forum, and might be described as 
classification according to the International Law of the 
forum. ^
The ciassiiication of a foreign rule of law' or a 
foreign institution must be of that law or institution 
with all the qualifications which the foreign law attaches 
to it. / “Palconbridge 1957 LIII L.Q..R. 251-256_7 For 
example, in classifying a foreign law requiring the 
consent of parents to marry, any procedure; whereby the 
consent can be dispensed with, which is part of the foreign 
law must be taxen into account. This might result in 
cases like Simonin v . mallac. /~i860 2 3w . & T r . 67_J7 
and the Gretna Green cases /"e.g. Compton v. Bear croft 
1769 k hagg. Cons. 444 11 _/ where the requirement of 
parental consent for marriage could have been dispensed 
with by adopting a certain procedure, being classified as 
relating to formalities, while cases like Ogden v. Ogden,
■/ 1908 P. 46J  where the parental consent could not have 
been dispensed with, are classified as relating to 
capacity, instead of a general rule of thumb that the 
requirement of parental consent to marry relates to 
formality or to capacity. / “Robertson pp. 239 -242; 
Cheshire p p . 231, 2; Baty, Journ. Comp. Leg. vii, 260,1. 
Falconbridge considers that both the indispensable and the 
dispensable requirements of consent relate to capacity - 
Bill L •.q .R . 2b4, and Leith, in Dicey, that both relate to 
formality - p. 966(n) . We agree with Faleonbridge but 
are more concerned with the method of approach, than the 
result.__7 This mi&ht result in a curious situation 
Suppose a person^domiciled in X ?by the law of which +r>e. 
de-mjG-ile consent of parents is required for marriage, but 
can be dispensed with by adopting certain procedure; 
marries in Y, by the law of which the consent of parents 
is also required for marriage?and can not be dispensed 
with. Suppose that by classifying according to the lex 
fori the rule of X as qualified by the law ol i£rit is 
considered to relate to formality, it will then not be 
applicable, because the law of Y governs formalities. 
Suppose/
Suppose furtner that by classifying according to the lex 
fQYi the rule of Y as qualified by the law of Y, it is 
considered to relate to capacity, then the rule of Y is 
not applicable because capacity is governed by the law 
of X* Therefore although the laws of both countries 
require the consent oi parents, the parties can marry 
without such consent. hut this is not an illegitimate 
conclusion. The rule of X. relate© to formality, and 
therefore does not apply to marriage in Y, while the rule 
of Y*: relates to eapacity^and therefore does not apply to 
a denizen of X, with the result that there is really no 
rule requiring consent of parents which is applicable to
that marriage of the denizen of X in country Y. ----- — —
■— — However, in classifying a foreign law in this way, 
only the terms of the foreign law and other laws which 
modify it can be looked at. ho account is to be taken 
of the position in which the law may be set forth in a 
Code, or of the foreign system’s view of its law. 
/"Falconbridge LIII L.q.R. 254,
The process of classification will now be examined 
in more detail, and illustrated. There are two situations.
The-.simple situation is where there is only one rule 
of law or institution to classify, being either of the law 
of the forum or of a foreign law. In Te Hico 1 s v . Curlier 
/"*"1900 A .C . 121_7 the only institution vvhich had to be 
considered and classified was the French rule of community 
of goods between spouses. In Huntingdon v. Attrill /~1893 
A.C. 150 J  too, the only law which had to be considered was 
the Hew York law. In the latter case an action had been 
brought in the Ontario Courts to enforce a judgement 
obtained in a Hew York Court by the creditor of a corporation 
against the directors of the corporation personally, .under a 
provision of the Hew York Company Laws that if directors 
gave a false certificate they should be personally liable 
for the debts of the corporation. The question was whether 
the/
the Hew York judgement and the law uncier which it had oeen 
obtained should be classified as penal in the sense of the 
rule of International Private Law that no 44,ate enforces 
the penal laws of another state. There were decisions 
of the Hew York Courts to the effect that the law was 
penal in the sense that it had to be strictly construed.
The Privy Council held that the Courts of Ontario were not 
bound to pay absolute deference to any interpretation 
which might have been put on the Hew York law in the .&tate 
of Hew York. “They had to construe and apply an inter­
national rule, which is a matter entirely within the 
cognizance of the foreign Court whose jurisdiction is 
involved." / a t  p. 155__/ Judicial decisions in the Hew 
York Courts were not precedents which must be followed, 
although the reasoning upon which the./ were founded must 
always receive careful consideration, and might be con­
clusive. The Court seised of the case must determine 
for itself the substance of the right sought to be enforced. 
Were any other principle to guide its decision, a Court 
might be enforcing a judgement in one case and denying 
effect in another, where the judgments were of the same 
character, in consequence of the causes of action having 
arisen in different countries; or in the predicament of 
being constrained to give effect to laws which were, in 
its own judgment, strictly penal. The opinion of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concluded with 
these words: "Being of opinion that the present action is
n°t, in the sense of International Law penal, .... their 
Lordships will humbly advise1 Her Majesty to reverse the
judgements appealed f r o m  " /  P • 161. Cp . bq^ciete— etc.
de Prayo n v » Hop pel The Times Hewspaper Hov • 2nd 1935 
where Rock© L • held that a German law oi prescription 
related to remedy, although German law considered that it
related to substanoe-_/-------------------------------------
The/
[>
ihe second, situation is where there are two rules 
of law on exactly the same point, of two systems of law to
^5 C&. S'
he classified. Thus in Re Cohn /"1944 171 L.T. 377
there were prescriptions oi both the lex fori and German
as to survivorship in the case of commorientest or there 
may be prescriptions as to onus of proof of both the lex 
fori and the lex loci delicti;or rules requiring the 
consent of parents for marriage which cannot be dispensed 
with, of both the law of the domicile and the law of the 
place of celebration. In this situation the judge knows 
that he cannot classify one rule differently from the other, 
or he might be left vvith two conflicting prescriptions or
rules for onus of proof, or alternatively none, and he can not
classify the indispensable requirement of consent for 
marriage, of the law of the domicile;as formality,while 
classifying the indispensable requirement of consent for 
marriage.of the law of place of celebration^as capacity; 
for that would mean that the parties could marry without 
consent, which wouid not be a legitimate result; although 
it was considered that it might be a legitimate result 
where the requirement of consent was different in the two 
countries. The judge has to classify the issue between 
the parties rather than the laws of the two countries. 
Accordingly the judge can proceed in this way; ii one of 
the rules is a rule of the forum, or if there is a 
corresponding rule of the forum, he may consider and 
classify it, when that classification will also apply to 
the foreign rule- Thus in Re Cohn the Court could have 
contented itself with examining and classifying the 
English rule as to presumption of survivorship. This was 
not how Uthwatt J. proceeded in Re Cohn. He classified 
first the English and then the German presumption as to 
survivorship with reference to the system of law oi which 
it formed part* But it was only by holding that both 
i 1 the/
the English and the German presumptions, when read in 
their contents, related to substance, that he avoided the 
difficulty of having two conflicting presumptions applicable^ 
or alternatively none: if he had classified the pre­
sumptions differently from each other he would have been 
in that difficulty. When there is no corresponding rule
of the forum, but two rules on the same point of two foreign
systems to be classified, the classification should not be 
of first one and then the other, but of that type of rule
of law, and when the classification has been made it will
apply to both rules. Thus the judge should say, how are 
presumptions of survivorship, or indispensable requirements 
of consent to marriage to be classified?
*n Cohn, / supra_/ since the Court classified the 
English rule as relating to substance?and therefore should, 
on the view just submitted, have thereupon classified the 
issue between the parties as substantive, it would have been 
referred to the law of Germany as the law governing substance. 
Then the German view of how the issue between the parties 
should have been classified would have been given effect to, 
because of the meaning which our Courts assign to ’the law 
of Germany’ and the consequent need for re-classification.
/"see p o s t / 7 Admittedly however, if the English Court had 
classified the English presumption as procedural, and 
consequently classified the issue as procedural,and applied 
the English presumption because it was the presumption of 
the lex fori, the view of German law as to whether their
not
rule is procedural or substantive wouldAhave been consulted, 
and German law might have classified its rule, as substantive. 
But that would only have left two conflicting rules to apply, 
and it would be absurd to say that we should not have applied 
our own in that situation* Further, to say that German 
law might have classified its rule as substantive7is not to 
say that German law would have classified the issue as 
substantive, or that if it would have, that it would have
been correct in so doing.
Certain/
Certain exceptions exist to the above formula for 
classification*
ification ihe classification of property is governed, by the
law of the situs of the property. ^ Lorenzen, op. cit.
«J "our, e(u dr. int*r,
at p. 264; Bar tin, 1697A6±tn*et 251; Bespagnet, 1898
r. du dr. tVt*r
Glune-ta2bb; Cheshire pp. 44, 409; Robertson pp. 76,
situs
190-217; Dicey Rule 149; Raoel, i, 52
V'
Convenience and commercial security demand that,when a
person contracts with reference to property,that the
nature of it, on which the extent of his. rights will
depend, should be Lnown in advance, and should not depend
on the forum in which some future litigation concerning
the property may be brought. Further the law of the
situs has effective power over the property.
assification The classification of property into moveable or 
operty
/Jjmo.veable immoveable is governed by the law of the situs of the 
moveable.
property. /~~Macdonald v* Macdonald 1932 3.C. (H.L.) 79, 
and cases infra J  But the classification must be according 
to the International Private Law of the situs, and not 
according to the internal law of the situs. The question 
is whether the situs regards the property as moveable or 
immoveable for the purposes of International Private Law, 
and not whether it regards the property as moveable or 
personal on the one hand, or heritable or real on the 
other, for the purposes of its internal law of succession. 
This is important because certain property which is 
immoveable for the purposes of International Law may be 
moveable in succession - e.g. Scotch heritable bonds, and 
land in many countries since the feudal rule of primo­
geniture was abolishedj [^ -S, e*g« in Canada - Macdonald 
v “ Macdonald 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 79J7 e* In other words 
*immoveable* is by no means synonymous with 'heritable* 
or ’real*, nor is 'moveable* in International Private Law 
synonymous with 'moveable* in succession^or with 'personal*
Thi3 principle was not clearly enunciated until 
the case of Macdonald v. Macdonald in 19 32 ^""""l 932 S.C.
(H.L.) 79J  That was an action by a daughter for legitim 
out oi her deceased father's estate, which included land 
in Canada. It was contended that the nature of the land 
in Canada, had to be determined by the law of its situs, 
that by Canadian law land vested in the owner’s personal 
representatives, and was dealt with and distributed among 
them iri the same way as personal estate, and that therefore 
legitim was due from it. According to Canadian law 
however such land, although personal in succession, was 
immoveable, and it was held that it was the nature of the 
property as moveable or immoveable which had to be 
determined by the law of its situs, with a possible proviso 
that land must be immoveable; /~per Lord Tomlin at p. 84, 
and nord Thanxerton at p . 88_y and pointed out that the 
rules of succession of the law of its situs were not the 
matters to which enquiry should be directed.in this primary 
question of classification.
Before 1932 some curious decisions resulted from 
failure to realise the above principle* E.g. in Train v . 
Train's Executrix^/ 1899 2 F. 146J  a domiciled Irishman 
died intestate possessed of a bond secured over heritage 
in Scotland. It was held that by the law of the situs of 
the bond, namely Scots law, the bond was heritable as 
regards terce, and therefore the lex rei. sitae governed 
the succession to it and the widow obtained terce; but by 
the law of the situs, Scots law, the bond was moveable as 
regards the rest of the succession,and since the law of the 
deceased's domicile governs moveable succession, the widow 
also obtained half of the bond by the Irish law oi intestate 
succession to moveables* How the first question should 
have been whether the bond was moveable or immoveabue by 
the law of the situs, Scots law, not whether it was moveable 
or heritable, and the answer would have been immoveable. 
Then/
Then the next, step should have been to apply our rule of 
International Private Law that the lex situs, Scots law, 
governs the succession to immoveables • The third, step
lot K CK'oe b een to <=\pp/ y the rulmt of js s e s s i o n
^in Scots law, namely that bonds are heritable in 
succession .quoad the legal rights of spouses and children® 
There!ore the widow should have obtained terce and nothing 
else • —  ..... .. ..-—  ■ .........  , . ...
Another curious decision is Monteith v . Monteith*s 
Trustees7/ 1882 9 R. 9 8 2 where a domiciled Scotsman died 
possessed of mortgages over land in England. by the law 
ol their situs these were personal, and so they were taken 
into account in computing legitim, notwithstanding the fact 
that, as Lord Young pointed out, by the law of Scotland 
mortgages over land are not tamen into account when computing 
legitim, ^"Titles to Land Consolidation Act 1868 Sec. 117_J 
while by the law of England the mortgages are not subject 
to legitim because legitim is not known in England; so that 
by both of the laws concerned the mortgages should have been 
free from legitim, yet by jumbling them together they were 
made subject to legitim. The first question should have 
been, are mortgages over land in England moveable or 
immoveable by the law of England, not are they real or 
personal by the law of England, and the answer would have 
been that they are immoveable* / Macdonald v. Macdonald,
supr a _ 7... ..—     ' ".— ~—          ~   ...... .
*— - Other Scottish decisions where it was held that the 
nature of the property as moveable or heritable should be 
determined by the law of the situs of the property,, 
r Campbell v. Bourehier March 5th 1605 E.C., Ross v. Ross’s 
Trs. July 4th 1809 E.C.; Mead v. Anderson 1830 4 W. & S.328; 
Clark v. Mewmarsh 1836 14 S 488; Mew lands v. Chalmers Trs . 
1832 11 S. 65; Downie v. Downie* s Trs. 1866 4 M. 1067; 
Marquess of Breadalbane v . Marchioness of Breadalbane’s Trs. 
1843 15 J. 389; Moss’s Trs. v. Moss (O.H.) 1916 2 S.L.T.31_7 
should be corrected in the light of Macdonald v. Macdonaldi 
the/
%fo.e question is whether the property is moveable or 
immoveable lor the purposes of International Law. by the law 
of the b i tus.
- Tt has been helcx in England that where a person
domiciled, in a foreign country dies intestate^ leaving an 
interest In the proceeds of sale of English land held under 
a trust for sale, so that by the doctrine of constructive
i
conversion the land is personal in succession, that land is 
nevertheless immoveable in International Private Law and 
succession to it is governed by the lex situs. / ~In re 
Berchtold 1923 1 Ch. 192. C p . Murray v. Champernowne 
I 1901 2 I.R. 232. J  "The doctrine of conversion is that
real estate is treated as personal estate or personal
i estate is treated as real estate; not that immoveables
are turned into movables, or movables into immovables"
- L Berchtold per Russell J. at p. 206/— ...... — ..-
One should, imagine that the converse would also apply, 
but in another case English'real estate, included in a 
settlefhuent under an English will, was sold under the 
Settled Land Act 1882 which provided that capital money 
arising under the Act, should for all purposes of disposition 
transmission and devolution, be considered as land; the 
proceeds of sale having been invested in stock, it was held 
that the stocm was an immovable* / .In re Cut!iffef s Will 
Trusts 1940 1 Ch. 565J  The second decision seems incon­
sistent with the first, in spite of Mr. Justice Morton’s 
statement in the second case that it was.not inconsistent.
,-gsification Whether a person's right to property is real or
:j —  interest
- J  Egoperty proprietary on the one hand or personal or contractual 
;| geal or
-iBpnal. on the other is also determinable by the law of the situs
j of the property, and by the law of the situs is again meant
1] ■
j\ the International Private Law of that country. /“Ealconbridge,
LIII L. q,.R . 543J
Whether a person is a national of a country must be 
determined by the municipal law of that country. Mr. 
Justice Russell said, in an English case: /*"S to eck v.
Publi.e._.frustee_ 1921 2 Gh. 67, at p. 82J  "There remains 
for consideration the contention that the words "German 
national" in the Treaty of Peace Order (which he had held 
formed part of the municipal law of England) . . . mean or 
include a German national according to English law. I 
confess I have difficulty in following this. Whether a 
person is a national of cX country must be determined by
the municipal law of that country  How could the
municipal law of England determine that a person jLs a 
national of Germany? ...... In truth there is not and could
not be such an individual as a German national according 
to English law." / Op. Hague Convention on Conflict of 
Rationality Laws 1930, Art. 2. In re O ’Keefe 1940 1 Ch.
124 (criticised in LVI L.Q,.R. 144) does not seem to carry 
out this obvious principle__/
It has been suggested that another exception might be 
made when the only two laws between which a choice of law 
lay were the foreign laws and classified in one way, which 
was different from the classification which would have been 
adopted by the forum: in that situation we should adopt
the common foreign cla.ssification. /"Lorenzen, 20 Cox.
Law Rev. at p. 281; Robertson p. 76; C p . Beckett 1934 
XV B.Y.I.L. at p. 62J  It is unnecessary to discuss this 
since the foreign classification will be adopted in the 
end in any event as a result of the process of Re-classi- 
.‘ficatioii. / q.v.
(L ) Selection 
The meaning to be given to "the connecting factor , 
namely ’domicile’> lex loci contractus, lex loci, deliqti 
etc. is always that of the forum. ^Robertson p. 108; 
Cheshire pp. 29, 30; Ealconbridge LIII L.q.R. 550 - 556; 
Beckett/
B e c k e t t ,  1934 XV B.Y.I.L. 59; Unger 1937 Bell Yard 
at p. 4; F.h. Mann 1937 XVIII B.Y.I.L. at p. IO2J 7
  The question whether a person is or is not domiciled
in a foreign country is to be determined in accordance 
with the requirements of our law ss to domicile, ^ reference 
to whether the person has or has not acquired a domicile 
in the foreign country in the eyes of the law of that 
country. ^ In re Martin: no ustalan v. houstalan (1900) 
p. kill; In re Annesley 1926 Gh. 69b; Dicey pp. 55, 56_J 
similarly the lex, loci con tract us and the lex loci 
delicti etc. are determined by our law only. '^Cheshire
p. 30; F.A. irnnn 1937 XVIII B.Y.I.L. 102J  ---------...
This is necessary because at this stage the lex causae 
has not been selected and its interpretation of these 
terms accordingly could not be used. There is at this 
stage no other law to gloss these terms. /^Pollock in 
1926 XLII L.q.R. 435_7 Further, "The choice of the 
connecting factor is of the essence of the system of
conflict of laws of the forum, ....  it is essential, in
order to give effect to the conflict rule of the forum, 
that the connecting factor specified in that rule should 
bear the meaning assigned to it by the lex fori and not 
the meaning as sighed to it by some foreign law. £ Falcon- 
: bridge LI 11 n.q.R.' bbl, ---- — --- .................. —
All the presumptions for determining the proper law of
/
a contract are connecting factors, and there is no doubt 
that is only our rules in this respect which are applied* 
— .—  The meanings which are given by our law to ”domicile, 
lex loci contractus, lex loci delicti etc. are considered
in, detail infra.
(3) Rft_-_classificati0n ,
Once the Judge has classified and then selected, 
he finds himself referred to a foreign system of law and 
has to apply the lavii of that country. But our Courts 
take f the law of a country’ 3f”q*v *_/ to nj-ean the whole 
law /
Beckett, 1934 XV B.Y.I.L. 59; Unger 1937 Bell Yard 
at p. 4; F.A. Mann 1937 XVIII B.Y.I.L. at p . IO2J 7 
- Tlie Question whether a £jerson is or is not domiciled 
in a foreign country is to be determined in accordance 
with the rectuirements oi our law U 3 to domicile, ^ reference 
to whe ther the person has or has not acquired a domicile 
in the foreign country in the eyes of the law of that 
country. ^ In re Martin: Lo us talari v. Loustalan (1900) 
p. kill; In re Annesley 1926 Oh. 692; Bicey pp. 55, 56_/ 
Similarly the lex loci contractus and the lex loci
delicti etc. are determined hy our law only. /^Cheshire.
■r_rri “ “ /
p. 30; F .A . Mann 1937 XVIII B.Y.I.L. 102 J  ----- — ..
This is necessary because at this stage the lex causae 
has not been selected and its interpretation of these 
terms accordingly could not be used. There is at this 
stage no other law to gloss these terms. /~Pollock in 
1926 XLII L.g.R. 435J  Further, "The choice of the
connecting factor is of the essence of the system of
conflict of laws of the forum, ....  it is essential, in
order to give effect to the conflict rule of the forum, 
that the connecting factor specified in that rule should 
bear the meaning assigned to it by the lex f0ri and not 
the meaning assigned to it hy some foreign law. /*~Falcon-
: bridge LI 11 n.^.R. 551, 2 _ J — — —  m.— --- ~
All the presumptions for determining the proper law of 
a contract are connecting factors, and there is no doubt 
that is only our rules in this respect which are applied.
— iLe meanings which are given by our law to ’’domicile, 
lex loci contractus, lex loci delicti etc. are considered 
in, detail infra.
(5) classification
Once the judge has classified and then selected, 
he finds himself referred to a foreign system of law and 
has to apply the law of that country. But our Courts
taxe ’the law of a country’ Z~"q *v *_/ 2Lean ^he whole
law/
, law of that country,including its rules of International
Private ^aw, and decide the question in issue exactly
as the Courts of the country referred to would* have
decided .that question. The result is that if the country
referred to is a foreign country, and if it adopts different
classification from ours, we have to re-classify according
to their conceptions and be referred anew to a system of
law« Re-.e_iassification has to oe done both of the result
already arrived at in'(l) Classification,and aiso of that
arrived at in (.2) Selection,.
.ftflsification If our Courts ,are seised of a case involving the 
JClassi- .
■ - validity of a marriage celebrated in country X,by a woman
domiciled in Y and it is- doubtful .whether a certain rule 
of the law of Y against the woman marrying relates to 
capacity, (in which case the disability would be given' 
effect to, since the law.of the domicile governs capacity) 
or relates to formalities' (in which case it would not he 
given effect to,since the lex aoci celebrationis governs 
formalities; the judge may have classified the issue, 
in accordance with the, principles expounded in (i) 
Classification, as one of formality. The judge is there­
fore referred by his rule that the lex loci celebrationis 
governs formalities to the law of X. But ii the Courts 
of X would have classified the issue as one ol capacity, 
and applied the law of Y as the law of the domicile, or 
the law of Z as the law of the nationality, the judge must 
reclassify to come into line with what the foreign Court 
would have decided, since he must decide the case exactly 
as the foreign Court referred to would have decided that 
>. ■ case* /"~See "The Law of a Country
If a judge in dividing a deceased’s estate has
to determine the lav* of the domicile of the deceased,
<>
in the first place he decides what was the deceased’s 
domicile according to our law, in accordance with the 
principles described in (2) Selection, but if he 
decides that the'deceased was domiciled in a foreign 
country X, and if according to the law of X the 
domicile of the deceased would be considered relevant 
to the issue/but the Courts of X would have said that 
the deceased was domiciled in Y, then the judge
refers himself to the law of Y .  ..... ..... ..
/~Jaser Elias Kotia v. Katr Bint oiryes Hahas 1941 
A.C. per curiam at p. 413, Robertson pp. 108, 9; 
Paiconbridge 1*111 L.^.R. 552-554_7
DOMICILE.
The status of a person in regard to many legal questions^
and questions of succession, governed by the personal law
of the propositus. This might mean either the law of his
nationality or the law of his domicile. Nationality and
domicile are quite different conceptions ^Udn$y v. Udn$y
1869 7 M(H.L.)39 per Lord Westbury at p. 99^: a French
national is a subject of France, owing allegiance to its
sovereign; a person domiciled in France is one whose per-
:manent home is there, and who may or may not be a subject of
France. The British countries, spd the United States, refer
questions governed by the personal law to the law of the
domicile, while most Continental countries refer it to the
CeJUK pp./«*■»»> fvy
law of the nationality.^ Why— this is -so require □ a brief 
historical explanation.
The primary test in the Roman Empire,ao wo have’seen,
or oC
was^citizenship, equivalent to nationality. But the idea 
of domicile was defined and developed ^Code 10,39,7; Dig. 
50,1,271.
In Mediaeval Europe the test was domicile. This is to 
be attributed to the fact that conflicts of law arose in 
Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands within the 
boundaries of one nation, among the various provinces of 
it, and not between nations, and in these circumstances the 
test of nationality would have solved nothing. The 
unification of law within these states, and the enthusiasm 
for nationalism which arose in the nineteenth century 
 ^changed the test from domicile to nationality. France led 
with a declaration in theCode Napoleoh in 1803 that the 
rules contained in it concerning status and capacity should 
still govern Frenchmen even though residing in foreign 
countries/
countries,^and the French Courts have reciprocally applied 
to questions involving a foreigner’s status the law of his 
nationality. test of nationality is accepted in
most Continental countries.
Domicile continues to be the test in the British
\
countries and the United States because the conditions 
which enabled it to be displaced on the Continent, namely 
the unification of the laws within each nation, do not yet 
apply. The Ufoited States has forty eight different 
systems of law, one for each State, and the British Common- 
iwealth has as many systems as there are Dominions and 
colonies. There is only one United States nationality 
and only one British nationality, and therefore nationality 
is useless to us as a guide to the appropriate personal 
law. {some of the countries that accept the test of nation­
ality, however, are not without this difficulty too, e.g. 
Poland, within which various provinces hade different
i
systems of lav;. See article by Kazimierz Niec in 1943 
S.L.R. p. 123. The difficultyv&s solved there by regarding 
nationality as only a preliminary test. After the primary 
connection had been made with a particular political unit, 
a further subsidiary test allocated the propositus to the 
law of the province to which he was attached by registration, 
every Polish national; even though born and resident abroad, 
being attached by reg/strAtion to a district in his own 
country (Cheshire p. 162 )J.
The great advantage of nationality as a test is the 
simplicity and the certainty with which the nationality of 
the pro^positus is ascertained. A simple rule of law 
settles the question^, E.g. he is a national of the country 
where he was bom, ft he f ins solifJI or of which his father 
was a.national, [the aanglunlfl" - Some countries adopt
one rule; some the other; some, like ourselves, apply a 
combination/
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combination of both. P0r nationality to be a perfectly 
satisfactory test all countries should proceed on the same
basis. At present a person can be a national of two
U  $c*ch S » alio* S Countries tskich the of tkc fto.tio.vaf i1y usually r*ly*n
countries or of nonej. But to ascertain where a person
, , _ , Je.tern'tlm* a
intended to make his permanent home* involving, as it ■fL«-c-Te>r —
Ho-fee-l if p p .
does, the very difficult question of the intention perhaps i^ o-izz. 
of one of the litigants, who is interested to misrepresent 
it, or of a dead man, who cannot expound it, often leads 
to prolonged and expensive litigation. As so much depends 
on the judges view of the evidence, lawyers often cannot 
say with certainty where a person is domiciled.
The great advantage of domicile as a test is that it 
ensures that a person*s status and succession shall be 
governed by those laws within the jurisdiction of which 
the propositus ha$$ freely settled, whereas the test of 
nationality often means that a law is applied with which 
the propositus haS£ long ceased to have any connection, or 
even with which he has never been connected. In short 
"nationality yields a predictable but frequently an 
inappropriate law, domicile yields an appropriate but 
frequently an unpredictable law" ^Cheshire pp. 163,4^.
The Domicile Act 1861 [*24 and 25 Vict.c.l2lJ was an 
attempt to cure the test of domicile of its disadvantage 
of uncertainty. The Crown was empowered to make a conven­
t i o n  with any foreign state that no British subject 
resident in that state, and no subject of that state resi- 
:dent in Britain should be deemed, for the purpose of 
succession to moveables, to have changed his domicile, un- 
iless he should have been resident there for a year before 
his death and made a declaration in writing of his intention 
so to do. This Act has the serious fault that it applies 
only to succession. It should apply to all questions of 
status and capacity also. But the idea is excellent. 
Unfortunately ho conventions have been made under it and it
is/ a
75 »
is a dead letter. An amended Act and a vigorous drive to 
secure international oonJent to a universal convention on 
the subject, could result in the following simple rules:- 
A person s personal law is that of the country where he 
is born, unless he shall pave changed it by residence for 
a fixed time in another country, plus a declaration in 
writing of his wish to change duly registered in that 
country.
The ideal for which ill students of International 
Po 1 iti-carl Law hope, is the recognition throughout the world 
of one system of International Pol^Moorl Law# the greatest 
obstacle to which is the different attitude of the British 
and American countires on the one hand and the Continental 
countries on the other, to the question of what is the 
appropriate personal law. 1 That obstacle could be re- 
:moved by a compromise 11 He that suggested above.
The hisc^ijry of domicile in Scotland is short.
Succession was at first considered to be regulated, not by 
the lex domicilii,but by the law of the situs of the goods 
in question ^Davidson v. Elcherson 1 77 8  Mor. 4 6 1 3 ;  Henderson 
v. McLean 1 7 7 8  Mor. 4 6 1 5 ;  Morris v. Wright 1 7 8 5  Mor. 4 6 1 6 .  
Shortly after the rule was changed and the m o d e m  view 
adopted that the lex domicilii governs succession: Bruces 
v. Bruce 1 7 9 0  3 Pat.1 6 3 ;  Hog v .  Hog 1 7 9 1  Mor. 4 6 1 9  and 
1 7 9 2  3 Pat.2 4 7 ;  Durie v. Coutts 1 7 9 1  Mor. 462 4 ;  Macdonald 
v. Laing 1 7 9 4  M o r . 4 6 2 7 j ,  and the ground of jurisdiction in 
divorce, was, even in the nineteenth century, uncertain, 
and it was believed to be possible to found jurisdiction 
on other elements than domicile jeee infra p. ]• Domicile, 
to begin with, was a conception of little importance, and 
therefore little developed. Its chief function was to 
indicate the place at which the executors of a defunct 
should obtain confirmation £stair E,8,8lJ. The Instit­
utional writers paid little attention to it. Erskine 
stated/
stated that the lex domicilii must govern intestate 
succession, £lnst. 3,9,4# citing Brown v. Brown 1744 Mor, 
4604] but, m -'¥9 bs,vo soon., his view was not followed ufrtil 
I?90 [gj^^l.g_v>_Bruoe supra]. As to the early cases, the 
rather loose description of a person as "a Scotsman”is 
used, instead of "a person domiciled in Scotland" or "a 
subject of Scotland", and when the Court laconically 
decides that the law of Scotland or of England should be 
applied to the question it is often impossible to say 
whether it is being applied as the lex domicilii or the 
lex patriae £see Purves v, Chisholm 1611 Mor. 4494].
The test of domicile has prevailed here in succession 
since 1790 |Bruo9fs v. Bruce supra] and in matrimonial 
jurisdiction since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
j^ At first the conception of domicile was very far from the 
modern one. See e.g. Macdonald v. Laing 1794 Mor. 4627; 
Ommaney v. Bingham 1796 3 Pat.44sJ.
PRELIMINARY RULES ABOUT DOMICILE.
1. Every person must have a domicile.
"it is clear that by our law a man must have some 
domicile"^Lord Chancellor (Hatherley) in Udny v. Udny 1869 
7 M.(H«L.)at p. 95. Similarly Lords Chelmsford and Westbury 
at pp. 97 and 99 respectively. Contrary to the Roman rule^ 
Savingy p. 107] A person may in fact be homeless,
Vincent v. Earl of Buchan 1889 16 R.637] or a "rolling-
: stone", ^McLelland v. MoLelland 1942 S.C.502] but a 
domicile will then be ascribed by a rule of law. The
fiction of a "domicile of origin" is used. "To secure
this result (that no man shall be without a domicile) the 
law attributes to every individual as soon as he is born 
the domicile of the father if the child be legitimate, or 
the domicile of the mother if illegitimate". ^Udny v. Udny 
per Lord Westbury at p. 99/. This domicile persists until
[see
77.
a different "derived domicile" or "domicile of choice" 
is acquired. if a person in fact abandons his domicile 
of origin and does not immediately acquire a domicile of 
choice, until he does acquire a domicile of choicehis
f
domici"1© */ill be held to be his domicile of origin 
[Kennedy Ball 1363 1 M. 1127 and 1868 6M (H.L.) eg].
And if a party abandons her domicile of origin and 
resolves to have no permanent home anywhere, her domicile 
will beheld to be her domicile of origin (vinoent v .
Buchan 1889 16 H. ®37^ J • If a person acquires
a domicile of choice by settling in a new country and 
then abandons that domicile without acquiring a fresh 
domicile of choice, his domicile of origin revives 
judny v. Udnyf supra. Arnott v. A m o t t ’s Trustees(o .H)
1884 22 S.L.R.lJ•
2. And every person has only one domicile.
"it is clear that by our law a man must have some 
domicile and must have a single domicile [hord Chancellor 
(Hatherley) in Udny v. Udny at p. 95. Fraser p. 1252.
Contrary to the Roman rule: Dig. 50,1; t*5, i.8,^2, and
1.27 §2. Savingy p. 107.Story p.48j.
This rule is self-evident if it only means that 
every person can only have one domicile for one purpose. 
Obviously it could not be held that a man was domiciled 
both in England and Scotland for the purpose of succession, 
for how then would his estate be divided? But the rule 
means more. It means that a man has only one domicile
for all purposes, for determining the succession to his
estate after his death, for determining which country has 
jurisdiction in his divorce, or for determininghis 
capacity. This has not always been the view in Scotland, 
where iti<*®s believed that the "matrimonial domicile" 
or domicile of the married pair7 gave jurisdiction
in consistorial actions, might be different from the 
husband’s domicile for succession, and that this 
’matrimonial/
’matrimonial domicile’ was founded by the spouses 
res:’ding within the jurisdiction. / “The doctrine was 
laid down by a decision of the whole Court in 1862, 
Jack v. Jack 24 D. 467. This doctrine is now 
discredited. See "Jurisdiction in Divorce " J
The Domicile Act, 1861 /~24 and 25 Viet. c. 12lJ7 
empowers the Crown to make a convention with a foreign 
state that no British subject resident in that state 
and no subject of that state resident in Britain, 
shall be deemed for the purpose of succession to 
moveables, to have changed his domicile unless he 
shall have been resident for a year before his death 
and made a declaration in writing of his intention 
so to do. This Act applies only to domicile for 
the purposes of succession to moveables and not for 
other purposes, e.g. jurisdiction in divorce. 
Accordingly if any convention/
convention hud been made under the Act, a British subject 
reside]< o in the other country who had not mad-© a declar™
*ation, mignt he held, to have a domicile for divorce in 
the iOreif.n ^tut©/ anci a domicile for succession here*
But no convention has been made under the Act,
A person can have more than one "commercial domicile" 
[jlhe Jonge. blasslna (1804)* C. Rob, 297] "forensic 
domicile" {hrsE. 1,2,10; Duncan and Dykes p. 32] or 
"domicile of citation". If domicile is allowed to a 
juristic person it may have very many domiciles. Since 
it is subject to jurisdiction by carrying on bulness, 
it may have a dozen "domiciles of citation" ^Aberdeen 
Railway Company v. Ferrier 18*4 460,4223; if its 
"residence" for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts is 
called "domicile" it can have more than one of these 
^Swedish Central Railway Company v, Thompson (192*)A.C. .
49*] * and the "domicile" i & f  determines the situs of 
the shares of a limited company need not be where its 
"residence" is for Income Tax purposes ^Baelz v. Public 
Trustee 1926 Oh* 863J .
3* The acquisition of a domicile is determined by our
law only.
The question whether a person is or is not domiciled 
in a foreign country is to be determined in accordance 
with the requirements of our law as to domicil©, 
irrespective of the question whether the person mas or 
has not acquired a domicile in the foreign country in 
the eyes of the law of that country |jCn re Martin * 
Lomstalan v. Lonstalan (1900 )P, (0.A-)211; In re Anneslejr 
(1926)Ch.69^3 , Thus when an Englishwoman resided in
f\ U u L
France for a number of years in circumstances -that, 
in the eyes of English law, gave her a domicile of 
choice there, but did not take the steps required by 
article 13 of the French Civil Code for the acquisition
of a French domicile^and consequently was not, in the
eyes of Kronen law, domiciled in France, she wa.s never' 
: theless held by the English Court to have acquired a 
domicile of choice in France £ln re Annesley, supraj. 
Full effect will be given in England to a domicile 
.acquired by our law, even though the law of the 
nationality of the person asserts that his status and
■xija (jxvw crk $va
i4« effects^ar© still governed by i-t JfWesxlake sec. ' 
FFF. In re Martin, 'suprajf •
This is necessar 
the question of domic 
cannot tell what law 
domicile is a prelimi 
settled by the lex fo
v; JxLII L.Q.R. because until
ile is determined, the Court
no other law is known 
classification is don
has to be upA ifted . . . . . . •
u  x . •, X-n.ary question mat can only be 
ri, because at the initial stage
that can settle it. All primary 
3 according to the lex fori.
Trig i-ftw opr DOMICILE .
There are three kinds of domicile: (l) Domicile of
origin: (2) Derived domicile: (3) Domicile of Choice' 
£storv p • b4* Fraser Husband and. Wife 2nd Ed. c.ISFl. 
Cheshire p.l6cJ.
(0 " DOMICILE of origin/'
The law ascribes to every person at birtha domicile 
of origin, which continues to be that person's domicile 
unless or until a different "derived domicile" or 
"domicile of choice" is acquired.
The d.omicile of origin of a legitimate child whose 
father is alive at the child's birth, is the domicile 
of the father at the time of the birth j^ Udny v. Udny 
1869 7 M (H.L.)89j Fairbairn v. Neville 1897 26R.192. 
Fraser p.ISbfJ.
The domicile of origin of a posthumous j^ Dicey p.80^ 
Currie on Confirmation P*^} or illegitimate, jfudny v.Udny 
per/
%
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per Lord Westbury at p. . L.A. v. Lamont 1R$7 i q d.
77.Qj McLaren p.8; Story p.49> Fraser p.ISbs} child 
is the domicile of the mother at the time of the birth.
The domicile of origin of a foundling is the 
country where the child was born, if known, said if not, 
the country where the child was found, ^Westlake 7th 
Ed. p.34*0).
Children of a putative marriage, i.e. whe-s there was
an impediment to marriage, but one of the parents bona,
fide believed that they were .married. although 
legitimate* take their domicile of origin from the
mother if she is the spouse who is in bona fides
jVirkclady Parish Council v. Traquair Parish Council 
(O.H.) 191b S.C. 1124; Smijth v. gmijfch (O.H.>1918 1 
S.L.T. 15Sj.
In all cases, except that of a foundling., the 
place of birth is irrelevant in determining where the 
domicile of origin is. It is the domicile of the 
father, or mother, that counts. Thus a child born in 
Scotland, whose father at the time of the birth was 
domiciled in England, has an English domicile of origin 
jwylie v. Laye 1834 12S. 927; Armitage's Trustees v . 
Armitage (O.H.) 1904 ^41 S.L.R. 304; Udny v. Udny 
1869 7M.(H.L.) 89; Grant v. Grant 1931 S.C.238_].
Similarly irrelevant are the place of residence of the 
father at the time of the birth, ^ Wylie v. Laye and Udny 
v. Udnyj and the nationality of the father (or mother), 
which may be different from his (or her) domicile.
Thus a child born in Belgium to a Frenchman resident 
in Peru but domiciled in Australia, has a domicile of 
origin in Australia.
A person has been held to have a domicile of 
origin in Scotland who ha^ never been in Scotland, but
whose/
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whose grandfather had a domicile of origin here which
he never lost, which he transmitted to his son and 
which was never lost,and which was again transmitted 
to the grandson j^Peddie 6 Dec. 1860.Currie on Confirm­
ation pp. 12 and 13. Grant v. Grant 1931 S.C.238/.
The domicile of dependent persons, namely pupils 
and married women, changes in conformity with the 
domicile of the persons on whom they are dependent. 
Pupils. As we have seen, a legitimate child is held 
to have a domicile of origin in the country in which his 
father is domiciled at the time of his birth. If the 
father subsequently changes his domicile while the child 
is still a pupil, the domicile of the child will change 
in conformity ^Lowndes v. Douglas 1868 24D.1391j 
Qhlamers v. Chalmers 'O.H.) 1998 II S.L.T.68. wraser 
p.1253}.
After the father’s death, during- her yidnity the 
^other’s doiaioile^governs the domicile of her pupil 
children, so that if she changes her domicile the
domicile of the children changes in conformity.
Husband and Wife 2nd Ed. p. 1253^ Arnott v. Groom , 
1846 9D. 142 j Crumpton ’s jr. F. v. Finch-Noyes 1918 S.C.
approved in Crumpton, was:"After thefather’s death, if 
the child lives with the mother, and she acquire a new 
domicile', it is communicated to the child.1 This seems 
to imply that the mother does not impose her domicile 
on her children in consequence of an Inescapable rule 
of law, as is the case with the father. Stirling J.usti-o-e 
in In re Beaumont (18 93) L.R. 3 Ch.$.490 said:"The
change in the domicile of a (fatherless) infant which 
may follow from a change of domicile on the part of the 
mother,/
(2 ) "DRIVED domicile".
378. The statement Fraser makes, and which was
o cr
mother, is not to be regarded as the necessary consequence 
of the change of the mother's domicile, but as the 
exercise by her of a power vested in her for the welfare 
of the infants, which in their interests she may abstain 
from exercising, even when she changes her own domicile*" 
But there is no reason to thinh that Scots law considers 
the power of the widowed mother to impart a derivative 
domicile to her children rests on a different principle 
from that of the father (though there are dicta to the 
effect that the domicile derived from the mother is 
more easily lost): the judges in Crumpton speak of "a 
domicile derivative from her". To hold that it did 
rest on a different principle would be an invidious 
perpetuation of sex inequality, and would be contrary to 
the view held in the United States, (Beale p.220) and the 
view that Dicey would have liked to hold had it not been
for In re Beaumont (p. 102).------ -......—. . ..... ...
  The rule here proposed has the virtue of certainty^
"Which in their interest she may abstain from exercising" 
has been rightly criticised (Dicey p. 106)^ 8an she
refrain from changing their domicile at, her discretion, 
even if they live with her in her new domicile?^.
But if the widowed mother marries a second time and 
her domicile is changed in consequence of the marriage 
(because of the rule, aftermentioned, that the domicile 
of a wife follows that of her husband), the domicile
U J .
tnort she acquires by the marriage is not conferred on 
the child, but the child’s domicile continues to be that 
which the mother possessed previously to her Second 
marriage ^ McLaren p.6. Fraser ibid. Crumpton’s J.F. v.
Finch-Noyes supra, where Fraser’s statement was adopted. 
Crumpton, however, is not a perfect precedent for the 
rule, because when Mrs. Crumpton married again her child 
was/
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was over puberty, and so could not have a "derived 
domicile" imparted to him. T h i s  was not n o t i c e d  by 
the judges. Further t h e  rule was not adopted in In 
re Beaumont, supra, where Stirling jr., proceeding on 
the view already quoted, held that when a widow who 
had several infant children, all of whom had a Scottish 
domicile, married a domiciled Scotsman and shortly 
afterwards went with him to England where he acquired 
a, domicile, taking the two eldest children with her, 
but leaving the youngest in Scotland in the charge of 
an aunt . the two eldest took her domicile in England 
and the youngest remained domiciled in Scotland.")
It has been suggested that if the widow changes 
her domicile for the fraudulent purpose of obtaining 
an advantage by altering the rule of succession, her
Wightman (1817) 3 Merivale p.6?J but this is very
expressed above is correct, namely that the mother*s 
domicile governs that of her child because she is head 
of the family, on the same principle as the father’s 
did, there is no room for the exception, because it is 
not admitted in the case of the father.
The domicile of illegitimate pupil children changes
with that of their mother [westlake sec.249> Beale p.
210j Dicey p.100; In re Luck’s Settlement Trusts 1940 
$ 6 ^  L • J •
Oh. 864, per Smith Lord J-u-stice at p. 8Q7J • If the 
mother marries a person who is not the father of the 
child, the stenfather’s domicile will not be conferred 
on the child, but the child’s domicile will continue to 
be that which the mother possessed previously to her 
marriage. j^ On the analogy of the child of a widow who
The domicile of the children of a putative marriage 
changes in conformity with the domicile of the mother
child’s domicile will not follow hers,
doubtful, {disapproved by Beale, p.220j. If the view
remarries.
if/
if she is the spouse who bona fide believes that they 
are married [parish of Kirkaldy v. Parish of Traquair 
(O.H.) 1915 S. 0.1124; Smi.lth v. Smijth (O.H.) 1918 1 
S.L.T.1P6. Supra p. J.
The domicile of adopted children changes with that 
of the adopter,[Beale p. 217} Dicey p.100- There are
no precedents, but the rule seems reasonable^
A guardian, other than the father or mother, has^no 
power to change a child’s domicile, which will therefore 
continue to be its domicile of origin or the last 
domicile derived from father or mother.[There are no 
precedents but see Douglas v. Douglas 1871 XII Equ. 617 
V - 0. Wickens p. 626^. if a guardian can change the 
domicile of his ward, it will only be a guardian having 
care of the person of the child who can do so, and not 
a tutor who merely has the superintendence of the pupils 
property; the change in domicile will not be an automatic 
one but only if the child lives with him in the new 
country [rhe rule in In re Beaumont supraj; and it is 
certain that the exception will apply which was doubted 
in the case of the widowed mother, namely that the 
change must be bona fide and not for the purpose of 
securing an advantage at the expense of the child’s 
estate, £  ffefcinger v. Wightman (1817) 6 Mer. n. 67^ But 
it is most unlikely that a guardian can change his ward’s 
domicile.
If the parents are divorced, and the custody of the 
children &Jze awarded to the mother, their domicile will 
change with hers during puj^illarity/ [not tp to sixteenj 
under the same conditions as if the father were dead. 
[Beale p. 215^.
In the unlikely event of a pupil child not being in 
anyone’s custody, the domicile of the child will be its 
domicile/
pp
domicile of origin or last derived domicile.
• When a girl attains tv,reive years of age, and a boy 
fourteen, the-ir domicile no longer depends on that of 
their father or mother, and they can acquire a domicile 
of choice. ^Fraser le-e-. cit. p. 1253j McLaren p.
Arnott v. Groom 1846 9 D. 142^ Chalmers v. Chalmers (O.H) 
1903 11 S.L.T. 68 ~ reacquisition by minor of domicile 
of origin}.
If the rule given later is correct, that a person
, . . La
cannot acquire a domicil 9 of choice unless they are of
age to do so both by the law of th4Ir existing domicile 
and by the law of the new country, the part of this rule
says that minors ma j acquire a domicile of choice
is not important, for th9 case must seldom arise of a
Scots minor wishing to a 
country where the age of 
but the part of the rule 
domicile does not depend
iquire a domicile in a foreign 
majority is below twenty one, 
states that a minor’s 
on the father’s or the mother’s
ie—-im-gro-rtant » If a domiciled Scotsman settles in a new
country leaving his minor child in Scotland, that minor 
child retains his Scots domicile. And even if the 
minor child goes with the father to the new country it 
by no means follows that the child’s domicile changes 
also. The animus of the child must be considered, to 
determine whether the child has acquired a domicile of 
choice in the new country. Thus in &rnott v. Groom 
[l846 9 D. 142J a widow brought her pupil daughter to 
Scotland from India, where the domicile of origin of the 
child was, thus giving the child a derived domicile in 
Scotland. When the daughter was fifteen,she and her 
mother left Scotland, and they lived in furnished lodging^ 
U hotels, and with friends, in various places, mainly in 
England, until the daughter’s death soon after reaching 
majority/
majority* it was held that the daughter was domiciled 
in Scotland, like the mother, but the Oourt considered 
the evidence of the intention of the daughter as 
distinct from that of her mother, and Lord Jeffrey^ who 
was dissenting, but on a specialty) says: ’Her domicile 
was no longer necessarily that of her mother, which I 
rather think continued Scotch; and the two can no longer 
be looked on, as a mother having power to create a 
domicile for her daughter, They are now only like two 
friends voluntarily living together, but perfectly 
independent of one another; and there might consequently 
have been a radical diversity in the qnimus of each, as 
to the character of their residence in England”fat page 
U50j.
In England children depend on their father, or 
mother, for domicile uhtil twenty one, and cannot acquire 
a separate domicile, of choice before that age* This 
rq,Uses the interesting question whether a minor whose 
father is domiciled in England, can acquire a domicile 
of choice in Scotland by residing here animo manendi *
There are three possible views. One is that the 
age at which a child can acquire a domicile of choice, 
is a question of capacity, which is governed by the law 
of the child’s domicile, namely in this instance England. 
Both the Scottish and the English Courts would hold that 
the child coukt not acquire a domicile of choice here. 
Both would hold that a minor, whose father was domiciled 
in Scotland but acquired a domicile in England leaving 
the child in Scotland, animo manendi, was domiciled in 
Scotland, and that a minor, whose father was domiciled 
in Scotland, who went to England animo manendi was 
domiciled in England. This view is logical and has 
the attractive feature that it would result in the same 
decision being arrived at no matter where the question 
was litigated. But it is extremely unlikely that an
English/
0, C\ I
English C o u r t  w o u l d  h o l d  that a  Scottish r!inor c o u l d  acquire 
a domicile in England.
T h e  s e c o n d  v i e w  i s  t h a t  e a c h  c o u n t r y  s h . o u . l d -  d e c i d e  + b o  
q u e s t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  i t s  o w n  l a w  o f  d o m i c i l e .  T h u s  a  m i n o r  
w h o s e  f a t h e r  i s  d o m i c i l e d ,  i n  E n g l a n d  a n d  w h o  r e s i d e s  • h e r e  
a n i m o .  m a n e n d i  .  s h o u l d  b e  h e l d  b y  t h e  S c o t t i s h  C o u r t s  t o  h a v e  
a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  S c o t l a n d ' ,  b u t  b y  t h e  E n g l i s h  
C o u r t s  s t i l l  t o  r e t a i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  d o m i c i l e  w h i c h  h e  d e r i v e s  
f r o m  h i s  f a t h e r ,  t h a t  a u t h o r i t y  t h e r e  i s  o n  t h e  t o p i c  i s  i n ­
c l i n e d  t o  t h i s  v i e w .  £  I t  i s  t h e  o n e  a d o p t e d  i n  A m e r i c a  -  
B e a l e  p .  1 0 8  a n d  c a s e s  t h e r e  q u o t e d :  D i c e y  p .  1 1 0 ;  a n d  t h e r e  
i s  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  w h i c h ,  h o w e v e r ,  h a s  n o t  y e t  b e e n  a p p l i e d  t o  
t h i s  t y p e  o f  c a s e ,  t h a t  i n  d e c i d i n g  w h e t h e r  a  d o m i c i l e  < h a s  b e e n  
a c q u i r e d  a  C o u r t  a p p l i e s  o n l y  ' t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i t s  o w n  l a w  -  
L o u s t a l a n  v .  L o u s t a l a n  1 0 0 0  P .  § 1 1 ,  I n  r e  A n n e s l e v  I Q O ' 5  C h . D .
P9P. The problem was debated, though not decided, in Urouart 
V. Euttsrfield lf>f>7 3T CbUD. 391J  In Chalmers v . Chalmers 
[(O.H.) 1903 11 S.L.T. 68^ the Lord Ordinary unconsciously 
assumed that the second view wa.s correct. The father, who was 
*a domiciled Scotsman, left Scotland when his son was four and 
lived in the south of England on his fortune. It was not clear 
whether the father had acquired an English domicile, thus giv­
ing his son a derived domicile in England, but Lord Kincaimey 
said that even if the son had a derived domicile in England, 
that domicile was lost and his domicile of origin was reacqui­
red when he came to Edinburgh University at the age of nineteen. 
If the son was domiciled in England, he had., on the first, view, 
ro capacity to reacquire his 's,oTr.ic* e 0*> onig^r* whlde s**11 
a minor, ""h® ^scislcr* Incona* stnn+ th +hir*d
3«c<& r\d Vf e W
view. S^he disadvantage of thgo attitude, howrever, is that 
for different countries to arrive at different decisions on 
the question of domicile merely perpetuates the conflict of 
laws instead of resolving it. £ It may be redargued, of course, 
that when the rules of International Private Law of states 
differ, decisions necessarily differ., and if they agreed that
won! d only show that one a tat© was not arriving its rules
T i l ©  t h i r d ,  v i e w  i s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  B a r  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :
" I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  a  p e r s o  n  s h o u l d ,  h a v e ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  a n  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d  v o l u n t a r y  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e ,  c a p a c i t y  
t o  a c t ,  a n d  t h a t  b o t h  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l © w h i c h  h e  h a s  
a n d  b y  t h a t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  w h i c h  h e  i n t e n d s  t o  r e m o v e ;  
t h e  f o r m e r  t h a . t  h e  m a y  b e  w n a b l e  t o  u n d o  t h e  t i e  t h a t  b i n d s  h i m  
t o  h i s  n a t i v e  c o u n t r y ;  t h e  l a t t e r  t h a t  h e  m a y  b e  i n  a  p o s i t i o n t o  
e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  n e w  a l l e g i a n c e . "  [ G i l l e s p i e ’ s  t r a n s l a t i o n  P n d
h a s  t h e  a d v a n t a g e  t h a t  t h e  s a m e  d e c i s i o n  w o u l d  b e  g i v e n  n o  
m a t t e r  i n  w h a t  f o r u m  t h e  q u e s t i o n w a s  l i t i g a t e d ,  w i t h o u t  i n ­
v o l v i n g  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  a  c o u n t r y  h o l d i n g  t h a t  a  p e r s o n  h a s  
a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  t h e r e  w h o  i s  u n d e r  a g e  b y  t h e  m u n i c i p a l  
l a w .
T h e  i m p o r t a n c e  a t t a c h e d  t o  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  h a s  l e d  t o  
t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  w h i c h  h a s  n o t  y e t  b e e n
I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a . t  t h i s  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  r u l e .  I t
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been directly decided, whether “domicile of origin” can 
only mean the domicile that a person received at birth 
or whether it means the last derived domicile that a 
pupil received from his parent. Lord Robertson 
declared in Woodbury v. Sutherland* s Trustees |l959 
S.L.T. 93J in favour of the first view, that “domicile 
of origin” means only the domicile that a person 
receives at birth and does not include “derived 
domicile”. In the Inner House the question was 
reserved [l939 S.IT. 84j| but there is so much reason 
for the first view that it can hardly be doubted. In 
addition to Lord Robertson’s opinion it has the support 
of Chi tty lu-s-irio-e [in re Craignish L.R. 1892 3 Ch. 180 
at pp. 184,5] Dicey £p. 79J and Currie £pp.9 and lojj 
and a distinction between “derived domicile” and “domi- 
:cile of origin” is at the basis of the undemoted 
cases;
[Crumpton’s J.F. v. Finch-Noyes 1918 S.C. 378;
Arnott v. Groom 1346 ~9D* 142;
Lowndes v. Douglas 1862 24D. 1391;
Chalmers v. Chalmers (O.H.) 1903 11 S.L.T* 68;
IB EB Macreight L:7R. 1886 30 ch.D.
To hold that a “derived domicile” could be the 
domicile of origin would be inconsistent with the 
statement that has often been made, that the derived
i
domicile is less persistent than^the presumption in 
favour of it is less strong than in the case of the
*f r fdomicileSL^origin. fChalmers v. Chalmers. Crumptons 
J.F. v. Finch-Noyes supra, per Lords Johnston and 
Mackenzie^ Arnott v. Groom supra, per Lord Jeffrey.
In the last two cases however it was domicile derived 
from the mother^ and the comment on its lack of tenacity 
may be due to that circumstanceJ  There is little
authority for the other view, [westlake Secs. 248 and 
261; whose statement is contrary to the authority which 
he quotes^namely In re Craignish supra/ and the ass-
:umption on which Lopes L,e*»€t rce proceeded in 
Urquharfy
9F
Urquhart v. Butterfield L.R. IB87 37 Ch.D. 3P7 at pp.
384,
The plea has beer advanced that great inconven-
returns permanently t
:ience and hardship wculd be caused by holding that 
domicile of origin mesnt simply domicile at birth.
E.g. if at the time of the birth of his child an 
Englishman is domiciled in Prance, but shortly 
afterwards, say withirj three months, the father
England, reacquiring his
domicile of origin, arid continues there until the
\I
child is of age, it wcjuld be a great hardship on this 
English child to hold that throughout the rest of his 
life a French domicile of origin clung to him, ready to 
arise whenever he abandoned the English domicile or 
any subsequent domicile acquired by choice. But 
this case can be met with the parallel case of an
Englishman domiciled 
retaining his domicil 
three months of the c 
acquiring a domicile 
months of the child’s 
derived domicile in P 
of origin would be eq 
Chitty Justice In re
in England at his child’s birth 
e of origin in England until 
lild reaching majority and then 
in Prance for the last three 
infancy. To hold that this 
?ance was the child’s domicile 
aally hard,(in the judgment of 
raignish).
The last derived domicile will persist until it
has been abandoned animo et facto, whereupon if a
domicile of choice has been acquired, that will be
the domicile, but if not the domicile of origin will
revive. £In re Macreight L.R. 1885 30 Ch.D, 165^ J.
There are two views as to the position of a
legitimated child. One view is that when the child
is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its
parents it takes its domicile from the father retro- 
;specively to its birth and that the father s
dornici le/
d o m i c i l e  a t  t e n  f i n e  o f  t h c - b i r + b  i s  u  r dor-idle o f  o r i g i n
Of V:'.. : Gi.O:]-f . ll. C O f!.C T' 'O: (O ' s 'f -U r'n; 'icil6 \ 1.2 c h  1^".0
c h i l d  o b t a i n s  f r o m  i t s  f a t h e r  a t  t.b r t i m ^  o f  f o  y-,r  ^ r ,- r < -r,.
i s  s ,  f . 5 s v e , : '  o o r n c i I e  ;  a r ^  f h s t  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i m i n  
o f  t h e  c h < i > l d  r e g a i n s  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  m o t h e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  
o f  t h e  b i r t h .
T h e  f i r s t  v i e w ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  o n e  
w h e n  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  l e g i t i m a t i o n  i s  t o  l e g i t i m i z e  t i n -  c h i l d  
f r o m  b i r t h ;  t h e  c h i l d  m u s t  t h e n  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  h a v i n g  p o t ­
e n t i a l l y  a  d o m i c i l e  w i t h  t h e  f a t h e r ,  t h o u g h  h e  h a s  p r o v i s i o n ­
a l l y  a  d o m i c i l e  w i t h  t h e  m o t h e r .  | T  B e a l e  p .  2 1 7 ,  w h e r e  h e  
c i t e s  H . c N i c o l I  v .  I v e s  5 0 1  K . p .  6 9  ;  -  f , A p e r s o n  b o r n  I l l e g ­
i t i m a t e ,  b u t  a f t e r w a r d s  l e g i t i m a t e d  b y  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  
m a r r i a g e  o f  h i s  p a r e n t s ,  s t a n d s  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  (  a f t e r  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  )  t h a t  h e  w o u l d  h a v e  o c c u p i e d  i f  h e  h a d  b e a n  
b o r n  l e g i t i m a t e .  H i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  i s  t h e  c o u n t r y  
w h e r e  h i s  f a t h e r  w a s  d o m i c i l e d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  h i s  b i r t h ” J  
T h e  S c o t s  l a w  o f  l e g i t i m e , t i o n  b y  s u b s e o u e n t  m e r r i a g e  h a s  
t h i s  e f f e c t ,  b e c a u s e  i f  r ^ s f s  o n  t h e  f i c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  m o t h e r  
a n d  f a t h e r  o f  t h e  i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d  g a v e  t h e i r  consent to 
marry a t  t h e  tine o f  t h e  conception a n d  t h a t  t h e  marriage 
t o f c i s  effect retrospectively t o  t h e  time of conception,
^ kerr v. Martin 1 8 4 0  2 D. 752 is inconsistent with this 
fiction, but McNeill v. hcGregor 1 9 0 1  4 F .  123  is authority 
for the view that the fiction will be allowed its place 
if no interests of third parties are thereby-:.endangered. |
C . J
Dicey, however holds the second view.^There Is support, 
too, for the second view in Shedden v.
i
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Patrick £l8q4 17 D.(H.L.)l8j where it was held that an 
illegitimate child,who was born in the United States 
of a British man and an American woman, was not made 
a British subject by the subsequent marriage of his 
parents, though he would have been a British subject 
from birth according to the statutes (if his parents 
had beeh married) because his father was a British 
subject* There is a parallel between nationality 
and domicile but the reason given for that decision 
does not apply here. The Lord Chancellor, Cranworth 
said that if a man before the marriage of his parents 
were an American, he might be made in inviturn, a 
subject of Her Majesty. ” In the event of war with 
America the appellant might lawfully take up arms 
against Her Majesty; but the subsequent marriage of 
his parents might make him a traitor - the existence 
of a state of the law so anomalous was never contem- 
jplated by the legislature.” It is submitted 
therefore that the first view is the correct one.
u/frtrvft/A . e domicile of a married woman is always the
same as that of her husband. At marriage her 
domicile changes to his, if his is different, and 
if he subsequently changes his domicile, hers will 
change in conformity jcrumpton’s J.F. v. Finch-Noyes
1918 S.C. 378. ’Her abode and domicile follows his’!_
Stair 1.4.9; Mackinnon’s Trustees v. The Inland Revenue
1919 S.C. 684 and 1980 S.C. (H .L .) 17!; Warrender v . 
Warrender 1835 2 S. & McL. 154; Low v. Low 1891 19 R. 
115j .Attorney General for Alberta v. Cook 1986 A.C.
Even when the spouses are living apart under a 
voluntary deed of separation, -the- wife cannot have--a 
domi-e-i-l-e— different from— that— of her husband fv/ar render
v./
\00f w  i
j y / a r r e n d e r  v .  W s , m e n d e r  1 3 3 2  2  S . & h c L .  1 3 4 ;  h o w  v  . L o w  1 2 9 1  
19 , v .  H P  J  ; o r  w h c-r\ t b c  h u s b a n d  l i a s  d e s e r t e d  h i n  w i f e  
o r  l o s t  1 1 i e  r i g h t  t o  i n s i s t o n  h e r  a d h e r i n g  b y  c o m m i t t i n g  
a d u l  h c r y  h c  v  1 n r o n  ’  s  T r s  ,  v ,  T b e  I n  1  a n d  P . e v r n u e  1 9 1 9  S . C .
6 8 4 ,  1 . 9 2 0  S . 0 . ( H . L . ) 1 7 1  }  ;  o r  e v e n  w h e n  t h e  s p o u s e s  a r e  
j  u  d  i  c  i  a ,  1 1  y  s  e  n  a  r a t e  d ,  £  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  f o r  A l b e r t a  v .  C o o k  
1 9 9 2  A . u .  4 4 4  J  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  w i f e  f o l l o w s  t h a t  o f  h e r  
h u s b a n d ,  f o r  t h e  r u l e  d o e s  n o t  r e s t  o n  t h e  duty o f  t h e  w i f e  
t o  a d h e r e  t o  h e r  h u s b a n d ,  a n d  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  t h e  f a m i l y  r e s i d e n c e ,  i i V s p i t e  o f  e a r l y  o p i n i o n s  
t o  t h a t  e f f e c t ,  ^ A d a m s o n  v .  B a r b o u r  1  M a c q .  3 6 7 ;  P a r i s h  o f
K i r k a l d y  v .  P a r i s h  o f  T r a q u a i r  { O . H . )  1 9 1 5  S . C .  1 1 2 4 $ p e r  L d .
1 2 5 4
D e w a r  a t  p . 1 1 2 6 ;  M o l a r e n  p .  1 4 ;  F r a s e r  p . ^ q w t r r j  b u t  o n  t h e  p r i n ­
c i p l e  t h a t  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  a r e  o n e  i n  l a w .  ^ A t t o r n e y  g e n e r a l  f o r .  
A l b e r t a  v .  C o o k » s u p r a j  T w o  f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w h i c h  h a v e  
l e d  t o  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  h a r d  a n d  f a s t  r u l e  t h a t  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  w i f e  i s  a l w a y s  t h a t  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d a r e :  f i r s t l y ,  g r e a t  
d i f f i c u l t y  w o u l d  b e  e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  r e g a r d  t o  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
f o r  d i v o r c e  i f  a  w i f e  w e r e  t o  b e  a l l o w e d ,  t o  a c q u i r e  a  s e p ­
a r a t e  d o m i c i l e -  w h i c h  C o u r t  w o u l d  h a v e  p o w e r  t o  g r a n t  d i v o r c e ,  
t h a t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  d o m i c i l e  o r  t h a t  o f  t h e  w i f & s ?  £  A t t o r n e y  
G e n e r a l  f o r  A l b e r t a  v .  C o o k .  s u p r a ;  h a c k i n n o n s  T r s .  s u p r a ,  p e r  
L d  D u n e d i n  J  S e c o n d l y ,  i t  w o u l d  m a k e  s u c c e s s i o n  t o o  u n c e r t a i n ,  
i f ,  p e r h a p s  a f t e r  t h e  d e a t h  o f  b o t h  s p o u s e s , i t  w e r e  p o s s i b l e  t o  
r a i s e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  h u s b a n d  h a d  b e e n  u n f a i t h f u l  t o  
t h e  w i f e ,  t h u s  a l l o w i n g  h e r  t o  a c q u i r e  h e r - t  a  s e p a r a t e  d o m i C f l e  
a n d  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  q u e s t i o n ,  w h a t  w a s  t h a t  d o v a i o i 1 e •  ^ l a c k i n n o n  s  
T r s »  s u p r a  J  T h e r e  i s  n o  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  r u l e  t h a t  n e r  d o m i c i l e  
f o l l o w s  h i s ,  a n d  i t  a p p l i e s  u n t i l  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i s  b r o u g h t  t o  a n
e n d  b y  d i v o r c e .
I n  t h e  U . S .  t h e  r u l e  i s  h e l d  t o  r e s t  o n  t h e  d u t y  o f  a d -  
h e r e n c e ; a n d  t h e  w i f e  c a n  a c q u i r e  a  s e p a r a t e  d o m i c i l e  i f  ne 
d e s o r t 3 h e r  o r  g i v e s  h e r  c a u s e  f o r  s e p a r a t i o n ,  a n d  o i  c o o . : - * s o  
i f  t k - r o  ' i s  a  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n .  £  B e a l e  o n .  2 0 1  e  ^  s e q u .
action and those Court s alone have jurisdiction.
T h e r e  i s  n o  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  c o n f l i c t  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n .
T h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  a r e  
C o u r t s  o f  A l b e r t a  h a d < £  
a  c  t  i  o n  b y  . M  r  s . .  C o o t  ,  w  
a g a i n s t  - h e r  h u s b a n d  w b .  
t h e y  d i d  n o t  n e e d  t o  h
c o r r e c t  i n  d e c i d i n g  t h a t  t h e  
n o  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  a  d i v o r c e  
s o  w a s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  A l b e r t a ,
3 w a s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  O n t a r i o ,  b u t  
) l d  t h a t  s h e  h a d  t h e  s a m e
d o m i c i l e  a s  h e r  h u s b a n d  i n  o r d e r  , t o  d e c i d e  t h a t .
I t  i s  a  p i t y  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  s e p a r a t e d  w i f e ' s  
d o m i c i l e  a r o s e  i n  a  c a d e  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  d i v o r c e .
I f  i t  h a d  a r i s e n  i n  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  t h e
y  C o u n c i l  m i g h t  h a v e  f e l t  t h a t  
e c t ,  f o r  i t  i s  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  
t h a t  t h e  i l l o g i c a l i t y  o f  t h e
w i f e ’ s  e s t a t e ,  t h e  P r i ^  
t h e  o t h e r  v i e w  w a s  c o r i  
p o s i t i o n  i n  s u c c e s s i o n
d e c i s i o n  i s m o s t  a p p a r e n t .  T h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  a  w i f e
t
w h o  h a d  o b t a i n e d  a  d e c r e e  o f  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n
a g a i n s t  h e r  h u s b a n d  p a s  
t o  h e r  h e i r s  a n d  r e p r e s  
w e  r e  t h  e n  d e a d .  f  C  o n ;
1 8 8 1  S e c . )
Y e t  t h e  l a w .  o f  t h e  
t a k e s  n o  p a r t  o f  h e r  e  
h e r  h e i r s  a n d  r e p r e s e n t  
I n  c o n c l u s i o n  i t  n
d e s e r t s  h e r  o r  g i v e s  h e  
c o u r s e  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  j i ;  
2 0 1  e t  s e q u ) .
s e s  o n  h e r  d e a t h  i n  i n t e s t a c y  
e n t a t i v e s ,  a s  i f  h e r  h u s b a n d  
u  g a  1  R  i  g h  t  s  ■ b c o t l  a n  d )  A ,  c  t
d o m i c i l e  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d ,  w h o  
t a t e  i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h o  a r e  
a t i v e s .
a y  b e  n o t i c e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  U . S .
t h e  r u l e  t h a t  h e r  d o m i c i l e  f o l l o w s  h i s  c e a s e s  i f  h e
r  c a u s e  f o r  s e p a r a t i o n ,  a n d  o f  
d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  j j B e a l . e  p p .
A  v o i d  m a r r i a g e  c a n  h a v e  n o  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  d o m i -  
: c i l e  o f  t h e  w i f e  b y  o n e r a t i o n  o f  l a w  ^ S m i j t h  v . S m 1 j t h  
1 9 1 8  1  S . L . T .  1 * * ;  P a r i s h  o f  K i r k c a l d y  v .  P a r i s h  o f  
T r a g u a i r  1 9 1 *  S . C . ,  1 1 2 4 ;  ^ i t f o r d  v .  ^ i t f o r f l  l Q ° i  P  
1 ^ 0  a t  p .  1 8 9 :  Y h i t e  v .  W h i t e  1 9 8 ^  P .  lllj. B u t  
s i n c e  s h e  r e m a i n s  c a p a b l e  o f  c h a n g i n g  h e r  d o m i c i l e ,
q f  s h e  h a s  i n  f a c t  l i v e d  v o l u n t a r i l y  w i t h  h e r  s u n - n o s e d  
i i u s f c a n d  s h e  n o  y  • . . .  , , a  a  , i . o r , i o l l e  g  c h o i c e  i n  t h e
c o u n t r y /
lnZ .
/■leftjpwMn, v. CK«-kr*»v*.r> ^ 2 . ^  S - L . l .  p e - r  lo - td  M «.c |< .ccy oU
c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  s h e  h a s  l i v e d  w i t h  h i m *  j ^ a e ^ B e a l e
p .  1 9 9  a n a  A m e r i c a n  c a s e s  t h e r e  q u o t e d  h i s . e r e  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  i s  n o t  v o i d  a h  i n l t g ,  b u t  m e r e l y  v o i e v ' d  e  .  
e . g .  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  o f  i m n o t e n c y  ?  s i n c e  a  e a r r ^  a ^ e  has 
s u b s i s t e d  t h e  w i f e  t a k e s  h e r  h u s b a n d ’ s  d o m i c i l e  
^ T u r n e r  v .  T h o m s o n  1 9 P - R  1 1  P .  D .  37 ]  .
* •— ’
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  d o n  i d l e  o f  a n  a d u l t  w h o
b e c o m e s  i n s a n e  c a n n o t  b e  c h a n g e d  b y  h i s  c u s t o d i e r s
' •  { V e s t  l a k e  s e c .  2 ^ 1 .  t f i c e y  u .  I f f ] .  H e  r e t a i n s  t h e
cl on 1 o  1. 1  e h  e  p  o  s r >  e  s  s  e d  a  t  t h e  t i m e  h e  b e e  a  r n  e
i n s a n e '  ( h o t ,  a s  D i c e y  s a y s ,  t h e  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e
w h e n  h e  c a m e  t o  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  i n s a n e  ( p . 1 9 6 ) .  A
p e r s o n ’ s  j u r i d i c a l  c a p a c i t y  c e a s e s  o n  b e c o m i n g  i n s a n e ?
*
e v e n  t h o u g h  h e  i s  n o t  c e r t i f i e d  f o r  s o m e  t i m e  l a t e r  -  
s e e  G - l o a g  o n  C o n t r a c t  2 n d  E d i t i o n  p .  9 2 ;  L o n d o n  v .  
E l d e r ’ s  _ C u r a t o r  B o n i s  ( O . H . )  1 9  0 2  S . L . T .  2 2 6 .  I t  i s  
t r u e  t h a t  i n  C r u m p t o n s  J .  F .  v .  F i n c h - N o y e s  3 9 1 8  S . C .  
3 7 8 ,  L o r d  J o h n s t o n  s a i d  ’ ’ H i s  s u c c e s s i o n  m u s t  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  
h i s  c e r t i f i c a t i o n ”  b u t  t h i s  p r o b a b l y  i s  m e r e l y  a  l a x  
u s e  o f  w o r d s :  t h e r e  w a s  n o  t i n e  l a g  i n  t h e  c a s e  
b e t w e e n  i n s a n i t y  a n d  c e r t i f i c a t i o n j .  T h u s  C r u m p t o n  
w h i l e  r e s i d i n g  i n  " o f f a t ,  b e c a m e  i n s a n e  a t  t h e  a g e  o f  
2 3 .  H e  w a s  k e p t  i n  a n  a s y l u m  i n  D u m f r i e s  u n t i l  h e  
d i e d  a t  5 7 .  T h e  C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  - h e  n e v e r  l o s t  t h e  
d e r i v e d  d o m i c i l e  w h i c h  h e  h a d  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  h i s  
m o t h e r  w h e n  a  p u p i l  a n d  t h a t  h e  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  
S c o t l a n d .  H o  a t t e n t i o n  w a s  p a i d  t o  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  
r e s i d e n c e  i n  t h e  a s y l u m  i n  D u m f r i e s  n o r  t o  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  d u r i n g  l u c i d  i n t e r v a l s  h e  e v i n c e d  a n  i n t e r e s t  
i n  M o f f a t .  T h e  t e m e u s  i n s p i o i e n d u r n  w a s  t h e  d a t e  o f  
b e  c o r n i n g  i n s a n e  ^ C r u m p t o n ’ s  J .  F .  v .  F i n c h - H o y  e s  
1 . 9 1 8 /
3 04.
y  S e e  a l s o  U r o u h a r t  v .  B u t t e r f i e l d
( 1 7 7 ? )  7 7  C h . D .  ( C  •  A  •  )  ~ " j | .
T h e  c a s e  o f  a  p e r s o n  w h o  h a s  been i n c a p a x  
d u r i n g  p u p i l l a r i t y  a n d  w h o  c o n t i n u e s  t o  live w i t h  
a n d  u n d e r  t h e  c a r e  o f  p a r e n t - s  a f t e r  m a j o r i t y  ,  i s  t o  
b e  a s s i m i l a t e d  t o  t h a t  o f  s .  p u p i l •  H e  n e v e r  a c q u i r e s
t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  c h o o s e  a  h o m e  f o r  h i m s e l f  s o  r e m a i n s  
u n d e r  p e r m a n e n t  p u p i l l a r i t y ,  a n d ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  h e  
l i v e s  w i t h  h i s  f a t h e r  o r  m o t h e r ,  a n d  c h a n g e s  h i s  
r e s i d e n c e  w h e n  t h e y  d o ,  h i s  d o m i c i l e  c h a n g e s  w i t h  t h a t  
o f  h i s  f a t h e r  o r  m o t h e r  u ^ t i l  t h e  e n d  o f  h i s  l i f e .
^ S h a r p e  v .  C r i s p i n  ( 1  °  3  o )  L . R .  1  P 4 D .  ^ 1 1 '  . ' W e s t l a k e  
p .  3 4 6 ;  B e a l e  p .  227;  D i c e y  p p .  1 0 4 , . 9 J ,
/ - ,r 
(3>1 D O h l O I L E  o f  C H 0 T 0 B .
A c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e .
” E v e r y  p e r s o n ’ s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  m u s t  b e  
p r e s u m e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  u n t i l  h e  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a n o t h e r  
s o l e  d o m i c i l e  b y  a c t u a l  r e s i d e n c e  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  
o t f  a b a n d o n i n g  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n .  T h e  c h a n g e  
m u s t  b e  a n i m o  e t  f a c t o  .  .  .  ” . j h o r d  W e n s l e y d a l e  i n  
A i h m a n  v .  A i k m a n  3  b l a c q .  8 6 4 J .  T h e r e  a r e  t w o  e l e m e n t s  
i n  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e ,  t h e  f a c t  
o f  r e s i d e n c e  i n  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  t h e  a n i m u s  o r  
i n t e n t i o n  o f  m a i l i n g  i t  t h e  s o l e  d o m i c i l e  a n d  o f  
a b a n d o n i n g  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f . o r i g i n  £ s t o r y  p .  4 7 :  
C h e s h i r e  p .  1 6 9 :  W e s t l a b e  S e c .  9 3 6 ;  D i c e y  p . ° 3 j .  
N e i t h e r  e l e m e n t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  w i t h o u t  t h e  o t h e r .  
R e s i d e n c e  a l o n e ,  h o w e v e r  l o n g  c o n t i n u e d ,  w i l l  n o t  c o n -  
: s t i t u t e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e .  T h u s  a l t h o u g h  a  m a n ,  
w h o s e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  w a s  S c o t s  ,  r e s i d e d  i n  L i v e r  -  
: p o o l  f r o m  t h e  a g e  o f  4 6  t i l l  h i s  d e a t h  3 7  y e a r s  
l a t e r ,  a n d  n e v e r  i n  t h a t  t i m e  s e t  f o o t  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  
h e  w a s  h e l d  n o t  t o  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  
^ n g l a n d ,  b e c a u s e  n o  ” a n i m u s ”  w a s  p r o v e d  e f  M i
\
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h i s  S c o t t i s h  o n e  [ L i v e r p o o l  R o y * ? ]  I n f i r m a r y  v .  R a m s a y
1 9 3 0  S * C #  ( H . L .  )  P S .  P o l  1  o w e d  i n  M c L e l l a n d  v .  T— h e l l a n d  
3  9 4 2  s.G.  K Q p J •  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n t e n t i o n  a l o n e  i s  n o t  
e n o u g h *  f o o m i c i l i u m  r e  e t  f a c t o  t r a n s f e r t u r ,  n o n  n u d a
c o n t e s t a t i o n s . B i g .  3 0 , 1 ,8(fj , T h u s  a l t h o u g h a  p e r s o n  
i n t e n d s  t o  m a k e  h i s  p e r m a n e n t  h o m e  i n  C a n a d a ,  a n d  t o  
a b a n d o n  h i s  o r i g i n a l  d o m i c i l e  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  a n d  a l t h o u g h  
h e  m a k e s  a l l  p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  t h a t  e n d ,  h e  c a n n o t  
a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  C a n a d a  u n t i l  h e  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  " f a c t ”  b y  r e s i d i n g  t h e r e .  S o  t h a t  i f  
h e  d i e s  o n  t h e  j o u r n e y  h e  h a s  n e v e r  l o s t  h i s  d o m i c i l e  
o f  o r i g i n ,  ^ W e s t l a k e  s e c .  2 3 0 ;  M c L a r e n  p p .  7 , 8 ;
F r a s e r  p .  1 2 8  o j .
( )  T h e  e l e m e n t  o f  r e s i d e n c e .
T h e  t w o  e l e m e n t s  a r e  e a s i l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  i n  
t h e o r y ,  b u t  n o t  s o  e a s i l y  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  b e c a u s e  l o n g  
r e s i d e n c e ,  o r  r e s i d e n c e  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  k i n d . ,  a s  
w e l l  a s  b e i n g  t h e  r e q u i r e d  r e s i d e n c e ,  m a y  b e  e v i d e n c e  
o f  t h e  r e q u i r e d  i n t e n t i o n .
I n  m a n y  c a s e s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  r e s i d e n c e ,  i . e .  
w h e t h e r  i t  w a s  i n  a  h o u s e  w h i c h  t h e  p e r s o n  o w n e d  o r  
i n  f u r n i s h e d  l o d g i n g s ,  a n d  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
r e s i d e n c e ,  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d ,  a n d  o f t e n  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  
d e c i s i v e  ^ K e n n e d y  v .  B e l l  1 8 8 3  1  M .  1 1 9 7  a n d  1 8 8 8  
6  M .  ( H . L . )  8 p ] j  b u t  a l l  t h e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  
n a t u r e  a n d  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s i d e n c e  r e l a t e  t o  
r e s i d e n c e  a s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  i n t e n t i o n  a n d  n o t  t o  
r e s i d e n c e  cjub, r e s i d e n c e .  I f  t h e  r e q u i r e d  i n t e n t i o n  
i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  f r o m  o t h e r  i n d i c i a  a l m o s t  
a n y  k i n d  o f  r e s i d e n c e  w i l l  s a t i s f y  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
t h e  f a c t  o f  r e s i d e n c e .  " I f  y o u  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  t h e r e  
I s  a  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  l i v e  i n  S c o t l a n d  a n d  i f  t h e  
p a r t y  g o e s  a n d  l i v e s  i n  a n  h o t e l ,  t h a t  i s  e n o u g h .
H e  I s  t h e r e  -  t h a t  i s  t h e  f a c t u m ;  a n d  t h e r e  i e  a l s o
t h e  /
106 .
i b e  a n i i r . u a ;  a n d  t b & t w o  u n i t e d l y  o o n « t i t u t «  t ’h . o  
d o m i c i l «•11 j h o r d  O r a n v / o r t b  i n  B e l l  v .  K e n n e d y  i n  H o u s e  
o f  L o r d 8  a t  p .  o o j .  " R e s i d e n c e ,  h o w e v e r  s h o r t  -  
e v e n  f o r  a n  h o u r  -  w i l l  h e  s u f f i c i e n t  i f  t h e  i n ­
d e n t i o n  t o  c h a n g e  e x i s t s  M .  ^ T a y l o r  v .  T a y l o r  ! f D x  
0  1  S . L . R .  1 8  p e r  L o r d  F r a s e r ,  O r d i n a r y ] •  I t  h a s  
b e e n  h e l d  t h a t  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  h a s  b e e n  a c q u i r e d  
a f t e r  f o u r  m o n t h s  r e s i d e n c e  i n  a  l e a s e d  h o u s e ,  
j l l a c p h a i i  v .  M a c p h a i l f s  T r u s t e e s  ( o  . l l j  1 9 0 6  1 4  S . L . T .
T o  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  a  p a r t y  m u s t  
r e s i d e  w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  t h u s  
b e c o m e s  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  
t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  s h o u l d  h a v e  o n e  f i x e d  r e s i d e n c e  w h i c h  
c a n  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t  a s  h i s  h o m e .  ‘  " I  c a n n o t  a d m i t  
w h a t  L o r d  F u l l e r t o n  a s s u m e s  t o  b e  t h e  r u l e ;  t h a t ,  i n  
o r d e r  t o  m a k e  a  d o m i c i l e ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  h a v e  s o m e  
p a r t i c u l a r  s p o t  w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  a  l a w  -  t h a t  
i t  i s  n o t  e n o u g h  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  s h a l l  h a v e  a n  
a p p a r e n t l y  c o n t i n u o u s  r e s i d e n c e  t h e r e ,  b u t  s h a l l  
a c t u a l l y  h a v e  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s p o t ,  o r  r e m a i n  f i x e d  i n  
s o m e  p e r m a n e n t  e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  I n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  
I n d i c i a e  o f  d o m i c i l e  t h e s e  t h i n g s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t ;  b u t  
t h e y  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  a s  m a t t e r  o f  g e n e r a l  l a w ,  t o  
c o n s t i t u t e  d o m i c i l e .  M a n y  o l d  b a c h e l o r s  n e v e r  h a v e  
a  h o u s e  t h e y  c a n  c a l l  t h e i r  o w n .  T h e y  g o  f r o m  h o t e l  
t o  h o t e l  a n d  f r o m  w a t e r i n g  p l a c e  t o  w a t e r i n g  p l a c e ,  
c a r e l e s s  o f  t h e  c o m f o r t  o f  m o r e  p e r m a n e n t  r e s i d e n c e ,  
a n d  u n w i l l i n g  t o  s u b m i t  t o  t h e  g e n e  a t t e n d a n t  o n  i t  .  .  
I f  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  r e g a i n i n g  i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  b e  
c l e a r l y  p r o v e d  a l i t e r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  h o m e  i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r y .  ^ A r n o t t  v .  G r o o m  1 8 4 6  9  D .  p e r  L o r d  
J e f f r e y  a t  p .  1 6 o j .
T h e /
107.
T h e  r e s i d e n c e  m u s t  f e e  w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  
t h e  l a w  w h i c h  b e c o m e s  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e ,  s o  
m e m b e r s h i p  o f  a  p r i v i l e g e d  c o m m u n i t y  w i t h i n  o n e  
c o u n t r y  w i l l  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  a n o t h e r  
c o u n t r y  t o  w h i c h  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h a t  p r i v i l e g e d  
c o m m u n i t y  b e l o n g .  I n  t h e  p a s t  i n  C h i n a ,  E g y p t  a n d .  
T u r k e y  t h e r e  e x i s t e d ,  a  s y s t e m  o f  " c a p i t u l a t i o n s t t  
w h e r e b y  E u r o p e a n s  r e s i d e n t  i n  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  w h o  
w e r e  r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  t h e i r  c o n s u l a t e , e n j o y e d  c e r t a i n  
p r i v i l e g e s :  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  n a t i v e  l a w
etc c>wn taw
^ a n d  t o  t h e i r  o w n  C o u r t s  s i t t i n g  i n  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s .  
W h e n  a  p e r s o n  h a v i n g  a  T u r k i s h  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  
s e t t l e d  i n  C a i r o  u n d e r  h r i t i s h  p r o t e c t i o n  a s  a  m e m b e r  
o f  t h e  p r i v i l e g e d  B r i t i s h  c o m m u n i t y ,  h e  d i d  n o t  
a c q u i r e  a n  E n g l i s h  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e -  t h a t  c o u l d  
o n l y  b e  a c q u i r e d  b y  r e s i d e n c e  i n  E n g l a n d  ^ A b d - u l -  
j f f e s s i h  v .  F a r r a  ( 1 8 8 8 ) L . R .  1 3  A . C .  4 3 l J .  A n  E n g l i s h ­
m a n  w h o  r e s i d e d  i n  C a i r o  a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  p r i v i ­
l e g e d  B r i t i s h  c o m m u n i t y  w a s  n o t  t h e r e b y  p r e v e n t e d  
f r o m  a c q u i r i n g  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  E g y p t .
^ C a s d a g l i  v .  C a s d a g l i  1 9 1 9  A . C .  .  T h e r e  i s  n o
s u c h  t h i n g  a s  a n  A n g l o - C h i n e s e  o r  A n g l o - E g y p t ! a n  
d o m i c i l e .
f
C o n n e c t i o n  w i t h a  c o m m u n i t y  h o w e v e r  m a y  b e  
i m p o r t a n t  i n  a  s e c o n d a r y  m a n n e r  i f  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  
p o w e r  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  t h e  d o m i c i l e  h a s  b e e n  
a c q u i r e d ,  r e c o g n i s e s  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  s y s t e m s  o f  l a w  
a p p l y  t o  d i f f e r e n t  c o m m u n i t i e s .  T h u s  t h e  E n g l i s h m a n  
w h o  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  E g y p t  w h i l e  t h e  n c a p i t u l -
n/er*
r a t i o n s "  i n  f o r c e  w a $  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  l a w  a p p l i -  
A
: c a b l e  t o  n a t i v e  E g y p t i a n s  b u t  t o  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  t h e  
Egyptian/
1 OP *
E g y p t i a n  s o v e r e i g n  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  h i m  
j ^ G  a  s  d a  g l  i  v .  0  a  s  d a  g l  i  s u p  r a j  .  A n d  a  H i n d u  o r  M o s l e m  
s e t t l i n g  i n  I n d i a  a n d  a t t a c h i n g  h i m s e l f  t o  h i s  o w n  
r e l i g i o u s  s e c t  t h e r e ,  w o u l d  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  b y  
v i r t u e  o f  w h i c h  h e  w o u l d  e n j o y  t h e  c i v i l  s t a t u s  a s  
t o  m a r r i a g e ,  i n h e r i t a n c e  a n d  t h e  l i k e  a c c o r d e d  b y  t h e  
l a w s  o f  B r i t i s h  I n d i a  t o  H i n d u s  o r  M o s l e m s  a n d  s u c h  
c i v i l  s t a t u s * ’ w o u l d  d i f f e r  m a t e r i a l l y  f r o m  t h a t  o f  a  
E u r o p e a n  s e t t l i n g  t h e r e  a n d  a t t a c h i n g  h i m s e l f  t o  t h e  
B r i t i s h  c o m m u n i t y ,  g O h i 1 1 y  J . t t & - t r 4 e e  I n  r e  T o o t a l s  T r u s t s
( 1 8 8 3 )  L . R .  8 3  C h .  D .  a t  p .  3 3 9 )  , , r e s t l a k e  p .  3 4 ? J  
T h e  A m e r i c a n  d o c t r i n e  t h a t ,  f o r  a  s o l d i e r  t o  
a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  h e  i s  
s t a t i o n e d ,  h e  r e q u i r e s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  h i s  f a m i l y  o r  
h i m s e l f  i n  a  r e s i d e n c e  o f  h i s  o w n ,  a n d  t h a t  r e s i d e n c e  
i n  h i s  b a r r a c k s  i s  n o t  e n o u g h ,  ^ B e a l e  p .  j  i s  n o t  
p a r t  o f  o u r  l a w .  G o v e r n o r  T r a p a u d  a c q u i r e d  a  d o r n i -  
s c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  S c o t l a n d  w h i l e  l i v i n g  i n  t h e  
g o v e r n o r 1  s  h o u s e  ^ C l a r k  v .  N e w m a r s h  1 8 3 6  P . O .  1 1 ,
3 9 p >  D y s o n  v .  D y s o n  ( O . H . )  1 9 0 9  2  S . L . T .  4 0 4 _ J  .  B u t  
t h e  A m e r i c a n  v i e w  m i g h t  b e  c o r r e c t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  
p r i s o n e r ,  [ " p o s t .  p .
H i e  f a c t  o f  r e s i d e n c e  c a n  o n l y  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
b y  t h e  p a r t y  h i m s e l f  t a k i n g  u p  r e s i d e n c e  i n  t h e  n e w
f*e>t r
c o u n t r y  a n d ^ b y  h i s  w i ~ ° e  a n d  f a m i l y  d o i n g  s o .  J B e a l e  p .  
*
T o  a l l o w  s u c h a  r e s u l t  wov
d o c t r i n e  t h a t  t h e  P r i v y  C  
A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  f o r  A l b e
t h a t  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  a r e  
(2)/
I d  b e  p r e s s i n g  t o o  f a r  t h e  
o u n c i l  i n s i s t e d  o n  i n  
r t a  v .  C o o k  ( 1 9 2 6  A . C .  4 4 4 )
o n e  i n  l a w .
(2) The element of intention.
The intention must be (a) to make the new country the 
sole domicile and (b) to abandon the domicile of origin. The 
intention of the person whose domicile is in question is a pure 
question of fact. /~A. Farnsworth 1943 LIX L.Q.P. 219J  The 
Court refused to determine in a special case whether, upon 
facts stated, a man had abandoned animo, his domicile of origin* 
that being an inference, not in law, but in fact, upon which 
the parties in a special case must be agreed. f ~Lawsonrs 
Trustees v. Lav/son 1883 10 R. 1278__/
(a ) Intention to make the new country the sole domicile.
This means to make the new country the principal residence|
and the centre of one’s business, with the intention of I
|
permanence. j
The Toman definition of ’’domicile” admirably expresses
this requirement:
’’There is no doubt that each person has his domicile in
that place where he has established his family residence
(laremi and the headquarters of his business and estate (rerum
ac fortunarum suarum summam); from which he will not depart
unless some business requires; when he has left which he seems
to be abroad; and if he has returned to it he has already
ceased to journey!’ /~~Code 10, 39, 7J
’’Principal residence”. A person may have a double
residence, one in the country of his original domicile and one 
in another country /""Brooks v. Brooks 1902 4 F. 1014 and 1905
Alkman v. Aikman 1859 2 1 L. 757 and 3 McQ. 854; Mackenzie’s
Trustees v. Mackenzie 8- Others (O.K.) 1894 2 S.L.T. 8 8; Hunter 
v . Hunter (0.H.) 1893 30 S .L.F. 915; Donaldson v . McClure 
1857 20 D. 307 and 1860 22 I). (H.L.) 7; Hunter v. Hunter (O.H.) 
1893 30 S.L.F. 915_J7 To acquire a domicile of choice the 
principal residence must be in the new country. Unless that is j 
so the person has not adopted the new country as his domicile, j 
The question of double residence also affects the abandonment 
of the domicile of origin./~*q«v._7
8F. (H.L.) 4; Foss v. Boss 1926 S.C. 1038 and 1930 S.C
The/
i * f 5 L 5 £ 2 £ . .  I t  i s  n o t  e n o u g h  i f  a  p e r s o n  m a k e  S c o t l a n d  h i s  
p r i n c i p a l  r e s i d e n c e  i f  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  h i s  p r o -  
: p e r t y  a n d  b u s i n e s s  i s  s t i l l  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  o f  o r i g i n ,  
E n g l a n d ,  f o r  a l t h o u g h  h i s  l a r e r a  i s  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  h i s  
r e r u m  a e  f o r t u n a r u m  s u a r u n  s u n m a m  i s  s t i l l  i n  E n g l a n d  
^ B r o o k s  v .  B r o o k s  1  c n o  4 p .  1 0 1 4 ,  n e r  L o r d  f r i n n e a r  
a t  p .  10 S P .  A f f d  a s  M a r c h i o n e s s  o f  H u n t l y  v .
G a s k e l l  1 9 0 5  8  F .  ( H . L . )  4 ] .
A  c o m m o n e r  c a s e  i s  t h a t  o f  a  m a n  m a k i n g  a  n e w  
c o u n t r y  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  h i s  b u s i n e s s ,  w h e n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
a r i s e s  w h e t h e r  h e  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  
i t .  T h a t  a  p e r s o n  c a r r i e s  o n  b u s i n e s s  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  
c o u n t r y  o r  i s  e m p l o y e d  t h e r e  u s u a l l y  m e a n s  t h a t  h e  
w i l l  r e s i d e  t h e r e  w i t h  a  c e r t a i n  d e g r e e  o f  p e r m a n e n c e .  
T h i s  i s  a  c i r c u m s t a n c e  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y  f B r o w n  v .
rurt
i s  c o n c l u s i v e  o f  i t ,  
a n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  m u s t  b e ,  w h e t h e r  h e  h a s  a d o p t e d  t h e  
n e w  c o u n t r y  a s  t h e  s o l e  d o m i c i l e  a n d  a b a n d o n e d  h i s  
d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n .  f , I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s ,  
j u s t  a s  in  t h e  c a s e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  m e n  o r  t r a d e r s ,  
t h e  n a t u r e ,  o r  t h e  t e n u r e ,  o r  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  o f  t h e  
o c c u p a t i o n  f o r m  o n l y  a n  e l e m e n t  o f  e v i d e n c e  i n  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  i n t e n t i o n  . . . .  I f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
p u b l i c  e m p l o y m e n t  o r  o f  p r i v a t e  e m p l o y m e n t  l e a d  a  m a n  
t o  r e s o l v e  p e r m a n e n t l y  t o  s e t t l e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  
h e  h o l d s  h i s  a p p o i n t m e n t ,  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  r e a s o n  o f  
h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  b u t  h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e s  h i s  
d o m i c i l e . , f  j F a i r b a i m  v .  N e v i l l e  1 8 ? 9  2 5  R .  1 9 2  p e r  
L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  R o b e r t s o n  a t  p .  203 J .  T h u s  a  S c o t s m a n  
w a s  h e l d  n o t  t o  h a v e  l o s t  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  i n  
S c o t l a n d  b y  r e s i d i n g  w i t h  h i s  w i f e  a n d  f a m i l y  i n  v a r i o u
B r o w n  1928 S . C .  542 1. B u t  i t
111.
p l a c e s  i n , - E n g l a n d  f o r  e l e v e n  y e a r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  w o r k  a s  
a  j o b b i n g  e n g i n e e r ,  l i e  d e p o n i n g  t h a t  i f  h e  g o t  a s  g o o d  
a  w a g e  i n  S c o t l a n d  a s  i n  E n g l a n d ,  h e  w o u l d  c o m e  h e r e  
t o  w o r k  ^ H o o d  v .  H o o d  1 8 9 7  2 4  R .  9 7 3 j .  A n d  a  s a i l o r ,  
w h o  l i v e d  a s h o r e  a t  L i v e r p o o l ,  w h i c h  w a s  c o n v e n i e n t  
f o r  h i s  s e r v i c e ,  w a s  h e l d ,  b e c a u s e  o f  v a r i o u s  i n d i c i a ,  
n o t  t o  h a v e  l o s t  h i s  S c o t c h  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  £ j | © r r  
v .  R i c h a r d s o n  *  s  T r u s t e e s  ( O . H . )  1 8 9 8  6  S . L . T .  244] .
T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  h e  h a s  t h e  a n i m u s  - r e v e r t - e n d i  
e r  i n t e n t i o n  o f  r e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  h o m e  c o u n t r y  a f t e r  h e  
h a s  m a d e  h i s  f o r t u n e  o r  w h e n  h e  r e t i r e ^  w i l l  g i v e  a
cvdoptcj the. nc.W
u s e f u l  i n d i c a t i o n  a s  t o  " w h e t h e r  h e  h a s  - a - b a n d o n e d  t h e
djuofey as h»5> dojnic.ilc to jn tcr I t
doipieii-e---of-■ origin^ ^ Pairbairn v. Neville 18^7 9-3 R,
1 9 2 y L . A .  v .  B r o w n * s  T r u s t e e s  1 9 0 7  S . C .  3 3 s J .  T h i s  
-i s  n e t  - - a n  i n f a l l i b l o  t o o A - - 4 n — a - 1 - 1 — e a n e n - .  I t  i s  o f t e n  
s a i d  t h a t  i f  a  m a n  r e s i d e s  i n  a  c o u n t r y  w i t h  t h e  
a n i m u s  m a n e n d i ,  o r  w i t h o u t  t h e  a n i m u s  r e v e r t e n d i  t o  
t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n ,  h e  h a s  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  
t h e r e ,  f s e e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  d i c t a  c r i t i c i s e d
—\ v L t  " t i s *  n o t  a *  'w f a U i  b /xr t e s t  in  oi 11 c a s - e S .  I h e .
l a t e r ]  b u t  t h i o b t e s t  i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  c a s e s  o f  
i n v a l i d s  w h o  a r e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  g o  a b r o a d  f o r  t h e i r  
h e a l t h  a n d  w h o  r e s i d e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  w i t h o u t  
a n y  h o p e  o f  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  r e t u r n ,  T h e y  r e s i d e  
w i t h o u t  t h e  a n i m u s  r e v e r t e n d i ,  y e t  d o  n o t .  a c q u i r e  a  
d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  ( s e e  l a t e r ) .  
I t  i s  a l s o  i n a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a  c a s e  l i k e  R a m s a y  v .  
L i v e r p o o l  R o y a l  I n f i r m a r y  £ l 9 3 0  S . C .  ( H . L . )  83J  w h e r e  
a  S c o t s m a n  a g e d  f o r t y  f i v e  w e n t  t o  L i v e r p o o l  t o  b e  n e a r  
o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  h i s  f a m i l y ;  h e  l i v e d  t h e r e  f o r  t h i r t y  
s e v e n  y e a r s  t i l l  h i s  d e a t h ,  r e m a i n i n g  a f t e r  t h e  d e a t h  
o f  t h e  l a s t  s u r v i v o r  o f  h i s  r e l a t i v e s ,  a p p a r e n t l y  
f r o m  l e t h a r g y  a n d  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  c h a n g e .  H e  
r e s i d e d  i n  L i v e r p o o l  w i t h o u t  a n y  a n i m u s  r e v e r t e n d i  
b u t  h e  d i d  n o t  a c q u i r e s ,  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  E n g l a n d :  
a /
112•
a  p o s i t i v e  k i n d  o f  a n i m u s  i s  r e q u i r e d ,  n a m e l y  t o  
a d o p t  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y  a s  t h e  s o l e  d o m i c i l e .  H o w e v e r  
t h e  t e s t ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  m a n  h a s  t h e  a n i m u s  r e v e r t e n d i  
i s  u s e f u l  i n  c a s e s  o f  p e r s o n s  g o i n g  a b r o a d  f o r  t h e  
p u r p o s e  o f  t r a d e  o r  e m p l o y m e n t .
T h e  c l i m a t e  o f  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y  m a y  b e a  w e i g h t y
if
f a c t o r .  I f  i t  i s  t r o p i c a l  o r  u n c o m f o r t a b l e  o r  u n -
: h e a l t h y ,  t h e r e  i s  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  f a c t , a g a i n s t  a
w h i t e  m a n  a c q u i r i n g  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  i t .  T h u s
t h e  p l e a  t h a t  a  S c o t t i s h  b u s i n e s s  m a n  h a d  a c q u i r e d  a
d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  B u r m a h  w a s  r e j e c t e d  w i t h  t h e
c o m m e n t  t h a t  n o  m a n  i n  h i s  s e n s e s  e v e r  g o e s  t o  B u r m a h
s i n e  a n i m o  r e v e r t e n d i  ^ S t e e l  v .  S t e e l  1 8 p 8  I B  R .  R p q J .
B u t  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i s  n o t  i r r e b u t a b l e ,  a n d  i n  a  l a t e r
c a s e  w h e r e  t h e r e  w e r e  s t r o n g  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  h e  d i d
% m a n
n o t  i n t e n d  t o  r e t u r n  t o  S c o t l a n d ,  a  S c o t l L & i i d  w a s  h e l d
t o  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  O e y l o n  | l .  A .
v .  B r o w n 1 s  T r u s t e e s  1 9 0 7  S . C . 3 3 3 ~ } .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d
i f  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  D o m i n i o n s  o r  t e m p e r -
i h * t
: a t e  c o l o n i e s  w h i c h  i s  a  c i r c u m s t a n c e  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  
t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e ' ,  b e c a u s e  " t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  m i g r a n t s  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i e s  g o  t h e r e  
w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  p e r m a n e n t  h o m e ,  
a n d  t h a t  r a i s e s  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  f a c t ’ *  ^ L . A .  v .  B r o w n T s  
T r u s t e e s  p e r  L o r d  M c L a r e n  a t  p a g e  3 4 o J .  " T h e  i n f e r ­
e n c e  . . . .  i s  n o t  m u c h  w e a k e r  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  o u r  p e o p l e  
w h o  h a v e  g o n e  t h e r e "  j ^ B r o w n  v .  B r o w n  1 9 2 8  S . C U  F 4 2  p e r  
t h e  L o r d  O r d .  F l e m i n g J .  A n d  o f  c o u r s e  i t  i s  e a s i e r  
t o  f i n d  t h a t  a  S c o t s m a n  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  
c h o i c e  i n  E n g l a n d  t h a n  i n  a  c o u n t r y  u n d e r  a  d i f f e r e n t  
s o v e r e i g n  w h e r e  a  s t r a n g e  l a n g u a g e  i s  s p o k e n ,  j j w h i c k e r  
v . /
v .  H u m e  ( 1 8 5 8 )  7  H . L . C .  1 2 4  p e r  L o r d  C r a n w o r t h  a t  p .  1 5 9 .  
A p p r o v e d  b y  I < o r d  C h e l m s f o r d  i n  M o o r h o u s e  v .  L o r d  ( 1 8 6 3 )
1 0  H . L . C .  2 7 2  a t  p .  2 8 7 ;  C o r b r i d g e  v .  S o m e r v i l l e  1 9 1 4  
1 , S . T . T .  p e r  L o r d  M a c k e n z i e  a t  p .  3 0 7 .  M a c p h a i l  v .
M a c p h a 1 1 1 s  T r u s t e e s  ( 0 . E . )  1 9 0 6  1 4  S . L . T .  3 8 8 _ 7
I t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  
d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  a n  e a s t e r n  c o u n t r y  t h a t  t h e  
p e r s o n  s h a l l  h a v e  a s s o c i a t e d  h i m s e l f  w i t h  t h e  n a t i v e s  
a n d  l i v & d l f  l i k e  o n e ;  s e t t l i n g  p e r m a n e n t l y  i n  t h e  w h i t e  
c o m m u n i t y  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  s u f f i c e s ,  f ~ C a s d a g l i  v .  C a s d a g l i  
1 9 1 9  A . C .  1 4 5 J 7
" W i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  p e r m a n e n c e " .  " I t  ( r e s i  d e n c e )  
m u s t  b e  r e s i d e n c e  f i x e d ,  n o t  f o r  a n y  d e f i n e d  p e r i o d  o r  
p a r t i c u l a r  p u r p o s e ,  b u t  g e n e r a l  a n d  i n d e f i n i t e  i n  i t s  
f u t u r e  d u r a t i o n "  f ~ U d n y  v .  U d b y  1 8 6 9  7  M .  ( H . L . )  8 9  
p e r  I j o r b .  W e s t b u r v  a t  p .  9 9 .  S e e  B e l l  v .  K e n n e d y  1 8 6 8  
6 M .  ( H . L . )  6 9 .  F r a s e r  p .  1 2 5 7 _ 7
( b )  T o  a b a n d o n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d o m i c i l e .  £ ~ T h e  
L a u d e r d a l e  P e e r a g e  C a s e  1 8 8 5  1 0  A . C .  6 9 2 _ _ /
" T h e  a n i m u s  o r  i n t e n t i o n  t o  a b a n d o n  o n e  d o m i c i l e  
f o r  a n o t h e r  m e a n s  s o m e t h i n g  f a r  m o r e  t h a n  a  m e r e  c h a n g e  
o f  r e s i d e n c e .  I t  i m p o r t s  a n  i n t e n t i o n  n o t  o n l y  t o  
r e l i n q u i s h  t h o s e  p e c u l i a r  r i g h t s ,  p r i v i l e g e s ,  a n d  
i m m u n i t i e s  w h i c h  t h e  l a w  a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  c o n f e r s  o n  t h e  d e n i z e n s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  -  
i n  t h e i r  p u r c h a s e s  a n d  s a l e s  a n d  o t h e r  b u s i n e s s  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  -  i n /
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i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  o r  m u n i c i p a l  s t a t u s  -  a n d  i n  t h e i r  
d a i l y  a f f a i r s  o f  c o m m o n  l i f e :  h u t  a l s o  t h e  l a w s  b y  
w h i c h  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  p r o p e r t y  i s  r e g u l a t e d  a f t e r  d e a t h ”  
( D o n a l d s o n  v .  M c L u r e  1 8 5 7  2 0  D .  3 0 7  p e r  L o r d  I v o r y  a t
22 p.
p .  3 2 1 .  A f f d .  1 8 6 0  ( H . L . )
' A
D i c t a  i n  m a n y  c a s e s  a n d  m o s t  o f  t h e  a c c e p t e d  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  d o m i c i l e  m a y  g i v e  t h ©  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  a n i m u s  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d ,  
a n d  t h a t  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  h a v e  r e s i d e n c e  p l u s  t h e
a n i m u s  m a n e n d i ,  Vo, c  t f a / n  p i c - - - - - - -
I n  U t o f r y  v .  U d n f e y  f l R 6 p  7 y .  ( H . L . )  89 J  L o r d  
W e s t b u r y  s a i d :  ’ ' d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i s  a  c o n c l u s i o n  o r  
i n f e r e n c e  w h i c h  t h e  l a w  d e r i v e s  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  o f  a  m a n  
f i x i n g  v o l u n t a r i l y  h i s  s o l e  o r  c h i e f  r e s i d e n c e  i n  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e ,  w i t h  t h e  u n l i m i t e d  i n t e n t i o n  o f  
c o n t i n u i n g  t o  r e s i d e  t h e r e . ”  ^ A d o p t e d  b y  L o r d  O r a i g h i l l  
C a r s w e l l  v .  C a r s w e l l  1 8 8 1  8 R .  9 0 1  a t  p .  9 1 2 ,  b y  
L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  S t r a t h c l y d e  i n  C r u m p t o n ^  J u d i c i a l  
F a c t o r  v .  F i n c h - N o y e s  1 9 1 8  S . C .  3 7 8 ,  a n d  L o r d  K i n c a i m e y  
i n  A r m i t a g e ; s  T r u s t e e s  v .  A r m i t a g e  ( O . H . )  1 9 0 4  1 1  S . L . T .  
697).
to S t o r y  ” T h a t  p l a c e  i s  p r o p e r l y  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  a
p e r s o n  i n  w h i c h  h i s  h a b i t a t i o n  i s  f i x e d  w i t h o u t  a n y
p r e s e n t  i n t e n t i o n  o f  r e m o v i n g  t h e r e f r o m ”  £ p .  4 7 .
A d o p t e d ,  w i t h o u t  a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t ,  b y  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t
S t r a t h c l y d e  i n  O o r b r i d g e  v .  S o m e r v i l l e  1 9 1 4  1  S . L . T .
3 0 5 ,  a n d  b y  C h i t t y  J u g t t o e  i n  C r a i g n i s h  v .  C r a i g n i s h
1 8 9 2  3  O h .  1 8 0 ,  a t  p .  1 9 2 .  H o w  m i s l e a d i n g  t h i s  d e f i n ­
is
j i t i o n .  c a n  b e  s e e n  f r o m  s t a v e r t  v .  S t a v e r t  1 8 8 2  9  R .  5 2 0  
w h e r e  t h e  L o r d  O r d i n a r y  a p p l i e d  i t  w i t h  r i d i c u l o u s  
r e s u l t s .  A n  A m e r i c a n  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  d o m i c i l e  i s  
d a n g e r o u s ,  b e c u a s e  t h e  A m e r i c a n s  d o  n o t  p u t  s o  m u c h  
e m p h a s i s /  ,
IIP.
e m p h a s i s  a s  w e  d o  o n  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  a n d  l o y a l t y  
t o  t h e  h o m e  c o u n t r y .  , f I n  A m e r i c a  t h e  B r i t i s h  l o y a l t y  
t o  o n e ’ s  p l a c e  o f  b i r t h  i s  ' l i t t l e  f e l t .  T h e  i m m i g r a n t  
w h o  i d e n t i f i e s  h i m s e l f  w i t h  h i s  n e w  c o u n t r y ,  o r  t h e  
E a s t e r n e r  w h o  g o e s  w e s t  a n d  i d e n t i f i e s  h i m s e l f  w i t h  h i s  
n e w  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  i s  a  c o m m o n  f i g u r e .  T o  r e f e r
s u c h  a  m a n ,  w h i l e  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  m o v i n g  f r o m  o n e
p l a c e  i n  h i s  n e w  c o u n t r y  t o  a n o t h e r ,  t o  a  f o r g o t t e n  
o r  h a l f - f o r g o t t e n  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n ,  w o u l d  b e ' u n r e a l  
( B e a l e  p .  1 . 8 4 , 5 )  " T h e  A m e r i c a n  d o c t r i n e  i s  v e r y  
n a t u r a l l y  m o r e  l i b e r a l  i n  a l l o w i n g  c h a n g e  o f  d o m i c i l e  
t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h "  ( p .  1 4 0 ) .  T h u s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  t h e r e  i s  n o  s t r o n g e r  p r e s u m p t i o n  a g a i n s t  c h a n g e  
f r o m  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  t h a n  t h e r e  i s  a g a i n s t  o t h e r  
c h a n g e s  o f  d o m i c i l e  ( p .  1 2 9 )  a n d  w h e n  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  
c h o i c e  i s  a b a n d o n e d  i n  f a c t  w i t h o u t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  
a  n e w  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e ,  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  d o e s  
n o t  r e v i v e ,  b u t  t h e  l a s t  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i s  r e t a i n e d
u n t i l  a  n e w  o n e  i s  a c q u i r e d . J
D i c e y  d e f i n e s  d o m i c i l e  a s  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h i c h  i s  
c o n s i d e r e d  b y  E n g l i s h  l a w  t o  b e  a  m a n ’ s ’ p e r m a n e n t  h o m e ’  
j - p .  6 5 j |  a n d  e x p l a i n s  ’ p e r m a n e n t  h o m e ’  a s  m e a n i n g  t h a t  
c o u n t r y  e i t h e r  ( i )  i n  w h i c h  h e ,  i n  f a c t ,  r e s i d e s  w i t h  
a n y m u s  m a n e n d i  o r  ( i i )  i n  w h i c h ,  h a v i n g  s o  r e s i d e d  
h e  c o n t i n u e s  a c t u a l l y  t o  r e s i d e  t h o u g h  n o  l o n g e r  
r e t a i n i n g  t h e  a n i m u s  m a n e n d i  o r  ( i i i )  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
w h i c h ,  h a v i n g  s o  r e s i d e d  t h e r e  h e  r e t a i n s  t h e  a n i m u s  
m a n e n d i  t h o u g h  h e  i n  f a c t  n o  l o n g e r  r e s i d e s  t h e r e .
P h i l l i m o r e  d e f i n e s  d o m i c i l e  a s  " A  r e s i d e n c e  a t  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e ,  a c c o m p a n i e d  w i t h  . . .  a n  i n t e n t i o n  
t o  r e m a i n  t h e r e  f o r  a n  u n l i m i t e d  t i m e ; * V a t t e l  a s "  a n  
h a b i t a t i o n  f i x e d  i n  s o m e  p l a c e  w i t h '  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  
r e m a i n i n g  . . t h e r e  a l w a y s " .
I n /
11* .
I l l  B e l l  v .  K e n n e d y  L o r d  C a i r n s  s a i d : f , T h e  
q u e s t i o n  I  a s k  y o u r  L o r d s h i p s  t o  c o n s i d e r  i n
t h e  p r e s e n t  c a s e  i s  i n  s u b s t a n c e  t h i s :  w h e t h e r  t h e  
a p p e l l a n t  h a s  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  m a k e  a r i d  h a s  m a d e ,
S c o t l a n d  h i s  h o m e ,  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
h i m s e l f  a n d  h i s  f a m i l y  t h e r e ,  a n d  e n d i n g  h i s  d a y s  i n  
t h a t  c o u n t r y ? " ^  M .  ( H . L . )  6 9  a t  p .  7 l J  .
f W , L o r d  W e s t b u r y f s  d i c t u m  i n  U d n f c y  e m p h a s i s e s  t h a t  
t h e  r e s i d e n c e  m u s t  b e  v o l u n t a r y ,  a  v i r t u e  w h i c h  t h e  
o t h e r s  d o  n o t  h a v e ,  b u t  a l l  a r e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  b e c a u s e  
t h e y  i m p l y  t h a t  r e s i d e n c e  p l u s  t h e  a n i m u s  m a n e n d i  
a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  
c h o i c e  p o t h e r  d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  a n d  c r i t i c i s e d  
l a t e r ,  i n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  e v o l v e  a  t r u e  d e f i n i t i o n )
B r o o k s  v .  B r o o k s  T r u s t e e s  £ l 9 0 2  4  F .  1 0 1 4 .  A f f d *  
M a r c h i o n e s s  o f  H u n t l y  v .  G a s k e l l  1 9 0 *  8 F .  ( H . L . ) 4 j ,  
s h o w s  h o w  m i s l e a d i n g  t h a t  c o n c e p t i o n  i s .  A n  E n g l i s h  
b a n k e r ,  a n d  M e m b e r  o f  P a r l i a m e n t  f o r  a  C h e s h i r e  
c o n s t i t u e n c y  w h o  h a d  l a r g e  l a n d e d  e s t a t e s  i n  L a n c a - '
: s h i r e  a n d  C h e s h i r e ,  r e t i r e d  f r o m  a c t i v e  m a n a g e m e n t  
o f  h i s  b a n k  a t  t h e  a g e  o f  f i f t y ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  
t h i r t y  y e a r s  o f  h i s  l i f e  l i v e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  o n  e s t a t e s  
w h i c h  h © p u r c h a s e d  o n  D e e s i d e ,  w h e r e  h e  k e p t  h i s  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  H e  p r e f e r r e d  h i s  S c o t t i s h  r e s i d e n c e ,  
t h o u g h  h e  r e t a i n e d  h o u s e s  i n  L o n d o n  a n d  M a n c h e s t e r  
f o r  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  a n d  b u s i n e s s  d u t i e s ,  a n d  h e  i n t e n d e d  
t o  l i v e  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  h i s  l i f e  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  w h i c h ,  
i n  f a c t ,  h e  d i d ,  l e a v i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  h e  w a s  t o  
b u r i e d  a t  h i s  S c o t t i s h  r e s i d e n c e .  N o w ,  o n  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n s  c i t e d  a b o v e  o n e  w o u l d  h o l d  t h a t  h e  h a d  
a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  B u t  i t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t s  c o r r e c t l y  h e l d ,  w h i c h  t h e y  
d i d /
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d i d  u n a n i m o u s l y ,  t h a t  h ©  h a d  n o t  l o s t  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  
o r i g i n  a n d  t h a t  h ©  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d .  D u r i n g  
h i s  l i f e t i m e  B r o o k s  w a s  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
d o m i c i l e .  O n  t h r e e  o c c a s i o n s  h e  a s k e d  h i s  M a n c h e s t e r  
s o l i c i t o r  i f  h e  w a s  a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t  ( w h i c h  w o u l d  h a v e  
l i m i t e d  h i s  t e s t a m e n t a r y  p o w e r s )  a n d  w a s  a p p a r e n t l y  
s a t i s f i e d  b y  t h e  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  h e  w a s  n o t .  T h e  C o u r t s  
i n f e r r e d  f r o m  t h i s  t h a t  h e  d i d  n o t  i n t e n d  t o  a b a n d o n  
h i s  E n g l i s h  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n ,  a n d  t h e y  h e l d  t h a t  i t  
w a s  a  n e c e s s a r y  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e q u i r e d  a n i m u s  t h a t  h e  
s h o u l d .  T h e  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  K i n r o s s  s a i d :  ” A  n e w  
d o m i c i l e  c a n  o n l y  b e  a c q u i r e d  a n i m o  a t  f a c t o ,  t h e  
a n i m u s  b e i n g  t o  s u r r e n d e r  t h e  d o m i c i l e  w h i c h  t h e  p e r -  
: s o n  h o l d s  a t  t h e  t i m e  a n d  t o  a c q u i r e  a n o t h e r  d o m i c i l e  
e l s e w h e r e ”  £ * 1 9 0 2  4  F .  a t  p .  1 0 3 7 ^ .  I n  T h e  H o u s e  o f  
L o r d s  t h e  E a r l  o f  H a l s b u r y  q u o t e d  w i t h  a p p r o v a l  t h e  
p a s s a g e  f r o m  o n e  o f  L o r d  I v o r y ’ s  j u d g e m e n t s  w h i c h  b e g i n s  
t h i s  s u b - c h a n t e r  £ s e e  a l s o  M a c k e n z i e s  T r u s t e e s  v .  
M a c k e n z i e  a n d  O t h e r s  ( O . H * )  1 8 9 4  o  S . L . T .  nQJ .
T h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  h a s  b e e n  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :  
’ ’ T h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  i s  t o ,  p r e v a i l ,  u n t i l  t h e  p a r t y  
h a s  n o t  o n l y  a c q u i r e d  a n o t h e r  b u t  h a s  m a n i f e s t e d  a n d  
c a r r i e d  i n t o  e x e c u t i o n  a n  i n t e n t i o n  o f  a b a n d o n i n g  h i s  
f o r m e r  d o m i c i l e  a n d  t a k i n g  a n o t h e r  a s  h i s  s o l e  d o m i c i l e .  
^ S o m e r v i l l e  5  V e s e y  7 8 6 .  A p p r o v e d  i n  m a n y  c a s e s ,  e . g .  
M u n r o  v .  M u n r o  1  H o b .  4 9 2 .  B r o o k s ,  s u p r a j
L o r d  C r a n w o r t h  w e n t  a s  f a r  a s  t o  s a y  t h a t  ” l n  
o r d e r  t o  a c q u i r e  a  n e w  d o m i c i l e  a  m a n  m u s t  i n t e n d  
q u a t e n u s  i n  i l l o  e x u e r e  p a t r i a m ”  ^Whicker v .  H u m e  
( 1 8 6 8 )  7  H . L . C .  1 2 4  a t  p .  1 F 5 9 J  M o o r h o u s e  v .  L o r d  
( 1 8 6 3 )  10  H . L . C .  2 7 2  a t  p .  2 8 0  w h i c h  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  
I n g l i s  ^ q u o t i n g  w i t h  a p p r o v a l  i n  S t e e l  v .  S t e e l _  1 8 8 8  
1 6  R .  8 9 0  t r a n s l a t e d  a s  m e a n i n g  t h a t  h e  m u s t  h a v e  a  
f i x e d /
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f i x e d  i n t e n t i o n  t o  s t r i p  h i m s e l f  o f  h i s  n a t i o n a l i t y ,  
o r  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s  t o  r e n o u n c e  h i s  b i r t h r i g h t  i n  t h e  
p l a c e  o f  h i s  o r i g i n a l  d o m i c i l e ,  j r h i s  w a s  a d o p t e d  b y  
t h e  E a r l  o f  H a l s b u r y  i n  M a r c h i o n e s s  o f  H u n t l y  v ,  
d a  s h e l l  s u p r a j .  T h e s e  w o r d s  a r e  p e r h a p s  a  l i t t l e  
e x t r a v a g a n t ,  a n d  h a v e  b e e n  c r i t i c i s e d  b y  m o d e m  w r i t e r s ,  
j j D i c e y  p .  8 9 /  B e a l e  p p . 9 9 , 1 0 0 /  F r a s e r  p .  1 9 9 4 , 8 ;  r e l y i n g  
o n  L o r d  W e s t b u r y ’ s  d i s s e n t  f r o m  t h e  t e s t  i n  T T d n ^ y  k .  
T T d n d y  1 8 9 9  7  M .  ( H . L . )  8 9  a t  p . 1 0 0 .  B u t  t h e  t e s t  w a s  
a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  l a t e r  c a s e s  o f  S t e e l  s u p r a .  M a r c h i o n e s s  
o f  H u n t l y  v .  G a s h e l l  s u p r a ,  a n d  W a h l  v .  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  
( 1 9 : 5 8 )  1 4 7  L . T .  3 8 2  p e r  L o r d  D u n e d i n  a t  p .  3 8 3 ^  b u t  
p r o v i d e d  q u a t e n u s  i s  b o r n e  i n  m i n d / a n d  t h e  p h r a s e  i s  
n o t  a p p l i e d  t o o  l i t e r a l l y ,  i t  i s  p r o b a b l y  s t i l l  a  
u s e f u l  a n d  n o t  u n f a i r  t e s t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w h e n  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  a  S c o t s m a n  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  
i n  a  c o m p l e t e l y  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  l i k e  F r a n c e  £ k s  w a s  
t h e  c a s e  i n  M o o r h o u s e  v .  L o r d  s u p r a j  •  I t  c a n n o t  b e  
m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  o a s e s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  t e s t  w a s  a p p l i e d  
wece d e c i d e d  w r o n g l y .  O f  c o u r s e  n a t i o n a l i t y  a n d  
d o m i c i l e  a r e  t w o  d i s t i n c t  t h i n g s  j u d n y  v .  U d n y  s u p r a ,  
p e r  L o r d  W e s t b u r y  a t  p „  :  a  m a n  m a y  c h a n g e  h i s  
d o m i c i l e  w i t h o u t  l o s i n g  h i s  n a t i o n a l i t y  ^ B o l d r i n i  v .  
B o l d r i n i  ( 1 9 ^ 3 )  p .  9 ;  B r a d f l e l d  v .  S w a n  t o n  ( 1 9 3 1 )  I r .
R .  44&j; m a y  c h a n g e  h i s  n a t i o n a l i t y  w i t h o u t  l o s i n g  h i s  
d o m i c i l e  j w a h l  v .  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  ( 1 9 3 2 )  1 4 7  L . T .
3 8 2 .  B u t  c h a n g e  o f  n a t i o n a l i t y  i s  a  v e r y  s t r o n g  i n d i -  
:  c a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n i r n u s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  c h a n g e  o f  d o r n i c i l e j ;  
a n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a n  a l i e n ,  w h o  w a s  l i v i n g  i n  E n g l a n d  
w a s  s u b j e c t  u n d e r  t h e  A l i e n s  O r d e r  1 9 2 0  t o  d e p o r t a t i o n  
f o r  m i s b e h a v i o u r  d i d  n o t . p r e v e n t  h i m '  f r o m  a c q u i r i n g  a n  
E n g l i s h  d o m i c i l e  o f . c h o i c e .  | B o l d r i n i  Vv B o l d r i n i  s u p r ^ j j j
W h i l e  t h e  p e r s o n  r e t a i n s  a n d  m a k e s  u s e  o f  a  
r e s i d e n c e  i n  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  i t :  w i l l  b e  
d i f f i c u l t /
119.
W h i l e  t h e  p e r s o n  r e t a i n s  a n d  m a k e s  u s e  o f  a /  
r e s i d e n c e  i n  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  i t  w i l l  b e - d i f f i c u l t  
t o  h o l c l  t h a t  h e  h a s  a b a n d o n e d  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n .
T h u s  r e s i d e n c e  i n  S c o t l a n d  w h e r e  h i s  " p r i n c i p a l
91 fi­
r e  g  i  d e n  c e  w a s  ,  f o r  t h i r t y  y e a r s ,  w a s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r
a n  E n g l i s h m a n  t o  l o s e  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n ,  b e c a u s e
i n t e r  a l i a ,  h e  r e t a i n e d  t w o  r e s i d e n c e s  i n  E n g l a n d ,  o n e
i n  M a n c h e s t e r  a n d  o n e  i n  L o n d o n ,  w h i c h  h e  u s e d  w h e n
t r a n s a c t i n g  b u s i n e s s ,  a n d  f o r  P a r  1  i a m e n t a r y  d u t i e s .
^ B r o o k s  v .  B r o o k s  1 9 0 9  4  F .  1 0 1 4 ,  a n d  1 9 0 . *  3  F . ( H . L . ) 4 :
S e e  a l s o  R o s s  v .  R o s s  1 9 9 6  S . C .  1 0 3 8  a n d  1 9 3 0  S . C .
( H . L . )  1 ;  A i k m a n  v .  A i k m a n  1839  21  D .  7 5 7  a n d  3  M e $ .
3 5 4 ; M a c k e n z i e 1s  T r u s t e e s  v .  M a c k e n z i e _ a n d  0 1 h e r s
( O . H . )  1 3 9 4  2 S . L . T .  8 8 ;  H u n t e r  v .  H u n t e r  ( O . H . )  1 3 9 3
3 0  S . L . R o  91$J. I t  w o u l d  b e  g o i n g  t o o  f a r  h o w e v e r
t o  s a y  t h a t  h e  c o u l d  n o t  l o s e  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n
w h i l e  r e t a i n i n g  a  r e s i d e n c e  i n  i t .  A n  E n g l i s h m a n
o b t a i n e d  a  p e r m a n e n t  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  p o s t  i n  E d i n b u r g h ,
a n d  h e  l i v e d  i n  h i s  o w n  h o u s e  I n  P o r t o b e l l o  w i t h  h i s
f a m i l y .  H e  i n h e r i t e d  a  p r o p e r t y  w o r t h  £ 1 0 0  p e r  a n n u m
i n  W e s t m o r e l a n d ,  w h e r e  h e  s p e n t  h i s  a n n u a l  l e a v e ,  a n d
t h e  h o u s e  o n  w h i c h  h e  a l l o w e d  h i s  s i s t e r s  t o  o c c u p y
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  h e  c o u l d  c o m e  a n d  g o  a s  h e  p l e a s e d . ,  H e
a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  S c o t l a n d  | F a i r b a i r n
v .  H e v i l l o  1 8 9 7  2 5  R .  1 9 p j .
W h e n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  
c h o i c e  i n  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  b y  a  S c o t s m a n ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h ­
m e n t  o r  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  E n g l a n d  i s  o f  
s o m e  v a l u e  i n  n e g a t i v i n g  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  h a s  b e e n  a b a n d o n e d  j c r a n t  v .  G r a n t  
1 9 3 1  S . C .  2 3 8 ,  p e r  L o r d  S a n d s | .
A b a n d o n m e n t  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  n e e d  n o t  
b e  a  c o n s c i o u s  a c t  -  m o s t  p e r s o n s  n e i t h e r  t h i n k  a b o u t  
d o m i c i l e  n o r  a p p r e c i a t e  i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  -  a n d  m a y
b e /
b e  i n f e r r e d  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n  h a s  s e t t l e d  
f o r  a  I o n a  t i m e  i n  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y ,  w i t h  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
h e  i n t e n d e d  t o  a d o p t  i t  a s  h i s  p e r m a n e n t  h o m e ,  a n d  t h a t  
f o r  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  h e  m a i n t a i n e d  n o  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n n e c t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n . / " " P o b i n s o n  v .  P o b i n s o n 1  s  
T r u s t e e s  ( O . H . )  1 9 3 4  S . L . T .  1 8 3 ;  C o r b r l d g e  v .  S o m e r v i l l e  
1 9 1 4  1  S . L . T .  3 0 5 .  I n  h o n a l d s o n  v .  1 8 6 0  22  L .
( H . L . )  7 ,  a n d  M a r c h i o n e s s  o f  H u n t l y  v .  G a s h e l l  1 9 0 5  8  1 .  
( F . T . . )  4  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n n e c t i o n  w a s  m a i n t a i n e d  w i t h  
t h e  f o r m e r  d o m i c i l e ^
I f  a b a n d o n m e n t  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  a p p e a r s  
f r o m  o t h e r  f a c t s ,  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  i n  a  w i l l  t h a t  t h e  
t e s t a t o r  w i s h e d  t o  r e t a i n  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n ,  
w i l l  b e  i n e f f e c t i v e  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  
d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y ,  f ~ P o b i n s o n  v .  
R o b i n s o n 1  s  T r u s t e e s ,  s u p r a .  C o m p a r e  I n .  r e  A n n e s l e y  
( 1 9 2 6 )  L . P .  C h . L .  6 9 2 ,  a n d  I n  r e  S t e e r  1 8 5 8  3  H .  h  N .  
5 9 8 _ 7
R o b i n s o n . v .  P o b i n s o n f s  T r u s t e e s  / " " ( O . H . )  1 9 3 4  
S . L . T .  1 8 3 _ 7  t h e  C o u r t /
181.
C o u r t  w a s  n o t  g o i n g  t o  p e r m i t  a  m a n  w h o  h a d  I n  f a c t  
a b a n d o n e d  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  a n d  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  
o f  c h o i c e  h e r e  t o  e s c a p e  f r o m  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  n a m e l y  
l i m i t a t i o n  o f  h i s  t e s t a m e n t a r y  p o w e r ,  b y  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  
i n  h i s  w i l l .
T h e r e  i s  E n g l i s h  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  a  m a n  i s  n o t  p r e v e n t e d  f r o m  a c q u i r i n g  a  d o m i c i l e  
o f  c h o i c e  m e r e l y  b y  a  w i s t f u l  i n t e n t i o n  t o  r e t u r n  t o  
h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  o n  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a n  e v e n t ,  
w h i c h  m a y  n o t  h a p p e n  f o r  a  l o n g  t i m e ,  o r  a t  a l l .  A .  
F r e n c h m a n  l i v e d  f o r  t w e n t y  s e v e n  y e a r s  i n  E n g l a n d ,  a n d  
m a r r i e d  s u c c e s s i v e l y  t w o  E n g l i s h w o m e n ,  w h o  w e r e - 
P r o t e s t a n t s ,  t h o u g h  h e  w a s  a  R o m a n  C a t h o l i c .  H e  h a d  
h i s  c h i l d r e n  b r o u g h t  u p  a s '  P r o t e s t a n t s ,  H i s  w i l l  w a s  
m  E n g l i s h  f o r m  a n d  h e  l e f t h i s  p r o p e r t y  i n  a  m a n n e r  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  F r e n c h  l a w .  N u m e r o u s  i r i t n e s s e s  
d e p o n e d  t h a t  h e  i n t e n d e d  t o  r e t u r n  t o  F r a n c e  w h e n  h e  
m a d e  h i s  f o r t u n e .  I t  w a s  a l s o  p r o v e d  t h a t  h e  a l w a y s  
r e f u s e d  t o  b e  n a t u r a l i z e d  i n  E n g l a n d  a n d  w o u l d  n o t
<i
l e a s e  a  h o u s e  f o r  m o r e  t h a n  t h r e e y e a r s .  H e  w a s  h e l d  
t o  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  E n g l a n d  ^ D o u c e t  v .  
G e o g h e g a n  1 8 7 8  L . R .  1 9  C h .  44lJ.  B u t  t h i s  m a y  n o t  b e  
a  f a u l t l e s s  a u t h o r i t y  |cp. W i n a n s  v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  
1 9 0 4  A . C .  ( H . L . )  2 8 7 ^  .  T h e r e  i s  a  t e n d e n c y  i n  s o m e  
o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  c a s e s  t o  b e  l e s s  s t r i c t  a b o u t  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  a n i m u s  t h a n  t h e  S c o t t i s h  c a s e s  
d e m a n d  J f s e e  D o u g l a s  v .  D o u g l a s  ( 1 8 7 1 )  L . R .  1 2  E q u .
6 1 7  a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  V - c  V . T i c v e n T s  c o m m e n t  a t  p .  6 4 4 J  •
I f  s o m e  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  t r u l y  i r r e c o n -  
i c i l e a b l e  w i t h  t h e  S c o t t i s h  o n e s ,  t h e  S c o t t i s h  l a w y e r  
c a n  c o n s o l e  h i m s e l f  w i t h  t h e  o b v i o u s  t e n d e n c y  o f  t h e
i
H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  i n  t h e  l a t e r  c a s e s  t o  l a y  m o r e  e m p h a s i s  
o n  i n t e n t i o n  a n d  b e  s t r i c t e r  i n  i t s  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f
t h i s /  x
182.
t h i s  e l e m e n t . £ s e e  e . g .  M a r c h i o n e s s  o f  H u n t l y  V .  G a s k e l d
1 9 0 3  8  F .  ( H . L . )  4 ;  L i v e r p o o l  R o y a l  I n f i r m a r y  y .  R a m s a y
1 9 0 0  S . C ,  ( H . L .  )  8 7 ^  #  . . . . .
T h e  t e n d e n c y  t o  p a y  m o r e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  a n i m u s  h a s
r e c e i v e d  j u d i c i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n .  B r o a d l y  s p e a k i n g ,
i t  i s  m u c h  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s a t i s f y  a  C o u r t  s i t t i n g .
t o - d a y  t h a t  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  h a s  b e e n  r e p l a c e d  b y
a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  t h a n  i t  w a s  i n  1 7 8 8 ; t h e  f a c t  o f
r e s i d e n c e  u s e d  t o  b u l k  m o r e  t h a n  i n t e n t i o n ,  i n t e n t i o n
o r  a n i m u s  n o w  b u l k s  m o r e  t h a n  r e s i d e n c e .  I n  t h e m s e l v e s
l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  i m m u t a b l e ,  b u t  t h e  w e i g h t
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  c a l l  f o r
t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n e v i t a b l y  v a r i e s  w i t h  t h e  c h a n g i n g
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  h u m a n  l i f e .  I n c r e a s e d  m o b i l i t y  a l o n e
h a s  w r o u g h t  a  g r e a t  c h a n g e  i n  o u r  i d e a s  o f  t h e
p e r m a n c e  o f  a  f o r e i g n  r e s i d e n c e ,  a n d  a  S c o t s m a n  w h o
l e a v e s  h i s  h o m e  a n d  k i n d r e d  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  t o  s p e n d
J i fe
t h e  b e s t  y e a r s  o f  h i s ^ i n  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  a  p r o f e s s i o n  
a b r o a d  n e e d  n e v e r  t h i n k  o f  e x i t i n g  h i m s e l f  f r o m  h i s  
n a t i v e  c o u n t r y f f  ^ L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  C l y d e  i n  G r a n t  v .
G r a n t  1 9 3 1  S . C .  a t  p .  2 5 ^ .  I n  v i e w  o f  t h i s  t e n d e n c y
s o m e  o f  t h e  o l d e r  c a s e s ;  [ e . g .  L o w n d e s  v .  D o u g l a s  
1 8 ^ 2  8 4  D .  1 3 9 1  w h e r e  L o r d  H e a v e s  s a i d :  f , I  d o  n o t
t h i n k  i t  i s  t h e  l a w  t h a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e
w i l l  b e  p r e v e n t e d  b y  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e  t h a t  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  o n  g o i n g  t o  a  c o l o n y  h a s  a n  i n t e n t i o n  o f
i
r e t u r n i n g  u l t i m a t e l y ,  o r  i n  a  c e r t a i n  n u m b e r  o f y e a r s ,  
m o r e  o r  l e s s ,  w h e n  h e  s h a l l  b e  a b l e  t o  d o  s o , f .  ( a t
T ctnj dicta of p -n
p a g e  1 4 0 2  )J. ^ f h e  o l d e r  j u r i s t s ,  [ e . g .  S t o r y  p .  FlJ 
m u s t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  i n a p p l i c a b l e  n o w .
F R E E D O M  o f  C H O I C E .
T h e  p e r s o n  m u s t  h a v e  v o l u n t a r i l y  c h o s e n  t h e  n e w  
c o u n t r y  a s  t h e  s o l e  d o m i c i l e  [ s a v i n g y  p .  9 9 ;  S t o r y  
p .  5 l J .  T h i s  m i g h t  a l m o s t  b e  a d d e d  a s  a  t h i r d
r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  
c h o i c e /
. 123.
c h o i c e  [ o p .  L o r d  S a n d s  i n  R o s s  v .  R o s s  1 9 2 8  S . C .  a t  
p .  1 0 3 4 : ” T h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  
r e q u i r e #  t h r e e  t h i n g s :  C h o i c e ,  I n t e n t i o n ,  a n d  R e s i d e n c e ” J
” T h e r e  m u s t  b e  r e s i d e n c e  f r e e l y  c h o s e n ,  a n d  n o t  
p r e s c r i b e d  o r  d i c t a t e d  b y  a n y  e x t e r n a l  n e c e s s i t y ,  s u c h  
a s  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  o f f i c e ,  t h e  d e m a n d s j o f  c r e d i t o r s  o r  
t h e  r e l i e f  o f  i l l n e s s . ”  j ^ L o r d  W e s t  b u r y  i n  T J d n y  v .  U d n y  
1 8 6 9  7  M .  ( H . L . )  89J .
( )  T h e  d u t i e s  o f  o f f i c e .
( a )  S e r v i c e  i n  t h e  a r m e d  f o r c e s .
T h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  a r m e d  f o r c e s  i s  
n o t  c h a n g e d  m e r e l y  b y  h i s  b e i n g  s t a t i o n e d  i n  a  f o r e i g n  
c o u n t r y  j w y l l e  v .  L a y e  1 8 3 4  1 2 S .  9 2 7 )  C a m p b e l l  v .  
C a m p b e l l  1 8 8 1  2 3 D .  2 3 6 ;  L o w  v .  L o w  1 8 9 1  1 9 R .  1 1 5 )  
S e l l a r s  v .  S e l l a r s  1 9 4 2  S . C .  2 0 6 )  P e d d l e ,  6  t h -  
D e c e m b e r  I 8 6 0  -  C u r r i e  o h  C o n f i r m a t i o n  p p .  1 2 , 1 3 * J .
T h e  t h e o r y  o f  t h i s  w a s  a d m i r a b l y  e x p r e s s e d  b y  L o r d  
F u l l e r t o n  i n  t h e s e  w o r d # :  “ O f f i c e r s  . . .  d o  n o t  
a c q u i r e  a  l e g a l  d o m i c i l e  i n  t h e  q u a r t e r s  t o  w h i c h  
t h e y  m a y  b e  s e n t ,  a n d  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  m a y  r e m a i n  i n  t h e  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e i r  d u t y .  B u t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
t h a t  e x c e p t i o n  I  t a k e  t o  b e ,  n o t  t h a t  t h e  C r o w n  h a s  
t h e  p o w e r  t o  r e c a l l  t h e m ,  b u t  t h e  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  C r o w n  h a s  t h e  p o w e r  o f  s e n d i n g  
t h e m  t h e r e ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e y  p r e s u m a b l y  a r e  t h e r e  o n l y  
i n  o b e d i e n c e  t o  t h a t  p o w e r .  T h e  i n f e r e n c e  o f  t h i s  
i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e ,  t h a t  h o w e v e r  l o n g  t h e i r  m e r e  c o r p o r -  
: e a l  r e s i d e n c e  m a y  b e  i n  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e ,  t h a t  
r e s i d e n c e  i s  t o  b e  a s c r i b e d ,  n o t  t o  a n y  a n i m u s  o f  
t h e i r s ,  b u t  t o  t h e  a n i m u s  o f  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  s u p e r i o r s ,  
t o  w h i c h ,  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e y  c o n t i n u e  i n  t h a t  p r o f e s s i o n ,  
t h e y  a r e  b o u n d  t o  y i e l d  o b e d i e n c e ” ,  [ c o m m i s s l o n e r s  o f  
I n l a n d  R e v e n u e  v .  G o r d o n 1  s  E x e c u t o r s  i « f q  1 2  
A  s o l d i e r  i s  u n d e r  t w o  d i s a b i l i t i e s  ( l )  t h a t  h e  h a s  n o t
c h o s e n /
124.
c h o s e n  h i s  s t a t i o n ; -  ( 2 )  h e  h a s  n o  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e
l e n g t h  o f  h i s  s t a y  t h e r e .  I t  i s  b e c a u s e  o f  ( l )  t h a t  a
s o l d i e r  d o e s  n o t  n o r m a l l y  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e
a t  t h e  p l a c e  a t  w h i c h  h e  i s  s t a t i o n e d .  B u t  a  r e t i r e d  
n a v a l
/ o f f i c e r ,  l i v i n g  i n  t h e  W e s t  I n d i e s  o n  h a l f - p a y ,  w h o  
. w a s  l i a b l e  t o  b e  r e c a l l e d  f o r  s e r v i c e  a t  a n y  t i m e  o n  
s i x  m o n t h s  n o t i c e ,  w a s  o n l y  u n d e r  d i s a b i l i t y  f * 5 )  
a n d  w a s  n o t  p r e v e n t e d  f r o m  a c q u i r i n g  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  
c h o i c e  i n  t h e  W e s t  I n d i e s  [ c omml s s i o n e r s  o f  Ini a n d  
R e v e n u e  v .  G o r d o n 1 s  E x e c u t o r s  s u p r a j  a n d  a n  a l i e n  
r e s i d e n t  h e r e ,  a l t h o u g h  l i a b l e  u n d e r  t h e  A l i e n s  
O r d e r  1 9 2 0  t o  b e  d e p o r t e d  f o r  m i s b e h a v i o u r ,  c o u l d  
a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  h e r e  j B o l d r i n i  v .
C ru K V C r u K  1^ A5" G W  l . G . R  . I (c>- <j. ( j I l_7T.
B o l d r i n i  ( 1 9 3 2 ) P . 9 / J .  T h e  p o i n t  m a y  b e  o f  i m p o r t a n c e
i f  a  p e r s o n  u n d e r t o o k  a  m i l i t a r y  a p p o i n t m e n t  k n o w i n g
t h a t  h i s  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  h a d  t o  b e  i n  a
p a r t i c u l a r  s p o t .  H e  w o u l d  t h e n  h a v e  c h o s e n  h i s
s t a t i o n  a n d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  w o u l d  b e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e
p e r s o n  w h o  s e c u r e s  c i v i l  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  a  f o r e i g n
c o u n t r y  a n d  g o e s  t o  r e s i d e  t h e r e ;  s u c h  a  p e r s o n  m i g h t
w e l l  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  t h e
c o u n t r y  w h e r e  h e  w a s  s t a t i o n e d .
B u t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e
a r m e d  f o r c e s  i s  n o t  c h a n g e d  m e r e l y  b y  h i s  b e i n g
s t a t i o n e d  i n  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y ,  i t  i s  n o t  i m p o s s i b l e
f o r  t h e  s o l d i e r  t o  c h o o s e  t o  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  t h e
c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  h e  i s  s t a t i o n e d ,  a n d  i f  t h e r e  i s  a n
e v i d e n t  i n t e n t i o n  t o  m a k e  t h e  c o u n t r y  h i s  p e r m a n e n t
h o m e  h e  m a y  b e  h e l d  t o  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  o f
c h o i c e  t h e r e .  ^  T r a p a u d ,  a n  E n g l i s h  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r ,
w a s  a p p o i n t e d  g o v e r n o r  o f  P o r t  A u g u s t u s ,  S c o t l a n d ,
i n  1 7 4 6 ,  a n d  r e s i d e d  t h e r e  i n  t h e  G o v e r n o r ’ s  h o u s e
t i l l  h i s  d e a t h  f i f t y  y e a r s  l a t e r .  H e  a c t e d  a s  a  
J u s t i c e  o f  t h e  P e a c e ,  p o s s e s s e d  a  f a r m ,  a n d  m a r r i e d
a /
a  S c o t s w o m a n .  H ©  w a s  h e l d  t o  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a
S c o t t i s h  d o m i c i l e  ( j c  1  a r k  v *  N e w m a r a h  1 8 3 6  P . O .  1 1 ,
3 9 5 ;  A l s o  D y s o n  v .  D y s o n  ( O . H . )  1 9 0 9  2  S . L . T .  4 0 4 j .
D i c e y * s  s t a t e m e n t  t h e r e f o r e  ’ ’ T h a t  a  s o l d i e r  d o e s
n o t ,  a n d  i n  f a c t ,  c a n n o t ,  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  t h e
p l a c e  w h e r e  h e  i s  s t a t i o n e d ’ *  j ’ P t h  e d .  p .  1 3 1 ; O p .
B e a l e  p .  I B f J  i s  t o o  s w e e p i n g .  H i s  s t a t e m e n t  w a s
c r i t i c i s e d  i n  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  S c o t t i s h  c a s e  o n  t h e
d o m i c i l e  o f  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  a r m e d  f o r c e s .  A n
E n g l i s h m a n ,  a  c h i e f  s t o k e r  i n  t h e  R o y a l  N a v y ,  w a s
s e n t  t o  C l y d e b a n k  i n  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3  9  t o  a w a i t  t h e
b u i l d i n g  o f  a  s h i p  o f  w h i c h  h e  w a s  t o  b e  o n e  o f  t h e
c r e w .  T h e  s h i p  w a s  n o t  c o m p l e t e d  t i l l  A u g u s t . *  1 9 4 1 ,
a n d  d u r i n g  t h e  i n t e r v a l  h e  l i v e d  w i t h  C l y d e b a n k
p e o p l e  c a l l e d  W a t s o n .  — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '
  T h e y  g a v e  h i m  a  k e y  t o  t h e  h o u s e .  H e  j o i n e d
t h e  M a s o n i c  L o d g e  i n  C l y d e b a n k .  G i v i n g  e v i d e n c e ,
h e  s a i d  t h a t  h e  c a m e  t o  r e g a r d  t h e  W a t s o n ’ s  a s  h i s
h o m e  a n d  t h a t  M r s .  W a t s o n  r e g a r d e d  h i m  a s  a n  a d o p t e d
s o n .  S i n c e  A u g u s t  1 9 4 1  h e  h a d  b e e n  a b o a r d  t h e  s h i p
a n d  h a g  b e e n  b a c k  o n  t h r e e  o c c a s i o n s  t o  t h e  W a t s o n ’ s
h o u s e  w h e n  o n  s h o r e  l e a v e .  H e  p r o f e s s e d  a n  i n t e n t i o n
t o  m a k e  S c o t l a n d  h i s  h o m e ,  t o  e n d  h i s  d a y s  h e r e  a n d  t o
g i v e  u p  h i s  E n g l i s h  d o m i c i l e .  H e  w a s  h e l d  n o t  t o
h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  S c o t t i s h  d o m i c i l e . ^ S e l l a r s  v .  S e l l a r s
1 9 4 2  S . C .  20cJ  L o r d  M o n c r i e f f  s u m m e d  u p  t h e  l a w
t h u s :  ’ ’ T o  e s t a b l i s h  c h o i c e  o f  r e s i d e n c e  t h e r e  m u s t  b e
e v i d e n c e  o f  a  v o l u n t a r y  a c t  u p o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e
p e r s o n  w h o s e  d o m i c i l e  i s  a s s e r t e d  t o  b e  c h a n g e d  a n d
t h e  m e r e  f a c t  o f  h i s  b e i n g  s t a t i o n e d  o n  s e r v i c e  w i t h i n
a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a  w i l l  n e v e r  p e r  s e  a v a i l  t o
e s t a b l i s h  s u c h  a  c h o i c e .  P e r  c o n t r a ,  i f  t h e r e  b e
a d d u c e d  s u f f i c i e n t  e v i d e n c e  o f  a  v o l u n t a r y  a c t  o f
c h o i c e ,  t h e  a c t  w i l l  n o t  b e  d e f e a t e d  o r  r e f u s e d
e f f e c t  m e r e l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  a r e a  o f  c h o i c e  h a p p e n s  t o  
c o i n c i d e  f
1. T; p .
o o i n o i d e  w i t h  a n  a r e a  o f  s e r v i c e  .  .  .  t h e  p u r c h a s e  
o r  p e r m a n e n t  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  a  h o u s e ,  t h e  t r a n s f e r  t o  
t h e  n e w  a r e a  o f  w i f e  a n d  f a m i l y ,  t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  a  
l a n d e d  e s t a t e ,  w o u l d ,  a n y  o n e  o f  t h e m ,  b e  a  c o n c u r r i n g  
c i r c u m s t a n c e  w h i c h  m i g h t  b e  r e l e v a n t  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  
c l a i m ’ 1  [ s e l l a r s  s u p r a ,  p e r  L o r d  M o n c r i a f f  a t  p $ ,  2 1 3 j | .  
C h i e f  s t o k e r  S e l l a r ’ s  o n l y  v o l u n t a r y  a c t s  S f e t *  c o u l d  
s h o w  t h a t  h e  h a d  a d o p t e d  S c o t l a n d  a s  h i s  d o m i c i l e  
w e r e  t h e  j o i n i n g  o f  t h e  M a s o n i c  L o d g e  a n d  t h e  r a i s i n g  
o f  a n  a c t i o n  o f  d i v o r c e  i n  S c o t l a n d  w h e n  h e  c o u l d  h a v e  
d o n e  s o  i n  E n g l a n d .  T h i s  w a s  n o t  r e g a r d e d  a s  
s u f f i c i e n t .
T h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  w h y  a  s o l d i e r  c a n n o t  c h a n g e  
h i s  d o m i c i l e  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  h i s  s e r v i c e  t o  a  
c o u n t r y  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  o n e  i n  w h i c h  h e  i s  s t a t i o n e d .
A  s o l d i e r  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  c o u l d ,  w h i l e  s e r v i n g  
a b r o a d ,  p u r c h a s e  a  h o u s e  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  e s t a b l i s h  h i s  
f a m i l y  t h e r e ,  g o  t o  v i s i t  t h e m  d u r i n g  h i s  l e a v e s  a n d  
a b a n d o n  a l l  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  E n g l a n d .  I n  t h o s e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i t  m i g h t  b e  h e l d  t h a t  h e  h a d  a c q u i r e d  a  
d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  S c o t l a n d  [ T h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  
s  a d m i t t e d  f e y  M c N e i l l  v .  M c N e i l l  ( O . H . )  1 9 1 9  2  S . L . T .  
1 2 7 ,  t h o u g h  t h e  f a c t s  7 / e r e  n o t  s o  s t r o n g  a s  i n  t h e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  i n s t a n c e  g i v e n ,  a n d  i t  w a s  h e l d  t h a t  
d o m i c i l e  h a d  n o t  b e e n ' c h a n g e d j .  A  s o l d i e r  h o w e v e r  
c o u l d  n o t  c h a n g e  h i s  d o m i c i l e  m e r e l y  b y  m o v i n g  h i s  
w i f e  a n d  f a m i l y .  H i s  p e r s o n a l  p r e s e n c e  i s  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  t h e  f a c t  o f  r e s i d e n c e  [ s e e  u n d e r  ’ ’ T h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  
o f  t h e  f a c t  o f  r e s i d e n c e ”  s u p r a } .  •
( b )  E m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  C r o w n
w h i c h  n e c e s i t a t e s  r e s i d e n c e  a b r o a d .
T h e r e  i s  n o  p e c u l i a r i t y  a b o u t  t h i s  e m p l o y m e n t ,  
a n d  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t  i s  i n  e x a c t l y  t h e  s a m e  p o s i t i o n  
a s  /
a s  a n y  e m p l o y e e  w h o  h a s  t o  l i v e  a b r o a d  t o  p e r f o r m  
h i s  j o b  1  F a i r  b a i r n  v .  N e v i l l e  i f  07  r r r #  i q p  j .  H e
u s u a l l y  k n o w s  w h e r e  h e  w i l l  h a v e  t o  r e s i d e  i f  h e  
a c c e p t s  a  c i v i l  a p p o i n t m e n t  f r o m  t h e  G r o w n ,  s o  t h e r e  
i s  f r e e d o m  o f  c h o i c e ,  a n d  u n l i k e  t h e  s o l d i e r  h e  c a n  
r e s i g n  a t  a n y  t i m e .  I t  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  t h e n  w h e t h e r  h e  
h a s  o r  h a s  n o t  a d o p t e d  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y  a s  h i s  s o l e  
d o m i c i l e ,  a n d  a b a n d o n e d  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n .  W h e n  
a  r e t i r e d  n a v a l  o f f i c e r  w a s  a p p o i n t e d  a  S t i p e n d i a r y  
M a g i s t r a t e  i n  t h e  W e s t  I n d i e s  a n d  r e s i d e d  t h e r e  w i t h  
h i s  w i f e  a n d  u n d e r t o o k  p u b l i c  o f f i c e  s o  a s  t o  s h o w  t h a t
A
h e  h a d  a d o p t e d  t h e  i s l a n d  a s h i s  h o m e ,  h e  w a s  h e l d  t o  
h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e ,  o f  c h o i c e  t h e r e  o m m i s s i o n e r s  
o f  I n l a n d  R e v e n u e  v .  G o r d o n ’ s  E x e c u t o r s  I P  D .
f l . ^ 7" !  .  B u t  a  S c o t s m a n  w h o ,  t h o u g h ,  h e  a c t e d  a s  a  c o n s u l
1
i n  I t a l y  f o r  t h i r t y  n i n e  v e a r s /  y e t m a i n t a i n e d  a
c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n ,  b e i n g  t h e  n e x t
h e i r  o f  e n t a i l  o f  S c o t c h  e s t a t e s ,  c o r r e s p o n d i n g
f r e q u e n t l y  w i t h  h i s  b r o t h e r  w h o  w a s  p r o p r i e t o r ,  b u y i n g
«
a d j o i n i n g  l a n d s ,  a n d  s e n d i n g h i s  w i f e  a n d  c h i l d r e n  h o m e
»
f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  t h e  c h i l d r e n ’ s  e d u c a t i o n ,  d i d  n o t  
a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  I t a l y  j t J d n y  v .  U d n y  1 8 8 9  7  M .  
( H . L . )  S p J .  T h e s e  a p p o i n t m e n t s  u s u a l l y  c a r r y  a  
p e n s i o n ,  a n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t  
i n t e n d e d  t o  r e t u r n  t o  h i s  h o m e  c o u n t r y  w h e n  h e  r e t i r e d  
i s  a  u s e f u l  i n d i c a t i o n  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  h e  h a d  a b a n d o n e d  
h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  ^ F a i r  b a i r n  v  N e v i l l e  s  u p  r a j  .
( c )  A n g l o - I n d i a n  d o m i c i l e .
B e f o r e  1 8 - 8 8  T h e  E a s t  I n d i a  C o m p a n y  w a s  b o t h  a  
t r a d i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  t h e  r u l e r  o f  B r i t i s h  I n d i a .
1
A  s p e c i a l  v i e w  w a s  t a k e n  a s  t o  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  p e r s o n s
i n  i t s  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  w a s  k n o w n  a s  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  
A n g l o - I n d i a n  d o m i c i l e .  T h i s  d o c t r i n e  w a s  a s  f o l l o w s
Residence/
r e s i d e n c e  i n  I n d i a ,  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  E a s t  I n d i a  
C o m p a n y  c r e a t e d  a  n e w  d o m i c i l e ,  a n d  t h i s  n o  m a t t e r  
w h a t  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  e m p l o y e e  w a s ,  o r  
w h a t  t h e  a n i m u s  o f ’ t h e  e m p l o y e e  w a s  a s  t o  r e t u r n i n g  
t o  h i s  n a t i v e  c o u n t r y  w h e n  h i s  s e r v i c e  w a s  a t  t h e  e n d ;  
w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  i f  t h e  e m p l o y e e  d i e d  i n  I n d i a  
o r  d i e d  b e f o r e  h e  h a d  e s t a b l i s h e d  h i m s e l f  a n y w h e r e  
e l s e ,  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  h i s  p r o p e r t y  w o u l d  b e  r e g u l a t e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  E n g l i s h  l a w ,  b e i n g  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e  
i n  I n d i a .  f ~M u n r o e  v .  D o u g l a s  ( 1 8 2 0 )  5  M a d d .  3 7 9  p e r  
V ' . C .  L e a c h  a t  p .  4 - 0 4 ;  C r a F g l e  v .  L e w i n  ( 1 8 4 3 )  3  C u r t .
^  F o r b e s  v .  F o r b e s  ( 1 8 5 4 )  K a y ,  3 4 1  -  w h e r e  t h e  
d e c e a s e d  w a s  a  S c o t t i s h  l a n d o w n e r ;  M o o r h o u s e  v .  L o r d  
( 1 8 6 3 )  1 0  H . L . C .  2 7 2 ;  W a u . c h o p e  v .  W a u c h o p e  4  P .  9 4 5 _ _ 7  
I n  E n g l a n d  t h e  d o c t r i n e  i s  n o w  d i s c r e d i t e d , / ~ S e e  
I r e  v o n  v .  L r e v o n  3 4  L . J . ,  C h .  1 2 9 ;  J o p p  v .  W o o d  4 L e G . J .
&  S .  6 1 6 ;  E x  p a r t e  C u n n i n g h a m ,  I n  r e  M i t c h e l l  ( 1 8 8 4 )
1 3  Q . B . L .  4 1 8 ;  P e a l  v .  P e a l  ( 1 9 3 0 )  4 6  T . J . P .  6 4 5 J 7  
w h i l e  i n  S c o t l a n d  i t  h a s  r e c e n t l y  b e e n  h e l d  n e v e r  t o  
h a v e  b e e n  p a r t  o f  t h e  l a w . [ ~G r a n t  v .  G r a n t  1 9 3 1  S . C .  2 3 8  J  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  . S u c c e s s i o n  A c t  o f  1 8 6 5 ,  a  s t a t u t e  o f  
t h e  I n d i a  C o u n c i l ,  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  a  m a n  i s  n o t  t o  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a s  h a v i n g  t a k e n  u p  h i s  f i x e d  h a b i t a t i o n  i n  
B r i t i s h  I n d i a  m e r e l y  b y  r e a s o n  o f  h i s  r e s i d i n g  t h e r e  
i n  H i s  M a j e s t y 1 s  C i v i l  o r  M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e ,  o r  i n  t h e  
e x e r c i s e  o f  a n y  p r o f e s s i o n  o r  c a l l i n g .
( i i )  T h e  d e m a n d s  o f  c r e d i t o r s .
I f  a  m a n ’ s  r e s i d e n c e  i n  a  n e w  c o u n t r y  i s  d i c t a t e d
b y  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  a v o i d i n g  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  a n d  i s  n o t
a  f r e e  c h o i c e ,  h e  d o e s  n o t  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  t h e
n e w  c o u n t r y .  T h u s  w h e n  p e c u n i a r y  e m b a r r a s s m e n t  f o r c e d
C o l o n e l  T J d n y  t o  l e a v e  L o n d o n  f o r  B o u l o g n e  i n  1 8 4 5  h e
d i d  n o t  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  F r a n c e  / ~ U d n y  v .
U d n y  1 8 6 7  7  M .  ( H . L . )  8 9 J  i n  a n o t h e r  c a s e  t h e  y o u n g e r
s o n  o f  a n  E n g l i s h  p e e r  f e l l  s o  m u c h  i n t o  d e b t  t h a t  h e  s o l d  
b j s  c o m m i s s i o n  i n  t h e  f l u e s  a n d ,  b y /
1^0.
by consent, left bis wife (with whom however be had 
not lived op©nly) and resided a.t first w5 th fr7 cwIr on 
shoots in Lewis and Harris. lie revisited England 
occasionally for a w e e k  or two to see his mother, 
using a n  a s s u m e d  name to avoid h i s  creditors. Later, 
on an allowance from a brother, he took the sub-let 
of a shoot in Scotland and lived openly under his own 
name, kept an establishment of servants and visited, 
the local gentry, but he still schemed to put an end 
to his financial difficulties In order to return to 
England. It was held that this six years residence 
In Scotland was not sufficient to disturb his 
English domicile of origin j l p i t t  v .  Pitt 7 P 6 ?  H h  
106 and 1864 P^. (H.L.) PQ • See also Orde v. Orde 
7OP9 os. 4©; and w ilson v. TSTilson 1°©° 1© rxn>7~j •
But there is no reason why a person who retires to 
a foreign country to avoid creditors cannot chose . 
to make that country Lis permanent home and sole 
domicile and chose to abandon his domicile o f  o r i g i n  
a n d  i f  h e  d o e s  s o  he will be held to have a o c m ! r e d  
a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  I n  the new country. The 
f l e e i n g  creditor is in no worse position than the 
soldier for the acquisition of a domicile of choice 
end Indeed is in a better one because there Is more 
than one country in which he could see1' sanctuary, 
so there will always be a certain amount of choice*
The fugitive from justice is In the same 
position as the fleeing creditor j ~ 7 n re art in.:
Loustalan (1900) P. (0. \.) °ll).
(iii) The relief of illness.
In cases whore a person is compelled'to live 
abroad on account of bad health, the rule that a 
domicile of choice- is not acquired unless the new 
country is freely chosen is logically followed out.
The case of an invalid going to ranee ior a definite 
period/
p e r i o d ,  s a y  s i x  m o n t h s ,  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  h e a l t h ,  
p r e s e n t s  n o  p r o b l e m .  H i s  r e s i d e n c e  i n  F r a n c e  i s  o n l y  
f o r  a  t e m p o r a r y  p u r p o s e  a n d  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  h i s  d o m i c i l e .  
T h e  d i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  w h e n  a  p e r s o n  g o e s  a b r o a d  p e r m a n e n t l y  
o r  i n d e f i n i t e l y  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  h i s  h e a l t h ,  w h e n  h e  w o u l d  
h a v e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  l i v e  a t  h o m e .  T h e r e  a r e  t w o  p o s s i b l e  
c a s e s  .
1 s t  C a s e  .  H e  i s  a d v i s e d  t o  g o  a b r o a d  a g a i n s t  h i s  
w i l l  b e c a u s e  h i s  l i f e  w o u l d  b e  e n d a n g e r e d  i f  h e  s t a y e d .
I n  t h i s  c a s e  h e  d o e s  n o t  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  
t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  h e  g o e s  a b r o a d  f o r  t h e  
r e m a i n d e r  o f  h i s  l i f e  w h i c h  m a y  b e  e i t h e r  a  s h o r t  o r  a  
l o n g  p e r i o d .  N o r  d o e s  i t  m a t t e r  t h a t  h e  a p p r e c i a t e s  
w h e n  h e  l e a v e s  t h a t  h e  w i l l  e n d  h i s  d a y s  i n  t h e  n e w  
c o u n t r y :  h i s  g o i n g  a b r o a d  w a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  c o m p u l s i o n ,
n o t  c h o i c e .  A l s o  u n d e r  t h i s  h e a d i n g  c o m e s  t h e  c a s e  o f  
t h e  i n v a l i d  s u f f e r i n g  f r o m  a  m o r t a l  d i s e a s e ,  f r o m  w h i c h  
t h e r e  i s  n o  h o p e  o f  r e c o v e r y  e i t h e r  h e r e  o r  a b r o a d ,  b u t  
f o r  w h i c h  h e  w i l l  f i n d  s o m e  r e l i e f  i n  h i s  l a s t  f e w  m o n t h s  
i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  c l i m a t e ,  / " h o o r h o u s e  v .  L o r d .  1 8 6 3  1 0  H . L . G .  
p e r  L o r d  K i n g s d o w n  a t  p .  2 9 2 .  S e e  a l s o  L o r d  C a m p b e l l  i n  
J o h n s t o n e  v .  B e a t t i e  1 8 4 3  1 0  C l .  a n d  F .  a t  p .  1 3 9 ;  
L a u d e r d a l e  P e e r a g e  C a s e  1 8 8 5  1 0  A . C .  6 9 2 J
2 n d  C a s e .  F i n d i n g  t h a t  h i s  h e a l t h  s u f f e r s  f r o m  t h e  
S c o t t i s h  c l i m a t e  h e  g o e s  t o  I t a l y  t o  r e s i d e  t h e r e  
p e r m a n e n t l y  o r  i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  h o p i n g  t h a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
a i r  w i l l  b e  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I f  h e  
m a i n t a i n s  n o  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n n e c t i o n ,  w i t h  t h i s  c o u n t r y  
h e  w i l l  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  i n  I t a l y  e v e n  
t h o u g h  h e  w o u l d  p r e f e r  t o  l i v e  i n  S c o t l a n d  i f  h e  w a s  w e l l .
’ ’ T h a t  t h e r e  m a y  b e  c a s e s  i n  w h i c h  e v e n  a  p e r m a n e n t  
r e s i d e n c e  i n  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y ,  o c c a s i o n e d  b y  t h e  s t a t e  
o f  t h e  h e a l t h ,  m a y  n o t  o p e r a t e  a  c h a n g e  o f  d o m i c i l e  m a y  
w e l l  b e  a d m i t t e d .  S u c h  i s  t h e  c a s e  p u t  b y  L o r d  C a m p b e l l  
I n /
B e a t t i e  v .  J o h n s o n . / " S u p r a  7  B u t  s u c h  c a s e s  m u s t  n o t  
b e  c o n f o u n d e d  w i t h  o t h e r s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  f o r e i g n  r e s i d e n c e  
m a y  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  c l i m a t e  o r  t h e  
h o p e  o r  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h e  a i r  o r  t h e  h a b i t s  o f  a n o t h e r  
c o u n t r y  m a y  b e  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  h e a l t h  o r  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I n  t h e  o n e  c a s e ,  t h e  f o r e i g n  a b o d e  i s  
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  n e c e s s i t y ;  i n  t h e  o t h e r  i t  i s  d e c i d e d  b y  
c h o i c e ” ,  / " b u r n e r  L . J .  i n  H o s k i n s  v .  M a t h e w s  8  D e  G . M .
&  G .  a t  p p .  2 8 ,  2 9 _ 7  C a s e s  c o m i n g  u n d e r  h e a d i n g  1  a r e  
a  f u r t h e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n /
133.
illustration of the misleading nature of the test
which is so often applied, namely that a domicile of 
choice is acquired when there is present residence 
plus the animus manendi (or no animus revertendl).
MI can well Imagine a case", says Lord 
Kingsdown in the judgment quoted from above, "in 
which a man leaves England with no intention whatever 
of returning, and not only with no intention of 
returning, but with a determination and a certainty 
that he will not return (and yet does not his
domicile)
There are few Scottish cases on the topic 
£see however Low v. Low 1891 19 H. 115; Boss v. Ross 
1926 S.C. at p. 1,0 54 (Lord
wife or child who is compelled to go abroad for the 
sake of health, that person probably acquires a 
domicile of choice abroad,because he is not compelled 
but chooses to stand by his family jjEhe judges seem 
to incline to the opposite view in Donaldson v. 
McClure i860 22D (H.L.) 7, but it does not raise this 
clear issuej. This brings about the seemingly 
paradoxical position that if a single woman is 
compelled to live on the Riviera she does not lose 
her domicile but if a married woman is similarly 
compelled and her husband goes with her she will lose 
her domicile, but this is because, the intention of a 
married woman does not affect her domicile and only 
the husband*s intention matters,
(IV) Other circumstances which restrict the freedom 
of choice.
Prisoners. The domicile of a prisoner will not be 
affected by his being imprisoned in a foreign 
country jorde v. Qrde 1829 98 • 49j•
Convicts/
that ha£ already been criticised (supra A.
If a person goes abroad indefinitely with a
C o n v i c t s .  A  p e r s o n  w h o  i s  t r a n s p o r t e d ,  e i t h e r  f o r  a  t e r m  
o r  f o r  l i f e ,  i s  p r o b a b l y  i n  t h e  s a m e  p o s i t i o n  a s  a  
p r i s o n e r ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  h i s  d o m i c i l e  i s  n o t  c h a n g e d  t h e r e b y ,  
w i t h  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  t h a t  h e  m i g h t  c h o o s e  t h e  p l a c e  o f  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a s  h i s  d o m i c i l e ,  a s  m a n y  c o n v i c t s  d i d  i n  
A u s t r a l i a ,  a n d  s o  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  t h e r e .
A  p r i s o n e r  c o u l d  n o t  d o  t h i s ,  b e c a u s e  e v e n  i f  h e  f o r m e d  
t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  a c q u i r i n g  a  d o m i c i l e  I n  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  
w h i c h  h e  w a s  i m p r i s o n e d ,  h e  c o u l d  n o t ,  w h i l e  i n  p r i s o n ,  
s a t i s f y  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t h e  f a c t  o f  r e s i d e n c e .  A n  
a l i e n  w h o  w a s  d e p o r t e d  a n d  f o r b i d d e n  t o  r e t u r n  w o u l d  n o t  
l o s e  h i s  d o m i c i l e  h e r e ,  e v e n  i f  i t  w a s  o n l y  a  d o m i c i l e  o f  
c h o i c e , i f  h e  d i d  n o t  i n t e n d  t o  c h a n g e  h i s  d o m i c i l e .  
r i  e i t c h  v .  V e i t c h  ( 1 9 2 9 )  7 3  S . J .  2 3 5 _ _ 7
E x i l e s ,  r e f u g e e s ,  E m i g r e s .  T h e s e  a r e  b y  l a w  o r  p o l i t i c a l  
n e c e s s i t y  p r e v e n t e d  f r o m  s t a y i n g  i n  t h e i r  o w n  c o u n t r y .
B u t  t h e y  h a v e  a  f r e e d o m  o f  c h o i c e  a s  t o  w h a t  o t h e r  
c o u n t r y  t h e y  w i l l  s e t t l e  i n ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  w h y  
t h e y  s h o u l d  n o t  a c q u i r e  a  d o m i c i l e  e l s e w h e r e  i f  t h e y  h a v e  
t h e  r e q u i r e d  a n i m u s .  f ~ B e  B o n n e v n l  v .  D e  B o n n e v a l  ( 1 8 3 8 )
1  C u r t .  8 5 6 _ _ 7  t h e y  h a v e  n o t  t h e  a n i m u s  r e q u i r e d  f o r
a  c h a n g e  o f  d o m i c i l e  t h e y  r e t a i n  t h e i r  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  
f~D e  B o n n e v a l  v .  D e  B o n n e v a l  s u p r a _ _ 7 , l a s t  d e r i v e d  d o m i c i l e ,  
f ~ I n  r e  T h e  D u c h e s s  D ! O r l e a n s  1  S w .  &  T r .  253__7 o r  d o m i c i l e  
o f  c h o i c e ,  f~V e i t c h  v .  V e i t c h  s u p r a J  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  f r o m  
w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  e x i l e d .  / ~ L o r d  W e s t b u r y * s  d i c t u m  i n  U d n y  v .  
Ud n y  1869 7 M. (H.L.) a t  p p .  99, 100, i s  t h e r e f o r e  
i n a c c u r a t e :  f , T h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  m a y  b e  e x t i n g u i s h e d
b y  a c t  o f  l a w ,  a s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  b y  s e n t e n c e  o f  d e a t h ,  
e x i l e ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  o u t l a w r y .  " J
A  r e f u g e e  w h o  c a m e  t o  t h i s  c o u n t r y  a s  a  t r a i n e e  o n
c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  h e  w o u l d  e m i g r a t e  o n  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  h i s
t r a i n i n g ,  b u t ^  w h o  w a s  a l l o w e d  t o  r e m a i n ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e
p l e a s u r e  o f  t h e  H o m e  S e c r e t a r y ,  w a s  a b l e  t o  a c q u i r e  a  
d o m i c i l e  o f  c h o i c e  h e r e .  f ~ M a y  v .  M a y  1 6 9  L . T .  4 2 ;  C p .  
" o l d r i n l  v .  B o l d r i n i  1 9 3 2  P .  9 ;  C r u k  v .  C r u h  1 9 4 5  T . L . F . i e /
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A man sentenced to death”will require a domicile to 
determine how his estate is to he divided. He is
possibly right, however^ about outlaws).
Students. Contrary to the Roman rule £savlngy p. 9^  
there is neither a disability nor presumption against 
a student acquiring a domicile in the place of his 
study [ohalmers v. Chalmers (O.H.) 1903 11 8.L.T. b%- 
Contrast Lord. Ordinary in Munro v. Munro. > 475^
The question Is simply whether he went there tempor­
arily for the purpose of studying only, or whether 
he intended to remain permanently. The mere fact 
of being a student affords no presumption one way or 
another: the other circumstances must decide.
p o M t C  t i g  a  r  C H P t c e  ( C t , n t i n i 4 & d )
The loss of a domicile of choice.
Just as a domicile of choice can only be 
acquired anlmo et facto, so it can only be abandoned 
animo et facto. The animus alone is not enough.
Mrs. Raffenel who had obtained a derived domicile In 
Prance through marrying a French officer, determined, 
on his death, to return to her domicile of origin, 
England. She boarded the packet at Calais, but 
before it left the harbour she was, through illness, 
obliged to land. She never recovered sufficient 
strength to resume the Journey and died In Franoe 
eight months later. She did not lose her French 
domicile |ln re Raffenel 3 Sw. & Tr. 49] • No^ is it 
sufficient for the person to leave the country in 
fact, if there is no intention to give up the 
domicile of choice (|ponaldson v. McLure i860 22 D. 
(H.L.) 7]. «  a person abandon the domicile of
choice animo et facto and die in ltlnere to the
do nitifci
domicile of origin that person has died^ln the 
country of origin jjn re Blanohl 1852 3 Sw. & Tr. lb 
Story/
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Story pp. 5^|; tot this is simply the rule laid down 
Uflny v._ Udny that if a person has abandoned a 
domicile of choice and has not acquired another 
domicile of choice his domicile is his domicile of 
origin, and Westlake’s statement [Sec. 2bo] that in
-Ji
the event of death in 1 tine re from one domicile of 
choice to another domicile of choice the domicile of 
the deceased is the domicile of choice to which the 
person is Journeying, is contrary to that principal 
[OP. Foote p. lo] .
While he retain§$ and makes use of a 
residence in the domicile of choice it will be 
difficult to hold that he has; animo,abandoned that 
domicile of choice. It was an element in favour of 
the retention of Donaldson’s domicile of choice 
in England and against the revival of his Scots 
domicile of origin that when he went to his larger 
Scottish residence and moved his establishment there 
he retained a smaller house in Wigan, which he 
vi^ted. ^ Donaldson v. McQlure 1857 20 D. 307 & I8b0 
22 D. (H.L.)7. Hunter v. Hunter (O.H.) 1893 30 S.L.R 
. But, WI cannot accede to the doctrine that if 
a man has lost his original domicile by acquiring a 
domicile in a foreign country, he cannot recover his 
original domicile while he retains any place of 
residence in the foreign country. The Animus must 
determine the effect of the residence being retained 
Alkman v« Alkman 1859 21 D. 757, 3 McCfc. 854jj • And 
slighter connection with the country of the original 
domicile will keep the domicile of origin alive than 
would preserve a domicile of choice (particularly 
when it is a question as it was in Donaldson y. 
McLure of reviving the domicile of origin).
There/
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There is a difference between the loss of 
a domicile of origin and the loss of a domicile of 
choice. The former requires not only abandonment 
animo et facto but the acquisition of a new domicile 
of choice [Bell v. Kennedy 1863 1 M. 1127 & 1868 6 M. 
(H.L.) 69J whereas a domicile of choice is lost 
merely by abandonment animo et facto, fudny v. Udn.v 
1869 7 M. (H.L.) 8 9. See above p. Contract the 
U.S. where every domicile continues until a fresh 
domicile has been acqulred/j 
The loss of a derived domicile.
The same principles apply here as in the 
case of a domicile of choice fin re Raffenel supra.
A derived domicile is equivalent to a domicile of 
choice - Crumpton1 s Judicial Factor v. Finch-Noyes 
1918 S.C. per Lord Mackenzie at pp. 390,l|. The 
combination of the animus and the fact is sufficient 
for the abandonment of a derived domicile as it is for 
a domicile of choice, and the acquisition of a new 
domicile is not necessary, for if no new domicile is 
acquired the domicile of origin revives, [in re 
Macreight (I885) L.R. 30 Ch.D. 165. But see dis- 
:cusslon as to whether domicile of origin Includes 
derived domicile - p. J 
The onus of proof of domicile.
If a litigant considers it necessary for
his case to aver that a certain domicile existed at
a certain time the onus is on him to prove it did.
[Kennedy v. Bell 1859 22 P. 269. This is obviouaj
If the domicile of origin is established it is
derived domicile 
presumed to continue until a different gxigfisxls
Krtrtitittai or domicile of choice has been proved, 
f/nirman v. Alkman 3 Macq. 854 per Lord Wensleydale 
at p. 15.1 and the fact that the person died in a 
different/
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different country does not affect this [Vincent v. 
-Earl _at ...BucliaB 1889 16 R. 637]. But If the domicile 
of origin Is unknown, In the absence of other 
evidence on the subject, he will be presumed to be
domiciled where he resides or where he hag died fBell
v, Kennedy 1868 b M. (H.L.) b9 per Lord Oranworth 
at p. 75J If a different domicile from the domicile 
of origin is proved to have been acquired that 
domicile will be presumed to continue until proved 
to have been abandoned. |rfhis is obvious, see e.g. 
Donaldson v. McClure supra. Crumptonfs Judicial Factor 
V. Flnch-Noyes 1918 S.C. 378J 
The tenacity of, the three types of domicile.
The domicile of origin is the most
tenacious and the most difficult to displace. It is
not so difficult to change a domicile of choice 
jwinans v. Attorney General I904 A.C. (H.L.) 287 
per Lord Macnaughten at p. 2901 or a derived 
domicile fChalmers v. Chalmers (O.H.) 1903 H  S.L.T.
L.
It has been said that a domicile derived from
the widowed mother is the easiest of all to be lost. 
^Crumpton1 s Judicial Factor v. Finch Noyes 1918 S.C. 
378 per Lord Johnston at p. 3^9* Arnott v. &room 
1 8 4b 9 D. 142 per Lord Jeffrey^
Within these general considerations the 
tenacity of the various types of domicile may vqry 
according to circumstances. If a child, whose 
domicile of origin is Jamaica, is sent here for his 
education,which gives him an attachment to Scotland, 
and return,g<$. to Jamaica, it is obvious that if the 
question of his acquiring a domicile of choice here 
arises in later years, it will be more easily inferred 
thatt if he had not been brought up here. The 
tenacity of domicile of origin is based on the 
presumed/
presumed affection that a man has for the country of 
his birth and upbringing, but if he is not in fact 
brought up in his domicile of origin, that must be kept 
in view in determining the factual question whether it 
was his intention to abandon his domicile of origin and 
acquire a domicile of choice here. f ~Bell v. Kennedy 
1863 1 M. per Lord Lowan at p. 1135; Lowndes v. Douglas 
1862 24 D. 1391 and particularly 1.J.G. Inglis at p. 1406_7
wIt is a received principle that the reacquisition 
of a domicile may be inferred from circumstances which 
would not be sufficient to infer the loss of the original 
domicile”, f~I . A .  v. Lamont 1857 19 3 D .  779 per Lord 
President McNeill at p. 783; Donaldson v. McClure 1857 
20 D. 307 per Lord President at p. 315_7 but the inference 
is not so strong when the person is returning from England 
as it would be in returning from a tropical country where 
he had made his fortune. f ~IonaIdson v. McClure ibid_7 
It has been held that in considering the evidence as to 
whether an Englishman came to Scotland animo remanendi, 
the fact that he had previously been in Scotland for 13 
years made it easier to accept his statement that he came 
with the intention of remaining. /"Kenyon v. Wenyon (o.H.) 
1900 8 S.L.T. 323J  
Evidence of Intention.
What facts are relevant and admissible to prove 
intention?
An enquiry into domicile usually starts with the 
question, where was his domicile of origin, for if that is 
established the onus of proof is thrown on the person 
seeking to set up a different domicile of choice. But 
since his domicile of origin depends on the domicile of 
his father or mother at the time of his birth and that 
domicile may not be known, the father!s domicile / a s  in 
TJcny v. Udny 1869 7 M. (H.L.) 89_7 or even the grandfather' 
domicile may have to be proved./"Grant v. G-rant 1931 S.C. 
238; Peddle 6 Dec. 1860 Currie pp. 12, 13.J7 
S ome /
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Some of the facts and circumstances of 
person's lives that have been used to prove intention 
are now given. Some are more important than others 
and none is conclusive. The weight attributed to 
a fact in one set of circumstances may, of course, 
be quite different from the weight that is allowed in 
other circumstances.
The residence. We are dealing now with 
residence as an indication of intention and not with 
the element of residence which is one of the two 
requirements in change of domicile. The very 
highest Importance is attached to the character of 
the residence.
Firstly. If the domicile of origin is
unknown a person will in the absence of other
evidence on the subject be presumed to be domiciled
where he resides, or where he has died. jTBell v. Kennedy
l8b8 b M. (H.L.) b9 per Lord Cranworth at p. 75*
Savingiay p. 1 3^  • MBut that is easily rebutted,
because undoubtedly the first enquiry as to the
domicile of anybody is, what is the domicile of
origin? M (Ibid) This rule has been criticised. Dicey
foimiulated it thus: ^Person's presence in a country
is presumptive evidence of domicilew. Lord
Moncrelff said that would require to be modified
because he could not acceptu that the single fact
of residence, no matter what its conditions,
character, quality or colour may be, is per se
sufficient to shift the onus of proof by affording
In all cases without, distinction even, a prlmq facie [faiJL+2^  li&CJLa /c.5-62] 
presumption of a change of domicile,f. ^ Admittedly
the fact that a person lived, or died ina country 
is not per se sufficient to relieve the person who 
haj. to prove that the domicile of origin has been 
changed, of the onus on him; but -chat is not what 
is/
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ie maintained here, or, although he is not clear, 
what Dicey is stating. The proportion is, that if 
the _domicile of origin is unknown the place where 
he is, is presumed to be his domicile. Lord Thurlow*s 
statement in Bruces v. Bruce £  1790 3 Pat. I63 J was-
(.McLelland v. McLelland strpya) 
that »A person being at a place is prlma facie evidence 
that he is domiciled at that .place; and it lies on 
those who say otherwise to rebut that evidence”, ^  
because Major Bruce*s domicile of origin was known.
But the rule here stated is not only unesceptlonable,
u n u S u a l
but necessary in an ext-renre case to ensure that a 
person ha£ a domicile. Further, the place where a 
man is born is, in the absence of knowledge of the 
father*s domicile, presumed to be his domicile of 
origin. It is on this principle that the domicile of 
origin of a foundling proceeds.
Secondly^ £jons_ continued residence. If 
the residence is colourless, and no ties are formed 
with the place of residence, that residence is only 
the fact, and the animus remains unproved and it was 
so held in Liverpool Royal Infirmary v. Ramsay £1 930 
3.0. (H.L.) 83] even when the residence continued for 
thirty seven years until the person1 s death. wIt 
is a settled rule in the constitution ot a domicile 
that it is not foraed or proved by the mere fact of 
residence, however long continued, without the animus 
or purpose of permanent domiciliation 11. ^ Munro v.
Munro 1840 1 Robin 492 at p. 522J.
The decision In Liverpool Royal Inflmary 
v. Ramsay hag$ been criticised^ E.j. pp. n/f., nr-
J  but it is logical and in accordance 
with previous decisions. If it makes practitioners 
uncertain as to where persons are domiciled, that 
is a fault of using domicile as the test of personal
status/
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status, not a wrong statement of the law by the 
House of Lords. The factsu&re unusual, and in the 
normal case residence for such a long period will be 
coloured, by attachments which the person made to the 
place of residence, such as the purchase of his house, 
friendships which he formed, membership of a Church 
or of Clubs; and in the normal case where the 
residence is so coloured, the duration of it will be 
a powerful factor. "Long continued residence in 
a place may in certain circumstances show that the 
domicile is changed" Jfper Lord Buckmaster at p. 8jJ
n--Dec
Thirdly .^ file nature, of the residence i.e. 
whether it is in furnished rooms or in house that the 
party owns, Is of the highest importance. That the 
person owned the house in which he lived is far 
stronger evidence of intentlonto settle there 
permanently than that he merely leased the house or 
rented furnished rooms. A man abandoned his 
domicile of origin in Jamaica and came to Scotland 
intending to make his home somewhere in the United 
Kingdom. He lived in a furnished house In Ayr 
while negotiating for a Scottish estate. It was 
held that he had not acquired a domicile of choice 
here until he purchased the Scottish estate as his 
peimanent residence and thereby showed that he 
elected Scotland as his domicile. ^ Cennedy v. Bell 
1863 1 M. 1127 and 1868 6 M. (H.L.) 6^ .
A permanent residence however Is not a 
requirement either of the fact of residence £q.v.J 
or the proof of intention. "If you establish there 
was a determination to live in Scotland, and, if 
the/
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the party goes and lives at an hotel, that is enough” 
[Lord Cranworth in Bell v. Kennedy l8b8 b M. (H.L.) 
at p. 7^  and so it has been held that a domicile of 
choice has been acquired after four months residence 
in a leased house [Macphail v. Macphail *s Trustees 
(G.H.) 1906 14 S.L.T. 388]. But the words in 
italics require to be emphasised. The difficulty 
Isto show that there was a bona fide animus m a n e n d i  
when there is residence in an hotel or furnished 
rooms, [see how The Lord Ordinary went wrong in 
applying this dictum without strong enough proof of 
the determination in Stavert v. Stavert 1882 9 R. 52qJ 
The less permanent the residence the stronger must be 
the proof of intention from other sources.
Fourthly, if the residence is in family, flat 
whi-eh is very favourable to the view that the domicile 
is there |Macphall v. Macphail1 s Trustees, supra;
Story p. 5lj ”The adoption of a family residence by 
a man and his wife will go far to create a presumption 
of intention to reside permanently and establish a 
domicile. "[Lord Kincairney in Hope Todd & Kirk v.
Bruce (O.H.) 1899 6 S.L.T. Jloj And to leave wife aid 
family here when making voyages to^fiast Indies in- 
idlcates an intention to retain the domicile of 
origin. £ Purvis Trustees v. Purvis Executors l8bl 23 D 
812J • Covert residence with a mistress is less 
valuable evidence than overt residence [Alkman v. 
Alkman 3 Macq. 854J •
Fifthly, in assessing the import of 
residence in London, it is tp be borne in mind that 
London is the metropolis of the Empire, the seat of 
Parliament, and the centre of pleasure and fashion 
and consequently residence there by wealthy persons 
who have a domicile of origin elsewhere in the
Empire/
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Empire and who maintain some connection with their 
native country has not the same effect in tending to 
prove the acquisition of a domicile as residence in 
another city would have ^tldny v. Udnv 1866 5 M. I64 per 
Lord NeaveSj Mackenzie^ Trustees v. Mackenzie &
Others (O.H.) 1894 2 S.L.T. 88 McLaren p. 10)
Fraser Pf>. 1258, Savigny p. 97^ .
The possession of heritage.__________ _______ __________
The ownership of estates in the domicile
of origin ^Marchioness of Huntly v. G-askell 1905 
8 F. (H.L.) 4 ; Alkman v. Alkman 3 McQ. 854; Ross v . 
Ross 1926 S.C. 1038; 1930 S.C. (H.L.)l; Munro v. Munro 
1840 1 Robin. 492; Forbes v. Forbes 1910 2 S.L.T. 4 2 5; 
Mackenzie^ Trustees v. Mackenzie & Others (O.H.) 1894 
2 S.L.T. 88] even without a mansion-house which is 
habitable jjjdny v. Udny 1869 7 M. (H.L.) 89J is 
important evidence of the retention of the domicile of 
origin. Heritable estates are particularly 
important when they are old and extensive family 
lands, and the person whose domicile is in question 
has in addition a title or clan chieftainship 
associated with the lands ^Ross v. Ross 1926 S.C. per 
Lord Sands at p. 1053-J
Similarly the purchase of an estate in anew 
country is important evidence of an intention to 
settle there. |jBell v. Kennedy 1868 6 M. (H.L.) 6 9.
L.A. v. Brown1 s Trustees 1907 S.C. 333] even when the 
residence on it is subject to a lease which has still 
a little time to run.|pyson v. Dyson (O.H.) 1909 2 
S.L.T. 4 0 4. But see L.A. v. Lamont 1857 1 9 B. 779} 
Even possession of a f a m  is a useful indication.
friar* vt Newmargh 1836 P.O. 11 395j.
NATURALIZATION.
N a t u r a l i z a t i o n  in a  foreign country is
very/
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very strong evidence of intention exuere patri^m 
[see Ross _v, Ross 1930 S.C. (H.L.)lj but, as 
explained above, [p. Jgij is neither necessary, 
^Bo.ldrini v. Boldrinl (1932) L.R. P. 9 ; Bradfield v. 
Swanton (1931) lr. R. AAbj nor conclusive. [wahl v. 
Attorney General (1 932) I47 L.T. 382.J 
EXPRESSIONS of INTENTION.
(a) In Evidence.
If the person whose domicile in question is 
alive he is always a competent witness as to his
PefhapS k-e is
bhsitj 110-b8 © x H * © —-4SQry^ no^ 1^ © on© of til© 
litigants, [e.g. Udny v. Udn.v 1869 7 M. (H.L.) 89J 
but the commonest circumstance in which the person 
whose domicile is in question gives evidence is a 
dispute about divorce jurisdiction when he is one of 
the litigants. In the former case the evidence, 
being independent, has a better chance of influencing 
the Court, but in the second case also, if the Court 
believes the witness, great importance will be 
attached to his evidence and little corroboration 
may be needed [carswell v. Carswell 1881 8 R. 90I. 
Contrast Dombroidwltzkl v. Dombrowltzkl 1895 22 R. 90b' 
For—the-same reason, fepressions of intention made 
at a time when no issue depended on domicile are 
alse of more influence than evidence of intention 
given by a litigant in Court. In one case it was 
remarked that it was very unsafe to rely on a man*s 
testimony in his own favour on such a subject as his 
intention twenty five years before; more attention 
therefore was paid to the correspondence passing at 
the time. jBell v. Kennedy 1863 1 M. 1127 and 
I8b8 b M. (H.L.)b9j]. In another, the evidence of 
correspondence was preferred to the impressions of 
families/
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families who were litigants ^Lowndes v. Douglas 1862 
24 D. 139l]. An expression of intention in a letter 
was open to the objection that it was written shortly 
ante litem mofrtam. j~Udny v. Udny 1869 7 M. (H.L.) 8 9, 
per Lord Chancellor Hatherley at p, 94^ *)
(b) Extra judicially.
"Declarations of intention are rightly 
regarded in determining the question of a change of 
domicile, but they must be examined by considering 
the persons to whom, the purposes for which, and the 
circumstances in which they are made, and they must 
further be fortified and carried into effect by 
conduct and action consistent with the declared 
intention1. |p.oss v . Ross 1910 S.C. (H.L.)l per Lord 
Buckmaster at p. 6.J
So statements made by a Scotch landowner 
in documents and verbally to a number of business 
people, as to his intention to live permanently in 
New York, being made for the purpose of securing the 
status of a 1 resident alien1 in the United States 
which would minimise his liability both to American 
and. British taxation, did not suffice to show an 
Intention to become domiciled in New York, particul-
bccn
:arly since they had not^made to personal friends, 
and since, in writing to his wife, he referred to his 
Scotch estates as ^home*.
[ b o s s  v. Boss 1926 S.C. 1 0 3 8, 1930 S.C. (H.L.) 1 . See 
also Woodbury v. Sutherland1s Trustees 1939 S.L.T. 93 
and 1939 S.N. 64].
Declarations of intention as to domicile 
often occur in wills. Here again the declaration 
is only evidence of the intention and is not conclusive 
If there is stronger evidence to the contrary the 
declaration will be disregarded. Thus an Englishman 
was/
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was held to have acquired a domicile in Scotland 
where he had carried on business for many years and 
had lived more or less continuously from 1888 till 
his death in 1918, leaving Scotch heritage, although 
in both his will and the codicil to a previous will 
which wafcein English form there was this declaration:
“I declare that notwithstanding the fact that I have 
recently thought it desirable to take a house in 
Scotland it is not my wish or Intention to reside
1
permanently in that country or to abandon my 
English domicile and it is my intention that my 
testamentary dispositions should be construed and given 
effect to and my estate administered according io the 
law of England" ^Robinson v. Robinson1 s Trustees 
(O.H.) 1934 S.L.T. 183; Cp. Corbrldge v. Somerville 
1914 1 S.L.T. 305. In re Steer (1858J[ 3 H. & N. 598; i 
In re Annesley (1926) L.R. Ch. D.
The Court in such a case is not going to 
peimit a person who has acquired a domicile of choice j 
here, to escape from the consequences, namely 
limitation of his te>Taw««T*py powerf by a declaration 
in his will. I
How the person described himself in d&eds is 
important. E.g.Mwl Colonel. Udny described himself in
a Marriage Contract in Scotch form as "of Udny in the 
County of Aberdeen" whireh was favourable to the 
retention of his domicile of origin.judny v. Udny 
l8bb 5 M. 164 & 18S9 7 M. (H.L.)8 9. See also 
Brooks V. Brooks 1902 4 F. 1014, 1905 8 F. (H.L.)4; 
Liverpool Royal Infirmary v. Ramsay 1950 S.C* (H.L.)
83.J
Perhaps even more favourable is the 
designation by which a person is known by the outside 
world. That a man whose domicile of origin was 
Scotch/
Scotch insisted on being called 1 Forbes of Astoun1 
(an estate in Aberdeenshire) was favourable to the 
retention of his domicile of origin.^Forbes v. Forbes 
1910 2 S.L.T. 4 2 5. Mackenzie Trustees v. Mackenzie & 
Others (O.H.) 1894 2 S.L.T. 8 8.}.
The style of deeds like wills and marriage 
contracts may be useful evidence. That the marriage 
contraction Scots form and said that the provisions 
were in full of terce, jus relictae and legitim was 
11 a point of the highest importance in the evidence1 
that an Englishman had acquired a domicile In Scotland 
at that time. The contention that he merely left 
the style of the deed to the Conveyancer he employed 
was not favourably regarded by the Court who thought 
that he must have known the effect of the marriage 
contract. jValrbalrn v. Neville I897 25 R. 1 9 2.
This consideration was outweighed b y _  $&e other 
evidence in Murray v. Maclaohlan 1900 8 S.L.T. 2 3 3, 
and Corbridge v. Somerville 1914 1 S.L.T, 305.J
His use of the word “home*1 in reference to 
his Scottish estates when writing to his wife was 
regarded as important in Ross v. Ross (1930 s.o. 
(H.L.)lj But in most oases such a loose word 
connotes little. So when a person whose domicile 
of origin was in Jamaica, abandoned Jamaica, and came 
to Scotland, his description of this act aa “coming 
AcHne11 was not regarded as important,because it was 
a natural expression for a colonial to use about 
the mother country,’ ^Bell v. Kennedy 1863 1 M. 1127 
and 1868 b M. (H.L.) 69J and in one case when it was 
argued that a person had acquired a domicile in 
Scotland because, Inter alia, when writing to his 
wife in Scotland he referred to it as home, the
plea/
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plea was rebutted by Lord Dundas showing other 
instances in the correspondence where ••home'1 applied 
to a house in Peru, and to a relative*s residence 
in South Africa. [Main v. Main 19X2 1 S.L.T. 493).
The term is flexible and unreliable.
Erijftjemeiivt flurry. The fact that a girl has become engaged to 
a man domiciled in another country is of the very 
highest importance. In Arnott v. Groom (1846 9D.14H 
a mother and her minor daughter, who were both 
domiciled in Scotland, the daughter only derivatively, 
left Scotland and thereafter they had no permanent 
residence, but lived in furnished lodgings, hotels 
and with friends in Europe, Scotland and England^ 
but mainly in England. While residing in England 
the daughter became engaged to a Bristol merchant.
She died shortly after attaining majority and before 
•becoming married or, it seems, any date being fixed 
for the wedding. The Court held (Lord Jeffrey 
dissenting) that fche died domidOLed in Scotland, the 
Lord Ordinary, Wood, remarking that “there is hardly 
anything more evanescent or uncertain than an
/IAmi tied Iy
engagement to marry”. It is submittedAin every 
case an engagement to marry a man domiciled in 
another country will not be conclusive evidence of 
her Intention to become domiciled there. If Miss 
Stewart had met her fiancd'in Barcelona on a 
Mediterranean cruise, had become engaged to him, and 
had returned to this country for a while before the 
marriage,then she might still have been domiciled 
in Scotland,because her Intention would then be 
consistent with the retention of her Scots domicile j 
in the meantime, and might only be an Intention to
acquire/
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acquire a Spanish domicile at a later date, namely on 
her marriage. But Miss Stewart was resident in her 
husband's country, England, at the time of the 
engagement.
That was the fact. It necessarily follows 
from the engagement that she intended to marry him 
and live with him. That wasthe intention.
in coming to the view that she had not changed her 
domicile. Firstly,* no time had been fixed for the 
marriage and Lord Fullerton maintained that her 
engagement was quite consistent with the supposition 
that she was to return and resume her domicile in 
Scotland before marrying. But this view is more 
appropriate to the hypothetical case just given than 
the facts of Arnott v. G-room where the lady was 
resident in England before the engagement. It is 
conceded buxwever that the position would have been 
stronger if she had gone to England for the wedding 
which was to take place at a fixed time in the near 
future. Secondly, the engagement might be broken 
off and so it was not certain they would marry. of 
course it was uncertain. But so is everything in 
this world. As Lord Fullerton himself said In a 
later case “if in order to constitute a domicile 
there were required an animus remanehdl so permanent
and so absblute, as to be/dependent of any possible 
change of circumstances I do not understand how, in 
the constant uncertainty transition of all sub- 
:lunary events, a domicile ever could be established” 
fCommissioners of Inland Revenue v. G-ordons Executors
Two considerations weighed with the Court
in
Entering/
jfoJLQPlng t.he__armed forces of a foreign country.
It is a strong element in favour of a man 
acquiring a domicile of choice in another country 
that he enters the military or naval service of that
Ex parte Cunningham (1884) 13 Q.B.D. (C.A.)4l8j.
There is difficulty in applying this con­
sideration where a state is made up of several 
countries, for if a domiciled Frenchman joins the 
British Army or navy in what country is this an 
indication of him being domiciled? If he joins a 
Scotch regiment presumably Scotland ^Dyson v. Dyson 
supra]. If he joins a corps that has no local 
association, or the navy, probably the consideration is 
in favour of the acquisition of a domicile of choice 
in England, as the Imperial metropolis.{president of 
the United States v. Drummond (1864) 33 Beav. 449]..
There is a strong presumption against a 
serving officer of one power acquiring a domicile In 
the country of a foreign power. ^Hodgson v. De 
Beauchesne (l858jt 12 Moore P.C. 285]. 
intention. other circumstances to which attention haj 
been paid are: where the main domestic establishment 
was ^Donaldson v. McClure i860 22 D. (H.L.) 7;
Brooks v. Brooks 1902 4 F. 1014, 1905 and#F. (H.L,)
4 1 ; where the majority of his property was situated
j^ Brooks v. Brooks supra]; the holding of public 
office In a country ^Brooks v. Brooks supra; 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Gordon's Executors
Tasker v. Grieve 1905 8 F. 45; Clark v. Newmarsh
educated in his domicile of origin while resident 
abroad/
country. (Dyson v. Dyson (O.H.) 1909 2 S.L.T. 404;
1850 12 D. 857; Donaldson v. McClure, supra} ;
that he sent his children to be
,ow
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abroad {u.dny v. Udny I869 7 M. (H.L.) 8 9; Low v. L 
I891 19 R. 1 1 5; Tasker v. Grieve.supra; Tulloh v. 
Tulloh 1851 23 D. 639}» the place which the person was 
determined to be buried in, ^ Donaldson v. McClure , 
supraj or had buried relatives in ^McG-uckln v. 0 *Neill 
1905 14 S.L.T. 246; Dornbrowitzkl v. Dombrowltzkl 
1895 22 R. 9ob; Kerr v. Richardsons Trustees (O.H.) 
1898 6 S.L.T. 244J; membership of a Church,^Brooks 
v._ Brooksf supraj) a Masonic Lodge, ^ Sellacs v. Sellars 
1942 3. C. 20fej a club: jwllson v. Wilson 1872 10 M.
573» Araltage'a Trustees v. Armltaee and others (O.H.) 
1904 11 S.L.T. 597i Campbell v. Campbell 1861 23 D. 
25b] that the person who died on a visit to his 
domicile of origin had a return ticket in his pocket 
[l.A. v. Brown1 s Trustees 1907 S.C. 303J ; where he 
kept his bank account ^Campbell v. Campbell supra; 
Donaldson v. McLure. supraj ; that he wore the kilt 
{Forbes v. Forbes 1910 2 S.L.T, 4 2 5. But pride in
be
the country of origin consistent with the 
acquisition of a domicile of choice elsewherej. “"fhere 
is no act, no circumstance in a raai^s life, however 
trivial it may be in itself, that ought to be left 
out of consideration in trying the question Whether 
there was an intention to change the domicile1 
Drevon v. Drevon (1864) 34 L.J. Ch. 129 P®r V.C. 
KindersleyJ.
It is competent in assessing a person1s 
intention at a particular time to consider his 
subsequent conduct. Thus when the question was 
the domicile in 1863 of an English civil servant who 
was working in Scotland the proof that he had no 
ahlmus revert end! to England at that time was 
assisted by the fact that he did not go back to 
England/
c
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England i n  I87S when he retired on a pension and 
could have returned (Vajrbalrn v. Neville 1897 
25 R. 192 at pp. 203 , 4^.
Definition of Domicile.
It only remains now to define domicile. A
■ n
few definitions have already considered and rejected 
b- J Some judges are prepared to ah and on the 
attempt to define domicile. '‘It has been repeatedly
recognised that the question of domicile is always 
one which depends on the special circumstances of 
each particular case, and that it is Impossible to 
frame a definition that will be applicable to every 
case."(Lord Ordinary Low In Brooks v. Brooks 1902 4 F.
■1014). "Domicile means permanent home, and, if that
was not understood by itself, no illustration would 
help to make it intelligible."^Whicker v. Hume (1858)
28, L.J. Ch. 39b per Lord Cranworth at p. 400J  This 
is pusillanimous.
The attempt to define domicile often breaks 
down on a failure to appreciate what Is being 
defined. There are three kinds of domicile.
A definition that embraces all three is so 
vague that it is useless; that is the fault of Dicey's 
definition. And most of the more precise definitions 
of domicile are only definitions of domicile of 
choice. The best plan Is to give a definition 
of each kind of domicile. Thus domicile of origin 
is that country which the law assigns to a person 
at birth as his domicile. Derived domicile is that 
domicile which is imposed on a dependent person by 
the person on whom he is dependent. The requisites 
of a domicile of choice have already been described 
as the fact of residence plus (1) the adoption of
the/
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the new country as the sd»le domicile which means to 
make it one's principal residence and the centre of 
one's business with the intention of permanence (2) 
the abandonment of the domicile of origin or the 
former domicile (3) free choice. These requisites 
are easily combined into a definition as follows. 
Domicile of choice means that country which a person 
SU1 lurls haj freely and perman^ly chosen as his 
principal residence and the seat of his business, 
to the abandonment of his former domicile, and in 
which he ha§ established himself by the fact of 
residence. Savigny came very near this when he 
defined domicile as "That place Is to be regarded 
as a man's domicile which he has freely chosen for his 
permanent abode and thus for* the centre at once of 
his legal relations and his business", (p. 97-"fbe 
deletion of "thus" Improves ItJ But his definition 
suffers from two faults which have been avoided in 
the definition given above, namely he omits the re­
quirement of the abandonment of the former domicile 
and he says nothing about the fact of residence, so 
that it appears that a man might choose a domicile 
of choice from an atlas without moving from his 
birthplace. The definition given also avoids the 
fault to which many of the accepted definitions are 
subject, namely-that they do not permit a person to 
be absent from his domicile for atemporary purpose. 
Philllmore says that domicile is "a residence at a 
particular place, accompanied, with ... an intention 
to remain there for an unlimited time" (sec. 49j > 
but a man who has a domicile of choice In England 
and who comes to Scotland for a temporary purpose 
undoubtedly does not lose his domicile ot choice
In England/
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England although he no longer fulfils the 
requirements of Phillimore*s definition [cp. 
Vatteljand Story1 s definitions]. Finally the 
definition proposed contains the qualification ^  
none of the accepted definitions include, that the 
person mus t be sul juris.
S T A T U S * A . p
A status is a class of persons to whom the law .
• r
assigns certain peculiar rights and duties, capacities 
and incapacities.
A person’s status may be the normal status, which in 
Scotland is 'that of the sane adult male bachelor who has 
incurred no legal disability. The normal status receives 
no special name, but a decision that a person is of the 
normal status is nevertheless a decision about status
<r~
strator _of Austrian -Property ,v0 Von Lprang _1926 
S • 0• 593 Revd. 1927 S.C. (H.L.)SoJ. A person’sjstatus 
on the other hand may differ from the normal in that he 
has rights and duties, capacities and incapacities 
fall short of or exceed the normal. E.g. The status of 
infancy, lunacy, married man, adult, spinster, married 
woman, bankrupt, are classes of persons whose rights and 
capacities differ from those of a sane adult male bachelor 
who has incurred no legal-disabilities.
The features of a status are;-(l) 'fhe rights and 
duties, capacities and incapacit-ies reside in an in­
dividual as belonging to a class [Austin p. 71oJ*
Every system of law has alimited number only of these 
classes, and .a person must fall within at least one of 
the classes. A person may, of course, fall within -ene 
more than one class e.g. he may be a married man and 
a bankrupt at the same timef, (2) The rights and . duties, 
capacities and incapacities attached in respect of 
membership of any class are extrinsically determined by 
the law and are not within the power of the person to
r-
determine for himself ^Uiboyet v* Niboyet 4 P.D. per L.J. 
at p. 11; O.K. Allen in 1930 46 L.Q.R. p. 288^. They 
are the same for every member of the classy(3) Ifhe 
capacities and incapacities are commonly considerable 
in number and various in kind, so as to impart to the 
party/
party invested with them a conspicuous character, and 
affect him in most or many of his social relations.
^Austin p. 71oJ
Mr. O.K. Allen has defined status as ” the condition 
of belonging to a particular class of persons to whom the 
law assigns certain peculiar legal capacities or incap­
acities, or both" |jL930 46 L.Q.R. 277j. This may be 
compared to Dicey*s definition of status as a person*s 
capacity or incapacity under the laws of his country 
for the acquisition of exercise of legal rights and for 
the performance of legal acts- [p. 531. See also Bar p.
3O!0 • But a status is not Cnly or always concerned with 
capacities and incapacities. The condition of a bach- 
;elor and of a married man are both a status and each is 
a different status. A judgement in a divorce action or 
declarator of marriage which determines whether a man is 
a bachelor or a married man is a judgement affecting 
status. Yet the capacities and incapacities of a 
bachelor and a married man might well be the same. In 
Scotland perhaps a' married, man is under an incapacity 
in that he cannot freely dispose of his estate by will, 
though it may be doubted whether this is correctly 
called an incapacity, £see post p. J but in English law 
is there any difference of oapaoity? A married woman 
ie certainly under many incapacities, but if legal reform 
continues its present tendency there will come a time 
when the married woman is in exactly the dame condition 
as to capacity as the unmarried woman. Yet decrees of 
divorce and declarator of marriage are the most obvious 
examples of judgements about status.
Again, according to a famous aphorism of Maine, 
legal development has been a progression 11 from status to 
contract”: the very early tribesman had no capacitie
3.
or incapacities at all, for his whole rights and duties 
were determined for him by his position in society- In 
very early times then there were legal systems entirely 
based on status that'did not know the meaning of capacity.
It is wrong then to describe status solely with 
reference to capacities and incapacities- Indeed if 
this is done it becomes difficult almost to the point of 
impossibility to distinguish status from capacity,' for 
status is then only an aggregate of capacities. Yet the 
idea of general capacities cannot be rejected altogether, 
for if it were we should have status defined as a class Of 
persons to whom the law assigns certain peculiar rights 
and duties, and trustees, motor-car owners, landlords, 
might each merit description as a status, which would 
not be correct either. Both rights and duties and 
general capacities and incapacities are required to con­
stitute a status. If a class is described as a status 
■£$lslE has certain peculiar rigjhts and duties but no 
peculiar capacities or incapacities, e.g* married men in
✓
England/ or in future married women, wfei^h strictly speak-
j'ing does not fulfil our definition, but^the description
is justified on the ground of convenience and the
necessity for continuity in the law.
 Some of the varieties of abnormal status among
natural persons that are-known,or wteAete—ie- known^to legal
' *
systems are on account of (1) Sex; (2) Nonage; (3) Fam- 
jilial relationship (patria potestas and manus); (4) 
Coverture; (5) Celibacy; (8) Mental Defect; (7) Bodily 
Defect; (8) Hank, caste, official position; (9).Race and 
colour; (10) Slavery; (11) Profession; (12) Civil Death; 
(13) Illegitimacy; (14) Heresy; (15) Foreign nationality; 
(18) Hostile Nationality; (17) Criminality; (18) Bank -
' ■ .. . • ' ,x h  * 1 'l-: ' •‘hi-
iruptcy ^Holland.;o XIV; O.K. Allen -ibid-p. 284j.
Status/
Status d i f f e r s  f r o m  c o u n t r y  to c o u n t r y  i n  three 
w a y s .  Firstly, s o m e  c o u n t r i e s  have a status or class 
that is wholly u n k n o w n  t o  others, e.g. our law does not 
know the status of s l a v e r y  or civil death;»Secondly, 
where there is the same status in two countries, the 
rights and duties, capacities and incapacities,which one 
country attaches to the status,differ from those which 
the other country attaches to it; Thirdly, the stage at 
which one status is divided off from the next differs 
from country to country: thus in one,majority is attained 
at 18, in another a t '21; similarly,the dividing line 
between the normal status and the abnormal status due to 
mental defect may be drawn in different places®
Capacity is a general power of acquiring and exer- 
:cising rights and performing legal acts, which the law 
assigns to a person in virtue of his membership of a 
particular status.' It will not do simply to define 
capacity as ’’the power to acquire and exercise rights” 
fc.K.Allen ibid p. 29sJ for a person might limit or 
enlarge by contract his power of acquiring and exercising
a man might, on selling a business, enter into a 
restrictive covenant not to carry on a similar business 
withvfcbhe county, and he would thereby have limited his 
power to acquire and exercise rights and perform legal 
acts, but it would be wrong to think of this as a limit- 
sation of capacity. Capacity is a general power 
assigned by the law in virtue of a person’s membership 
of a status.
The power further is a general one. Rules of law 
that say that foreigners cannot own land or Jews accept 
more than interest are not rules of capacity, but 
simply particular positive prohibitions. The general 
principle, to be mentioned later, is that capacity is 
governed/ .
would not alter his capacity. Thus
a *.
governed by the law of the domicile'^ 'person. Thus if a
A
minor domiciled in country X by the law of X cannot enter 
into a binding marriage contract, then he cannot do so in 
country Y , because his capacity is everywhere judged 
according to the law of his domicile. But if a Jew '
domiciled in country X is prohibited by the law of X 
from accepting more than 6# interest wk±eh does not mean 
that he cannot accept more than 5# in country Y if the law 
of Y permits a greater interest. -Similarly if the law 
of X prohibits anyone from entering into an obligation by 
Bill of Exchange that does not prevent a person domiciled 
in X from so obliging himself in country Y, which permits 
Bills of Exchange £savigny p. J. The rule of X in 
‘each case is not a rule about capacity because it only 
prohibits a particular act and is not-a law about the 
general power of the person to acquire and exercise rights 
and perform legal acts.
^"Doubts, however, may be raised as to whether we ' 
have a case of true incapacity to act, . . .  £n cases 
where the law merely refuses to allow a person to under­
t a k e  particular legal transactions, e.g. to undertake 
obligations by bill, or in respect of loans of money, 
but in.other respects leaves him with full capacity to 
dispose of every asset of his property.” Bar p.304.
But one must demur when he explains .that rules'concerned 
with the capacity to act are imposed for the purpose of 
protecting the person (p. 306). That is certainly the 
ca^e with the capacity allowed to infants, lunatics, 
prodigals, but not with serfs, castes, married women.
It is the generality of a power e? lack of power and its 
applicability to many different kinds of acts which make 
it a questioh of. capacity.
A person’s status could be determined by many 
systems/
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systems of law. The three principal, contestants are 
(1) the individuals personal law; (2) the law of the 
place where a juridical act is performed,- which is called
\L
"the lex loci contractus, ^ the lex loci celebrationis; and 
(5) the lex rei situs. We determine status according to 
the first in regard to certain legal questions,and 
according to the second and third in regard to others.
In regard to most legal questions we determine status by 
the personal law, e.g.for marriage or marriage contracts 
or wills, status is determined by the lex d«m-Cafehere the 
legal question concerns a mercantile contract we deter­
m i n e  status by the lex loci contractus» This exception 
is introduced on the ground of commercial expediency*
When the legal question involves immoveable property we 
determine status by the lex rei situs« This exception 
comes about through the over-riding principle that the 
lex situs of immoveables governs all questions concerning 
them. A person* s status there- fore may be considered 
by our Courts to be different on different occasions, 
depending on the nature of the problem that is being 
litigated.
Some jurists,have criticised this situatioh as 
illogical. They say that status is always determined
? i
by the personal law of the individual, but effectis not 
always accorded to the capacities and incapacities that 
the personal law attaches to him as a result of his 
status. ^Fraser, Parent & Child p. 720; C.K.Allen 1930 
46 'L«Q4-E» p. 297; Dicey Rule 138; Cheshire pf 209}.
Thus these writers say that the law of a person’s 
domicile always conclusively settles whether he is a 
minor, but our Courts give effect to th© incapacity that 
his domiciliary law attaches to him in respect of his 
minority only in certaincases, ©*g« in marriage, but 
not/
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not in mercantile contracts?where our Courts apply our 
own law. But this theory will not stand close examin­
ation. -When we say that capacity in regard to mercantile
contracts is governed by the lex loci contractus,we mean 
more than thatif a mercantile contractile executed here, 
our Courts will decide the capacity of the parties 
according to our law, even if they are domiciled abroad.
We also mean that.if the parties were domiciled in 
Prance, executed a mercantile contract in Germany, and the 
question was litigated here, weo^ould decide the question 
of the capacity of the parties according to German law.
We mould not apply our law. The lex is excluded in
the case of mercantile contracts to admit the lex loci 
contractus, not the lex fori. When one considers that, 
it is impossible to say tliat our Courts recognisiting, that 
the status of the parties is determined by their domic- 
liliary law;but that they refuse to admit the effects 
of the domiciliary law in certain cases,and apply our 
own law. Further, if these jurists'are correct, our 
Courts would decide whether a, person is a major or minor 
according to hex—d. and only the effects of minority
A
according to our own lawje.g. if a person domiciled in a
\
country where he is a minor till twenty five, entered 
into a mercantile contract in Scotland, our Courts, 
should hold that he is a minor (because his status is 
always determined by his domiciliary law) but refuse to 
apply the foreign rules of minority because it is a 
mercantile contract, apply instead the Scots rules of 
minority. This is absurd.
cu-r-e.
What is the natifcre of the question involved?
Determine the status of the party according to the legal 
system appropriate to the question. Then decide from 
the expert evidence what are the rights and duties, 
capacities and incapacities attached to that status by 
that law. Apply the appropriate duty, capacity or in- 
:capacityjto the problem at issue.
8.
The appropriate foreign law for the determination 
of status whether it is the lex d* or the lex loci 
oontraotus will be ignored and our own law enforced where? 
(!) there is a question of public order,
(2) the status indicated by the appropriate foreign 
law is unknown to our law, and
(3) the status indicated by the appropriate foreign
law is penal, whether known to our law or not,
»•
The conception of ordrepublio is a favourite one 
of the Continental Statutists, but is too vague to bepf 
much practical utility* But it is worth noticing that 
the exception has its place in our law e*g* although the 
property rights of the spouses inter se are in general and 
in the absence of a M.C* governed by the law of the 
domicile of the husband for the time being as is the 
question of the dissolubility of the marriage* The 
husband’s power over his wife is determined by the 
Courts of the residence of the spouses applying their 
own law| similarly with the patria potestas s for in these 
questions the public order is involved#
2.
In many systems of law there are Jrinds of status 
unknown to our law, e*g# civil death, slavery, prodigal- 
:lty• When the lex d* (or lex loci contractus If that 
is the appropriate system for determining the person’s 
status in the particular legal question in dispute) 
classifies the person in a status unknown to our law, 
two situations are possible, namely, (a) the transaction 
in question had occurred wholly or partly out^ith the 
territory of the lex d* or (b) had occurred wholly within 
the territory of the lex d*
(a) In the former case we Ignore the foreign classifi*
* cation! and allocate him to the status that he would 
occupy According to our law* E*g* suppose the person is 
a/
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a slave by the law of his domicile,and consequently un- 
table to sue in a Court of law. If the question of his 
capacity to sue arises in this country, i.e. outside the 
territory of his domicile^ since slavery is a status un- 
:known to our law, that classification of the law of the 
domicile will be ignored, and the person will be alio- 
seated to the status that he would have according to our 
law, i.e. if he is adult and sane, the normal status, 
with the result that he can sue, ^Polydore v. Prince 
1887 Ware 402, 8 BealeHpJ* Again, when a person who 
is a slave by the law of his domicile is brought^ ^ Knight 
v * Wedderburn 1778 Jan. 15 Mon, 145 45; Somerset v. 
Stewart 1772 Lofft 1, 3 Beale jJ or escapes^ j^ Forbes v. 
Cochrane 1824 2 B. & C. 44$^ to this country, so long as 
he is here he is classified according to our law and is 
free. He cannot be forced to return to his domicile, 
^Knight v. Wedderburn supra; Forbes v. Cochrane supraj 
but if he does, he comes under situation (b) and is 
classified again as a slave, j^ The Slave, Grace 1827 2 
Hagg. Admir. 94J. Similarly, although a person is a 
prodigal, jworms v. De Valdor 1880 49 L.J. (N*S#)Ch. 261 
In re Selot1s Trust 1902 1 Ch. 488^ or has suffered 
civil death, jwilson v. King 1894 59 Arkansas 52, 5 
''Beale 15^ by the law of his domicile^he is not to be 
classified as such and subject to the disabilities 
attaching to that status in countries where such kinds 
of status are not known.
(b) In the latter case, when the transaction occurs -A 
wholly within the lex t o  we~recognise that even a. status 
that is unknown to our law-.will validly affect the 
person j~the validity of all personal statutes tfwill be 
admitted, and they will be enforced by the tribunals 
of other countries, as to acts that are done and rights 
that/
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that are acquired within the territorial limits of the 
community where these laws are established" Polydore v. 
Prince (1837) Ware 402, 3 Beale 2, per Ware at p. 4-J£ 
This principle has applied in a number of old
oases on slavery. Thus Holroyd J. stated: "If he (the 
plaintiff ) being a British subject , could shew .that the 
defendant,also a British subject, had entered the country 
where he, the plaintiff was domiciled, and had done any 
act amounting to a violation of that right to the possess 
:ion of slaves that was allowed by the laws of that 
country, I am by no means prepared to say that an action 
might not be maintained ^gainst him" ^Forbes v. Cochrane 
1824 2 B. & C. 448: at p. 462^. Again, when British 
subjects^resident and domiciled in Great Britain,who 
possessed slaves in Brazil, contracted to sell them to a 
subject of Brazil, domiciled there, for employment in 
Brazil, the English Courts heid that the contract might 
be enforced here* ^ Santos v. Illidge 1860 8 C.B. (N.S.)
861. Cp. Madrazo v.Willes 1820 3 B. & Aid. 353; Buron 
v. Denman 1848 2 Ex. I67J • And if a slave was brought 
to this country and returned again to his domicile • that 
permitted slavery, our Courts recognised that on his >
return'he must be classified again as a slave, although
I***' f
She would net be  ^classified as free while here, Slave,
Grace 1827 2 Hagg. Admir. 94^.
It Is submitted that the principle still applies to 
kinds of status unknown to our law, other than slavery, 
but not t Q  slavery, that, as well as being an unknown 
status, is also contrary to the policy of our law and to
morality. When the above cases on slavery were decided,
f
slavery was simply a ^ status unknown to our law, and slave
/wf .
traffic was considered as prohibited by public m t e r -
:national law.. (Le Louis 2 Dod 210? Brown v. Denman supra)j
11. ■ . ' 
How slave traffic may be regarded as contrary to public 
international law.and slavery so contrary to the policy of 
our law and to morality that no right arising out of 
slavery, even in a country that permitted it; would be 
recognised or enforced here.
But where the foreign status is simply unknown to 
our law, and is not contrary to morality or the policy of 
our law, then we recognise that such kinds of status 
validly affect the persoh in regard to transactions that 
take place wholly within the foreign territory. , Thus 
e.g*, although civil death is -unknown,-to' our law, if, 
according to the law of Spain the property of a persoh 
who becomes a monk should devolve on his heir, we should 
recognise the fact of the property in Spain of a person 
domiciled there having, through his taking monastic vows, 
devolved upon his heir, jjDioey p.
These principles involve assigning a different 
status to a person according to his location. It has 
been said before that there is nothing illogical about
f
a person having a status for one legal question and a 
different status for another, and similarly there is 
nothing illogical about a person having one status,e.g. 
that of prodigality, in his domicile where prodigality is 
recognised, and another^e.g. of a normal adult,in this 
country where it is not. But the same jurists who say 
that you cannot have more than one status at one time 
also say that your status does not change as you change 
your geographical position* ^And see Bar. p. 319J Why 
not? Status is not a ”personal attribute” of the pro- 
spositus that, like mental deficiency or youthfulness, he 
carries about with him everywhere he goes. It is a 
legal conception purely• It is a method of classifi­
c a t i o n  to determine how a person’s rights, duties, 
capacities/
■ 12 *
capacities and incapacities under a certain legal 
system differ from those of the normal person under that 
system# There is no reason why a person should not be 
classified according to one system of law for a certain 
question, according to a second system for another 
question; and according to one system of law for a trans- 
-action taking place in a certain locality, and according 
to a second system for a transaction taking place else-, 
where* As an American judge has said: ’*• ;
11 It follows of course that when a slave passes into
a country, by whose laws slavery is not recognised, his
civil condition is changed from a state of servitude to
that of freedom, and he' becomes invested with* those civil
capacities which the law of the place imparts to all who
stand in the same category# It is indeed said, by
Chief Justice Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the
Court in the case of the Slave Med, £c v# Aves, 18 Pick.
193} that ttslaves in such case become free, not so much
because any alteration is made in their status or con-
jdition, as because there is no law that will warrant, but
there are laws, if they choo'se to avail themsleves of
them, that prohibit their forcible detention or forcible
r e m o v a l I f  by this is meant there is no change in the
personal state of a slave in relation to the law of the
country he has left, it may well be admitted to be
correct. The law of that country,notwithstanding he is
for the time withdrawn from its direct and immediate
control, would hold him to be a slave until he acquired
his freedom in some of the forms of emancipation known
to that law. His mere transit into a country whose law
declared him free, within its jurisdictional limits,
ItU
would not per se liberate him from the^capacities and 
obligations resulting from the law of his domicile within 
the/
13.
the legitimate sphere of that law's operation, and if 
he is to.return to that country the condition would 
reattach to him precisely as when he left it*?.. (Lord 
teaca-~2--i{agg•'~1dm. 94-).. • ®But it by no 
means follows that because the law of his domicile holds 
him to be a slave, he has .not, while within a jurisdiction 
that declares him to be free, all the faculties that be- 
:long to a state of freedom. It is difficult to under- 
!stand what the law does by declaring him free, if it 
does not invest him with the rights and capacities of a 
free man; and, if it does, it confers upon him a personal 
state, very different from that of slavery; and there is 
no absurdity or contradiction in supposing a man to be a • 
free man in one country and a slave in another......tt
Although a status unknown to our law is ignored 
for transactions that take place outwith the territory 
of the lex domicilii’, that status may have subsidiary 
effects that are recognised by our law. - Thus polygamy, 
khat is unknown to our law and the rights and duties
* en- forceaU. f*  j n  o u r  C o u r t s
of which are not reeogniood by our -l-aw, can still have
the effect that the children of the polygamous union are 
legitimate, and that their legitimacy will be recognised 
by our Courts (See post p. ).
Some Tjinds of status are penal e.g. outlawry, 
infamy, civil death and that resulting from attainder,
being visited on individuals for crimes and offences.
If the lex domicilii (or lex loci contractus if that is 
the law appropriate to tjt^ e determihation of status in 
the questioib that is being litigated) classifies the 
person in a penal status, we ignore the foreign class!- 
:fication» ^ Commonwealth v. Green 17 Mass. 515, 3 Beale 
Wilson v. King (1894) 59 Arkansas 32,3Beale 15;
Polydore v. Prince (1837) Ware 402, 3 Beale 2, per Ware
J./
14.
J. at p. 3]  even though our law has the same penal 
status*(Folliott v. Ogden (1789) 1 H.B1. 123 . '
attainder] This rule is only an application of. the 
wider principle that "the penal laws of one country 
cannot be taken notice of in another’’ jogden v. Folliott
(1790) 3 T.R. 726 per Buller J. at p. 733 ”The penal
■are strictly local and-1 awa of— f-Q-re 1 gn--countri-ee 
affect nothing more than 
by virtue of their author 
hither comes with all his 
:cover money held for his 
like, and cannot be affec
hey can reach and can be seized 
Lty; a fugitive who passes 
transitory rights; he may re­
use, stock, obligations and the 
:ed in this country by proceed-
f-iiigg against him in th a t ’w M o h  ho has 1-e-ft-?-"beyond the
^  /limits of whi-oh-guch nrocRetiinga., do not extend^ (Folliott
A 2 1---
v. Ogden (1789) 1 H.B1.-123 per Lord Loughborough_at p. 
1351 See 9,lso Lynch v. Provisional Government of 
Paraguay (1871) 2 P. & D. 268;' Wolff v. Oxholm (1817)
6 M. & S. 92; Huntingdon v. Attrill 1893 A.O. •ff>r€hr)
150; Scott v.Attorney General 1886 11 P.D* 128, as explained 
-^n Warter v. Warter 15 P.D. 152^. Thus^ when it was 
objected during a trial in Massachusetts that one of the 
witnesses was infamous, because he hae| been convicted of 
larceny in New York, and for that reason his evidence 
could not be received, Parker O.J. stated; ”The penal 
laws of a country do not reach, in their effects, beyond 
the jurisdiction where they are established’’ jfoommon- 
;wealth v. Green supra 3 Beale p,llj and when in an 
action in Arkansas it was pled in defence that the 
jfemirvnn had suffered civil death because he had been sen- 
:tenced to death for murder in Tennessee, Battle J. 
said ,fThe conviction and sentence of King in the State 
of Tennessee did and does not affect his right to sue 
and recover in this State, ^ Wilson v* King supraj •
In/
In the next chapter we shall take the legal 
questions ox' common occurrence, and consider in more 
detail the systems of law that determine the most 
important implication of status, namely capacity.
In regard, to these questions.
As already mentioned, the steps are -
(i) What is the nature of the question involved?
(ii) Determine the status of the party according to 
the legal system appropriate to the question.
(iii) Decide from the expert evidence what are the 
rights and duties, capacities and Incapacities, attached 
to that status by -that law.
(iv) Apply the appropriate duty, capacity or incapacity 
to the problem at Issue. But in practice.where capacity 
is involved, these steps are compressed -so that .the steps 
are; (i) What is the legal question involved?
(ii) Determine the capacity of the party according to 
the legal system appropriate to the question.
(iii) Apply'the capacity given by the appropriate law.
It is necessary to state the matter in the more ’ long*^  r 
winded way in order to explicate the theory and the 
rules applicable when an unknown status was involved, 
but now it will be more convenient to state the 
rules in the manner in which they have been evolved 
by precedent and. are most likely to arise in practice.
' CAPACITY
The partyTs personal law at the time of the act 
(Determines whether' he has capacity to perform a jur loical 
act, except :! n the case, of capacity to-enter into a 
mercantile contract, where the lex loci contractus rules, 
and in regard to immoveables, where the lex situs rules.
By personal law is meant the law of the party’s 
domicile and if the domicile has more than one. system of 
law then the system that, the sovereign power of the 
domicile recognises as appropriate to him. ' Thus the 
personal law of a native domiciled in India where there 
are many systems of law is the law of the religious 
community to which he is attached.
KISTCBICAT, 3XMMAFY
The almost universal opinion of the early continental 
jurists was that all questions of capacity (except in 
regard to immoveables) must, be determined by the lex 
domicilii. /"See Story^ 5 0  et sequ. for an account of
their opinions//---------- — ..— -..-.. -...    -.-
  The early English authorities, on the other hand,
state that all questions of capacity must be governed by 
"k*10 loci contractus. There are a number of cases 
dealing.with the invalidity of marriages on the ground 
of incapacity, where the lex loci celebrationis>of the 
marriage was looked to, /"Compton v. Beareroft 1769 
2 Hagg. Cons. 444 N; Middleton v. Janverin 1802 2 Hagg.
Cons. 437; Scrimshire v. Scrimshire 2 Hagg. Cons. 395.
Op. Harford v. Morris 1776 2 Hagg. Cons. 423J
16.
493^ and one case where Lord Eldon held that capacity 
to accept a loan was ruled by the lex loci contractus . 
[Male v. Roberts 1800-3 Esp. 163^ The same attitude 
was adopted by Story and Burge. Thus Story said:
"As to acts done, and rights acquired, and contracts made 
ih other countries, touching property therein, the law of 
the country where the acts are done^ the rights are acquir- 
:ed, or the contracts are made, will generally govern in 
respect to the capacity, state and condition of persons"
[Seit.lO^j. "Hence we may deduce, as a corollary, that 
in regard, to questions of minority, competency or incom- 
:potency to marry, incapacities incident to coverture, 
guardianship, emancipation and other personal qualities 
and disabilities, the law of the domicile of birth, or 
the law of any other acquired or fixed domicile, is not 
generally to govern, but the lex loci contractus aqt actus, 
the law of the place where the contract is made or the 
act done. Therefore a person who is a minor until he is 
of the age of twenty five years by the law of his domi­
c i l e  and incapable, as such, of making a valid contract 
there, may, nevertheless, in another couhtry where he 
would be of age at twenty one years, generally make a 
valid contract at that age, even a contract of marriage." 
[sec. 103.Op. Burge Ool. & For. Law pt. 1 p. 132^^
Turning to the more recent English cases, in 
Simonin v. Mallac. [i860 2 Sw. & Tr. 67j[ parties domicil- 
:ed in France may be married in England without the con­
s e n t s  of their parents, required by the law of' France but
Iar*A
not by the law of England. The marriage ha-o-been held '
• . j
valid, in accordance with the above decisions, ^ because in 
conformity with the lex loci celebrationis. It is to be 
noticed that lack of the consents required not an 
absolute bar to marriage according to the French law: 
fUe man was 29 and the woman 22, and for persons- of those 
ages/
17.
ages the absence of consent did not prohibit the marriage,
but merely postponed it;^The parties asked their parentsJ
A
advice by a formal and respectful act each month for three 
months, they could marry at the end of the fourth month 
despite an adverse answer from their parents; the French 
Courts would hold a marriage abroad without the formalit­
i e s  of consent valid or invalid according as they consider 
jed that the parties had got married abroad to defraud 
the lawpr not; the marriage could be validated subsequent- 
sly by the parents consent, and would be valid if not im- 
:peached within a certain time. However, in Ogden v. 
Ogden, ^ 1908 P .  4 6 j  where domiciled Englishwoman married 
a domiciled Frenchman, aged 1 9 ,  in England, without the 
consent of the Frenchman’s parents* jthe marriage was also 
held valid because conformable to the lex loci celebrat­
ionis* 9r3rib h o u g h ~~jEhe effect of the lack of consent in his 
instance was different from the instance of the man and 
woman of 29 and 22 in the case last considered, for -t h -e 
marrlarge=-of $  person of that age, without the consent of Ua 
parents, was , according to French law, altogether null-.
. f D-e^ r A—-r-<v£-<) p- ^ ~7~J
Ogden was a. bolder application of the lex loci to
capacity than Simonin v«, Mailac ^Cheshire p. 231; contra
Dicey p. 966). It is important to appreciate this,
because it has been said by the Court of Appeal Simonin
A
v * Mallac did not deal with capacity to contract^but 
only with the formalities of the ceremony. ^Sottomayor v.
De Barros (No.l) 1877 3 P . l J  It may be possible to 
say that about Simonin v. Mallac, but it is very difficult 
to refuse to recognise that Ogden dealt with capacity.
view about capacity to 
contract marriage was that the lex loci celebrationis 
ruled. Thus Lord Meadowbank enquired: "Or would a 
marriage here be declared void because the parties were 
domiciled in England and minors when they married here, 
and/
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In Scotland too the early
18.
and of course incapable by the law of that country of 
contracting marriage? This category of law does not 
affect the contracting individuals only, but the public, 
and that in various ways; and the consequences would 
prove not a little inconvenient, embarrassing, end, pro- 
sbably, even inextricable, if the personal capacities of 
individuals, a3 of majors or minors, the competency to 
contract marriages . . • were to be qualified and regul- 
:ated by foreign laws and customs, with which the mass of 
the population must be utterly unacquainted.” ^Gordon 
v. Pye Fergusson’s Consist. Reports App. at p* 362. See 
also Fraser , Husband and Wife, p. 1299,; Gillespie in 
Bar p. 373:; Fraser, however, states that the lex 
domicilii governs capacity and minority and majority
in his Parent and Child pp. 718 et sequj Cooper v.
Cooper's Trustees [l88F 12 R. 473 Revd. ^H.L.) 2lJ 
dealt with capacity to make a marriage contract was in- 
^elusive because the lex domicilii of the party whose 
capacity was in question to be the same as the lex 
loci contractus, and in holding that the law of Ireland 
should govern it was not necessary to say whether it 
governed qua lex domicilii or qua’ lex loci contractus.
. The law of the domicile first came into the picture, 
apart from an obiter dictum in Udny ^Domicil or the 
place of settled residence of an individual is the 
criterion established by law for the purpose of determin- 
:ing the civil condition of the person, for it is on this 
basis that the personal rights of the parties,— that is, 
the law that determines his majority or his minority, 
marriage, succession, testacy or intestacy_jnust depend.” 
1869 7 flf. (HvL.) 39 per Lord Westbury at p. 99^ in ■
Sottomayor v. De Barros (l\fo.l)„ £supraj which dealt with 
the/
the question whether a marriage 'was invalid because the 
parties were within the prohibited degree of relationship
by the law of their domicileralthough they were not by the 
lex loci celebrationis. In the Court of Appeal Cotton 
L*J* made the startltng-declaration: !fBut it is a well 
recognised principle of law that the question of capacity 
to enter into any contract is to be decided by the law 
of domicile . , . , as in other contracts, so in that of 
marriage, personal capacity must depend on the law of
domicile” j/at p* 5j Simonin *v. Mailac was distinguished 
as dealing only with the 'formalities of the ceremony, 
which are ruled by 'the lex loci celebrationis. That
the lex domicilii governs capacitywis certainly not a 
’’well recognised principle of law”? and this is recognised 
by sir James Hannen in Sottomayor v. De Barros (No.S)-
said for itsy suitability to regulate capacity in marriage^ 
and the statement occurs in a case in which an impediment 
to marriage,arising from the prohibited degrees of 
relationship,wecase treated as a question, of capacity, 
whereas ”it may be questioned whether • • • the question . 
of capacity is really raised at all in such a case; 
that is to say, where both the parties are capable of en­
tering into a marriage but may not marry each other 
because such a marriage would be illegal in their own 
country, That is rather a question of illegality than 
of capacity • • |ogden b* Ogden 1908 P* 46 per Sir
governed by the lex loci contractus, uhtil a case 
did not deal with capacity said that capacity in all 
contracts is governed by the lex domicilii,
/The early cases made no attempt to distinguish
1879 5 P. 94 at p. 10oj although a great deal can be
Gorell Barnes at p. ^  : j
In short, capacity in all contracts was formerly
between, e,g*. capacity in- regard to marriagCr-and 
capacity/ J • .
20.
capacity to enter into a mercantile contract, '.sir 
Edward Simpson in Scrimshire £2 Hagg.Cons. 39dJ and 
Cotton L.J. in Sottomayor v.. De Barr os (No.l) (supra 
p. J each states his principle as applying to all con- 
;tra-cts. This has caused embarrassment to English ■ 
lawyers. Story, as we have seen, following the- early 
cases, states that the lex loci contractus afoft' actus 
governs capacity in all cases, while Westlake, following 
the more recent dictum in Sottomayor v. De Barros- (No.l), 
lays down the rule that the lex domicilii governs 
capacity in all contracts. Dicey £pp. 654 et sequ} and 
Cheshire '[p. 215^J make a distinction between mercantile 
and other contracts which their different nature demands. 
Fortunately, the Scots lawyer is not under the came 
embarrassment. Lord Nacnaghten gave the lead for making 
a distinction m  Cooper v. CoopersTrustees that dealt
---------------L------------   J------------ ; -------------------   ;
with capacity to enter into a Marriage Contract*whoro foe
sai d: "Perhaps in this country the question is ^ finally-
settled, though the preponderance of opinion here as well
as abroad seems to be in favour of the^law of the t 
* t
domicile. Itmay be that all cases are not to be gov- 
terned by one and the same rale.” (HoL.)21 at
p*3oj. And when the Court of Session decided, in 
McFeetridge v. Stewarts & Lloyds, that the lex loci 
contractus governed capacity in mercantile contracts:,
Lord Guthrie remarked: f,It may be that, in the case of 
contracts like marriage contracts, affecting premanently 
the domestic relations, the law of the domicile would be 
held to apply. Cooper , in which an obiter dictum of 
Lord Macnaghten was expressed, on which the pursuer 
strongly relied, was a case of that kind»(l913 S.C. 773, 
at p. 792j Considering ..that- the .Scots Courts have,' since 
the inconclusive case of Cooper, in which the lex loci 
contractus and the lex domicilii were the same, adopted
different/ ' ’ '
tpacity o f  stator.
21.
different rules in regard to non-mercantile acts,.where 
-*-ex dombilll was held to govern capacity in Sawrey- 
Cooksons v. Sawrey-Cfrooksons Trustees ,£l9Q^ 8 F.• 157J' 
and in regard to mercantile contracts where the lex 
loci contractus was held'to 'govern capacity iii McFeetridge’ 
V’* Stewarts $ Lloyds- '^supraj there can be no doubt that 
the statement at the commencement of this chapter 
is correct. In addition there are Scots cases dealing 
with non-mercantile acts other than contracts, namely 
cases about wills ^Purves V. 0hi3holm lr/s/l611 Mor.
4494; Robertson v. Landell 1843 6 D. 170; Hunter v. Dunn 
(O.Ho) 1 9 0 0  8 S.L.T. 1 9 7 j  -and receipts for legacies^
^Fieeman v. Bruce's Executors (O.H.) 1905 13 S.L.T. 97; 
Seddon Petitioner 19. R. 101 and 20 R. 675;' Atherstone*s 
Trustees 24 R. 39; Elder Petitioner 1903 5 F. 307^“ 
Revocation of trust. deeds, jfeawreyCookson v. Sawrey-Ofrookson 
Trustees 1905 8 F. 137J-: and assignations, [De Virte v. 
McLeod 1869 7 M. 347, 6 S.L.R. 23^ where the lex domicilii 
wa^held to govern. [op. IE Ounha (1828) 1 Hagg.
See.. 237J .
OASES WHERE THE LEX DOMICILII GOVERNS.
Incapacity to make a will may result from weakness 
of mind; from nonage; or from restraints which are im- 
:posed by positive law on the weaker sex, and particularly 
on married women. ^McLaren p. 2 2 ^  in all these cases 
the question whether the tuioScri had capacity is 
decided?as far as regards moveables, according to the law 
of his or her domicile at the time of making the will. 
^Purves v. Qhieholm 3r/s/l611 Mor. 4494; In re Mar aver 
(1828) 1 Hagg. Ecc. 498; Robertson v. Landell 1843 6 D.
170 (nonage); Hunter v. Dunn (O.H.) 1900 8 S.L.T. 197 
(facility); McLaren p. 23^| Capacity to make a will 
of/ •
o‘f immoveables is governed by the lex situs. ^Robertson 
v * Landell supra; McLaren p. 24; Cheshire p. 550; Dicey 
p. 585J
According to some writers, jsaviMjf §1 377 ,595J
capacity is required both at the date of making the will '
and at the time of death of the tWfoio-r , while others
^Cheshire p. 514 1 ' state that the
Jt
must have capacity by the law of his domicil© and the 
time of his death. But the rule of our law* that a will
valid at the time of execution is not invalidated by a
subsequent change of domicile, would doubtless be held 
to cover the case of objections to the capacity, of the 
t&jJtoJcrr, ^McLaren p. 23n. This is probably the rule at 
common law, but in any event, by Sec* 3 of the Wills Act 
1861 it is.the rule for at least British subjects,and 
probably for all persons **. In re G-roos (1904) P. 269^.
The capacity of a legatee to receive payment of a
moveable testamentary provision, and to grwnt a valid 
discharge therefor, i« deteminsd by the law of the 
domicile of .the legatee at the time of receipt, ^ Freeman 
v, Bruce’s Executors (O.H*) 1905 13 S.L.T. 97; Seddon, 
Petitioner 19 R. 101 & .20 R. 675; Atherstone’s Trustees 
24. R. 30; Elder. Petitioner 1903 5 p. 3 . When the 
legatee has not capacity by the law of his domicile^ 
the only person to whom payment is due, and who can give
; •? Id
a valid receipt, is the guardian by^th# law of the 
beneficiary’s domicile ^ Seddon supra; Ogilvy v. Ogilvy’s 
Trustees (O.H.)1927 S.L.T. 83J . and if that law does not 
recognise a person as guardian unless appointed by its 
own Courts j, then our Courts will not recognise him as 
guardian until appointed, ^ Seddon supraj*-' A petition 
to the nobile officium by trustees under.a Scotch Trust 
Disposition and Settlement for authority to pay the 
income of legacies to the fathers of minor beneficiaries
who/ '
who wore domiciled in England?and from whom, according to
the law of England, a valid discharge could not be -obtain-
;9d; was refused as overdriving the nobile offioium ,
jAtherstone’s Trustees supra].
Capacity to receive payment of an immoveable legacy
and to grant a valid discharge therefor, is governed by
■^ile 3-ex situs, and a discharge tendered by a guardian'duly .
appointed under the lav/ of the domicile of a minor i's not
sufficient. (Qgilvy v. OgiT&ry’s Trustees (O.H.) 1927
  -------------
S.L.T. 83; Allen v. Robertson 1855 18 D. 97; See
McFadzean Petitioner 1917 S.0*142j|*
Capacity to enter into a marriage contract is
determined by the law of the domicile of each party at
the time of making the contract. Each party must have
capacity by the' lav/ of his or her domicile at that time.
In Cooper v. Cooper’s Trusteesj f l 8 R 5  12 R. 473,Revd. 15
V* V
R. (H.L.)21] a Scotsman aged 29 married in Ireland an 
Irishwoman aged 18,and an antenuptial Marriage.Contract 
in Scotch form was signed in Ireland before the ceremony. 
After his death;she brought an action of reduction of the 
contract on the ground of minority and lesion. It was 
held that Irish law must determine whether she had 
capacity to enter into the contract. Unfortunately 
this decision of.the H o m e  of Lords was inconclusive^ 
because the lav/ of Ireland was both theiaw of her domicile
i *
and the lex loci contractus. All that the casedecided 
was that the matrimonial domicile or the "proper law" 
of the contract could not govern the question of 
capacity. The Lord Chancellor, Halsbury, put it thus:
"It is said • • • • as both parties contemplated a' 
Scottish married life, and as a consequence a Scottish 
domicile, the principle 1' have' spoken of (the law of the
these two persons .....  But .... the argument assumes
a binding contract, and if one of the parties is under 
incapacity the whole foundation of the argument fails" 
/~at p. 25_7 Lord Macnaghten said: "It is difficult 
to suppose that Mrs. Cooper could confer capacity on 
herself by contemplating a different country as the 
place where the contract was to be fulfilled, if that 
be the proper expression, or by contracting in view of 
an alteration of personal status which would bring with 
it a change of domicile!’ /~at p. 31J  On the issue 
between the lex domicilii and the lex loci contractus 
the case is not helpful. The Lord Chancellor applied 
Irish law as the law of her domicile?while Lords Watson 
and Macnaghten reserved the question whether Irish law 
was applicable as the law of the domicile.or as the lex 
loci contractus, although Lord Macnaghten seemed to 
favour the former. The question was clinched, however, 
in favour of the law of the domicile in Sawrev-Cookson v. 
Sawrey-Cookson1 s Trustees f “1905 8 F. 157_J7, a decision 
of the Court of Session, which has the great authority 
-e-f Lord President Dunedin. P i n  tfc Peetrldge v. Stewarts & 
Lloyds 1913 S.C. 773 where the lex loci contractus was 
held to apply to capacity in mercantile contract#, Lord 
Guthrie said:(at p. 789) "It may be that, in the case 
of contracts like marriage contracts, affecting 
permanently the domestic relations,the law of the 
domicile would be held to apply. Cooper, in which an 
obiter dictum of lord Macnaghten is expressed, on which 
the pursuer strongly relied, Is a case of that kind."
Cp. In re Cooke’s Trusts (1887) 56 L.J. (M.S.) Ch. 637; 
Luncan v. Dixon (1890) 44 Ch. D. 211; Guepratte v. Young 
(1851) 4 De G. & Sm. 217; Vidltz v. O ’Hagan 1900 2 Ch.
87 (which was treated purely as a question of capacity 
although it was probably, in part at least, a question 
of essential validity - Cheshire p. 257 and contrast 
Sawrey-Cookson supra) £/
jIr can tile 
ps
pier ally •
Subject to the exception, mentioned, the law of the 
domicile of each party governs the capacity of that party 
to marry. Bach party must have capacity by the law of 
his or her domicile* iiy capacity is meant only the 
question whether the person is old enough and sane enough 
to marry. The rule is subject to this exception: 
when the parties are by the laws of their respective 
domiciles of marriageable age our Courts will not 
recognise any incapacity attached by the law of the 
domicile of either simply through refusal of parents or 
guardians to consent to the marriage, which is not 
recognised by the lex loci celebrationis. This topic is 
fully dealt with in the subsequent chapter on marriage.
Capacity in regard to miscellaneous non-mercantile 
acts is referable to the lex domicilii. Thus the question 
whether a married woman had capacity to revoke a unilateral 
trust deed which she had made before marriage was referred 
to the law of her domicile at the time of the purported, 
revocation:/ bawrey-Cookson v. bawrey-Cooxson*s Trustees 
1905 8 P. 157_/; and the question whether an obligation or 
assignation by a married woman was valid without the consent 
of her husband was referred to the law of her domicile at 
the time. Z~De Virte y> Macleod 1869 7 M. 347, 6 S.L.R.237:
As to assignation contra Dicey p. 606; Republic of
con
Guatemala v. Nunez 1927 1 K.B. 669 is inclusive, the lex 
domicilii and the lex loci actus being the same. Pender 
v. Commercial Bank (O.H.) 1940 3.L.T. is another authority 
in favour of the lex domicilii, although the issue there 
was truly this: whether or not a benefit under a policy
of assurance was assignable, a question to be settled.by 
the proper law of the contract of insurance. Lord 
Robertson’s judgement at one point treats the issue as 
that, at another treats it as a question of capacity to 
assign, and at still another treats it as a question of 
the validity of the assignation, to be governed by the 
proper law of the assignation^
EXCEPTIONS TO THE LEX DOM ICILII,
Capacity to enter into a mercantile contract is gov- 
: e m e d  by the lex loci contractus. Each party must have 
capacity by the lex loci contractusf M^cFeetridge v. Stewarts 
& Lloyds 1 9 1 5  S.C. 773; Wilkie v. Dunlop 1 2 -5 .5 0 6 ;  Male v. 
Roberts 1 8 0 0  3 Esp. 1 6 5 J *  In McFeetridge y. Stewarts & . 
Lloyds, a ™inor whose domicile was Irish, and whose
father resided in Ireland, took service as a labourer^ 
with a firm in Scotland, He was injured at his work, and 
agreed, without consulting his father, to accept compen- 
:sation under the Workmens Compensation Act 1 9 0 6 ,  After 
compensation was paid for some time^he brought an action
of damages for his injury at common law.and contended that,
rwf ' ' ■
being a minor, he was bound by his election of Workmen’s
A
Compensation. It was held that his capacity as a minor’ 
to enter into the agreement to accept Workmens Compensation 
fell to be determined,not by the lex domicilii (Irish £a 
but by the lex loci contractus (Scots ]f!aw)# "To apply the 
law of a foreign country to a contract for hire of labour 
would be to relegate such cases to the most inconvenient 
forum^ Jper The Lord Justice Clerk, ,Macdonald, at p. 784~j& 
Traders can not be expected to satisfy themselves as to the 
domicile of business acquaintances, and as to the law of 
that domicile,before entering into, contracts with them.
If a man.twenty four years of age, resident in. Scotland^ 
ordered timber from a Scottish firm,it would be most un- 
:fair, if when asked to pay for the timber, he could reply 
that he was of Mexican extraction, that he was still 
domiciled in Mexico, and that by his personal law he could 
not make a binding contract until he was twenty five.
"The obstacles to commercial intercourse between the sub- 
:jects of foreign states would be almost insurmountable, 
if a party must pause to ascertain, not by the means 
within/
within his reach, hut by recourse to the law of the 
domicile of the person with whom he is dealing, whether 
the latter has attained the age of majority, and, 
consequently whether he is competent to enter into a valid 
and binding contract. If the country in which the contract 
is litigated is also that in which it was entered into, and
if the party enforcing it were the subject of that country,
it would be un0ust as well as unreasonable, to evoxe the 
law of a foreign state for the benefit of the foreigner, 
and to deprive its own subject of the benefit of the law of 
his own state./".Burge: Colonial and Foreign Law pt.l p.132_/ 
Some modern writers have expressed the opinion that 
it should be ’the proper law of the contract’ which should 
govern capacity in mercantile contracts,/"Cheshire p.211. 
Dicey p. 639 (that, however, is only a comment. The rule 
that Dicey gives is the lex loci contractus) 7 1 the proper " 
law of the contract’ being the law by which the parties to
a contract intended, or may fairly be presumed to have
intended, to submit themselves./"Dicey p • 628_J7 This view 
has little to recommend it. It is difficult to see how a 
minor who has no capacity to commit any juridical act, can 
acquire capacity by intending that his juridical acts should 
be governed by the law of another country; or how a major, 
who has full capacity, can escape the results of it by 
pleading that the parties were contemplating a foreign law* 
To say that the proper law of the contract governs capacity 
assumes that there is a binding contract, which of course 
there never was if one of the parties had no capacity.
/~See the reasoning in Cooper v. Cooper’s Trustees 15 R. 
(H.L.) 21 by the Lord Chancellor Halsbury at p. 25 and Lord 
Macnaghten at- p . 31 against a similar argument there, quoted 
above p. J
A correction that might be made in the rule as above 
stated;would be to put it thus: a person has no capacity
to 'enter into a mercantile contract if he has not capacity 
by/
•by either his lex domicilii or the lex loci contractus, arid 
he has capacity ii‘ he has it oy either his lex domicilii 
or oy the lex xoci contractus. There is no authority as 
to this, but it is a possible view./ See McLaren p.. 2b;
Savigriy p. 155, where he described a provision of the then 
Prussian law to that effect; Bar p. 307, 312. The Hague 
Convention of 1912 contained an article concerxxing a Uniform 
law for Bills and Cheques which provided that, while capacity 
to contract is normally governed by the national law: "La 
persoxine qui serait incapable, d ’aprks la loi indiqufee per 
l ’alinea precedent, est, nganmoins, valablement tenue, si 
elle s'est obligde sur le territoire d ’un Btat, d ’apres la 
legisla.tion duquel elle aurait ete capable'!_quoted by 
Westlake £ 2 . Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1930 is 
to a similar effect - H.C. Gutteridge (1934) 16 Jo. Comp.
Leg. 53 at p . 60
It is difficult to see how the capacity of a corporation, 
even in regard to mercaxitile contracts, can be referred to 
any law other than the law under which the body is incorporated, 
and this may be held to be an exception to the rule that the 
lex loci contractus determines capacity.. However there is 
no authority. /~But see Bills of Exchange' p « _/ The
capacity of a corporation means its powers under its articles, 
or incorporating statute or charter, and the question whether 
directors have power to bind the corporation is a distinct 
issue. / Chalmers, Bills of Exchange Act p. 70J
All questions of capacity in regard to immoveables are 
governed by the lex rei situs./~Qgilvy v. Qailvy’s Trustees 
(O.H.) 1927 3.L.T. 83; Murray v . Baillie 1849 1ID. 710;
Allen, v . Robertson 1855 18 D.97; Mcffadzean, Petitioner 1917 
B.C. 142; Lamb v. mont^omerie 1857 20 i). 1323; Burns. 
Conveyancing Practice p. 149; Cheshire p. 540; ftestlaxe
Bee. 165 (a), Story Secs. 429-431; Dicey p. 585; Bank of 
Africa Limited v. Cohen (1909) 2 Ch. 129. Conti’a Fraser, 
Parent and Child pp. 727, 8_/ "The Court, in dealing with a 
contract relating to immoveables^ is bound to determine this 
question of capacity by/
29.
by the lex situs, and if the lex situs shows that the con- 
:tracting party has not the capacity to contract, the whole 
contract is void, and nothing can be done in this country 
to enforce that contract against the contracting partyj 
^Bank of Africa Limited v. Cohen,supra, per Eve J. at' p.
136; Cp. Buckley L.J. at p, 143. Although this principle 
is unexceptional it may be doubted whether the case raised 
a question of capacity, or only one of the formalities of 
the contract•- Cp. Cheshire p. 641J
Thus for a conveyance of immoveables to be valid^the 
granter must have capacity, to grant the conveyanceaccording 
to the lex situs and the grantee carjacity to receive accord ,
:ing to the lex situs. ^Under the head of capacity to 
receive a. conveyance of lands is sometimes put the rule, 
that used to exist in Scots law (Lord Kincardinefs Creditors
v. Heere Van Sommerdyke 1683 Mor. 4636; Leslie v. Forbes
h
1749 Mor. 4.636; Alexander 1862 24 Scots J. 622) and still 
persists in other systems,that an alien cannot own land.
If the lex situs excludes aliens from holding lands, that 
rule prevails whatever be the law of the domicile. But 
if by the lex situs an alien can hold lands, it is immater-
:ial that the law of the domicile prevents it..  Story
Sec. 430 • This, however, is not really a question of 
capacity^.
Where the granter or grantee has no capacity by the
i
lex situs, it will not suffice thathe has capacity by his 
lex domicilii. If it is desired to convey immoveables 
during non-capacity of the granter or grantee^this must be 
done through the intervention of a guardian appointed by 
the lex situs,and the guardian appointed by the lex domicilii 
does not have the right, as he would have with moveables, 
to receive|ogilvy v. Ogilvy^ Trustees supra; Allen v. 
Robertsofo suprsj or grant ^Lamb v. Montgomerie supra; 
McFadzean, Petitioner, supra. In the latter case^ofi an
application/
application to the nobile officium the Oourt on production 
of evidence that the petitioner had been duly appointed 
guardian according to the lax? of the domicile of the pupil^ 
granted authority to complete a title in the pupilfs 
name and sell property, but the authority of our Court has 
always to be obtained, either in this way,.or by the appoint 
:ment of a curator bonis,(as in Allen v. Robertson and 
Murray v... Baillle) or a factor loco tut oris' (as in Lamb 
v I Montgomerlejj ilL,
Capacity to enter into a contract to convey or 
mortgage land is also governed by the' lex situs,|banh of 
Africa Limited v. Cohen, supraj . It would be absurd to 
say that a person,who has full power by the lex situs 
to convey heritage, is unable owing to the law of his 
domicile to enter into a valid contract for the sale of 
it; and conversely, a foreigner who is not old enough-by 
kk® 1®% situs to convey heritage,could not possibly under- 
: take a binding obligation to convey It. 'Jpra-ser, Parent 
and Child p. 728. Dicey, however, states that capacity 
to make a contract re immoveables is governed by the pro - ■
:per law of the'contract (p.^87j. "In addition to the 
reason just given in the text. this. is. subject to all the 
objections applicable to the view that' capacity in regard 
to. mercantile, contracts is governed by the proper, law 
(q.v/j ' ■ and in regard to marriage contracts-^
by-the lav/ of the matrimonial domicile
✓
Again ,, Capacity to make a will regarding immoveables 
is governed by the lex situs,^Robertson v . Landell' 1843 ■
6 D. 170; McLaren p. 24; Cheshire p., 550-;' Ricey p.. 58sJ 
These rules are merely applications of the general 
principle that the lex situs governs - all rights relating 
to immoveables. -
THE EFFECT OF k_ CH AN GE OF DO MICIL B ON C AP AC ITY♦ 
p j n o ^  tdiffor" r y - -to
country a— difficult— quo a t i on- arises wh enaa person aged ,
sixteen.domiciled/
domiciled in country A, where the age of majority is • 
fourteen, changing his domicile to country B, in which 
the age of majority is twenty one, - does he lose his 
•capacity? And if he changed from B to A would he gain 
capacity? I f ' c a c  K  c o u n t r y  c J - e c i d e J  i s / o m i  c i  I t  a c c o r d i n g  ' T"«> i fs. o w n  l a w  o f
dominie, The Courts of A.would hold that the person of 
sixteen could change his domicile to B, while the Courts 
of B would hold that he could not. Similarly the Courts 
of A would hold that his parents could not change his 
domicile for him by becoming domiciled in B, while the - 
Courts of B would hold that they could. The Courts of 
A would hold that when he moved his domicile from B to A 
he acquired capacity, that when he moved from A to B he 
lost 'capa'city. which he had. The Courts of B would hold 
that when he moved from B to A he could not acquire a 
domicile there and accordingly his capacity would remain 
unaltered, unless his .parents changed his domicile for him, 
when he would become emancipated, and similarly that when 
he moved from A to B he could not acquire a domicile in Bj 
and so his capacity would remain unimpaired, unless hi3 
parents changed his domicile for him,when they would hold 
that he had lost capacity. This seems ridiculously 
complicated^ and to involve the impossible position of a 
major losing majority by changing his domicile.
It has been submitted that the rule about the age 
at which one can acquire a domicile should be that 
suggested by Bar, namely: 1 It is necessary that a
person should have, in order to an independent and 
voluntary acquisition of a domicile, capacity to act, 
and that both by the law of the domicile that he has; and 
by that of the country to which he intends to remove; 
the former, that he may be able to undo the tie that 
binds him to his native country; the latter, that he 
may be in a position to enter into the new allegiance”,
/~”Gillespie 1 s translation 2nd Ed. p. 329_7-and 
accordingly, the person of sixteen cannot change his 
domicile from A to B or B to A: he must, wait till
he is twenty one before he can do that* Consequently 
the difficulty never arises of a person changing his 
domicile from a country where he is a major to a 
country where he is not, or contrariwise. /""The 
results that Bar deduces, however, are different 
from those submitted here. After the passage quoted 
he goes on: "The authority of the State that permits
one who is minor by her laws, to establish his domicile 
independently in her territory, silently recognises 
the capacity of this person to act; she silently 
concedes the right of majority, if she permits anyone 
who is not yet major by her laws to establish his abode 
independently in her territory ... On the other hand, 
however, we must hold that a person who Is still a/
a  i n  I  i n  o r  b y  t , " h  e  l a w  o f *  t h e  d o m i c i l e  w h i c h  b o  b n  c l  h i t h e r t o  - e n  —
o f  m a j o r i t y . "  T h u s  B a r  a p p e a r s  t o  h o l d  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n  o f  s i x t e e n  
c o u l d  c h a n g e  h i s  d o m i c i l e  f r o m  B  t o  A ,  g a i n i n g  c a p a c i t y .  T h i s
t h e  s a m e  r e s u l t  a s  S a v i n g y  d i d  b y  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n i n g . ( S a v i n g y
T o  B a r ’ s  r u l e  s h o u l d  b e  a d d e d  o n e  o t h e r  r u l e ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  o n c e  
a  p e r s o n  h a s  a c q u i r e d ,  c a p a c i t y  b y  h i s  d o m i c i $ . l i a r y  l a w ^ h e  c a n n o t  
b e  d p p r i v e d .  o f  t h a t  c a p a c i t y ,  a n d  t h e  d o m i c i l e  w h i c h  g i v e s  i t ,
t h r o u g h  t h e  a o t r i - e n  9f  a  p a r e n t  &  u . u m . i c i l e  i n  a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y  b y  
t h e  l a w  o f  w h i c h  t h e  c h i l d  w o n I d  s t i l l  b e  i n  i n f a n c y  a n d  d e p e n d e n t  
o n  t h e  p a r e n t  f o r  d o m i c i l e .  T h u s  i f  t h e  f a t h e r  o f  t h e  m i n o r  o f  
s i x t e e n  w e r e  d o m i c i l e d - ,  l i b e  t h e  m i n o r , i n  S c o t l a n d ,  a n d  t h e  f a t h e r  
a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e . i n  E n g l a n d ,  h e  w o u l d  n o t  c o n f e r  t h e  E n g l i i h  
d o m i c i l e  d e r i v a t i v e l y  o n  t h e  c h i l d ,  a n d  t h u s  r o b  h i m  o f  t h e  
c a p a c i t y  w h i c h  h e  h a d  g a i n e d .  £  A r n o t t  v .  G r o o m  1 8 4 6  9  D *  1 4 8  
T h i s  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  a s  ’w e l l  a s  t h e  S c o t s  
C o u r t s .  B u t  i f  t h e  f a t h e r  o f  a  c h i l d  o f  s i x t e e n  c h a n g e d ,  h i s  d o m ­
i c i l e  f r o m  E n g l a n d  t o  S c o t l a n d . ,  t h e  c h i l d  w o u l d  b e  e m a n c i p a t e d ,  
b o t h  i n  t h e  V i e w  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  a n d  t h e  S c o t s  C o u r t s .
j o y e d ,  b e c o m e s  m a j o r  a t  o n c e  u p o n  a c q u i r i n g  c i t i z e n s h i p  i n  
a n o t h e r  s t a t e ,  i f  h e  i s  o f  t h e  a g e  t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  a s  a  c o n d i t i o n
d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  v e r y  l o g i c a l l y  f r o m  t h e  p r i n c i p l e .  B a r  a r r i v e s  a t
a  m i n o r  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o o . i c i . l e  w h i c h  h e  h a d  h i t h e r t <
e n  j  o y  e d ,  b e e o m e s  r a a  j  o r  
i n  a n o t h e r  s t a t e ,  i f  h  
a .  c o n d i t i o n  o f  r a a  i o r i t y
B  w i t h o u t  l o s i n g  c a p a c i  
j a c i t y .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  
p r i n i c p l e .  B a r  a r r i v e  
d i d  b y  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o r
a t  o n c e  u p o n  a c q u i r i n g  o i t z e n s h i p  
i s  o f  t h e  a g e  t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  a s  
”  T h u s  B a r  a r r e a r s  t o  h o l d  t h a t
t h e  - p e r s o n  o f  s i x t e e n  c o u l d  c h a n g e  h i s  d o m i c i l e  f r o m  A  t <
t y ,  a n d  f r o m  B  t o  A ,  g a i n i n g  c a p  
f o l l o w  v e r y  l o g i c a l l y  f r o m  h i s  
s  a t  t h e  s a m e  r e s u l t  a s  S a v i n g y  
i n g  ( S a v i n g y  p .  1 7 0 )J
A R  K  1  A  G  A .
o f  .  
r t  ~
A  m a r r i a g e h a s  b e e n  v a l i d l y  c o n t r a c t e d ^  w i l l ;  b e
 a c t  r e c o g n i s e d  e v e r y w h e r e .  T h u s  i f  p a r t i e s  m a r r y  i n  c o u n t r y
a n
X . a n d  t h e i r  m a r r i a g e  i s  f o r m a l l y  v a l i d ,  a n d  i s  v a l i d  a s  t o  
t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s , a n d  t h e  e s s e n t i a l s  o f  t h e  
c o n t r a c t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s e v e r a l  s y s t e m s  t h a t  g o v e r n  t h e s e  
d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s ,  t h e y  a r e  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  w h e n  t h e y  g o  t o  
r e s i d e  i n  c o u n t r y  Y ,  a n d  t h a t  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  m a r r i a g e  d i d . ,  
n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  f o r m s ,  o r  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a s  t o  c a p a c i t y ,  
o r  e s s e n t i a l s ^  o f  c o u n t r y  Y ,  j [ B r o o k  v *  B r o o k  1 8 6 1  9  H . L . C .
1 3 9  p e r  L o r d  C a m p b e l l  a t  p .  213 J .  B u t  i t  i s  o n l y . t h e  1 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  h u s b a n d  a m i d  w i f e  t h a t  
i s  g i v e n  e f f e c t  t o ;  t h e  r i g h t s  a n d  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
s p o u s e s  a r e  n o t  d e t e r m i n e d  a t  i t s  i n c e p t i o h  s o  a s  t o  a d h e r e  t o  
t h e  m a r r i a g e  i n  w h a t e v e r  c o u n t r y  i t  m a y  s u b s i s t .  - I n  t h i s  
r e s p e c t  m a r r i a g e  d i f f e r s  f r o m  a  c o n t r a c t .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
a  m e r c a n t i l e  c o n t r a c t , t h e  r i g h t s  a n d  - o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
p a r t i e s  i n t e r  s e  a r e  c o n c l u s i v e l y  s e t t l e d  b y  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  
w i l l  n o t  a l t e r  i f  t h e  p a r t i e s  c h a n g e  t h e i r  r e s i d e n c e ^  a n d  
c a n  b e  e n f o r c e d  i n  a n y  c o u n t r y  e x a c t l y  a s  t h e  p a r t i e s  
o r i g i n a l l y  c o n t r a c t e d .  T h e  l e g a l  r e l a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  
t o  a  m e r c a n t i l e  c o n t r a c t  i s  f i x e d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  m a k i n g  
t h e  c o n t r a c t .  T h e  l e g a l  r e l a t i o n  o f  s p o u s e s . , - - o n  t h e  
o t h e r /
other hand.is fluid. The parties to a marriage cannot 
attach any conditions to it or vary its legal obligations 
by consent, f ~Lang v. Lang 1921 S.C. 44 per Lord President 
Clyde; Cordon v. Pye Ferguss Cons. Hep. A pp. 276 per 
Lord Meadowbank at pV 361~J and accordingly they are not 
bound in any implied contract to the rights and obligations 
at the inception of the marriage. f ~Gordon v. Pye supra; 
Warrender v. Warrender 1835 2 S. 3c McL. 154,Affg. 12S.
847;. Edmonstone v. Edmonstone etc. June 1st 1816 F.C. 
per Lord Bobertson at p. 149J7 The property rights of 
the spouses inter se will, in general, and in the absence 
of a Marriage Contract, be governed by the law of the 
husband’s domicile for the time being; /~See post p. J  
the question of the dissolubility of the marriage by the 
law of the Courts which have jurisdiction to dissolve it; 
other rights, such as the husband’s power over his wife, 
by the law of their residence for the time being./-Dicey 
p. 548; Fraser p. 1318_7 f,Would a husband in this 
country be permitted to keep his wife in an iron cage, 
or beat her with rods of the thickness of a Judge’s 
finger, because he had married her in England, where 
it is said this may be done?” f~Gordon v. Pye supra, 
per Lord Meadowbank at p. 361 J. The fact that a
marriage is indissoluble in the country in which it was 
contracted is not of the essence of the contract so as 
to adhere to it and prevent the marriage beini? dissolved 
if the spouses become domiciled^and so give the Courts 
jurisdictjon,in another country where it is dissoluble. 
f~Cordon v. Pye supra; Warrender v. Warrender, supra; 
Edmonstone v. Edmonstone, supra; Humphrey v. Humphrey’s 
Trs. (O.H.) 1895 33 S.L.H. 99; Harvey v. Farnie 1880 
6 P.D. 35__7 Lord Brougham in Warrender v. War render
£1835 2 S. & McL. 154_7 said: wlf, indeed, there go
two things under one and the same name in different 
countries - if that which is called marriage is of a
different nature in each - there may he some room for 
holding that we are to consider the thing to which the 
parties have hound themselves according/
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a c c o r d i n g  t o  i t s  l e g a l  a c c e p t a n c e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  
t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  w a s  c o n t r a c t e d .  B u t  m a r r i a g e  i s  o n e  a n d  
t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a l l  t h e  C h r i s t i a n  w o r l d  o v e r .  
O u r  w h o l e  l a w  o f  m a r r i a g e  a s s u m e s  t h i s ;  a n d  i t  i s  i m p o r t ~  
: a n t  t o  o b s e r v e  t h a t  w e  r e g a r d  i t  a s  a  w h o l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
t h i n g ,  a  d i f f e r e n t  s t a t u s  f r o m  T u r k i s h  o r  o t h e r  m a r r i a g e s  
a m o n g  i n f i d e l  n a t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  w e  c l e a r l y  s h o u l d  n e v e r  
r e c o g n i s e  t h e  p l u r a l i t y  o f  v o w g ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t  v a l i d i t y  
o f  s e c o n d  m a r r i a g e s , -  s t a n d i n g  t h e  f i r s t ,  w h i c h  s e c o n d  
m a r r i a g e s  t h e  l a w s  o f  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  a u t h o r i s e  a n d  
v a l i d a t e .  T h i s  c a n n o t  b e  p u t  o n  a n y  r a t i o n a l  g ^ r o u n d ,  
e x c e p t  o u r  h o l d i n g  t h e  i n f i d e l  m a r r i a g e  t o  b e  s o m e t h i n g  
d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  C h r i s t i a n ,  a n d  o u r  a l s o  h o l d i n g  t h e  
C h r i s t i a n  m a r r i a g e  t o  b e  t h e  s a m e  e v e r y w h e r e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
a l l  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  o n e  c o u n t r y  h a v e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i s  
w h e t h e r  o r  h o t  t h e  t h i n g  c a l l e d  m a r r i a g e  -  t h a t  k n o w n  
r e l a t i o n  o f  p e r s o n s ,  t h a t  r e l a t i o n  t h a t  - o u r  C o u r t s  a r e  
a c q u a i n t e d  w i t h ,  a n d  k n o w  h o w  t o  d e a l  w i t h  -  h a s  b e e n  
v a l i d i l y  c o n t r a c t e d  i n  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  t h e  p a r t i e s  
p r o f e s s e d  t o  b i n d  t h e m s e l v e s .  I f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  
a n s w e r e d  i n  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e ,  a  m a r r i a g e  h a s  b e e n  h a d ;  
t h e  r e l a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  c o n s t i t u t e d ;  a n d  t h o s e ' C o u r t s  w i l l  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  u n d e r  i t  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  m u n i c i p a l  l a w  w h i c h  t h e y  
a d m i n i s t e r  •11
A s  L o r d  B r o u g h a m  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  a b o v e  p a s s a g e ,  t h e s e  
p r i n c i p l e s  o n l y  a p p l y  t o  m a r r i a g e  ' a s  w e  u n d e r s t a n d  i t .  
P o l y g a m o u s  u n i o n s  a r e  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  n a t u r e ,  a n d  a l t h o u g h  
s o m e  o f  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  e f f e c t s  o f  p o l y g a m o u s  u n i o n s ,  s u c h  
a s  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  c h i l d r e n ,  a r e  r e c o g n i s e d ^ a s -  
^  m a r r i a g e s .  I t  I s  n e c e s s a r y  t h e r e f o r e  t o  d e f i n e  m a r r i a g e  
a s  w e  u n d e r s t a n d  i t ,  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  f r o m  p o l y g a m o u s  
u n i o n s ,  a n d  t o  d e s c r i b e  w h a t  r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  a c c o r d e d  
/  t o  p o l y g a m o u s  u n i o n s .
|tion Marriage as we understand it is "the voluntary union
jjtrrlage.
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others.” (jhyde v . Hyde 1866 L.R. 1 P.D. 130 per Lord Pen- 
:zance at p. 133: Approved in In re Bethell 1887 3^ Ch.T).
220; Brinkley v. A«G». 1890 15 P.- 76; Nachlmson v. llaohimson 
1930 P. 217; Walton Husband and Wife 2nd. Edition p.lj^ Thus 
when two Mormons contracted a "marriage^in a Mormon state^ 
where polygamy was both lawful anc\usual; ( Hyde v- Hyde sup raj 
and when' a domiciled Englishman "married” in' the tribal 
. territory an African .native woman'according to the*custom of 
the tribe, that permitted polygamy |jTn re Bethell supraj 
these were held not to be valid marriages as understood in 
our law. Nor did it matter in these cases that the parties 
were both single at.the time that they "married”: what they 
entered into was a polygamous union, and not marriage in our 
meaning of the term. [ m  the American case of Royal v.
Cudahy Backing Company ,(1982) 195 Iowa 759 and by S.G. Vesey- 
Fitzgerald in 1931 L.Q.Il. p. 253 the attitude is taken that 
' a 'union between persons capable of contracting a polygamous 
marriage^arid doing so in a polygamous form*should be regard- 
s ed as a marriage in our sense if they were both single at
the time'and intended the union to be monogamous .J «------ —
 Some ofNthe cases talk of ".Christian marriage" or
"marriage as it is understood in Christendom [ M l  e v. Hyde 
supra; In re Bethell supraj but a marriage between non- 
Christians, or between a Christian and a non-Christian, 
entered into in a foreign country according to the appropriat 
ceremony there,will be regarded as a marriage in our sense, 
if by the foreign law the union is of one man and one woman 
for life to the exclusion of all others-..^Brinkley . v. A»G.
10 90 15 P. 76 - a  marriage in J a v a n ] ?  Further, if the
V
marriage satisfies the test that it is at inception the 
voluntary union of one man and one woman for life to the
exclusion,of all others, its validity will nos.be further'
• tested/
tested by the question o f  its dissolubility, end a Russ:* r\\
rarriage ohix-h c-oule. : coccd'-ng to his:^ian law, be dissolved
by mutual consent, , .or at the will of one of the parties with
merely formal conditions, of r&gistoftti** ,wis none, the less a
marriage as we understand- it: although the marriage could be
so readily dissolved, until it was dissolved it': subsisted,
to the 'exclusion of all others, and was intended by the
p a - r t i e s  e. t  i t s  • i n c e p t i o n  t o -  ' l a s t  a l l  t h e i r '  l i v e s  *
jhachimeon - v . Hachlmson . lovo • P., , The Pu'-si?n systo-r- I-.-,
to is respoc-t is similar to the Classical Homan law} where
marriage could be dissolved by repudiumj •
How is .it determined whether a union is a marriage .
in our sense-or a polygamous union? -Sp-e afetog genera 11 y ,
"The form'of the ceremony is - the criterion. The- prinolml
are -Pioye- aoou-patoly— e-o-d-thuat If the union is entered
into in the form prescribed by the lex loci celebrationis 
>
for. marriages in' our sense,' it is a marriage in our sense, 
and that, even though the husband or both spouses are capable 
of entering into a -polygamous union by their personal'law* 
^Rex v. The Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Hammer- 
: smith 1917 1 K.B. 634; Chetti v. Chetti 1909 P. 07, where"*" L -T- TT-_— " >
the Court granted judicial separation in a marriage cele-
jbrated in London against a Eindu domiciled in India, and.
over-ruled inter alia his contention that the marriage was a
polygamous one and consequently not within the matrimonial
jurisdiction of the Court; Lendrum v. Chakravartl 1929 S.L.T.
96, MacDougall v .Chitnavis 1937 S.C. 390, hangrulkar v .
Mangrulkar 1939 S.C. 939, when marriages in Scotland with
♦
Hindus domiciled in India were held to be monogamous;
Brinkley v, A.G. 1890 15 P. 76; Westlake Sec. 34(a)J an4 
oj^ en-l-f ■ Or - prior polygamous -ma-iFFia-g^c had- h^e-n—v-al-idly onte-ped 
Into ^Rox v. ffagiui-b 1917- -1 K«B« ■ 3-5ojj • •
-ff-f
 If the union hajS teen entered into in a. form for
polygamous marriages, it is not a marriage in our sense
^Hyde v, Kyde 186?? L.R. 1 P • D. J even though celebrated, in
this country, jfn re Abdul if j i d Pel shah , Times newspaper
December 16th, 18th, 1926 f January 14th, 18th? 1927, 1932
L.Q.E. at p. 348; In re Ullee 1885 53 L.T. (U.S.) 71lJ or
even. though both the parties were single at the time and
intended monogamy, jplyde v. Hyde supra; In re Bethell 1887
38 Ch.D.220; S.G.Vesey-FitzgeriAd in 1931 L.Q.R. p. 253
takes the opposite attitude that a union between persons
capable of contracting a polygamous union,and validly
doing so in a polygamous.form, should be regarded as a
mcirriage in' our sense if they were both single at the time
and intended the union to be monogamous, and this haS 
/
the support of the American case of Royal v. CudahyS  --------------------- -y ~
Packing Company (1922) 195 Xowa7 5gJ. ' p.
Such, a union- entered, into in a polygamous form is a 
valid polygamous union, and as sucfn the subsidiary, effects 
of itr e.g., fhe legitimacy !of. the children,, a.re entitled 
to the recognition.'of ■ our'Courts, if the husband was capable 
of entering into .'.a polygamous union by his. personal law 
and the union 3^ s celebrated in the form prescribed by 
that lav/ for polygamous unions, ^ Hyde v. Hyde supra at p. 
138^ even'though celebrated in a country where polygamy • 
is not permitted. ^ This last clause is necessary in the 
interests of just reciprocation. It is only proper that 
we should permit koslems to contract their institution 
according to their forms in this country>when we claim 
that'our’subjects are validly married in the Christian 
sense if they marry in an Eastern country, where the use 
of the local form is impossible, as. nearly as may bekIn 
conformity with the Scots Common Daw (See p, )W.E.
Beckett in 1932 48 L.Q.R. at p. 366. In Sa R e  Abdul.
?8.
3 id Bel shall. supra, and In be Ullee , supra, Moslems domiciled 
in Bagdad and India respectively contracted polygamous 
marriages in England according■to the Moslem rites, and these 
were regarded by the English Courts as valid Polygamous 
unions under which the children might .be legitimate. P.E. 
Beckett states' (ibid)’ ’’It is, moreover, well known that 
Mohammedan marriages are from time to time performed at.-the 
mosque in Woking." • Westlake Sec. 34 bfj A union entered 
into in a polygamous form is not a valid polygamous union, 
the subsidiary effects of which our Courts will recognise, 
if the husband had not the power by his personal law to 
enter into a polygamous union; £ln re Bethell 1S87 38 Ch.D.
220 - the husband was domiciled in England and although the 
union was. entered into in tribal territory, where polygamy 
was lawful^according to the polygamous form,the marriage was 
not only held not to be a marriage in our sense, but the
.children were held to be illegitimate, showing that it was
\ .
not even a valid polygamous, union);' such a union is not a
monogamous union either, it is a complete nullity.
Viiat now is the recognition that our Courts extend to
a polygamous union? If the union does not conform t o 'our
conception of marriage, our Courts will not entertain a
matrimonial suit thereanent* Q.ur Courts- will not divorce^
or Judicially separate, the parties, jjiyde v« Hyde lS6n L*£*
1 P* & D0 l£oJ. The r?*tio of thie is the impossibility
of applying our law of marriage, and our marital remedies, to
a totally different institution* It would be ridiculous to
give a third Hindu "wife" a divorce for adultery because the
husband had married a fourthMwife,f« "We have'in England
no law framed on the scale of polygamy or adjusted to its
requirements" jper Lord Penzance at p. 136)* But it is
not
going too far to say that our Courts will/recognise a
*
Polygamous union at all^and will give no effect to it what­
ever. Lord Penzance concluded his Judgment in Hyde v, Hyde
nth/
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with these ivords- ,fThis Court does not profess to decide upon 
the rights of succession or legitimacy which it might be 
proper to accord to the issue of polygamous unions, nor 
upon the rights or obligations in relation to third persons 
that people living under the sanction of such unions may 
have created for themselves. All that is intended to be 
here decided is that as between each other they are not en- 
ititled to the remedies, the adjudication or the relief of 
the
iss].
The rule appears to be that.if the polygamous marriage 
was validly entered into, ^it was validly entered into if the 
husband was capable by his personal law of contracting a 
polygamous marri.Fige union and such a union has been celebrat- 
: ed according to the forms of that law. The ceremony may be 
performed anywhere, even in this country, where polygamy is 
not permitted to persons whose personal law does not permit 
djU see supraj although our Courts will not recognise 
that the man and the woman are husband and wife and will not 
entertain matrimonial causes between them, it will recognise 
the polygamous union to a certain extent-and accord recog­
nition to certain subsidiary effects of the marriage. Thus- 
the children are legitimate, ^ In re Ullee supra . See-aiatfs^ 
Executor v* The Master,South African casey (l917) App. Div. 
302/1932 48 L.Q.R. 344 n. & 349] and on the death of their 
father intestate entitled to succeed to his estate in accord­
a n c e  with the law of his domicile, [in re Abdul iTa jid Belsah 
The position in. regard to the children seems reason 
:ably clear, but it is an undecided point in this country 
whether any subsidiary effects of marriage will be accorded 
to the wife. Is she a wife to the extent of conferring on 
her her "husband's" domicile; a right to Workmen's Compen- 
:sation; £see American case Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co.
(1992) 195 Iowa 75'l 1931 47 L.Q.R. at p. 2SlJ or solatium 
in/
supra
■j
matrimonial law of England.[1866 L.R. 1 P. & D. at p.
in respect of the death of her "husband"? In South Africa 
it has been held that the spouse of a polygamous marriage 
is not a "wife" either within the meaning of an immigration 
statufe which entitled a woman, although otherwise a pro­
hibited immigrant, to enter the country if she was the wife 
of a person who was not a prohibited immigrant, /"Ssop v. 
Union Government 1913 13 O.P.F. 133; P. v. Subina 1912 
T.D.P,. 1079__7 or within the meaning of a rule which debars 
a wife from, giving evidence against her husband in a 
criminal trial; /~~Palana v. P. 1907 T.P. 407; F_. v. Vboko 
1910 T.P. 445__7 nor is- she a "surviving spouse" for the 
purposes of succession duty-/~Seedat's (Executorg) v. The 
Piaster supra. For these South African cases see 1932 48 
L.Q.K. p. 349_/ In England it has recently been held that 
a prior polygamous marriage, invalidates a subsequent 
monogamous marriage^ f ~Clayton v. Vasan, 1946 p. 67;
Uaindail v. Balncall 1945 01 T.L.P. 549, Affd. 1946 62 
T.L.P. 263. In re Hillard (1887) 1.1,.P. 10 had. .218. The 
registrar General refused to allow the celebration of a 
marriage between two Hindus, the woman having been married 
in childhood to another Hindu - The Scotsman August, 15th 
1931. A prior monogamous marriage that is still subsisting 
would Invalidate a subsequent polygamous union, because the 
two could not subsist together, and the prior one, valid at 
the time of the marriage, could not be defeated - Contra 
yy.H. Beckett in 1932 48 L.Q.P. p. 364/7 and in view of that, 
an earlier dictum that, if one of the wives of a polygamous 
union came to this country and married again, the polygamous 
union would not be recognised to the extent of subjecting her 
to a charge of bigamy, f ~Harvey v. Farnie 1880 6 P.D. 35 per
gc
Lush Lord Justice at p. 53_/ may have to be^considered . —
/ “The question was left open in Hex v. Naguib 1917 1 K.B.359_ 
If a polygamous "wife" came to this country.,and some person 
said that because she was not married in the Christian sense 
she/
she was no true wife but an immoral woman living in 
fornication with a man not her husband, it has been 
suggested that she would surely have a good cause for an 
action of defamation in a Scots Court. /“C .K. Allen in 1930 
46 L.Q.R. at p. 309. He also says, that it is inconceivable 
that a Moslem ’’married” to a wife of fourteen years would 
""be liable to prosecution for carnally knowing his wife
under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885. Agreed, but this 
result must depend on the good sense of the Crown not to 
bring a prosecution, for if one were brought would our 
Courts not be bound to convict, be in" bound by the statute, 
which is in general terms? ~J 'Whatever recognition is 
accorded to polygamous marriages, equivalent effect must 
be given to polygamous divorces./“Walton p. 372_J7n*** this 
is' certain, that if the laws of one country and its courts 
recognise and give effect to those of another in respect 
of the constitution of any contract, they must give the 
like recognition and effect to those same foreign laws 
when they declare the same kind of contract dissolved” 
/ "Warrender v. Warrender II S. & McL. per Lord Brougham at 
p. 213_7 The Hammersmith Marriage Case /“1917 K.B. 634J  
refused effect to a polygamous divorce according to the law 
of the husband's domicile because the marriage was a 
-■ monogamous one.
If a polygamous union Is not valid, because, for 
example, the husband’s personal law does not permit polygamy, 
no recognition will be accorded to the union by our Courts, 
even to a limited extent. Thus the children will be 
Illegitimate./ “In re Bethell 1887.38 Ch. D. 220, where the 
husband’s domicile was English^/. The rule, that certain 
subsidiary effects of a polygamous marriage will be 
recognised if such a marriage is permitted by the law of 
the matrimonial domicile^is in harmony with the principle 
that, the essential validity of a marriage in our sense is 
tested by the law of the matrimonial domicile./“See post
p- J
v  A F P  I  A G E  
Fo rma 1 Va 11 d i t y
A marriage is formally valid if (a) celebrated in 
accordance with the forms required by the lex loci 
celebrationis;/"Fraser p. 1309; Dicey p. 732; Oheshij. 
p. 322; Westlake Sec. 17; Savigny p. 292; Admin istra
of Austrian Property v. Von Lorang 1926,3.0. 598, 
Revd. 1927 8.0. (H.T .) 8CV_7; (b) celebrated in a forelg
country in compliance with the foreign Harr5ages Acts 
1892. /~~55 and 56 Viet. c. 23J \  (c) when celebrated in
a foreign country in which the use of the local form is 
impossible, it is celebrated as nearly as possible in 
conformity with the requirements of the law 
of/
11
o f  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s  d o m i c i l e ,  [ p r a s e r  p .  1 2 1 . 5 ;  Westlake S e c .  2 8 :
C h e s h i r e  pp. 388-330; Dicey pp. 742-7 44 a n d  7 2 8  (n); S t o r y  
S e c .  1 1 9 ;  R u d i n g  v .  S m i t h  2  H a g g .  G o n e .  3 7 1 ;  P h i l l i p s  v .  
P h i l l i p s  ( 1 9 2 1 )  5 8  T . L . R .  I M Q ;  R . - ' v .  B r a m p t o n  1 8 9 8  1 0  P a s t
non I ^
J  *
( a ) .
”  I f  a  m a r r i a g e j i s  g o o d  b y  t h e  l a w s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h e r e
i t  i s  ' e f f e c t e d ,  i t ' i s  g o o d  a l l  t h e  w o r l d  o v e r ,  n o  m a t t e r
w h e t h e r  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g  o r  c e r e m o n y  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e d  m a r r i a g e
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  ' t h e  p l a c e  w o u l d  o r  w o u l d  n o t  • c o n -
s t i t u t e  m a r r i a g e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o n e  o r
o t h e r  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s .  I f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  m a r r i a g e  i s  n o
m a r r i a g e  i n  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  i t  i s  c e l e b r a t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  n o
m a r r i a g e  a n y w h e r e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  c e r e m o n y  o r  p r o c e e d i n g  i f
c o n d u c t e d  i n  t h e  p l a c e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s f  d o m i c i l e  w o u l d  b e
considered a good marri a g e .  |B e r t l i  1  a r m e  v .  D a c t o u s  1 9 3 0  A . 8 .
( P . O . ' ) - a t  u .  8 3 j .
s t r i k i n g  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  d o c t r i n e  o c c u r r e d  a s  a
A  0
result o f  t h e  S c o t s -  C o m m o n  h a w .  w n  a l  l o w e d  m a r r i a g e  b y  
c o n s e n t  d e  p r o s e n t i ,  b y  p r o m i s e  s u b s e n u . e f t t e  c o p u l a ,  a n d  b y  
c o h a b i t a t i o n  w i t h  h a b i t  a n d  r e p u t e . ^ T h e  f i r s t  t w o  m e t h o d s  o f  
c o n t r a c t i n g  m a r r i a g e  h a s t  b e e n  a b o l i s h e d  b y  t h e  " C a r r i a g e  
( S c o t l a n d )  A c t  1 9 3 9  S e c *  ^  S c o t c h  p a r t i e s v a r e  n o t  m a r r i e d
l/IL- •
b y  e x c h a n g i n g  c o n s e n t ^  o r  c o - h a b i t i n g  w i t h  h a b i t  a n d  r e p u t e  A -  
i n  a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  t h e s e  r u l e s  d i d  n o t  a p p l y  a n d  w h e r e  
• a  m a r r i a g e  c e r e m o n y  w a s  r e q u i r e d ’ ^ - ,  t a c c u l l o c h  v .  : r a c c u l l o c h  
1 7 3 9  M o r .  4 5 9 1 ,  2  P a t .  3 3 ;  c e n t r a  S t r a t h m o r e  v .  F o r b e s  1 7 2 1  
6 P a t .  ( S u p p .) 6 o 4 ^ ; S a s s 6 n  v .  C a m p b e l l  1 8 8 4  3 9 .  1 5 9 ,  S e e . f  
2 & S .  3 0 9 ;  C u l l e n  v .  G o s s a g e  1 8 3 0  1 2 D .  6 3 3 :  J o h n s t o n e -  v .
G o d o t  1 8 1 3  F e r g u s s ,  C o n s .  R e p o r t s  8 ;  C a m p b e l l  v .  C a m p b e l l  
1 8 0 7  3  M .  ( H • L • ) 1 1 3 ;  R a p i e r  v .  h a r i e r  1 8 0 1  H u m e  3 0 7 ;
F e r g u s s o n  C o n s i s t .  L a w  p .  2 7 ;  W a l t o n  p .  3 1 3 ;  F r a s e r  p . 1 7 0 o j  
a n d  c o n v e r s e l y  s u b j e c t s  o f  a n o t h e r  s t a t e  c o m i n g  t o  S c o t l a n d  
a n d  e x c h a n g i n g  c o n s e n t  w e r e  v a l i d l y  m a r r i e d ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  
t h a t  a  c e r e m o n y  w a s  p r e s c r i b e d  b y  t h e i r  l a w .  [ ^ F e r g u s  s o n  i b i d .  
H e n c e /
Hence the MGretna Green" marriages were valid^ Dalrymple 
]£i\
v. Dalrymple 1314' 2 Kagg• 54, and see the cases in Scots 
Courts consequent thereon,referred to in Ferguseon Consist#
L a w  p .  2fj | . . . . . . . .  - . . . . ; ■■■ ■ ■ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : *  .
-—   -To establish a marriage by promise- 'subsequent© copula * '•* - -,-m ——f ----- . l--; J
both the promise and the copula. haul--' to be in Scotland. 
[ijongworth v. Yelverton 1 8 * 2  1 ll. 161, 1664 2 M.(H.L.)
49; S e e  X. v. y. 1961.1 S.L.T. 7$}.
It has been said -^ Sottomayor v . De Barr os (Ho. 1) 1 2 7 7 '  
]P*  ^* Chetti v. Chetti 1
366; D i c e y  - p .  7 3 2 ,  75*J  t h a t  c a s e s  w h e r e  a  m a r r i a g e  w i t h o u t  
t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  p a r e n t s ,  w h i c h  w a s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  b y  . t h e  l e x  l o c  
c e l e b r a t i o n i s  b u t  w a © r e q u i r e d  b y  t h e  l e x  d o m i c i l i i  o f  t h e  
■ p a r t i e s ,  w a s  h e l d  v a l i d  [ o g d e n  v .  0 g d e n  1 9 0 6  P .  4 6 ;
C o m p t o n  v .  B e a r c r o f t  ( 1 7 6 9 )  2  H a g g .  C o n s .  4 4 4 E . ;  M i d d l e t o n  
v .  J a n v e r i n  ( 1 8 0 2 )  2  H a g g . ' C o n s .  . 4 5 7 ;  . S c r i n s h i r c  v .  f c r i i n -  
: *  s h i r e  1 7 5 2  2  H a g g .  C o n s .  3 9 6 ;  s i m o n i n  v .  M a l l a c  1 8 6 0  2  
S w .  &  T r # ’  6 7 j  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r m ­
a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  c e r e m o n y ,  a n d  i f  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  i s  a d o p t e d  i t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  q u o t e  t h e s e  c a s e s  - - ' a s  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
r u l e  t h a t  t h e  l e x  l o c i  c e l e b r a t i o n i s  g o v e r n s  t h e  f o r m a l i t i e s  
o f  m a r r i a g e .  T h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
c o n s e n t s  a s  a  f o r m a l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  n o t  r e g a r d e d  e i t h e r  a s  
c o r r e c t ;  -er^  n e c e s s a r y :  I t  i s .  a s  - s i m p l e  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a n  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y '  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  t o  c a p a c i t y  t o  m a r r y ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  o u r  C o u r t s  w i l l
n o t  r e c o g n i s e  a n y  r e s t r i c t i o n  i m p o s e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e
\
d o m i c i l e  o n  p e r s o n s  o f  m a r r i a g e a b l e  a g e  s i m p l y  t h r o u g h  t h e  
r e f u s a l  o f  p a r e n t s  o r  g u a r d i a n s  t o  c o n s e n t  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
[ s e e  p o s t  p .  J.
T h e  M a r r i a g e  M i t h  F o r e i g n e r s  A c t  1 9 0 6  [5 E d w .  7  C h .  4 J  
p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  c e r t i f i c a t e s  t o  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t s  
w h o  d e s i r e  t o  b e  m a r r i e d  a b r o a d  a c c o r d i n g  t o r t h e  l e x  l o c i  
w h e r e  s u c h  c e r t i f i c a t e s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  b y  t h e  l e x  T o c i  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  n o  i m p e d i m e n t  t o  t h e  M a r r i a g e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  o u r  l a w . '
That the parties have only gone to the locus 
celebrationis in order to evade troublesome formalities of 
their own law as to the ceremony, publication, or consents 
of parents; is no objection to the validity of the marriage. 
f ~Dalrymple v. Lalryrnple supra; Scrimshire v. Scrimshlre 
1752 2 Hagg. Cons. 395; Simonin v. Mailac 1860 2 Sw. & Tr. 
67; Fraser p. 1301. Contra Huber 1, 39; J. Voet 23, 2, 4; 
in France such conduct constitutes fraude A la loi and the 
marriage Is invalid/^ — ........
 Nor will our Courts hold that a .marriage,which a
person has validly contracted according to the forms of the 
lex loci of a country, other than his domicile, Is invalid 
because he is disabled by his domiciliary law from marrying 
otherwise than in accordance with the forms of his 
domiciliary law. f ~Papadopoulos v. Papacopoulos 1930 P. bbj 
British consul, on being satisfied by personal 
attendance that a marriage between parties of whom one at 
least Is a British subject, has been duly solemnised in a 
foreign counter in accordance with the local law of the 
country, may register the marriage as having been so 
solemnised./ Foreign Marriages Act 1892 Sec. 18_7
According to the principle of exterritoriality, an 
Ambassador’s residence, merchant ships on the High Seas, 
warships wherever they are, and the lines of an army serving 
abroad,are considered for certain purposes as part of the 
country to which the Ambassador Is accredited or the ship 
or army belongs. At .Common Law. if a marriage is celebrated 
in a British Embassy abroad according to the formalities 
of the English Common Law, that marriage' is formally valid 
because by a fiction it is in accordance with the lex loci 
celebrationis , f ~Bste v. Smyth 1854 18 Beav. 112_7* or at 
anyrate our Courts would hold it valid. Conversely, if a 
marriage is celebrated at a foreign Embassy in England- 
according to the forms required by the foreign law, that 
marriage/
marriage would be formally valid, because by a fiction, in 
accordance with the lex loci celebrationi3,f~Ballet v. Ballet 
1901 17 T.L.R. 317J  * . Similarly the marriage of a British
soldier within the lines of a British Army serving abroad, 
and a marriage on board a British warship laying in port at 
Cyprus/
Cyprus according to the formalities of the English Common 
i a w w r e  valid, {r, v, Brampton (1800)IQ, East 288; Culling 
v« Culling 1896 P. lldj, In the case.of Embassies this 
is only so when' both of the contracting parties are subjects 
of the State at whose Embassy they are married.^P e t r e l s v .  
Tondear 1790 1 Hagg. Cons. 156; Lloyd v. Petitjean (1839) 2 
Curt. 251; Bar p. -374j|. in the case of ships on the High 
Seas there is no reason to restrict the application of the 
rule,, and the marriage of any persons according to the law 
of the shipfs nationality would be valid because according 
to the lex loci celebrationis.
It is probably the forms of English law that have to 
be observed in British Embassies, on British warships^ and 
within the lines of a British Army abroad, in harmony with
f
the principle that when British, subjects establish a colony
t > R»gra^ <- Case (SSST
abroad, they carry English law with them. {/Contra Walton p.
321 j 323|^ But on a merchant ship on the High Seas it is j
probably the forms 'of the le^ w of the country where the ship
is registered that have to be recognised. So that on a ,
Our^ci anrv <3-
British ship registered a r  London tne forms of English law,
r. Wait erfl. A.3>'2.3  ^ — i
^?ontra Dicey p. 74Bg ' • «x
. (b)
would apply.
Hie Common Jaw possibility of being married according 
to English forms at a British Embassy, within the lines of 
a British army, or on'board a British warship abroad, have.' 
been extended by statutory provisions.for marriages at 
British Embassies and Consulates and within the lines of a 
British Army or on board a British warship abroad* These 
provisions implement and do not supersede or impair the 
Common Saw as to marriages abroad, foreign Marriages Act 
1892 Sec. 23J.- The Foreign Marraige^ Act: 1892, £.55 & 56 
Viet, c, 23, a consolidating enactment,;repealing 4 George
46.
IV c. 91; 12 and 13 Vict.c,68;31 and 32 Viet.c.61;33 and 34 Viet. 
c.47f~34 and 55 Viet.c.74. See also 4 Georg© XV c.67;5 George 
IV c .68; 3 and 4 William IV c. 45; 17 and 18 Vict.c.88;21 and 22 
Vict.c.46;22‘and 23 Vict.c.64;27 and 28 Vict.c.77;30 and 51 
Viet.c.2; 30 and 31 Viet.c.95; 42 and 43 Viet.e.29; 49 Viet. 
c.3;55 'and 56 Vict.c.23; 2 and 3 George V c.15; which remove 
doubts as to marriages already celebrated abroad], provided 
that a,11 marriages between parties, of whom one at least is a 
British subject, solemnised as provided in The Acts in any 
foreign country before a "marriage officer" shall be as valid . 
in law as if the same had been solemnised in the United Kingdom 
with a due observance of all forms required by law. ^ Sec.lJ 
"Marriage officers" are such persons as are authorised by a 
Secretary of State in writing to act. Ambassadors, consuls,
■ . hmA^ t .5 «c • i (3
governors and high commissioners may be authorised^and the
authority may be in favour of the person holding an office for
the time being. An officer may by regulation be authorised
to act as a marriage officer without written authority and by
the Foreign Marriages Order in Council 1913; Ambassadors/ or any
member of the diplomatic service not below the rank of Secretary,
may act  ^See .11). The Act has requirements as to
residence and notice (Secs. 2,3,6,7,8, and see Foreign Marridges 
DtJ*A -
^in Council Order 1913J and provide^ that "the like consent shall 
be required to a marriage under this Act as is required by law 
to marriages solemnised in England" K s e c • The last provision 
was not limited to persons domiciled in England^and would appear 
to apply to persons domiciled in Scotland^although no consents 
are required by Scots law. The marriage must be solemnised at 
the official house of the marriage officer, with open doors, and 
May be solemnised by anotherjperson in the presence of the marriage 
officer, according to the rites of the Church of England, or such 
other form and ceremony as the parties thereto see fit to adopt, 
or may, where the parties so desire, be solemnised by the marriage 
officer/
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officer,, (sec.sj. A marriage under the Acts may be solemnised 
on board one of Her Majesty’s Ships on a foreign station- 
£seo#lgJ and the Commanding Officer of the ship is the 
marriage officer. [Foreign Marriages Order in Council Sec.
2oJ • The Commanding Officer, before he solemnises a 
marriage, shall be satsified that, at the port or place where 
the marriage is solemnised, sufficient facilities do not 
exist for the solemnisation on land,either according to the 
lQx loci or according to the Act-^Foreign Marriages Order in 
Council Sec.2oJ.
The Act5contains provisions for avoiding objections to 
the formal validity of marriages under it* After the 
marriage has been solemnised,it shall not be necessary, in 
support of the marriage^ to give any proof of the residence 
or consent requiredj or of the authority of the marriage 
officer7nor shall any evidence to prove the contrary be 
given in any legal proceeding touching the validity of the 
marriage.(sec•iz\ *
The marriage is registered with the marriage officer, 
£secs. 9 and loj and M- British consul , on- being satisfied &-y 
p ersonal attendance that a- marriage- -b-e two on part-ioe of whom 
■ene at least io a British subject-, has been duly-' acribemniood 
in a foreign country^ in accordance with %he local law of 
-4he country, may register tho marriago as having been bo 
-g-ol-emniGed [soo.16^-.
All marriages solemnised within the British lines by 
any chaplain or officer or other person officiating under 
the orders of the Commanding Officer of a British Army 
serving abroad, shall be as valid in law as if the same had 
been solemnised within the United Kingdom, witha due obser­
v a n c e  of all forms required by law. j’S e c . 2 2 ] . -------;------
  The British Army need not be serving in a state of
hostility^ and authority is not required by the chaplain 
officiating from the Commanding Officer for the performance 
of/
48.
of the particular ceremony, jfwaldergrave Peerage Case (1837)
4 01. & P. 649 under 4 George 4 c. 91 now repeated, is
to the same effect
now repea that is
A marriage duly solemnised in a foreign country in 
accordance with the Act is formally valid here,even if 
declared invalid as regards form by the Courts of the locus
  14<tis obvious that although a marriage solemnised in
accordance with the Act is formally valid in the eyes of our 
law,it may not be so in the eyes of the lex loci celebration!s 
"It is, of course, well settled that a marriage may be valid
in one > country and at the same time void in another. v . 
Northcote, supra, per Ferwell j;u g trice at p. 265).-. To minimise 
the occasions on which this will, happen,it is provided that 
a marriage officer shall not be required to solemnise a 
marriage, or to allow a marriage to be solemnised in his 
presence, if in his opinion the solemnisation thereof would 
be inconsistent with'International law or the comity of 
nations. Act. Sec. 19j. But this is a vague provision of 
doubtful value. The provision might prevent the marriage 
of, say. first cousins in a country where that is.not per­
mitted, although it is permitted by our law, but it hardly 
helps on the question of formal validity. Further, if it 
appears to the marriage officer that the woman about to be 
married is a British subject, and that the man is a foreigner, 
he must be satisfied that:-
(a) the marriage will be recognised by the law of the 
country to which the foreigner belongs-(pre sumably belongs 
-by' na-tionality4 or ~---  ---  - ----- —  ...... ;
(b)’ some other marriage ceremony, in addition to that under 
the Act, has taken place, or is about to take place, between 
the parties, and that such other ceremony is recognised by 
the law of the country to which the foreigner belongs; or,
(c) the leave of the Secretary of State has been obtained.
gelefrrationig»|nay v. Northcote 1900 2 Oh. 26211
ft
.{.Foreign Marriages j^ in Council Order 1913 Sec.S.j 
This/
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This still does not cover all cases, and a marriage 
under the Foreign Marriages Act 1692 may be valid here but 
invalid abroad. This is inconvenient. Another unsatis­
factory feature is thatfwhile we claim that marrailges 
celebrated abroad at British Embassies are valid if one of 
the parties is a British subject, the marriage of foreigners 
at their Embassy here is valid only if both of the parties 
are nationals of the State whose Embassy it is. Logically 
we should concede as much as we claim. This might be done 
by abandoning the theory of exterritoriality as the basis 
for the validity of the marriage of foreigners at their 
Embassy here?and by adopting the Continental theory\about 
formalities of marriage, namely that the forms of the locug 
celebrationis are not imperative but optional, an alternative 
formbeing the form of the parties1 personal law ^Westlake 
is?] (which would be that form which the personal law pro­
v i d e d  for marriage abroad). Therefore, if the law of the 
domicile of the husband, say French law, permitted marriage 
abroad in certain circumstances when only one of the parties 
was French, that marriage would be valid because in accord­
a n c e  with the lex domicilii. A \®ill is validly executed 
if executed according either to the lex domicilii or the lex 
loci actus, so why not a marriage?
M
The purpose of the rule is to provide facilities for 
persons who might find themselves in a country where the 
local form of marriage could not beused because they were 
not of the religion which the local law required them to be 
for the use of the local form. j^ Lord Clonourry’s Case 1811, 
Cruise on Dignities p. 276j or because the local form was for 
polygamous marriages. The usejof the local form must be 
impossible: it is not sufficient that it imposes difficult-
:ies?e.g. that it requires six months previous residence of 
the parties. [tCent v. Burgess (1840) 11 Sim 36ij.
 The/
 The rule will not apply in this form if the persons
are British subjects?and the marriage takes place in a k m  
British colony or in a country which has no civilised legal 
systenu In these cases the marriage would presumably 
have to take place according to the forms of the English 
fiommon ^aw as the lex loci celebrationis, in accordance 
with the principle that British colonists carry English law 
with them to their new home*fLarttour v. Teesdale (1816) 8
IAtl^ en Jest P,(?(
Taunt 8.30; Fraser p. 131oJ^
It is difficult to say what is the Scots law on 
marriage applicable to a marriage by domiciled Scots in a 
foreign country where the use of the local ceremony is 
impossible* It is clear that statutes like the Marriage 
Notice (Scotland) Act 1878, [41 and 42 Viet. c. 4sJ and The 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939^(2 and 3 Georg© IV c. 34-J in 
so far as they prescribe formalities for religious and civil 
marriages in Scotland, have no application to marriages 
celebrated by scots people abroad* But the latter Act 
provides*. ^ Sec*53 f,No irregular marriage by declaration de
presenti or by promise subsequente copula contracted after 
the commencement of this Act shall be valid”. This clause 
is in general terras, and notwithstanding that the Act is 
entitled ”An Act to amend the law relating to the constit- 
 ^ sution of marriage in Scotland", would appear to apply to 
marriages wherever they take place.fin re Groos 1904 P* 269J. 
Consequently the Scots law of marriage applicable to 
domiciled Scots in a foreign country where the use of the 
local form is impossible would appear to be:-
1. Irregular marriage: only marriage by cohabitation 
with habit and repute. The rule has already been stated
cohabiting with habit and repute in a foreign country where 
this form of constituting marriage is not recognised, but 
that/
J that Scotch parties are not married bysupra p
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that rule only applies where there is a looal form of 
marriage which the parties could have used. Where there is 
no local form of marriage which the parties could use, they 
will be validly married if they cohabit with habit and 
repute.
2. Marri.ages by clergyman; The marriage should be as 
nearly as possible in the form for marriage by a clergyman 
in Scotland.
CAPACITY and ESSENTIAL VALIDITY of-MARRIAGE.
fc? -€e-
Subject to the exception^ mentioned, a marriage is valid 
as regards the capacity of the parties if each party has 
capacity by the law of his or her domicile, ^ Fraser, Parent 
& Child p. 722 (contra Fraser,,Husband ,& Wife p. .12990; Bar
s
p. 344, 352-4; Savingy p. 291; MacDougall v. Chitnavis 
3^0 '
1937 S.C.^per Lord Moncrieff at p. 406. There is no pre-
;cedent^to suuoort thfa statement; the only authority is
the analogous position of marriage contracts (q.v.), Dicta
from English cases are usually quoted here, e.g. "as in
other contracts, so in that of marriage, personal capacity
must depend on the law of domicilev!l Sottomayor v. De Barros
(No. 1) 3 P.D. per C^rt of A^^^f at p. 5; or 1fThere could
be no valid contract (of marriage) unless each was competent
to contract with the other_ Mette v. Mette 1 Sw. & Tr. 416
per Sir Cresswell Cresswell at p. 423jLbut ae these cases
do not deal with capacity as here meant, it would be unfair
to quote them in support of the statement^ and by the lex
loci celebrationis, [There is no authority for this, but it
Brfy, L o m /, p-
seems reasonable: Cheshire p . 2 2 2 Westlake Sec. 19/ andA J
otherwise is invalid. By capacity is meant only the 
question whether the person is old enough and sane enough
to marry. The rule is subject to this exception: when the
parties are by the laws of their respective domiciles of
out1 .
.marriageable, age, eru Courts will not recognise any mcapac- 
:ity/
:ity attached by the law of the domicile of either through 
refusal of parents or guardians to consent to the marriage,
at p. 407 (commenting on Simonin v. Mallac and Ogden); This,
decisions in Simonin v. Mallac 1860. 1 Sw. & Tr. 67;
0 gden v. 0 gden 1908 p. 46; Compton v. Bearoroft 1769 2 Hagg.
marriage that the parties married in the locus Celebrationis 
for the purpose of avoiding the law of their country as to 
consents of parents. [ Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hagg. 
Cons. 54, and subsequent Scots cases Ferguss. Consist. Law 
p. 25; Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1752) 2 Hagg. Cons. 595; 
Simonin v. Mallac (1860) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67,.In other countries, 
e.g. France, this amounts to frauds a la, loi and the
Subject .to the exception^ mentioned^, a marriage is 
valid as to essentials if it satisfies the requirements of 
the law of the matrimonial domicile, [Bar pp. 352-4; Savingy 
p. 291,2; Cheshire pp..218-233; Beattie v. Beattie 1866 5 M 
181; Brook v. Brook 1861 9 H.L.C. 193; MacDougall v. Chitnavis 
supra; Mette v. M ette 1 Sw. & Tr. 416; Scott v. Attorney 
General 11 P.D. 128; In re Bozzelli 1902 1 Ch. 751; In re De 
Wilton 1900 2 Ch. 481. This statement of the law is con= 
rsistent with the decisions in, but not the ratio deoidendig 
of:- Sottomayor v. De Barros (No.l)1877 2 P. 8£, Revd. 1877 3 
Sottomayor v . De Barros (Ho.2) 1879 5P. 94 (where a 
question was truly one of the essential validity of
the marriage was treated as a question-of capacity). It 
is inconsistent with both the decision and the ratio of 
In re Paine 1940 1 Ch. 46, (where essential validity was 
also/
-that is not recognised by the lex loci celebrationis , 
[MacDougall v. Chitnavis 1937 S.O. 390 per Lord Moncrieff
if is submitted, is the correct interpretation of the
Cons. 444N.I It is nonobjection to the validity of a
marriage is invalidf.
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also treated as capacity^ and the lex loci celebrationis 
L^endrum v . Chakravarti (o.H.) 1929 s.L.T. per Lord 
Mackay: "The capacity of each spouse is ruled primarily by 
the laws of his own domicilp, but also he must be able to 
satisfy the law of capacity for marriage of the lex loci ■ 
celebratloniS (p. 103) For "capacity" read "essential 
validity" for the case is really about essential validity.
This case has been over-ruled by MacDougall v. Chitnavis
Pre.
1937 S.O. 390 but not th-e-refe-re of disagreement with this
Pu Ia F1 ' 2^ -^  p (»0
principle. Cheshire p. 292;^Westlake Sec. 19j as to 
essentials, and is invalid if it violates either. By 
essential validity is meant the question whether the 
marriage is ilJogarl because the parties are within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship, or because the marriage 
is prohibited by some other rule of law. The rule is 
subject to this exception: our Courts will not recognise 
any prohibition of the law of the matrimonial domicile 
which prevents marriage simply because one of the parties 
is of a certain religion or caste,^MacDougall v. Chitnavis 
supra; Chetti v. Ohetti 190^ p , 67; Westlake Sec. 22; Cp. In 
re De Wilton 1900 2 Ch. 48lJ Thus when a Scotswoman was 
married in Scotland to a Hindu domiciled in India and pled 
in an action of nullity of marriage that he was not capable^ 
by the law of his domicile of contracting a marriage outside 
Hinduism, it was held that this religious disability did 
not invalidate the marriage. But the marriage would pro- 
jbably be invalid if the place of celebration of the marriage 
was the country which Imposed the prohibition^ or is in 
holy orders^ £"0r suppose a priest or monk domiciled in a 
country where the marriage of sucha person is prohibited 
were to come to this country and marry an Englishwoman, 
could the Court be called on at the instance|of the husband 
to/
' *
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to declare that the marriage was hull and to give a legal 
sanction to his repudiation of his wife?^ Sottomayor v. De 
Barros (Ho.2)1879 5P. 94 per Sir James Hannen at p. 104, 
referred to with approval in Chetti v. Qhetti supra, and 
MacDougall v. Chitnavis (supra) per The Lord Ordinary, 
Jamieson. See comment at end of last notejj or can only 
marry within a-selected group of persons, jj’It is still the 
law in some of the United States that a marriage between a 
white person and a ’person of colour’ is void. In some 
States the amount of colour that will incapacitate is
XtsT
undefined: m  North Carolina all are prohibited who are 
descended from negro ancestors to the fourth generation 
inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation may 
have been a white person. Suppose a woman domiciled in 
North Carolina, with such an amount of colour in her blood 
as would arise from her great grandmother being a negress, 
should marry in this country, should we be bound to hold 
that such a marriage was Iroid?^ Sottomayor v. De Barros 
(No.2) 1879 5 P.D^ 94 per Sir James Hannen at p. 104. He 
would have taken the case of a man domiciled in North 
Carolina had he regarded the question as one of essential
t
validity instead of capacity. The Nazi Nuremberg Law of 
September 1935 prohibited the marriage of Germans and Jews 
and a marriage contracted abroad with the view of evading 
the law may be declared void at the instance of the Public 
Prosecutor. This prohibition would also be disregarded 
by our Courts. Contra Cheshire pp. 148,9. See comment at end
of last note,./----------------------------- - ----------’_______
  The words of Lord Moncrieff in Macdougall v. Chitnavis
1937 S.C. 390 are appropriate to the whole of this class of 
exceptions to the applicability of the law of the matrimonial 
domicile. "If, however, in place of a. pc^rper question of 
’capacity1 to marry the question w-euld be whether the law 
of the domicile allows its marriageable citizens to make 
selected marriages or to marry without consent, I may say, 
as/
as at present advised, that I find no authority in these 
oases that directs me to regard such a question as being 
one upon which our Courts are bound to- consult and apply 
the law of the domicile, or to enfroce any such restrictions 
or prohibitions as that law may impose* Therev3.s, in my 
opinion, a radical distinction between capacity to marry and 
liberty to marry; between the ius matrimonii of adult 
citizenship on the one hand and an imposition of fetters upon 
adult citizenships on the other* It is recognised that
even the lex domicilii will not be allowed to operate in
T  r
poenam"J or that is penal, [Westlake Sec. 22. In Scott v .
Attorney General 11 P.D. 128, as explained in Warter v. Warter 
15 P.D* 152, the prohibition against ' a divorced woman re­
marrying was penal and disregarded, but in any event it 
was a prohibition of the woman’s domicile and not of the 
matrimonial domicile. A prohibition in a foreign law 
against adulterers -remarrying shoulc(be regarded as penal 
{Fraser p. 130^1 and denied effect. Beattie v. Beattie 
1866 5-U*181 ia not conclusively against this view, because
i
in that case the prohibition against knowing adulterers
marrying was a prohibition both of the lex domicilii and the
lex loci celebrationis. Other countries would probably
classify the Scots Act 1690 c. 20 which prohibits adulterers
from marrying as penal and disregard it, and accordingly
the marriage of Scots adulterers in England would be held
valid by the English Courts. Walton (p. 331) puts the
question whether our Courts would hold the marriage in
England of such parties as valid, but surely they could not,
for the statute directly states that the marriage of these
persons, named in a decree of the Scots Court is null, and
our Courts are surely bound to apply this statute. But see
-Kynnaird v. Leslie (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 389}.
of the
The law of the matrimonial domicile/prior marriage 
determines/
determines whether parties are prevented from marrying 
because of the subsistence of the prior marriage^ f ~hartin 
v. Buret (0.H .) 1938 S.L.T. 479; Warter v. Warter 15 P.D. 
152. The question here is whether the prior marrnage has 
been validly and finally dissolved_J7 subject to the exception 
that if the prior marriage is dissolved according to the law 
of the matrimonial domicile of that"marriage, our Courts 
will not recognise a penal restriction against remarriage 
imposed by that law on one of the parties. P i  cott v . Attorney 
General 11 P.D. 128; and see c o m m e n t  thereon in Wart e r v. 
Warter supra. Cp. p e n u l t i m a t e  note
-*-ex 1°°i celebrationis will determine any question 
as to whether consent has been precluded by duress, 
f ~Sottomayor v. De Barros 1877 2 P. 81, revd. 1877 3 P. 1, 
1879 5 P. 94; Hussein v. Hussein 1938 P. 159; Korel v. 
Korel, The Times May 28th 1921J  or mistake, f ~MacDougall v. 
Chitnavis 1937 S.C. 390; Wilson v.- Horn (O.H.) 1904, 41 
S.P.P. 312; Valier v. Valier 1925 133 L.T. 830; Mitforti v. 
Mitford 1923 P. 130; Cheshire p. 346__7 but the over-riding 
proviso is always present, that our Courts will not recognise 
a contract which contravenes an essential principle of 
justice or morality, and therefore they will not recognise 
a marriage, even although valid by the lex loci celebrationis 
which has been brought about by what our Courts regard as 
coerc5 on. r * *  ufman v. Gerson 1904 1 K.B. 591_J7
If the question is not whether the marriage is void, 
but whether the marriage is voidable, the issue is similar 
to that in a divorce case: #fie Courts of the domicile of the
husband at the time of the action alone have jurisdiction^ 
and they try the question by their own law. Inverclyde v. 
Inverclyde 1930 P. 29; Administrator of Austrian Property 
v# Von Dorang 1926 S.C. 598 per Lord President Clyde, 1927 
S.C. (H.I.) 80. Hot followed In Easterbrook v. Basterbrook 
1944 p. 10; and Hutter v. Hutter 1944 P. 95; but the ratio 
of the two last mentioned cases is not one which affects 
Scotland/
Scotland - see supra p. The ground for avoiding
a valid marriage which occurs most frequently in legal 
systems is impotency. The English Matrimonial Causes Act 
1937 Sec. 7 however, introduces several new grounds for 
avoiding a marriage, namely
(1) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the 
wilful refusal of the respondent to consummate the marriage.
(2) that either party to the marriage was at the time of the 
marriage of unsound mind or a mental defective within the 
meaning of the Mental Deficiency Acts, 1913 to 1927, or 
subject to recurrent fits of fnsanity or epilepsy.
(3) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage 
suffering/
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suffering, from venereal disease in a communicable form,
(4) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage 
pregnant by some other person than the petitioner^#
These principles are always subject to two over-riding 
provisos# A marriage valid as to formalities, capacit'yi 
and essentials, by the several systems of law that determine
these different questions, will not be recognised in
erf" p  p
Scotland if (1) contrary t-Q-r-eli-gion and morality. (Fenton
4*17 -- ----
v. Livingstone 1859 01 D* (lI.Trr); Beattie v., Beattie 1866
P-ervsl
5M# 181. This question is dealt with under ftThe-gxe-luoien
PJAu
of— a—1-aw tlm tr ^vnul-eh-n-orma,! 1 y--be--a/pp-ll-Qa-bl-e. "J( 2) a British
statute is directly applicable to the issue directs
otherwise, for our Courts are bound to follow the statute.
E.g. The Royal Marriage Act £12 George III c. llj provides
that no descendant of George III shall be capable of
contracting matrimony without the previous consent of the
Sovereign in Council, and that every marriage without such
consent shall be null and void.^ A descendant of GeorgeITT
married at Rome in accordance with the form wae required
by the lex loci without having obtained the necessary con-
jsent. The marriage was held by the English Courts to be
void and the children illegitimate, ^Sussex Peerage Case
1844 11 Cft# & F. 85^. The descendant in question was a
domiciled Englishman and a British subject, but the English
Courts would have had to hpld the marriage invalid even if
he had been domiciled in Italy [Dicey p. 749}. : Foreign
Courts would probably not give effect to.this Act unless
the descendant was domiciled in a British country, flbid^.
While it is submitted that these are the correct
general principles, it is a task of no little difficulty
to expound the authority for them. There us little doubt
(£)
-that "fhe English text-writers are embodying the result of 
the majority of the English decisions ^The Scottish cases 
are few and insufficient for the deduction of a complete set 
Of/
(¥)jDicey pp#732 et sequ.Westlake sec#21.Halsbury1s Laws of 
England VI p. 286j
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of principles on this point. They are, in general, con­
sistent both with the statement of the English text-writers 
and with the view here expressed : Beattie v. Beattie 1886 
5 M. 181; MacDougall v. Chitnavis 1937 S.C. 390; Lendrum 
v. Chakravarti 1929 S.L.T# 96 (in part over-ruled by above 
oas0)’ Martin v. Buret (O.H.) 1938 S.L.T. 479^ when they 
state the law to be as follows
1* To be a valid marriage each of the parties must 
have the capacity to marry the other according to the law 
of his or her respective domicile ^Brook v. Brook 1861 9 
H.L.C.193; Mette v. Mette 1 Sw. & Tr. 416; In re De Wilton 
1900 2 Ch. 481; In re Bozzelli 1902 1 Ch. 751; Sottomayor 
v. De Barros (No.l) 1877 2 P.81. Revd. 1877 3 P.l; In re 
Paine 1940 1 Ch. 46; Peal v . Peal 1930 143 L.T. 768^ . .
2. If the marriage is celebrated in England between 
persons of whom one has an English and the other a foreign 
domicile it is not invalidated by any incapacity which, 
though existing under the law of the foreign domicile
does not exist under the law of the Er^ftish [sottomayor
I&76 S' P. 74* v C&ttU /log p. (sT7~\
v . De Barros (Ho. 2){-sup-ra); Chetti I
3. Capacity to marry the other means not only(that 
the party must have the necessary age and sanity,)but
that there must be no prohibition in the domiciliary law of
either against marriage with the other (e.g. on the ground
of near relationship).^Brook v. Brook (supra) did not say
this; because the question there which was whether a
marriage between a man and his deceased wifefs sister was
valid was treated as a question of the essential validity
of the marriage. But Sottomayor v. De Barros (No.l)
(supra) started the classification of this question of
whether a marriage was invalid because of the relationship
of the parties, as.a question of capacity, and this
attitude was maintained in Sottomayor v. De Barros (No*2)
1879 5 P.94, Chetti v. Chetti 1908 P .67,In re Paine supraj
' ” "  — — — —  ^
4./
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4. The requirement of parental consent for marriage 
is not a question of the capacity of the contracting 
parties but a formality of the ceremony, to be ruled by 
the lex loci celebrationis. ^Sottomayor v. De Barros 
(No.l) (supra) per curiam;Chetti (supra) at p. 82 and the 
earlier cases reconsidered in this light; Compton v . 
Bearcroft 1769 2 Hagg.C.444N; Middleton v. Janverin 1802 
2 Hagg.0.457;Scrimshire v. Scrimshire 2 Hagg.C. 595;
Simonin v. Mallac 1860 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; See Ogden v. Ogden 
1908 P.46J.
Principle 2 has rightly incurred the censure of 
Cheshire in these words: "If this is our contribution to 
the Science of Ptwtt Law the reputation of
England for insular pride and complacency is deserved.
A domiciled Englishman is to remain subject to the 
English law of capacity in the event of a marriage abroad, 
but no respect is due to an incapacity affecting a 
domiciled foreigner who marries in England. That such an 
inelegant theory should be maintained destroys any affect- 
:ion which we might have felt for the doctrine that 
capacity depends on the lex domicilii of each party’1 
[p. 228} .  •
Aa to Principle 4 it is quite clear that in sound 
theory a rule of law that parental consent is required 
before a child can enter into marriage is a limitation 
of the capacity of the child and a question of capacity.
It is admittedly desirable that the rules required by 
Continental.. systems of law as to parental consents should 
not obstruct the marriage here of persons of marriageable 
age, and that the old cases where the lex loci celebrationis 
was applied in this respect should be followed. But this 
does not require wrong classification. It is simple 
enough to say that the applicability of the law of the 
domicile of each party to the question of their capacity
to/ .
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to marry is subject to the exception that when the parties 
are by the laws of their respective domiciles of marriageabl 
age, our Courts will not recognise any incapacity attached 
by the law of the domicile through refusal of parents or 
guardians to consent to the marriage. And this method of 
stating the law harmonises with the rule that the law of 
the matrimonial domicile governs the essential validity of 
the marriage, except that our Courts will not recognise any 
prohibition that prevents marriage simply because one of 
the parties is of a certain religion or caste, or is in 
holy orders, or can only marry within a selected group 
of persons. Ignoring requirements for parental consent 
when the parties are otherwise marriageable is similar to 
ignoring rules that priests cannot marry or that a man may 
not marry out of his caste or marry a negress, and is done , 
in the interests of liberty. There is no reason why it 
should not be freely admitted^ifoja--the tendonoy■ is—quite 
admirable-, that our recognition of the applicability of the 
law of the domicile of each party to the question of 
capacity, and the applicability of the law of the matrimon- 
:ial domicile to the essential validity of marriage should 
be limited in the interests of freedom^, iLc iJL,
For a criticism of principle 5 it will be necessary 
to consider the nature of the various impediments to 
marriage.
THE IMPEDIMENTS TO MARRIAGE.
There are a number of possible impediments to marriage:
(1) Incapacity of the parties or one of them through nonage.
In our law a marriage between persons either of whom is
under the age of sixteen is void^Age of Marriage Act, 1929^0*/ j 
thereis no need for parental consent. In other systems of 
law there is an age below which marriage cannot be con­
tracted and another age below wtdch marriage can only be 
contracted w ith parental consent £e.g. the law of '^rancej.
(2) Incapacity of one of the parties through insanity.
(3) That the parties are within the prohibited degrees 
of/ '
6 l m _  .
of relationship.
(4) That the parties are prohibited from, marrying each other 
by virtue of some other rule of law e.g. many systems of 
law prohibit adulterers from marrying [For Scotland see The 
Scots Act 1600 c.20. In Beattie v. .Beattie 1866 5M-.181 whoyo 
a similar rule in the law of Lower Canada was enforced'; see 
a -^so Scott v . Attorney General 11. P.D* Ifsl Similar rules
Whci . “
■tfeert may, or- might in the future, occur: in .the legal systems
of foreign countries, are prohibitions against marriage with
a person .with a transmissible congenital defect, against
marriage with mental defectives or with persons who have or
have had venereal disease, jjlst 2nd and 3rd of these are
grounds for avoiding a marriage in England, although not
grounds for holding the marriage null ab initio„Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1937(7)1
J  N
(5) That there is a subsisting prior marriage.
(6) Consent may have been i^eciSdecl by duress or mistake.
These impediments are not all of the same nature.
One and two are questions of capacity to. be governed by 
the law of the domicile of each of the parties. Three and 
four deal with the essential validity of the marriage, which 
is governed by the.law of the matrimonial domicile. But 
Dicey [pp.732 et se^ J  Oh-eshire [pp.218~233j) and Westlake 
[sec.2lJ treat both^impediments resulting from, nonage and 
from the parties being within the prohibited degrees of 
relationship as questions of the capacity of the parties 
to marry. This confusion seems to have commenced with 
Sottomayor v. De Barros (Ho.l)fl877 3 P. ll where the quest - 
:ion of the prohibited degrees of relationship woS0 re­
treated, and it is present in the subsequent English cases 
{E.g. In re Paine 1940 1 Ch.46; Sottomayor v. De Barros 
(Ho.2) 1879 5 P.94; Chetti v. Chetti 1908 P.67^. It 
should be clear, however, that a woman aged twenty five and 
domiciled/
domiciled in Scotland?and a man aged twenty seven and
domiciled in England/both have capacity to marry; it may 
be that A and B cannot marry each other, because they are 
.brother and sister, but that is not a restriction on the 
capacity of A or B to marry, which is of the very fullest, 
but a rule of law prohibiting that particular marriage. 
[cp. Walton^.£97j • The prohibi-tion on the ground of 
relationship (3) is akin to the miscellaneous prohibitions 
such as the prohibition of adulterers marrying^).
Cases dealing with the prohibited degrees of relationship 
are authoritative pn the kindred questions of the 
■ miscellaneous prohibitions:^ and not, as they have been 
taken to be, on the totally different question of 
capacity to marry.
The true distinction between questions of essential 
validity and capacity has$ received some judicial 
recognition, obiter, though.usually the judges have been 
as indistinct in their pronouncements as the textwriters. 
Thus Lord Moncreiff has said, f,It is, no doubt, in 
accordance with the law of Scotland, giving effect to 
international usage, but giving effect thereto by a 
sentence of its own, that (first) the essentials of what 
constituted marriage according to the moral law, in so 
far as the essentials so required do not conflict with 
its own view of moral principles, and (second) the 
matrimonial capacity of the parties to any action which 
it assumes jurisdiction to try, are alike questions that 
fall to be determined in our. Courts upon an application 
of a law that may be other than our own, being the law of 
the domicile is charged with the control of the
Again, an English judge, commenting on the English case of
marr1age.” jMacDougall v. Chitnavis 1937
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Sottomayor v. De Barros (No.2)£l879 5 P*94| where the 
impediment/
impediment of the near relationship of the parties was 
described as a question of capacity, said;,f. . . .  it may 
be questioned whether . . . . .  the question of capacity 
is really raised at all in sucbja case, that is to say, 
where both the parties are capable of entering into a 
marriage but may.not marry each other because such a 
marriage would be illegal in their own country. That 
is rather a question of illegality thar\ of capacity.w 
[Ogden v. Ogden 1908 P.46 per Sir Gorell Barnes at p. 74]. 
Further, some writers have made the distinction [llalsbury’s 
Laws of England vi p. 285 et sequ; Foote 5th Ed. pp. 123- 
5, 376 et sequ; Bar p. 352; Savingy p. 29l}• It is 
particularly encouraging that the writers on JStaS peculiar
 ^ft I J.tuC
reliance has been placed in Scotland for the rules of the 
P-t^roibL L~w , namely Savingy and Bar, have made this 
distinction.
r
Keeping the true nature of the various impediments
in view, it is clear that on principle questions of
capacity to marry should be governed by the law of the
domicile of each party, and questions of essential validity
byi the law of the matrimonial domicile.
Firstly, as to capacity: The law of the domicile 
having regard to differences of climate and national 
character is best qualified to determine for its .subjects 
at what age they are fit to marry.
Two alternatives to the law of the domicile of each 
party have been suggested, namely, the lex loci oele- 
:brationis and the law of the matrimonial domicile. That 
capacity to marry should be governed by the lex loci
celebrationis has, as we have seen, the support of Story,
[sec. 103^ ) Fraser (Husband and Wife p. 1299. But contrast  ^
Fraser, Parent and Child pp. 715 et sequ} and the older 
cases/
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cases [pompton v . Bearcroft 1769 9 Hagg.Cons. 444 N;
Middleton v. Janverin 1802 2 Hagg.Cons.437; Scrimshire
v. Scrimshire 2 Hagg.Cons.396; Gordon v. Pye per Lord
Meadowbahk,Fergussons Cons. Rep. App. at p.362] and
also of Simonin v. Mallac [i860 2 Sw. & Tr. 67] and
0 gden v . 0 gden [l908 P.46]. But these opinions and
cases must be regarded as either obsolete, or as
illustrations only of the exception to the applicability
of the law of each partyfs domicile to the question of
their capacity to marry; Simonin v. Mallac and Ogden
are almost certainly illustrations of the limitation of the
Applicability of the law of the domicile, in spite of the
sweeping language that is used.
The other alternative is suggested by Cheshire, namely
that capacity to contract marriage is governed by the law
of the matrimonial domicile [pp. 218-2333* ' This attitude
however, so far as regards capacity in its true sense,
^Cheshire regards the cases dealing with prohibited marr- 
:iages as questions of capacity] is inconsistent both with
sound principle and with the authority of analogous cases
dealing with marriage contracts. As to principle, it is
difficult to see how a girl who has no capacity to marry
can acquire capacity simply because by the law ef—the
L a w  of the domicile of her intended husband she would
have had capacity. Girls marry in India at a very early
age. If an Indian man of thirty purports to marry a
Scottish girl of twelve, is that marriage valid? Of such
a union Cheshire writes: |fIf an English girl of fourteen
wishes, contrary, to the law of England, to marry a foreigner
domiciled iria country whose law permits marriage at this
I
early age, it may .justifiably be doubted whether there is 
any defensible ground upon which English law can regard the
union as void. The social life of England is unaffected, 
for/
for the girl loses her connection with this country upon
the acquisition of her husband*s domicile. If,the law
of that place chooses to regard the union as valid, on
what ground can English law interfere? Paternal government
cannot be pushed to the extent of dictating to English
people what they shall do when settled in a foreign
country" [pp •220,l]. A contention more repugnant to
commonsense or the spirit of the law could scarcely be
imagined. An Indian’s physical constitution' may be
suited to marriage at that age, but our lawjbohsid-ers that
the physical constitution of Scottish persons is not so
suited, and forbids the marriage of a person domiciled in
Scotland below the age of sixteen, in the interest of that
person. Scottish law is better able to determine when
Scottish persons are capable of marriage than a foreign
law made for a person of a different race, religion,,and
perhaps more backward ideas. It is the duty of govern- 
%
:njent to protect its subjects from, among other things, 
the folly of their own acts when, by reason of nonage, 
they are incapable of forming ms,ture judgments. To 
perform that duty is hot to push paternal government to 
the extent of dictationj but to refuse to perform it 
would be a shameful abdication of its duties in favour 
of a foreign legal system that might care nothing for the 
welfare of the subject. To say that ’the girl loses 
her connection with this country upon the acquisition of 
her husband’s domicile”, begs the questioh. If the 
marriage is valid she acquires her husband’s domicile.
But is the marriage valid? If she does not have that
capacity^ she cannot marry in the first place. —  --
 -The argument against the matrimonial domicile is
even more convincing if y w  takes an instance when the 
matrimonial domicile is not the pre-marriage domicile of 
either party, but the place where they intend to live.
For in that case both parties may have no capacity to 
marry by the laws of their respective domiciles, yet by 
contemplating residence in another country (that contem-
to perform) they acquire capacity!
As to the authority of the analogous cases of 
marriage-contracts, in Cooper V, Coopers Trustees,[l885 
12 R, 473 Revd_. 15 R. (H.L.) 21^ a minor woman domiciled 
in Ireland,who had no capacity by the law of Ireland to 
make a binding Marriage-Contract,entered into one with 
her intended husband, a domiciled Scotsman, whom she 
married in Ireland, -and the plea was taken that Scots 
law; as the law of her matrimonial domicile, must govern 
her capacity. This plea was rejected. "It is said 
that • . . .  as both parties contemplated a Scottish married 
life, and as a consequence a Scottish domicile, the 
principle J have spoken of- (the law of the 
domicile) does not regulate the contract relations of 
these two persons • • . . But • . • • the argument assumes 
a binding contract, and if one of the parties was under 
incapacity the whole foundation of the argument fails"
[per The Lord Chancellor, Halsbury at p, 25},"It is 
difficult to suppose that Mbs, Cooper could confer capacity 
on herself by contemplating a different country as the 
place where the contract was to be fulfilled, if that be 
the proper expression, or by contracting in view of an 
alteration of personal status which would bring with it 
a change of domicile." [.Per Lord Macnaghten at p# 3lJ. It 
is just as difficult to see in the case of marriages as it 
is in the case of marriage contracts.
Consequently it is submitted that the law of the 
domicile of each party determines that party's capacity
:plation being a juridical have no capacity
to marry
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T h e  r u l e s  o f  l a w  w i t h  w h i c h  t h i s  t o p i c  i s  c o n c e r n e d
fo r
are prohibitions against-marriages on the ground^that the
parties are nearly related,, or that they are adulterers or
mental defectives. These rules are imposed by States in
the public interest; For Qgaa-^ke-, to avoid in the first
case the evil result, in the children, if inbreeding, in
the second the hurt to the morals of the community, and
in t h e  t h i r d  t h e  t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  h e r e d i t a r y  t e n d e n c i e s
to mental deficiency. Only one &tate has an interest
to enforce these rules^ and that is the state in which the
marriage is to subsist, namely the matrimonial domicile
or domicile of the husband. Therefore it should be
to the law of that country alone that reference should be
made on these questions. "None of these matters concern
the &tate to which the woman has up to that time belonged,
"and which she is now quitting. As the woman has in any
view a right to emigrate, she has the power, by natural-
:ising herself in a new country, (we should say, by
acquiring a domicile) of denying effect to all these
limitations imposed by the law to which she once belonged.
Naturalisation as a preliminary to marriage would,
however, in such cases be an empty form, and all the more
so, as all states accord naturalisation directly to the
wife of a citizen of the country ipso jure.” j^ Bar p.56sj.
These rules are clearly distinguishable from the rules
about the age at ■which a woman can marry, which are
imposed in the interest of that woman and therefore $£
governed by the law of her domicile^which is the best
system to judge of her capacity and the only one that.
a not
has duty toprotect her interests. It could/be said of 
A
a woman who was under age that, as she has a right to 
emigrate^she could domicile herself in her husband’s 
country prior to marriage and therefore defeat the 
prohibitions of her own law, for being without capacity
she /
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she could not acquire a domicile elsewhere, {Although M. 
Scbtnitoff uses this argument in LVI L.Q.R. (1940) p.P?14 
to support the view that the matrimonial domicile governs 
oapacityj
The authority for the proposition that rules concem-
jing the essential validity of the marriage are determined
according to the law of the matrimonial domicile is of the
very highest, and it is submitted that subsequent decisions
^adb are to a contrary effect misunderstand the leading 
tLi
cases, they are the decisions of inferior Courts,
and are English decisions tha-t are not binding in 
Scotland, The leading case is a decision of the House 
of Lords, Brook v. Brook {isei 9 H.L.C. 193^: a domiciled 
Englishman married his deceased wife’s sister, a domiciled 
Englishwoman, in Denmark, by the law of which the marriage 
was valid. The marriage was invalid by English law.
It held that the marriage was invalid, and the ratio 
decidendi was that this was a question of the essentials 
of the contract which must be governed by the law of the 
matrimonial domicile, f,But while the forms of entering 
into the contract of marriage are to be regulated by the 
lex loci contractus,' the law of the country in which it 
is celebrated, the essentials of the contract depend upon 
the lex domicilii, the law of the country in which the 
parties are domiciled at the time of the marriage, and in 
which the matrimonial residence is contemplated.” {Lord 
Campbell at p, 207j<|”It is quite obvious that no civilised 
state can allow its domiciled subject^ or citizens, by 
making a temporary visit to a foreign country, to enter 
into a contract, to be performed in the place of the 
domicile, if the contract is forbidden by the law of the 
place of domicile*! [at p. 212J., MBut I am by no means 
prepared/
prepared to say, that the marriage now in questioii ought 
to be, or would be, held valid in the Danish Courts, 
proof being given that the parties were - British, subjects 
domiciled In England at the time of the marriage, that 
England was to be their matrimonial residence, and that 
by the law of England such a marriage is prohibited as 
being contrary to the law of God. The doctrine being 
established that the incidents of the contract of marriage 
celebrated in a foreign country are to be determined 
according to the law of the country in which the parties are 
domiciled and mean to reside, the consequence seems to 
follow that by this law must its validity or invalidity 
be determined." fp.ElE^fr This ratio is consistent with 
the Scots cases./ ^ Beattie v. Beattie 1366 5 M.181J 
MacDougal1 v . Chitnavis 1937 S.C. 390, per Lord■Moncreiff 
at 'p. 406~j and with some of the later decisions of the 
inferior English Courts,-£ln re Bozzelli 1902 1 Ch.761; In 
re De Wilton 1900 *2 Ch. 481; Mette v.'.Mette 1 Sw. Sr. Tr.
416 professes to follow Brook, but it also contains this 
statement by sir Cresswell Cresswell is inconsistent
with the fat-io of Brook: "There could be no valid contract 
unless each was competent to contract with the other"'(at 
p.423)J. Unfortunately the facts in Brook did not 
raise the issue sharply enough, because the domicile of 
both parties was the same, and consequently the decision 
(although not the ratio) is equally consistent with the 
view that the law of the domicile of each party has to be 
satisfied as to essential validity. In Mette Jdupra^j the 
domicile of the parties was different, the marriage being 
prohibited by the law of the domicile of the husband and 
permitted by the law of the domicile of the wife and the 
place of celebration. The marriage was held invalid.
But/
70
But here again the decision is equally consistent with the
application of the law of the matrimonial domicile or the 
necessity for satisfying the laws of both domiciles. The 
ratio swings between the two views; Sir Cresswell Cresswell
professed to follow Brook,but his judgment contained this .
sentence: "There could be no valid contract unless each 
was competent to contract with the other" fat p.423].
In Sottomaypr v, De Barra s (No.l)(l877 2 P.8'1, Revd. 
1377 3 P.lJ the prohibition of a marriage on the ground of 
near relationship was treated as a question of capacity, 
and although, since the domicile of both parties was the 
same, the decision is just as consistent with the appli­
cation of the law of the matrimonial domicile as with the 
law of the domicile of each party^ $he attitude that 
prohibitions are a question of capacity inevitably led to 
the later decisions, where the domicile of the parties v<ra.s 
different, in which it was held that the law of the 
domicile of both parties must be satisfied, ff.g. In re
the only one in which the issue between applying the law 
of the matrimonial domicil© on the one hand, or satisfying 
the law of the domicile of both parties on the other, was
i4iy raised by the facts. A domiciled Englishwoman 
married her deceased sister*s husband^who was a German, in 
Germany. The marriage was valid by German but not by 
English law. It was.held that the marriage was invalid.
In all previous cases the marriage was declared invalid 
either because of an incapacity of the husband under his 
lex domicilii^or because of an incapacity of both under 
the law of a domicile common to both. But in this case the 
marriage was held invalid because of an incapacity of the 
wife under the law of her domicile, notwithstanding that 
the marriage was valid both by his domicile and the lex 
loci, j^ see 52 J.R. 284 and L.Q.R. Jan. 1940 p. 22Ji This
Paine (1940 1 Oh. 46 This decision of Bennet justice is
case/
case therefore undoubtedly proceeds on the view that the
lex domicilii of both parties must be satisfied. The
case, however, cannot be regarded as authoritative,
because it proceeds on the mistaken view that the question
of the prohibited degrees of relationship is one of the
capacity of the parties,and it is inconsistent with the
ratio of the House of Lords decision in Brook. In any
event it is only the decision of an English Court of / '
first instance, which is not authoritative in Scotland, or
even of much persuasive authority. ~ - --   -.
— ..  It must also be recorded that the Colonial Marriages
(Deceased Wife!s Sister) Act, 1906 /"~6 Edw. 7 c. 30J
which was passed "for removing doubts" provides that where
a man has married his deceased wife’s sister, and at the
date of the marriage each of the parties was domiciled in
a part of the British Dominions in which at that date such
a marriage was legal, the marriage, if legal In other
respects, shall be legal for all purposes. This proceeds
/
on the assumption that the law of the domicile of each 
party Is concerned in the question.
In conclusion It is submitted that it is the law of 
the matrimonial domicile which must determine the essential 
validity of the marriage. ......      — .
As stated In the general principles the lex loci 
celebrationis must also be satisfied along with the law 
of the matrimonial domicile (in questions of essential 
validity) and the law of the domicile of each party 
(in questions of capacity) before there is a valid marriage.
Please Tmgmr$ the the sipurt br*e&*t«
ae footnotes* ^
DIVORCE
Our Courts have jurisdiction in divorce actions 
if the permanent domicile of the spouses is Scottish 
at the date of raising the action, irrespective of 
where the parties were domiciled at the time of the 
marriage, or at the time of the alleged marital offence,
a n d  i r r e s p > « c 1 1 v»e <£>"f
Awhere the marriage was celebrated, where the alleged 
marital offence was committed, where the spouses are 
residing, or what their nationality is; and conversely 
our Courts have no jurisdiction in divorce, subject to 
the exceptions to he mentioned, if the parties are not 
domiciled in Scotland at the date of raising the action* 
/~Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier 1895 A.C. 517; Attorney- 
General for Alberta v. Cook 1926 A.C. 444; Pitt v. Pitt 
1864 2 M. (H.L.) 28 per L.C. Westbury at p. 30;
Bar pp. 381 - 385; Dicey Rules 62, 63
J
Since the domicile of the wife is always the same as 
that of her husband, so long as the marriage subsists, 
even although the parties are judicially separated,
Z Attorney-General for Alberta v . Cook, supra_/ this 
in effect means that our Courts have jurisdiction if 
the husband is domiciled in Scotland at the date of the 
action and have no jurisdiction if this is not the case*
In divorce actions it is necessary for the pursuer 
to aver that the husband is a domiciled Scotsman, but 
that bare averment will not suffice: it must be
supported by specific averments to justify it*
/"“Horn v « Horn (O.H.) 1935 S.L.T. 589J  In an 
undefended action it is pars judicis to ensure that the 
Court has j urisdiction;Z  e*g* Sellars v. Sellars 1942 
S.o. 206J  and it is the pursuer’s duty to put before 
the Court all relevant facts bearing on the husband’s 
domicile, both those favourable to the contention that 
hi s/
his domicile is in Scotland and those unfavourable to 
it* L hr own v. Brown 1928 B.C. 542 J Even in a 
defended action when the defender takes no objection 
to the jurisdiction the Court will not exercise 
jurisdiction if it appears that the husband is domiciled 
abroad; Vvalton p. 364_/ but if the husband appears 
to be domiciled here and the defender has appeared and 
not stated any objection to jurisdiction it is not 
pars judicis to enquire strictly into the husband’s 
domicile. / “Watts v. Watts 1885 12 R. 894J  In one 
action of divorce brought by a husband it was held 
that the Scottish Courts had jurisdiction because the 
husband was domiciled in Scotland at the date of raising 
the action, although at the proof he said that he had 
gone to England ana had then no intention of returning 
to Scotland. ^ Hunter v. Hunter (O.H.) 1893 30 3.L.R. 
915_7
If the Court of Session has pronounced decree of 
divorce without having proper jurisdiction to do so, 
because it had been misled as to domicile, it will not 
entertain an action of reduction of the improper decree 
unless the defender is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Court on one of the recognised grounds at the time 
of the action of reduction. / "Acutt v. Acutt 1936
S.C. 386; Longworth v. Yelverton 7 M. This may
mean that the unfortunate spouse who has been wronged 
by the improper decree has no means of obtaining a 
complete remedy. Suppose a husband domiciled in 
England comes to Scotland and obtains a divorce by 
false representations that he is a domiciled Scot, 
then returns to England where he is beyond the reach 
of an action of reduction, the wife can not apply 
to the English Courts to which he is subject for 
declarator of marriage or reduction of the decree 
because one Court would not entertain an application 
for/
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for the recission of a decree of another sovereign 
Court; / “Acutt, supra; Jack v. Jack 1940 S-L.T. 122. 
Contra Armitage v. Attorney General 1906 P.135J7 
she can not apply to the Scots Courts; in any 
proceedings in England or elsewhere in which reliance 
is placed on the decree of divorce she could have it 
set aside for the particular purposes of that action, 
because it was not granted by a Court having jurisdiction 
but there is no way in which she could obtain a general 
declarator that for all purposes the divorce is null.
Domicile as the only ground of jurisdiction in 
divorce has only come to be recognised in Scotland 
within the last 100 years. Before 1862 very much 
less than a permanent domicile in Scotland was 
recognised as sufficient. The domicile required was 
considered to be the "forensic domicile" which is 
acquired by 40 days residence within the jurisdiction.
It was not sufficient if the only connection with 
Scotland was that a husband pursuer had resided for 
40 days in Scotland before the raising of the action,
/ “Ringer v. Churchill 1840 2 D» 307; Blake v. Blake 
1826 4 3. 795; Allison v« Catley 1839 1 D. 1025J  
or that a defending wife had resided for that period 
in Scotland, / B ennie v . Bennie 1849 11 D. 121lJ7 
but jurisdiction was sustained (in the teeth of the 
permanent domicile of the husband and ignoring it) 
when both parties had been residing in Scotland for 
40 days and the offence had been committed in Scotland; 
r Qldaker v. Goldney 1834 12 S. 468; Parrester v. 
Porrester 1844 6 D« 1358; Christian v* Christian 
1851 13 D • 1149_^7 when the defending wife was residing 
in Scotland, where they had married and formerly lived 
together; / “Shields v » Shields 1852 15 D. 142;
Scott v. Scott 1859 21 D . 285; Buchanan v. Downie 
1837/
1837 16 S. 82_7 when the husband defender had been 
residing for 40 days in Scotland and was personally 
cited there and the offence had been committed,
/~Levett v. Levett 21st Dec. 1816 P.O.; Walker v. 
Walker*1844 17 J. 87; b tterton v* Tewsh 1811
Perguss. Cons. Rep. 23; Porbes v. Porbes 1817
Perguss. Cons. Rep. 209; Rowland v . Rowland 1817
Perguss. Gons. Rep. 226; Shaw v . Shaw 1851 13D. 8197
or the marriage celebrated, f Wyche v. B lount 27th June 
1801 P.O.; Porbes v. Porbes, supra_7 in Scotland.
It is interesting to notice that the Commissary Court 
in the second decade of the 19th century considered 
that a real and permanent domicile was necessary to 
establish divorce jurisdiction, and that they were 
’’corrected" on this by the Court of Session.
L btterton v . Tewsh, Porbes v . Porbes, Rowland v . 
Rowland, supra_7 Jurisdiction was also sustained when 
the permanent domicile of the husband was in Scotland,
L  Birie v. hunan 1796 ior. 4594_/ even when he was 
pursuer and the wife tHe resident abroad; £ Warrender 
Vo Warrender 1835 II S. and McL. 154; Tulloh v. Tulloh 
1861 23D. 639; Prench v. Pilcher 13th June 1800 P.C._7 
but jurisdiction was not sustained simply on the ground 
that the defending husband’s domicile of origin was 
Scots. / "Morcombe v. Mchelland 27th June 1801 P.O.; 
Tovey v . Lindsay 1813 1 Dow
These grounds of jurisdiction were very lax and 
the judges occasionally seemed to regret that matters 
were in this state* / See e.g. Lord Mackenzie in 
Walker v. Walker 1844 17J. 87 at p. 88; Lord Glenlee 
in Oldaker v . Goldney 1834 12 S • at p. 469_/
In 1862 the whole Court reconsidered the question 
of jurisdiction in divorce in Jack v. Jack /  1862 24D. 
467_7 arid laid down that the basis of jurisdiction was 
the "matrimonial domicile" of the spouses, an attitude 
which/
which had been foreshadowed by the earlier case of 
Shields /~1852 15 jD. 142J  Jack v. Jack was an action 
of divorce by a husband against his wife for adultery.
His domicile of origin was Scots. They were married 
in Scotland in 1853 and lived here as spouses for two 
years. He averred that he then left her because of 
her adultery and went to America where he had since 
resided and become a minister of religion. She 
pleaded no jurisdiction because he had become domiciled 
in America. He admitted that he continued to reside 
in America "without any present intention of returning". 
The Court held that the matrimonial domicile was in 
Scotland when he left her and had not altered by his 
going to America leaving his wife in Scotland, and that 
in consequence of the matrimonial domicile being in 
Scotland the Court had jurisdiction. Lord Justice 
Clerk Inglis defined the conception thus: "But the true
enquiry, I apprehend, in every such case is, where is 
the home or seat of the marriage for the time, - where 
are the spouses actually resident if they be together,
- or if from any cause they are separate what is the 
place in which they are under obligation to come together, 
and renew, or commence, their cohabitation as man and 
wife?" / “at p. 484J  Lords Heaves and Mackenzie 
expressed themselves thus: "In order to found
jurisdiction in cases of divorce, we do not think it 
always necessary that the parties should have a domicile 
in Scotland sufficient to regulate succession. We think 
there may be a residence or domicile founding jurisdiction 
such as would not regulate succession, as where a 
husband and wife have been for years resident in 
Scotland as married parties, but where the husband, from 
being a foreigner, and only in Scotland on the public 
service, may never have acquired a domicile of succession
in this country". Lord President McHeill and Lords 
Ivory and Curriehill drew a distinction between the 
domicile of the married pair as such and the husband’s 
domicile. Her offer to prove that the domicile of the 
husband was in America was not allowed because it was 
immaterial, since America could not be the domicile of 
the married pair as such, which they held was the ground 
of jurisdiction, What has now been held to be the 
fallacy of these opinions, and the views of the minority 
of the Court, are expressed in these words of Lord Leas, 
who held that there was no jurisdiction because the 
pursuer had acquired a new domicil in the United States: 
"The phraseology appears to me to be calculated to 
mislead. It is figurative, and wants judicial precision. 
There is no third domicil involved apart from the 
domicil of the husband and the domicil of the wife. 
Domicil belongs exclusively to persons. Having 
ascertained the domicil of the husband and the domicil 
of the wife, the inquiry into domicil is exhausted"
/ “at p. 473J 7 J ack was followed in two cases in 1862.
/ "Hook v. Hook 1862 24 D. 488 and Hume v. Hume 1862 
24 D. 1342_J7 Thereafter the doctrine has a curious 
history. The Court of Session applied it in the same 
year in Pitt v . Pitt / “1862 1 M. 106J  and upheld 
jurisdiction in the action of divorce, but on appeal 
to the House of Lords the respondent’s counsel declined 
to support the decision on the ground of matrimonial 
domicile and contended that the true domicile of the 
husband was in Scotland. The House of Lords found 
that the true domicile was not in Scotland and over- 
:turned the decision of the Court of Session, the Lord 
Chancellor Westbury remarking that counsel’s concession 
was right in law. What then was the law? Jack Was 
followed to the extent that the older lax cases were 
considered/
considered to toe no longer law^/ Staver t v. Stavert 
1882 9 R. 519_/ out it was a moot point as to whether 
matrimonial domicile or the permanent domicile of the 
husband was the te3t. There is no future Scottish 
case in which jurisdiction was upheld on the ground 
of "matrimonial domicile". In a case in 1872 
Wilson v . Wilson 1872 10 M« 5 7 3 Lord Ormidale 
expressed the view that the result of Pitt was that 
a matrimonial domicile must be held to be unknown to 
the law, but in the Inner House Lord President Inglis 
made an obiter re-af f iruiation of the opinion that he 
had expressed in Pitt and Jack that "for the purposes 
of divorce there may be a matrimonial domicile different 
from the absolute domicile which will rule succession." 
The theorywas also championed by Lord Eraser in 
"Husband and Wife". l_ ii, p. 1276; a similar doctrine 
appears in the English case of Ifiboyat v. niboyat 
1878 4 P.D. 1_7
On the other hand there were many obiter judicial 
opinions against the theory of matrimonial domicile 
Z  S tav er t v. Stavert 1882 9R. 520 per Lords Deas and 
Shand; Low v. Low 1891 19R. 115 per Lord Trayner; 
Dombrowitzki v. Dombrowitzki 1895 22R. 906 per Lord 
Trayner/7. There was therefore considerable doubt 
about "matrimonial domicile" when the whole-question 
was reviewed by the Privy Council in Le Mesurier v .
Le Mesurier /~1695 A.C. 517J  in an appeal from 
Ceylon. The plea that jurisdiction in divorce could 
rest on "matrimonial domicile" was rejected and the 
opinion expressed that the doctrine was not accepted 
in either Scots or English law* There can be no 
doubt of the finality of this decision of the Privy 
Council and that the doctrine of matrimonial domicile 
is now completely discredited? /~See Light v. Light 
(G.H.)/
(O.H.) 11 S.L.T. 100; Mackinnon*s Trustees v . Inland 
Revenue 1920 S-C. (H.L.) per Viscount Haldane at p.174_y 
although the curious position exists that a  decision of 
the whole Court in favour of it has not been regularly 
overturned.
A decree of divorce pronounced by a foreign Court 
is accorded recognition here if the foreign countrywas 
the domicile of the parties at the date of the action.
/ In countries where the Courts do not grant divorce, 
an Act of the legislature declaring the parties to be 
divorced would, if the legislature were that of the 
parties domiciled,be recognised in the same way as a 
decree of Court/7 Such a decree is equivalent to a 
judgment _in rem and if it has been obtained without 
fraud or collusion,/ See Bater v. Bater 1906 P. 209J  
and accords with Scottish notions of substantial 
justice// ”See Scott v. Scott (O.H.)’ 1937 S.L.T. 632 
(no intimation to the other spouse of the foreign 
action)/7 is accepted as conclusive in the Scottish 
Courts even in questions between persons whoware not 
parties to the foreign action. Administrator of 
Austrian Property v. Von ho rang 1927 S.C. (H.L.) 80; 
Bater v. Bater 1906 P. 209; Bar p. 382J  There is 
always in addition of course the over-riding principle 
that the decree must not be repugnant to morality.
/ “Humphrey v. Humphrey*s Trs. 1895 (O.H.) 33 S.L.R. 
per Lord Moncreiff at pp. 100,101 J  'Jhe foreign decree 
is valid here ex proprio vigore and it is unnecessary 
and incompetent to bring an action of declarator in 
the Scottish Courts of the validity of the foreign 
divorce; /~~Arnott v . L .A. (O.H.) 1932 S.L.T. 46.
A different attitude appears in Armitage v« Attorney 
General 1906 P. 135; De Massa v. De Massa, The Times 
March 31, 1931; Galene v. Galene 1939 P. 237; and 
Sasson/
Sasaon v. Sasson 1924 A.C. 1007__7 although when it whs 
desired to have the register of marriages here altered 
after a loreign divorce, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Moncreiff, 
sustained an action of declarator that the husband mixs 
domiciled in the foreign country at the date of the decree 
of divorce: he opined however that the proper procedure 
would be by petition to the nobile officium . / Arnott v.
L .A». supra__7
A foreign country may claim to exercise divorce 
jurisdiction on other grounds, but although a divorce 
pronounced by a foreign country where the parties are 
not domiciled at the time may be valid in that country, 
it will not, subject to a few exceptions to be mentioned, 
be accorded extra-territorial recognition and regarded 
here as valid. / “Le Mesurier, supra; Scott v. Scott 
(O.H.) 1957 S.L.T. 652; Jack v. Jack (O.H.) 1940 S.L.T. 
122; Calder v. Oalder (O.H.) 1901 8 S.L.T. 550;
C . jJ . v. A .B . 1908 S.C. 757; Bar pp. 582, 5; Shaw v.
1 Gould 1868 L.R. Ill E. and I.A. 55J
The ratio of There must be one jurisdiction to dissolve
these rules
about divorce marriages and the decrees of the appropriate jurisdiction 
sdiction
must be universally regarded as conclusive in order to 
prevent the difficulties inconveniences and scandals 
which would arise if a man and woman could be held to 
be married in one country and not married in another, 
r Wilson v. Wilson L.R. 2 P . and L . 442 per Lord 
Penzance; Ogden v . Ogden 1908 P* 46 per Lord Gorell 
at p. 82; Le Mesurier, supra, at p. 540^7 and as tllis 
is a question of status it is appropriate that that one 
jurisdiction should be the Court of the domicile of the 
parties.
.What law When a Court has jurisdiction to divorce it applies
is applied
its own divorce law, irrespective of the law ol the 
domicile of the parties at the commencement of the 
marriage/
marriage, the lex loci celebrationis» and the lex loci 
delic11 , Bar pp. 581, 584_J A decree of divorce 
pronounced by the Courts of the country where the 
parties are domiciled at the time, is valid although by 
the law of the country where the marriage was entered 
into and where the spouses were domiciled at the time 
of the marriage, a marriage is indissoluble.
/ "Warrender v. Warrender 1855 II S. and McL. 154;
Gordon v. Pye Perguss. Cons. Rep. App. 276; Edmonstone 
v. Edmonstone etc. June 1st 1816 P.O. -.J Our Courts 
will divorce persons domiciledin Scotland on grounds 
not sufficient by the law of the place of celebration 
of the marriage or of the domicile of the parties at 
the time of the marriage, but sufficient according to 
our law: / War render v. War render, Gordon v. f.y e , 
Edmonstone v. Edmonstone etc. supra; Carswell v. 
Carswell 1881 8 R. 901J  And conversely our Courts 
will recognise as valid a decree pronounced by the 
Courts of the domicile even although the grounds on 
which itwfcs pronounced would not be sufficient for 
divorce according to our law, and that even in the 
case of marriages entered into in Scotland between 
persons who^tere at the time domiciled Scots people. 
r Humphrey v • Humphrey’s Trs. (O.H.) 1895 33 S.L.R. 99; 
Harvie v. Parnie 1880 6 P.D. 35; Pemberton v. Hughes 
1899 1 Ch. 781; Mezger v. Mezger 1956 5 All E.R. 150
Certain countries recognise the right of one spouse 
to divorce the other at will or by mutual consent, with 
only formal interponing of authority by the Courts,
or with only formal requirements of registration of the 
divorce or even without further formality at all. It 
is quite clear that if the faculty of divorcing in this 
way is part of a polygamous marriage law, we will not 
recognise it as divorcing a monogamous marriage.
/The/
Hammersmith Marriage Case 1917 1 K.B. 634_7 
Where the faculty of divorcing in this way is part of a 
monogamous marriage law, it is an undecided question 
whether such a divorce, obtained in the country of the 
domicile, would be recognised here* Itwis opined obiter 
in The Hammersmith Marriage Case /~Rex v . Hammersmith 
Superintendent Rep;istrar of Marriages 1917 1 K.B. 634 _7 
that we will not recognise a foreign divorce unless it 
has been decreed by a competent Court /~by four of the 
six judges at pp. 642, 652 and 655, 661, and 662 and 
665_y ; and Lord Brougham stated: "If there were a 
country in which marriage could be dissolved without 
any judicial proceeding at all, merely by the parties 
agreeing in pais to separate, every other country ought 
to sanction a separation had in pais there •*• It may 
safely be asserted that so absurd a proposition never 
could for a moment be entertained? Warrender v.
Warrender 1855 II S. and McL. at p. 205_/ And so mere 
repudiation by one spouse without the interponing of 
judicial authority, although a valid divorce in the 
domicile, would not be recognised here* /"**Contra 
Seni Bhidak v. Seni Bhidak, The Times Newspaper 3rd 
December 1912; Cheshire p* 565. An act of the 
legislature of the country of the parties1 domicile 
declaring the parties to be divorced, would, of course, 
be just as valid as a decree of Court^/ There hatfealso 
been obiter opinions which would support the view that 
even if there has been a decree of the Court of the 
domicile, if it proceeded on nothing but repudiation 
by one of the spouses or on mutual agreement to have 
a divorce, it would not be recognised here, or at 
least would not be recognised in the case of marriages 
which were originally Scottish, f ~Birt v. Boutinez 
1868 1 P. and D. 487; Hammersmith Marriage Case 1917 
1 K.B. per Viscount Reading C.J. at p. 642; Dicey p.939; 
Walton/
Walton p. 371, 425J  but this is a more doubtful 
opinion. There is clearly no ground for refusing to 
recognise a divorce pronounced by a foreign Court on the 
ground of repudiation of a marriage celebrated in that 
foreign country by persons domiciled there, for the law 
of the foreign country is the only one which ever did 
have or could have anything to do with the status of 
the couple, and that law could not fairly be recognised 
as joining the couple without being recognised as 
disjoining them. Now the marriage which is formed in 
a country where marriage is dissoluble by repudiation 
or mutual consent is marriage as we know it, it creates 
the same status and is the same thing as a marriage in 
this country, /"~Na chi ms on v. Nachimson 1930 P. 217 J  
so there is no reason to distinguish between the validity 
of a divorce by the Courts of the foreign country, on 
the ground of repudiation, of a marriage celebrated 
-there, and the validity of a divorce by the Courts of 
the foreign country, on the ground of repudiation, of 
a marriage celebrated here* It is possible however 
that effect might be refused to a foreign decree of 
divorce pronounced on the ground of repudiation because 
of the over-riding principle which is always present 
that to do so would be contrary to morality or the 
distinctive policy of our law. In Hump hr ey v» 
HumphreyTs Trs. 1895 33 8.L.R. Lord Moncreiff at pp.
100, 101 adds "provided always that the ground of 
divorce is not repugnant to the standard of morality 
recognised by a civilised and Christian state?^
.Foreign divorces have been recognised when the ground 
was "violent and ungovernable temper^ /  Pemberton v. 
Hughes 1899 1 Ch. 781J  and "insulting behaviour and 
incompatibility of temper", / Mezger v. Mezger 1936 
3 All 33 .R . 130 J  
Exceptions/
Exceptions to the rule that our Courts hav.e jurisdiction 
only when the parties are domiciled he re .
There is one certain exception to the rule that our 
Courts only have jurisdiction when the domicile of the 
spouses is Scottish ati£ the date of the action and other 
possible exceptions.
In view of the large nunjber of marriages which took 
place between British girls and foreign soldiers in this 
country during the recent war with Germany the Matrimonial 
Causes (War Marriages; Act 1944 /f*7 and 8 Geo. 6 c. 43- 
C p . the Act passed in 1919 as a result of the first 
World War, 9 and 10 Geo. 5 c .  28_/ provided that in the 
case of certain marriages to which the Act applies the 
Court of Session should have jurisdiction in relation to 
proceedings for divorce or for nullity of marriage as if 
both parties were at all material times domiciledin 
Scotland. The marriages concerned are marriages 
celebrated on or after 3rd September 1939 but before the 
day to be appointed by Order in Council where the husband 
was, at the time of the marriage, domiciled outside the 
United Kingdom, and the wife was, immediately before 
the marriage, domiciledin Scotland. This extension of 
jurisdiction does not apply to any marriage if, since it 
was celebrated, the parties thereto have at any time 
resided together in the country in which the husband was 
domiciledat the time of the residence, and for the 
purposes of this proviso the whole of the United States 
of America, the whole of India and the whole of any 
British possession outside India shall be treated as one 
country. The Act does not extend or alter the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Session in relation to any 
proceedings for divorce or for nullity of marriage where, 
at the commencement of those proceedings, the parties are 
domiciled anywhere in the United Kingdom. /  Sec. 2 _/
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The words of the Act cover actions at the instance of 
the husband as well as those at the instance of the 
wife* A divorce under this Act would not be recognised 
in any non-British foreign country which acts on the 
rule in Le Tviesurier.
The following exceptions have been said to exist
It is said that when a married pair are domiciled 
in Scotland the husband, cannot, after the commission of 
a marital offence, deprive his wife of her right to a 
divorce or compel her to seek it in a foreign Court by 
changing his domicile to another country, and in these 
circumstances the Court of Session is certainly wont 
to assume jurisdiction and grant decree of divorce.
C l  iannah v. Hannah (O.H.) 1926 S.L.T. 370; Lack v.
Lack (O.H.) 1926 S.L.T. 656; Forbes v. Forbes (O.H.)
1910 2 S.L.T. 425; Stewart v. Stewart (O.H.) 1906 
13 S.L.T. 668; Pabst v. fabst (O.H.) 1896 6 S.L.T. 117; 
Robertson v. Robertson (O.H.) 1915 2 S.L.T. 96, see 
1916 2 S.L.T. 95; Bedding v. Redding (O.H.) 1888 15 R. 
1102; Manderson v. Sutherland 1899,1 F. 621 per Lord 
Moncreiff at p. 629; Buchanan v. Downle 1837 16 S. 82; 
Crabtree v. Crabtree (O.H.) 1929 S.N. 116; Bar p. 385;
Walton, Husband and Wife p. 361; Duncan and Dykes p.168.
There are doubtless many unreported Outer House cases to 
the same effect. J  This rule has been held applicable 
not only when the marital offence was the act of 
desertion by which the husband left the wife to go 
abroad but also when the marital offence was adultery.
Stewart v. Stewart, supra; Manderson v. Sutherland,per 
Lord Moncreiff, supra_7 and even wh0h tile adultery was
committed outside Scotland. / "Hannah v. Hannah,
Crabtree v. Crabtree, supra_7
The limits of the doctrine have been defined. It has 
been observed that the doctrine only applies when a wife, 
against/
against whom a matrimonial offence has been committed by 
her husbandfis left by her husband in Scotland where he 
was previously domiciled,and that it would not apply 
when the parties havi$ never resided together in Scotland 
and she was deserted while she was in Australia and the 
country he had gone to, namely Ireland, so far from 
being a strange country to her was the domicile of origi 
of both parties. Kelly v. Kelly (O.H.) 1927 S.N. 132; 
Cp . Robertson v. Robertson 1915 2 S.L.T. 96; 1916 2 S.L
95.7 In one case the Lord Ordinary appears to have 
considered that this doctrine not only justified the 
Scottish Courts in decreeing divorce, but gave them the 
sole jurisdiction to divorce and invalidated divorce 
proceedings brought by the husband in his new domicile 
on different grounds which emerged later. Crabtree v . 
Crabtree, supra__/ The cases in which this doctrine 
was laid down are mostly later in date than Le Mesurier, 
/f*1895 A.C. 517J  and the principle of that case is 
usually fully in the mind of the Court. Moreover, in 
Mackinnon’ s Trs • v . The Inland Revenue 1920 A.C.
(H.L.) 171__7 in which it was held that the wife's 
domicile follows that of her husband even when there 
has been a contract of voluntary separation and he has 
lost the right to require her to adhere by committing 
adultery, Viscount Cave remarked "... and there is no 
doubt authority (which it is not now necessary to 
examine) for the proposition that, in such a case, the 
husband will not be allowed to set up his own wrong 
as an argument for prejudicing his wife’s rights."
/""at p. 180. quoted in Attorney-General for Alberta 
v. Cook 1926 A.C. at p. 458J  The theory of the 
doctrine has been variously stated to be "that the 
husband could not destroy the jurisdiction to entertain 
an action founded on desertion by the very act of 
desertion/
desertion which constituted the ground of action”
/~~Jack v. Jack 1862 24 I). 467 at p. 473 per Lord 
Leas who held the modern opinion that the only 
jurisdiction in divorce is based on the permanent 
domicile of the spouses. Cp. Lord McLaren in Redding 
v. Redding, supra;J7 that it would be a hardship to 
compel a wife against whom a matrimonial offence had 
been committed to follow her husband to another 
country in order to obtain a remedy, / ~Kelly v.
Kelly (O.H.) 1927 S.N. 132 per Lord Constable;
Armytage v. Armytage 1898 P. 178 per Gorell Barnes J. 
at p. 185_7 and that to hold differently might deprive 
the wife of the remedy to which she had become 
entitled^either because he might keep changing his 
domicile, or might obtain a domicile in a country where 
divorce is not recognised on the grounds which had$ 
emerged, f ~Ogden v. Ogden 1908 P. at p. 78 per Sir 
Gorell Barnes; Bar pp. 385, 6J  A similar doctrine
to the present appears in certain obiter dicta in 
English cases which have not recently been followed, 
but these obiter dicta and cases deal with a slightly 
different position and it is fair to distinguish them. 
In Armytage v. Armytage /~1898 P. 178 at p. 18b j  
Gorell Barnes J. said: ”The Court does not now 
pronounce a decree of dissolution where the parties 
are not domiciled in this country, except in favour 
of a wife deserted by her husband or whose husband 
has so conducted himself towards her that she is 
justified in living apart from him, and who, up to 
the time when she was deserted or began so to be, 
was domiciledwith her husband in this country, in 
tha-t case, without necessarily resorting to the 
American doctrine wh-Loh in such circumstances a wife 
may acquire a domicile of her own In the country of 
the/
the matrimonial home, it is considered that, in order to 
meet the injustice which might he done by compelling a 
wife to follow her husband from country to country, 
he cannot be allowed to assert for the purposes of the 
suit that he had ceased to be domiciledin this country.11 
Z~cP • the same judge in Ogden v. Ogden 1908 P. at p. 78, 
and Brett L.J. in Niboyet v. Niboyet 1878 P.I. at p*14_7 
In recent cases in England this dictum has not been 
followed, and it has been held that since the decisions 
of the House of Lords in Mackinnon’s Trs. v. The Inland 
Revenue ^~1920 S.C. (H.L.) 171 J and Attorney General 
for Alberta v. Cook /~~1926 A.C. 444 J that there can 
only be a single matrimonial domicile of the husband and 
wife in which proceedings can be maintained to dissolve 
the married status, no exception to that general rule 
can be admitted in the case of a wife deserted by her 
husband in the original matrimonial domicile; under such 
circumstances the wife cannot be allowed to assert for 
the purpose of maintaining proceedings that the original 
domicile of the husband is still subsisting and that the 
English Court retains jurisdiction to dissolve the 
marriage when the husband has acquired a domicile of 
choice elsewhere. ^""H. v. H. 1928 P. 206; Herd v. Herd 
1936 P. 205J  A different situation is involved here 
from that with which the Scottish cases deal. In 
England at the time of these cases divorce for desertion 
was not competent and the actions were for divorce for 
adultery which was committed some time after the desertion 
and when the husband was domiciledin his new domicile. 
These cases do not affect the possibility of there being 
a rule that a husband can not deprive his wife of her 
right to divorce by acquiring a domicile elsewhere after 
the offence has been committed. In England the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, jT~l Edw. 8 and 1 Geo. 6
c. 57 sec. 13J  which also introduced divorce for 
desertion in England, has now provided that where a 
wife has been deserted by her husband or where her 
husband has been deported from the United Kingdom under 
any law for the time being in force relating to the 
deportation of aliens, and the husband was immediately 
before the desertion or deportation domiciledin England 
and Wales, the Court shall have jurisdiction for the 
purpose of divorce and nullity of marriage and judicial 
separation notwithstanding that the husband has changed 
his domicile since the desertion or deportation. This 
statutory provision restores the older dicta which had 
not been followed, and is also wide enough to be the 
statutory English counterpart of the supposed Scottish 
doctrine, which is said to be part of the Scottish 
common law.
It is submitted that the supposed Scottish common 
law exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts 
of the domicile is not conclusively settled, and although 
it would be acted upon in the Cuter House, if the matter 
were tested in the highest Courts it might be held that 
no such exception is recognised. The considerations 
against the exception are
The fact that it was considered necessary to have 
statutory provision in England is an indication that the 
doctrine does not exist under the common law and therefore 
will not exist in Scotland where there is no statutory 
provision. The doctrine is contrary to the rule laid 
down by Le Mesurier that the Courts of the domicile have 
exclusive jurisdiction in divorce, and there is no 
reservation in Le Mesurier to the effect that such an 
exception might exist. Application of the doctrine 
would entail that a divorce granted in Scotland would 
not be recognised elsewhere. Our Courts would certainly 
not/
not recognise a divorce granted abroad on these grounds 
of jurisdiction if it were shown that the domicile at 
the time of the action was in Scotland. The precedents 
which support the doctrine are more numerous than weighty: 
most of them are Outer House cases. It has only once 
been upheld in the Inner House, in a case which is most 
scantily reportedj f ~Robertson v. Robertson 1915 2 S.L.T. 
96, 1916 2 S.L.T. 95_7 except for a case in 1837 when the 
law of jurisdiction in divorce was in a most uncertain 
state; / ~Buchanan v. Lownie 1837 16 S. 82J  and on the 
only other occasions on which it has been mentioned 
with approval in the Inner House the opinions were obiter. 
f ~Manderson v. Sutherland 1899 1 F. 621 per Lord Moncreiff 
at p. 629; Jack v. Jack 1862 24 D. per Lord Leas at p-467_7 
It has been said L e  Stewart v. Stewart (O.H.) 1906 
13 S.L.T. 668_7 that the doctrine is supported by a dictum 
of Lord Chancellor Westbury in Pitt v. Pitt 1864 2 M. 
(H.L.) at p. 32_7 but on examination it will be found that 
the case Lord Chancellor was dealing with was an action 
of divorce at the instance of the husband. As for the 
Outer Houses cases, in five of the reported cases in 
which the doctrine was approved, the opinion was obiter. 
r Redding 1888 15 R. 1102; Stewart 1906 13 S.L.T. 668;
Kelly 1927 S.N. 132; Hannah 1926 S.L.T. 370; Forbes 1910 
2 S.L.T. 425_J7 The actions in which the doctrine was 
upheld were undefended.
There is more to be said for the doctrine if it is 
confined to divorces for desertion and stated in this 
form: a husband can not by deserting his wife in
Scotland where they were previously domiciled, deprive 
her of her right to have recourse to the Scots Courts for 
divorce for desertion or compel her to seek that remedy 
in a foreign country where he has become domiciledafter 
the desertion. /~See Fraser ii p. 1289_/r The two 
reported/
reported Outer House cases in which it was necessary to 
decide on the doctrine and In which the doctrine was 
upheld, are both cases of desertion. /~Pabst v. Pabst 
(O.H.) 1898 6 S.L.T. 117; Lack v. Lack (O.H.) 1926 
S.L.T. 656_7 In such circumstances there is this 
additional argument for the doctrine "that the husband 
could not destroy the jurisdiction to entertain an action 
founded on desertion by the very act of desertion which 
constituted the ground of action." /~Jack v. Jack 
1862 24 D. 467 per Lord Leas_7 1° say that the doctrine 
applies to adultery as well as desertion is simply to say 
that when the wife is pursuer the general rule is that 
jurisdiction in divorce is based on the domicile of the 
parties at the time of the marital offence, whereas the 
general rule clearly Is that jurisdiction is based on 
the domicile of the parties at the time of the action.
However if the matter were tested in the highest 
Courts the doctrine might be held not to exist, even in 
the case of desertion. It is quite clear of course that 
if a wife averred that at the time she was deserted .,her 
husband had been domiciledin Scotland, and that he had 
simply disappeared and that she did not know where he 
was, even although she thought that he might have gone 
overseas, the Scottish Courts would sustain their 
jurisdiction with perfect justice. But the principle 
of that would be that the husbandfs domicile must be 
presumed to continue Scottish until it has been proved 
that he has acquired another domicile. One way in 
which some of the decisions could be justified by 
principle is by saying that the husband’s domicile 
presumably continued Scottish until the date of the 
action. The case in which the doctrine was upheld in 
the Inner House f ~Robertson v. Robertson 1915 2 S.L.T.
96, 1916 2 S.L.T. 95_7 wa3 an undefended action for 
divorce for desertion in which the husband’s address was 
unknown/
unknown to the pursuer, and that may be a better way 
of supporting the decision.
It has been held in certain English cases that 
when a wife is domiciledin England before marriage, 
marries a foreigner in England,and the marriage is 
valid according to English law but is declared null 
by the Courts of his domicile so that the woman is 
considered to be married in this country but not 
married in the country of her husband’s domicile,
If grounds of divorce arise against her husband 
(e.g. as a result of his marrying again in his own 
country) the English Courts should exercise jurisdiction 
in an action of divorce at the instance of the English 
wife. /"~Stathatos v. Stathatos 1913 P. 46; de Montaigu 
v# de Montaigu 1913 P. 154; following the suggestion 
of Lord Gorell in Ogden v. Ogden 1908 P. at p. 82;
Dicey p. 285 j  This jurisdiction is said to arise 
ex necessitate: the wife is not married by the law of
her husband’s domicile and so cannot have recourse to 
its Courts for divorce, and is entitled to divorce 
according to our law; the English Courts are the only 
Courts to which she can turn; the reason for the 
Courts of the domicile having exclusive jurisdiction to 
divorce, namely that this avoids the scandals and 
inconvenience of a person being married in one country 
and not in another, not onlydbesnot justify the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the domicile 
in these circumstances, but supports the exception to 
that jurisdiction. However this doctrine of 
exercising jurisdiction ex necessitate forms no part 
of the law of Scotland, f ~Acutt v. Acutt 1936 S.C. 386; 
Mangrulkar v. Mangrulkar 1939 S.C. 239; Attorney-General 
for Alberta v. Cook 1926 A.C. 444; Administrator of 
Austrian Property v. Von Lorang 1927 S.C. (H.L.) 80.
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Cp. Dicey pp. 925 - 934, Baty, Polarized Law p. 68__7 
The answer to the problem is that the situation does 
not really arise,because when the Courts of the 
domicile of the parties have pronounced a decree of 
nullity of marriage, that decree, being pronounced 
by a Court of competent jurisdiction, is equivalent to 
a judgement in_ rem and is binding everywhere, 
f ~Administrator of Austrian Property v. Von Lorang 1927 
S.C. (H.L.) 80__7 even in this country when the grounds 
of the foreign decree of nullity would not have been 
sufficient for nullity in the view of our Courts.
f ~Le iUassa v. be Massa The Times Newspaper March 13, 1931
Galene v. Galene 1939 P. 237; Cp. Cheshire p. 359;
Dicey objects to this method of solving the problem by 
saying that it would not solve it when the wife has never 
lived in her husband!s country of domicile, and so has 
never acquired his domicile either in fact (by living 
there with him) or by operation of law (because there 
was a valid marriage) - p. 287. The reply is that 
when a marriage celebrated here is valid by our view 
but is declared null by the Courts of his domicile, the 
marriage must be regarded as a voidable and not a void 
one, and so she always takes his domicile by operation 
of law because a valid marriage was subsisting until the 
decree of the foreign Court was pronounced •_7
When the wife is the guilty party, in spite of 
a doubt expressed by Lord Chancellor Westbury in 
Pitt v. Pitt ’’whether the domicile of the husband is 
to be regarded in law as the domicile of the wife, 
either by construction or by attraction, so as to 
compel the wife to become subject for the purposes of 
divorce to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of any 
country in which the husband may choose to acquire a
domicile" /~1864 S M. (H.I.) at p.32J  it is now
settled/
settled that no exception exists here to the rules
that
which the Courts of the domicile of the married pair 
at the time of the action have jurisdiction to divorce, 
and that her domicile always follows his. f  Carswell v. 
Carswe 11 1881 8 B. 901_/r It is no objection that one 
of the main reasons for the husband acquiring a domicile 
in Scotland was to obtain a divorce, provided that he 
has acquired a bona fide Scottish domicile, /"’ibid; 
Stavert v. Stavert 1882 9 P. 519 per Lord President 
Inglis_7 But If, while the parties were domiciled 
in country A she committed an act which gave him no 
right to divorce, and he changed his domicile to B 
where such an act gave a right to divorce, quid juris?
In Carswell v. Carswell /~supra_7 two Canadians married 
In Canada; she deserted him in Canada where desertion 
was not a ground of divorce; he came to Scotland, 
acquired a domicile in Scot3.and and obtained a divorce 
on the ground of her desertion. The issue was before 
the Court in a very marked manner, because the pursuing 
husband admitted that one of the main reasons for his 
coming to and settling in Scotland was to obtain a 
divorce, and the four years period of desertion prior 
to the action which had to be proved occurred mainly 
in Canada. further the wife’s address was unknown 
to the pursuer.
It may be, however, that the rule in Carswell only 
applies where the marital offence is desertion by the 
wife. Lord Young justified the decision with these 
considerations: ’’Her duty as a wife is to be with her
husband here, and I cannot accept the language of the 
Lord Ordinary that the pursuer’s domicile in Scotland 
was acquired as a domicile not for her, but as a domicile 
against her. It is a domicile for her, assuming that he 
has made Scotland his home .... I cannot say, in such
a state of facts, that the law of Scotland is an unfair 
law to govern the domestic relations of a man who has 
adopted this country as his home. The duty of his wife 
is to be here, and subject to the same law as her husband . 
Now, it is because she has gone away from him that she 
does not know he is here, and is not here with him - 
if indeed she is ignorant, which I have already said I 
consider extremely doubtful.” / “at p. 909_J These 
considerations would not apply to a marital offence like 
adultery, sodomy, bestiality or any other act which simply 
occurred and had no continued existence. There Is 
probably justice in the Bar’s opinion: !,If, then,
something took place which is no ground for divorce 
by the personal law of the spouses at the time, but is 
a ground for it by a personal law which they afterwards 
acquire, and if the thing which took place had no continued 
existence, happened once for all - if, for instance, 
by the earlier law simple adultery by the husband is 
not a ground on which the wife can sue for divorce, but 
must be accompanied by some other qualification, while 
by their subsequent law simple adultery is enough - 
a change of nationality (or domicile) cannot elevate 
to the rank of a ground for divorce the circumstance 
which took place under the dominion of the former law.
We may say that if the spouse must put up with this 
conduct, without being able to raise an action of 
divorce, it is regarded, so far as the marriage is 
concerned, as non-existent.” /"Gillespie’s translation 
p. 385; Cp. Baty, Polarized law, p. 63__/
Suppose a wife commits adultery in country A, where 
the parties are domiciled,and that adultery is a ground 
of divorce there, but action must be brought within
twelve months of the offence, and suppose the parties
/
come to Scotland and acquire a domicile here, where there
is no twelve months’ limitation, and the husband brings 
an action of divorce after the expiry of the twelve 
months’ period, quid juris? Probably the action of 
divorce could proceed here, and the foreign rule of 
12 months’ limitation could be disregarded as a rule 
of practice and procedure which should be governed by 
the lex fori. / “Fraser, Parent & Child p. 73? Cp.' the 
ratio of Fenton v. Livingstone 1859 21 D. (H.L.) 10__7 
However If the limitation to 12 months’ occurred in 
the very statute which gave the right of divorce it 
might be considered a limitation of the right itself 
which entered into it ab initio and therefore a matter 
of substance, /~Cp. Goodman v. L.N.W.B. (O.H.) 1877 
14 S.L.B. 449_J7 if that was the nature of the 
limitation then there having been no right to divorce 
when the parties left the former domicile there would 
be no right of divorce in Scotland. Similarly it is 
submitted that if the wife committed, adultery while 
they were domiciled in country A and the husband 
condoned it, condonation being an answer by the law 
of Country A, and the husband subsequently acquired a 
domicile In country B where condonation was no answer, 
he would not thereby acquire a right to divorce from 
the Courts of country B. / “Contra Fraser Parent &
Child p. 73J
Exceptions to the rule that we will only recognise 
divorces granted by the Courts of the domicile.
a
If a divorce is granted by the Court other than 
the Court of the domicile, and that divorce is recognised 
in the country of the domicile, we should on that ground 
recognise and give effect to the divorce,and that even 
although the grounds for which the divorcees granted 
not sufficient for divorce either according to the 
law/
law of the domicile or the law of this country* 
r Armitage v. A^G. 1906 P. 135; Cass v. Cass 1910
102 L.T. 397/7
Divorces granted under certain Imperial statutes 
raise further exceptions. The Indian and Colonial 
Divorce Jurisdiction Act 1926 /~16 and 17 Geo. V c. 40J  
enacts that Courts in India shall have jurisdiction to 
divorce, and as incidental thereto to make an order as 
to damages, alimony or maintenance, custody of children 
and costs where the parties are British subjects domiciled 
in England or Scotland, provided that the petitioner 
resides in India at the date of the petition and the 
place where the parties last resided together was India, 
and the marriage was solemnised or the offence committed 
in India and provided that the petitioner shows that by 
reason of official duty poverty or other sufficient 
cause he or she cannot proceed in the Courts of the 
domicile.The grounds of divorce are those recognised 
in England. The £ct provides that a divorce granted 
under these provisions after being registered In England 
or Scotland, whichever is the domicile of the parties, 
shall have the same force and effect as if made by the 
High Court in England or Court of Session in Scotland. 
Thus a divorce pronounced by a court other than the 
Court of the domicile of the parties Is by statute to be 
recognised as effective here. The Act may be applied by 
Order in Council to any part of His Majesty’s Dominions 
other than a self-governing Dominion /~Sec. 2J  and by 
Order in Council has been made to apply to Kenya,
/~S.B. & 0. 1928 No. 635J  Straits Settlements,
/ “S.B. & 0. 1931 No. 851_J7 Jamaica /"S.F. & 0. 1932
and
No. 475_/ Hong Kong / “S.R. & 0. 1935 No. 836__/A Ceylon , 
/~S.B. & 0. 1936 No. 562J  If the rule suggested above
is correct, that when a divorce is recognised as
effective/
effective by the Courts of the domicile it is just in 
the same position as a divorce granted by the Courts 
of the domicile, then divorces granted under the Act 
which have been properly registered , will be held 
binding by foreign Courts which recognise the Le Mesurier 
rule.
The Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act 1944 
and 8 Geo. VI c. 43J  as well as the provisions 
above-mentioned about the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Session, have a similar extension of the jurisdiction 
of the High Court in England, so divorces granted in 
England under that Act will be recognised as effective in 
Scotland although not granted by the Courts of the 
domicile. / “Sec. 4_7 The provision in the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 which is quoted above, to 
the effect that when a wife is deserted by her husband 
and the husband has been domiciled in England Immediately 
prior to the desertion the High Court In England should 
have jurisdiction to divorce notwithstanding that the 
husband has changed his domicile since the desertion may 
raise another exception to the rule that we only recognise 
divorces pronounced by the Courts of the domicile, for it 
may be proper that our Courts should recognise divorces 
pronounced under the authority of a statute which is 
passed by the United Kingdom Parliament.
JURISDICTION IN QUESTIONS INCIDENTAL TO DIVORCE
If our Courts have jurisdiction to pronounce decree 
of divorce they have jurisdiction to deal with these 
questions which are incidental to the divorce proceedings, 
namely (1) custody of children (2) aliment, and (3) 
patrimonial rights resulting from the divorce as regards 
moveables wherever situated and Immoveables within the 
jurisdiction, f~~Manderson v. Sutherland 1899 1 P. 621_7 
but/
but not immoveables situated abroad / ~Cathcart v. Cathoart 
1904 12 S.L.T. 182__7 notwithstanding that the defender may 
reside outside the jurisdiction and not be subject to the 
jurisdiction on any of the usual grounds in personal 
actions such as possession of heritage and arrestment of 
moveables in Scotland, and on the question of the custody 
of the children notwithstanding that the children are 
resident outside the jurisdiction. f ~Philips v. Philips 
1944 LX T.L.P. 595J
In an action in our Courts for the patrimonial rights 
consequent to a divorce pronounced in our Courts, our 
Courts will not, while the decree of divorce stands,
a p p e a l  'from o f  r e j i u t t i o n  o f  "r"t i >  C o m p e t e n t
.listen to objections that the divorce was pronounced 
A
without jurisdiction. f ~Manderson v. Sutherland;
Cathcart v. Cathcart, supraJ
If we recognise a foreign Court as being a Court 
of competent jurisdiction in divorce and give effect here 
to its decrees of divorce, and if it has dealt with any 
these ancillary matters in the divorce action we will 
recognise it as being a Court of competent jurisdiction 
for these matters and give effect here to its decrees 
regarding them; otherwise we will not give effect to 
its decrees on these incidental matters, even although the 
defender was subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
Court in respect of residence or some other common ground 
of jurisdiction in personal actions. Thus when a divorce 
and order for maintenance of the wifewfcs pronounced in the 
United States in respect of a couple w h o ^ r e  really 
domiciled in England so that the decree of divorcees 
invalid, it^&s held that the ancillary maintenance order 
w a s  also invalid. f ~Simons v. Simons 1939 1 K.B. 490J  
Itv&s argued that although the decree of divorcees 
invalid because it^dis a decree in rem and not pronounced 
by the only Court of competent jurisdiction, the 
maintenance/
maintenance ordervais valid, being a decree in p ersonam 
and pronounced by a Court that hae) jurisdiction 
lli personam because both parties ha-*!# submitted to the 
Court which pronounced it by presenting cross petitions 
for divorce* This plea was rejected because the 
Court only orders maintenance because it has ordered 
divorce and if the decree of divorce falls the 
ancillary order for maintenance has to suffer the aame 
fate.
The position as regards expenses and damages in a 
divorce action is different. In a divorce action the 
Court will award exxjenses against one of the spouses 
notwithstanding that the spouse is not subject to the 
jurisdiction in personal actions, provided that the 
Court has jurisdiction in respect of the divorce.
But the converse is not also true. When a wife brings 
an action of divorce against her husband and his plea 
of no jurisdiction is sustained the Court has power to 
award exx>enses against the husband although they have 
no power to deal with the merits of the case against 
him, /f”Stavert v . Stavert 1882 9 R . 519; C p . Westergaard 
v * Westergaard 1914 8.C. 977; FiXe v. PiXe 1899 6 S.L.T. 
531_7 and that even although the husband is not subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Court for personal actions- 
/"“hinder v. Linder 1902 4 F . 465J  The test probably is 
whether the wife reasonably thought that the Court of 
Session was the proper forum, in which case the wife 
will be allowed expenses. In one case when the 
defending husband stated a plea of no jurisdiction and 
a preliminary proof was allowed on the question of 
domicile the Lord Ordinary granted an interim award of 
expenses to the wife. The defender reclaimed against 
the competency of this award, but the Inner House, in 
sending the case to the Summar Roll, granted a further
interiiV
interim award to meet the expenses in the Inner House, 
and. later, when disposing of the reclaiming motion after 
debate, affirmed the award made by the Lord Ordinary, 
/ “hinder v . .binder, supra__7
In an action of divorce for adultery in the Court 
of Session the paramour can only be called as a co­
defender (which is done only when there is a conclusion 
for exxjenses or damages against the paramour) if the 
paramour is subject to the jurisdiction in one of the 
recognised ways in personal actions, such as residence 
within Scotland or the possession of heritage or 
arrestment of moveables in Scotland, and it will not 
do to say that because there is jurisdiction in the 
divorce action on the ground of the domicile of the 
parties there is therefore jurisdiction for the 
incidental purpose of citing the paramour as co- 
defender and maxing him or her liable for expenses and 
damages. / Fraser v. Fraser and Hibbert 1870 8 M. 400J  
The position is different in England, where the paramour 
does not need to be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
English Courts in personal actions before being cited 
as a co-defender, because the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1857 provided that a husband who petitions for divorce 
or damages must make the alleged adulterer a co­
respondent to the petition Sees- 28 and 33_/ and that 
the petition should be served on the co-respondent 
whether within or without Her Majesty?s Domisions 
/~Sec. 42. The present provisions are secs. 176, 177 
and 189 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) 
Act 1925 15 and 16 Geo. 5 c. 49; See Rayment v. Ray ment 
1910 P. 271; Rush v. Rush 1920 P. 242; Dicey p. 282J  
We would not give effect to a decree for damages 
awarded by a foreign Court against a co-defender who 
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
Court, even although the foreign Court had jurisdiction
in the action of divorce between the spouses on the 
ground that the spouses were domiciled in the foreign 
country. /~Phillips v. Batho 1913 3 K.B. per
Scrutton L . J . at p. 29, 30; Payment v. Bayment 1910 
P. 271; Contra Dicey p. 427J  Phillips v. Batho 
Supra_/ decided that the Courts of England would 
enforce a decree for damages against the co-respondent 
regularly pronounced according to the law of the Court 
which pronounced it although the Court did not have, 
according to the principles of International Private 
Law, jurisdiction over the co-respondent, where the 
Court that pronounced it was also a Court of the 
British Sovereign, because the English Courts, which 
did have jurisdiction over the co-respondent according 
to the principles of International Private Law, could 
not have granted that decree for damages, not having 
jurisdiction over the divorce. This case therefore 
is of no authority in Scotland where a separate action 
for damages against the paramour is competent even 
although the Scots Courts have no jurisdiction to 
d ivorce •
Jurisdiction in actions for the dissolution of a 
marriage on the ground of the presumed death of one 
of the spouses.
The Scottish Courts would presumably only have 
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the dissolution 
of a marriage on the ground of the presumed death of 
one of the parties / “under sec* 5 of the Divorce 
(Scotland) Act 1938, 1 and 2 Geo. 6 c. bQ_/ where 
the husband was a domiciled Scotsman, and a decree of 
dissolution on this ground by a foreign Court which 
was the Court of the domicile would be regarded as a 
conclusive decree in rem. In short the proceeding
is/
The
Scottish 
authorities 
nn declator 
nf marriage
The
Sco ttish 
authorities 
on declator 
of nullity 
of marriage
is analogous to divorce* This principle is in harmony 
with that applicable to presumptions of death in the 
case of succession. / q*v._/
Jurisdiction in Actions of Declarator of Marriage and 
Actions of D eclarator of Nullity of Marriage.
The Scottish authorities as to jurisdiction in 
actions of declarator of marriage are to the following 
effect
The Scottish Courts have jurisdiction if (l) the 
parties are domiciled in Scotland at the time of the 
action / “Mc^exlana v. Menelland 1942 B.C. 502 J
or (2 ) if the alleged marriage was celebrated in 
Scotland and the defender (either man or woman) was 
present in Scotland when cited. / Murison v. Murison 
1925 B.C. 624; Wylie v. haye (Whole Court) 1834 12 S. 
927, over-ruling Dodds v. Westcomb 1745 M. 4793, and 
Mackenzie v. Mackenzie 8th March 1810 F.C.; Wilson v. 
Horn 1904 (O.H.) 41 S.L.R. 312; Tallarieo v . L.A.
1923 S.L.T. 272; Scruton v. Gray M. 4822; Key v. Key 
Fraser Husband and Wife 2nd Ed. p. 1272J
The Scottish authorities as to jurisdiction in 
actions of declarator of nullity of marriage are to the 
effect that the Scottish Courts have jurisdiction if
(1) the parties are domiciled in Scotland at the date of 
the action /"“Administrator of Austrian Property v.
Yon Lorang 1927 S.C. (H.L.) 80; Martin v. Buret (o.H.) 
1938 S.L.T. 479; A L B . v. Y.Z. 1900 (O.H.) 38 S.L.R.559 
A.B. v. C.B. 1884 H R .  1060, 12 R- (H.L.) 36._/ or
(2 ) if the marriage was celebrated in Scotland.
/ " MacDougall v. Chit navis 1937 S.C. 390; L endrum v . 
flhp-kravarti (O.H.) 1929 S.L.T. 96; Miller v. Deakin 
(O.H.) 1912 1 S.L.T. 253_J7 The Court has not insisted 
on service on the defender when within Scotland to 
validate/
validate the second ground of jurisdiction.
The English authorities as regards declarators 
of nullity /_ There is no counterpart in England 
of the Scottish declarator of marriage__/ are to the 
effect that the English Courts have jurisdiction.if 
(l) the parties are domiciled in England at the time 
of the suit / Inverclyde v. Inverclyde 1951 P. 29;
Von Lorang, supra J  or (2) the place where the 
marriage is alleged to have been celebrated is in 
England (without necessity for the respondent to be 
in England when cited) Simonin v. Mallac (i860)
2 S w . & T r . 67; Sottomayor v. be Barros (Mo. l)
(1877) 3 P.D. 1; (No.2) 1879 5P.D. 94; Ogden v .
Ogden 1908 P. 46; Husaien v. Eussien 1938 P. 159;
UfJL*\k« 1&TL-RA31; </ahcrv.V>Uep
or (3) the parties are resident in England at the time 
of the suit / ~Roberts v. Brennan 1902 P. 143;
C p • Mitford v. Mitford 1925 P. 130
or (4) the petitioner is resident and domiciled in
England at the time of the suit. f “White v. White
1957 P. I l l 7 ---------------------------------------
 -The locus celebrationis is a competent jurisdiction
"that
not only when the ground i s Athe formalities of the 
marriage have not been properly observed7but also when 
it is that the parties have no capacity or that the 
marriage is essentially invalid,/-Bottomayor v. be 
Barros (Nos. 1 and 2), supra _7
One case held that there was a distinction between suits
for nullity in void marriages on the one hand and 
voidable marriages on the other; that the Courts 
of the locus celeorationis had jurisdiction to annull 
a marriage which was said to be void ab initio, on the 
ground for example, of non compliance with the 
formalities of the lex loci celebrationis, but that
only the Courts of the domicile of the spouses could
annul /
annul a voidable marriage on the ground for example of 
the impotence of one of the spouses, because such a 
marriage was valid until annulled, and the process of 
nullity in that case was more akin to an action of 
divorce /  Inverclyde v. Inverclyde 1931 P. 29; 
following the distinction made by Lord President Clyde 
in Administrator of Austrian Property v . Von Lorang 
1926 S.C. at p. 616; C p . White v . White 1937 P. ill; 
contrast Mitford v. Mitford 1923 P. 130J  However 
this distinction has not been followed in the most 
recent cases which have held that the locus celebrationis 
has jurisdiction to annull on the ground of impotency 
as on any other ground./"Basterbrook v. Easterbrook 
1944 P. 10; Hutter v. Hutter 1944 P. 95J  The ratio 
of the case which supports the third ground of 
jurisdiction is that the jurisdiction of the English 
Ecclesiastical Courts whs based on the residence of the 
parties, and in suits for nullity the Probate Division 
follows the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts as 
prescribed by sec. 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1857; this case however is of no assistance or 
authority in Scotland. The case which supports the 
fourth ground of jurisdiction is a sympathetic judgment 
in an undefended case by a single judge. In it the 
domicile of the parties is not the same because the 
woman did not live with the man after the ceremony and 
so did not in fact acquire his domicile and since there 
is no valid marriage she did not acquire his domicile 
by operation of law. It is curious that the Court 
should have sustained its jurisdiction because England 
was the domicile and residence of the female petitioner. 
It would not have been so unreasonable if the Court 
of the place where the respondent was domicilecfand 
resident had assumed jurisdiction. rsut in the 
circumstances/
circumstances of the case the marriage, and the status 
and the person of the respondent were all completely 
beyond the jurisdiction of the English Court. There 
was no circumstance which subjected him to the jurisdiction 
of the English Court. In Ogden v. Qgden the English 
Courts would not recognise a decree of the Erench Courts 
pronounced when the petitioner was domiciledand resident 
in Erance, the respondent being domiciledand resident in 
England. / 1908 E . 46_J It i3 submitted that the case 
which supports the fourth ground of jurisdiction can be 
disregarded also.
The principle issue is whether the Courts of the 
domicile of the parties have exclusive jurisdiction, as 
in divorce, or whether the Courts of the locus celebrationis 
also have jurisdiction. The difficulty of having two 
jurisdictions competent to declare or annuiZ a marriage 
is that in Von Eorang / supra_/ The house of Lords held 
that a decree of nuxiity of marriage is equivalent to a 
judgment i_n rem, and when pronounced by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction, will be accepted as conclusive 
everywhere. now suppose a Erenchman married a Scotswoman 
in Scotland without the parental consent required by his 
law. According to our principles the marriage is valid, 
but Erench law classifies the necessity for consent as a 
question of capacity to be governed by the personal law, 
and since by the personal law of the man, Erench law, 
consent is necessary, the marriage is invalid according 
to Erench principles,therefore an action of nullity in 
the Scots Courts would fail but in the Erench Courts 
would succeed. If each Court is a competent forum 
is the decision of each conclusive everywhere? Does 
the conclusive determination of the question depend on 
whether the irate Erench parents can obtain a Erench 
decree of nullity before the designing Scotswoman can 
obtain/
obtain a decree of declarator? It will not do to suggest 
tnat the Courts of the domicile have a jurisdiction that 
entitles their decrees to be recognised everywhere and 
that the Courts of the locus celebrationis have a con­
current jurisdiction whose decrees are only recognised 
within the locus celebrationis, because the Scotswoman 
might obtain a declarator of marriage in the locus 
celebrationis here while the Erench parents were obtaining 
a declarator of nullity in the Courts of the domicile, and 
our Courts would be at the same time bound by the decision 
of our Courts and by the contradictory decision of the 
Courts of the domicile which vvould, on the authority of 
Von j-iQrang, be conclusive here.
The Scottish authorities which acknowledge that the 
locus celebrationis is a competent jurisdiction, do not 
conclusively establish that rule. Most were decided 
before Von lorang, and do not have in view that the
decision is one affecting status; they proceed on
principles applicable to personal actions. This 
criticism can be directed at Murison v . Murison ,
/ ”l923 S.C. 624J  where the competence of the locus 
celebrationis was affirmed in the Inner House after a 
very full debate, and also of the decision of the whole 
Court in the early case of Wylie v. Laye ■ / 1834 12 S. 
927_/ Eurther, in both these cases the Court held that 
there was no jurisdiction because the defender was not 
present in Scotland when cited, which the Court held was
also necessary where the ground of jurisdiction was that
Scotland was the locus celebrationis, and accordingly 
the opinions that the Scots Courts have jurisdiction 
when Scotland is the locus celebrationis were obiter.
There are only four reported cases where the fact that 
Scotland was the locus celebrationis was held to give 
the Scottish Courts jurisdiction; three of these are 
Cuter house decisions /~Key v. Key Eraser Husband and 
Wife/
Wife 2nd Ed. p. 1272; Lendrum v. Chakravartl 1929 
S.L.T. 96; and Miller v. Leakin 1912 1 S.L.T. 253_J7 
and in the one Inner House case MacDougall v.
Chitnavis 1937 S.C. 390__7 which was decided in 1937, 
the Court observed that the question was not free from 
difficulty and that the general question whether the 
Court of the domicile has not exclusive jurisdiction 
in actions of nullity might require to be reconsidered.
The case was an undefended one, the Court had heard 
argument on the whole case and was deciding against the 
pursuer and appellant on the merits, and accordingly 
did not feel bound to go into the question of jurisdiction 
with any particularity.
If, as the judges thought in Murison and Wylie v.
Laye, jurisdiction can be founded ratione contractus 
coupled with service on the defender while within 
Scotland, which is simply one of the normal grounds 
for founding jurisdiction in personal actions, there 
seems to be no reason why jurisdiction should not also 
be founded by the other normal grounds in personal 
actions, namely residence of the defender within the 
jurisdiction for at least 40 days, the possession 
of heritage in Scotland, or the arrestment of moveables 
in Scotland,Lord Hunter said in Murison: "The Court
(in Wylie v. Laye) were of opinion that, although the 
alleged marriage between the pursuer and the defender 
was stated to have been contracted in Scotland, the 
locus contractus did not lay a foundation for a 
jurisdiction over a foreigner, unless he had been cited 
in this country, or in some cases, unless his funds 
had been arrested here jurisdictionis fundandae causa.
The latter ground of founding jurisdiction may be left 
out of account, as it has been decided that jurisdiction 
cannot be constituted by the arrestment of funds 
belonging to a foreigner, when the action on which 
the/
the arrestment was used raised a question of status - 
Morley v. Jackson 16 R. 78" It is curious that it did 
not occur to Lord Hunter that jurisdiction founded 
rations contractus plus service on the defender within 
Scotland should also now be left out of account on the 
ground that jurisdiction cannot be founded thus when 
the action raises a question of status.
The English authorities which affirm the competence 
of the locus celebrationis are of little or no assistance 
In Scotland because they proceed on the ratio that the 
English Probate Division by sec. 22 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857 /~Now Sec. 32 of The Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act 1925^7 has, in all suits, and proceedings 
other than proceedings to dissolve any marriage to 
proceed and act and give relief on principles and rules 
as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and 
rules on which the Ecclesiastical Courts hade theretofore 
acted and given relief, and the Ecclesiastical Courts 
used to give relief In cases other than those in which 
the parties were domiciled in England.
It has been argued for the locus celebrationis 
that since the lex loci celebrationis must govern all 
questions as to the formalities of the marriage 
ceremony it is logical that the Courts of the locus 
celebrationis should have a jurisdiction at least over 
those questions; /"Cheshire p. 340_7 but this is a 
dangerous method of reasoning: the Courts of the
domicile may not apply the lex loci celebrationis to 
questions of formality, or if they do, they may not 
agree with our view that the question in issue is one 
of formality. /“See Ogden v. Ogden 1908 P. 46_7
But one cannot go so far as to say that the 
Courts of the domicile should have exclusive jurisdiction, 
as in divorce. In a divorce action there is juris­
diction when the domicile of both the parties is In 
this/
this country at the time of the action,but a divorce 
action proceeds on the assumption that there is a valid 
marriage,and the parties always have the same domicile 
in consequence of the marriage, so that there is only 
one Court, namely the Court of the domicile of the 
husband,which is concerned with and can alter the 
status of the parties. In actions of declarator or 
nullity, however, the woman’s domicile is not always 
the same as his. If there was no marriage her domicile 
would not be the same as his by operation of law. In 
many actions of nullity her domicile is in fact the 
same as his because she has in fact lived with him. in 
his country, and this was the case in Von Lorang. But 
in many cases also she has not lived with her "husband" 
in his domicile and so has not acquired his domicile. 
/""MacDougall v. Chitnavls 1937 S.C. 390; Ogden v. Ogden 
1908 P. 46; White v. White 1937 P. 111__7 Tn Von Lorang 
Lord Phillimore said "for the purpose of pronouncing 
upon the status of parties ... The Court of the law 
which regulates or determines the personal status of 
the parties, if they are both subject to the same law, 
decides conclusively." /“1927 S.C. (H.L.) at p. 97J  
The qualification is important. This leaves room 
then for the locus celebrationis to function.
It is suggested that if the matter is reconsidered 
by a fuller Court or in the House of Lords these rules 
might emerge.
If both parties have the same domicile the Scots 
Courts have jurisdiction only if Scotland is the common 
domicile. The fact that Scotland is the locus 
celebrationis would not give the Scots Courts 
jurisdiction - even to pronounce a decree which is
Falcon bridj-e Lilt L. Q.R.ZZUg j
effective only within Scotland. /^"Finally, if the 
Court is a competent Court, still more if it is the 
only competent Court - and in my opinion the Wiesbaden 
Court/
Court was the only competent Court for these parties - 
..." per Lord Phillimore in Adminstrator of Austrian 
Property v. Von Lorang 1927 S.C. (H.L.) at p. 98/7 
If both parties have the same domicile, which is in a 
foreign country, the decrees of that common domicile 
are equivalent to judgments In rem, and, if they have 
been obtained without fraud or collusion and accord 
with Scottish notions of substantial justice, will be 
accepted as conclusive by the Scottish Courts 
c Adminstrator of Austrian Property v . Von Lorang 1927 
S.C. (H.L.) 8 0 J  even if the same decision would not 
have been given if the case had been tried in this 
country; f ~De Massa v. De Massa The Times newspaper 
March 13, 1931; Galene v. Galene 1939 P. 237.
In V°n Lorang the validity of a marriage celebrated in 
Paris was decided by the Courts of Wiesbaden where the 
parties were domiciled. The ground of nullity was 
that the French requirements of residence and 
publication had not been observed and the Wiesbaden 
Court took evidence of Erench law on this topic and 
applied French law on the principle that as to the 
formalities of marriages locus regit. Our Courts
would have proceeded In the same way. But in Ogden
v. Ogden 1908 P. 46, the Court of Appeal was faced with 
the validity of a marriage celebrated in England between 
an Englishwoman and a Frenchman which was said to be 
Invalid according to French law because of lack of the 
consent of the Frenchman’s parents. According to our 
principles parental consent is a formality which is 
ruled by English law as the lex loci celebrationis, 
(alternatively, as suggested below, it is a question of 
capacity which English law would have disregarded) and 
since according to the English lex loci celebrationis 
lack of consent is not in the circumstances a bar, the 
English/
English Courts would have held the marriage valid, 
but the French Courts had already annulled the marriage, 
holding that parental consent pertained to capacity
was governed by French law which held that he did 
had not ha«f capacity. The Court of Appeal refused 
to recognise the French decree and sustained the 
validity of the marriage. Sir Gorell Barnes,
President, said that if the question was compliance 
with tl^ e formalities of celebration the decision of 
the Court of the domicile not be binding on the 
Court of the place of celebration. !'It certainly 
would be somewhat startling if this Court, having 
come to the conclusion that the marriage in question 
between the appellant and pursuer was valid in 
England, should yet hold that the French decision 
that it was not a valid marriage was binding upon it.” 
(pp. 80, 81) If France had been the common domicile 
of the parties this attitude would have been wrong. 
However the decision in Ogden was correct because of 
the special circumstances of the case: the woman
had never in fact acquired her husband’s French 
domicile so that the French Court not being the Court 
of the common domicile was not a Court of competent 
jurisdiction within the meaning of Von Lorang - see 
Lord Fhillimore in Von Lorang, 1927 S.C. (H.L.) at 
p. 97_7 with possibly this exception that we will not 
recognise a decree of nullity of a foreign Court which 
declares null a marriage celebrated according to the 
Foreign Marriage Act 1892, even if that country is the 
common domicile of the parties,/""Hay v. Northcote 1900 
2 Ch. 262; Dicey p. 438<J7 If both parties have the 
same domicile the decrees of any foreign Court other 
than that of the domicile will not be recognised here. 
/ "Clayton v. Clayton 1932 P. 45; Scrimshire v. 
Scrimshire/
Scrimshire 1752 2 Hag. Cons. 595; Sinclair v. Sinclair 
1798 1 Hag. Cons. 294; contra Mitford v. Mitford 1923
P. 130_7
If the above rules are not held to be the law,
and if it is decided that our Courts have jurisdiction
when Scotland is the locus celebrationis, it is submitted
that the Courts of the domicile would still be held to
have exclusive jurisdiction in actions to declare null
a voidable, as distinct from a void marriage, for the 
*
process is more akin to divorce. The distinction that 
is taken between void and voidable marriages in 
Inverclyde v. Inverclyde /"1931 P. 29; see also 
Administrator of Austrian Property v. Von Lorang 
1926 S.C. per Lord President Clyde at p. 616; White 
v. White 1937 P. iu_7 is sound. This distinction 
has been rejected in two recent English cases 
f ~Easterbrook v. Easterbrook 1944 P. 10; and Hutter v. 
Hutter 1944 P. 95_7 but the ratio of the rejection is 
that the English Ecclesiastical Courts made no distinction 
and the English Divorce Court has by statute to follow 
the practice of the English Ecclesiastical Courts; and 
this is reasoning that will not have any influence in 
Scotland. A voidable marriage being a good marriage 
until annulled by the Court, the woman can be said to 
have the same domicile as her husband by operation of 
law, so that there will always be a common domicile, as 
in divorce, /~Cp. Dicey p. 298J  which makes that domicile 
very appropriate and convenient to be the competent and 
only competent jurisdiction.
In two English cases /""De Massa v. De Massa, The 
Times March 31 1931, and Galene v. Galene 1939 P. 237J  
decrees of nullity have been granted by the English 
Courts on production of a decree of nullity of the 
Courts of the domicile, the decree being pronounced 
because/
because of the principles of Von Lorang. The Scots 
Courts however would probably regard such a confirmatory 
decree as unnecessary and therefore incompetent, because 
the foreign decree is universally valid ex proprio 
vigore , f ~Arnott v. L.A. 1932 S.L.T. 46j/
If both parties have not the same domicile the 
Scots Courts will have jurisdiction in actions of 
nullity or declarator of marriage if this country is 
locus celebrationis, at least when the question is 
one concerning the formalities of the marriage./“The 
qualification is perhaps unnecessary because the place 
of celebration has an interest when the question is the 
essential validity of the marriage because it is 
submitted that the rule is that for a marriage to be 
valid as regards essentials it must satisfy the 
requirements of the law of the matrimonial domicile 
and of the lex loci celebrationis; and when the issue 
is capacity the locus celebrationis has an interest 
because it is submitted that for a marriage to be 
valid as regards capacity each party has to have 
capacity by his or her domiciliary law and by the 
lex loci celebrationis. Even when the ground of 
nullity is bigamy the Courts of the locus celebrationis 
can claim this interest, that they must see that their 
registers are correct. The main basis of the 
jurisdiction, moreover, is not its appropriateness but 
that the defender is subject to it rations contractus 7  
Their decision however will not be equivalent to a 
judgment in rem since the res, that is the status of 
the parties,is not within its jurisdiction. The res 
is not within any one jurisdiction and so there is 
probably no jurisdiction that can give a judgment 
in rem.
The next question is whether the Scottish Courts
have jurisdiction simply on the ground that Scotland is 
the/
the locus celebrationis or whether the defender must 
in addition have been in Scotland when cited. It Is 
clear that the same rule should apply in actions of 
nullity and in actions of declarator of marriage, for 
the two actions try the same question, the validity of 
a marriage, and the only difference is as to which 
party is the pursuer. Indeed there may be cross 
actions of declarator and nullity which have been 
conj oined. g. l  ongworth v. Yelverton 1864 2 M.
161, 2 M. (H.L.) 49J7
In a declarator of marriage the defender is 
subject to the jurisdiction ratlone contractus, 
because by the very act of entering into the contract 
he impliedly submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Courts of the locus contractus on any question relating 
to the contract.
It has been suggested that the same does not 
apply in an action of nullity, for there the pursuer’s 
argument is that there is no contract; but this 
distinction is illusory: it is equally valid to say 
that if two parties commit equivocal acts, by those 
very acts they impliedly submit themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the Courts of the locus on any question 
as to what those actsamount to in law. But if there 
were anything in this distinction one would have 
expected that the requirement that the defender must be 
in Scotland when cited would be present in nullity 
cases when there could,on this argument, be no 
jurisdiction ratione contractus, and would not be 
required in declarators where there could be jurisdiction 
ratione contractus. But the decisions are that presence 
in Scotland is required in declarator but not in nullity. 
Since presence in Scotland is required in declarator,
If there is any difference between declarators and 
nullities then a fortiori it should be required in 
nullities./
nullities. The principle that the defender must be 
in Scotland when cited has been affirmed after full 
consideration in two cases of declarator of marriage, 
r Wylie v. Laye 1834 12 S. 927; Murison v. lurlson 
1923 S.C. 624_J7 and it is submitted that this principle 
is good both for declarator and nullity of marriage.
Of the three cases of nullity where presence of the 
defender in Scotland was dispensed with, two were 
Outer Houses cases, and one of them / "Miller v. Peakin 
1912 1 S.L.T. 253J  was later doubted by the judge who 
decided it when he held in Murison v. Murison that 
presence in Scotland was necessary for declarators;
/~1923 S.C. at p. 647 per Lord Hunter_7 and the only 
Inner House case where jurisdiction in nullity was 
sustained without the defender being in Scotland, 
the question of jurisdiction was not fully argued, 
and Murison was not quoted,/"MacDougall v. Chitnavis 
1937 S.C. 390J
If both parties have not the same domicile our 
Courts may have jurisdiction in actions of declarator 
and nullity on the ground that the defender is domiciled 
In Scotland,/"Fie id v. Reid (O.H.) unreported, December 
29th 1905; Fraser ii, 1271; Duncan & Dykes p. 189/7 
or has. simply been resident in Scotland for more than 
40 days before the raising of the action, /"Residence 
of the defender in Scotland for more than 40 days seems 
to have been assumed to be a valid ground of jurisdiction 
in F'orrest v. Funstone 1789 Mor. 4823. Contra Fraser, 
ii 1275, 6; Duncan & Dykes p. 185_7 or even on the 
ground of prorogation of the jurisdiction,/"Tallarico v. 
The Lord Advocate 1923 S.L.T. 272; Murray v. Lindley 
1805 Mor. For. Comp. App. No. 5; Duncan & Dykes p. 190; 
Dicey p. 297; Contra Fraser Ii pp. 1276, 1294J  This 
possibility arises because jurisdiction founded ratlone 
contractus/
contractus plus service on the defender when within 
the jurisdiction is simply one method of founding 
jurisdiction In personal actions. Why should other 
methods of founding jurisdiction in personal actions 
not be equally valid? The justice of allowing our 
Courts jurisdiction when the defender Is residing here 
appears from the consideration that If the parties do 
not have the same domicile and if before jurisdiction 
can be founded rations contractus the defender must
tt>e IoC n s contractu^
be served while in ^ Scotland-, there may be no other 
jurisdiction to which the pursuer can have recourse.
But the English case which upheld jurisdiction 
when the pursuer was domiciled and resident In 
England / “White v. White 1937 P. 1117 is unsupportable - 
actor sequitur forum rei. And jurisdiction can not be 
founded on the possession of heritage or arrestment 
of moveables in Scotland because the conclusion is 
not a monetary oneA/ “£cruton v. Gray 1772 Mor. 4822J
However if the validity of the marriage affects 
rights in or succession to Scottish heritage, the 
Scots Courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action 
of declarator or nullity which Is associated with an 
action or another conclusion in the same action dealing 
with the heritable question. / "Shedden v. Patrick 1849
11 D. 1333 J
Jurisdiction In actions of separation.
The Scottish Courts have jurisdiction in actions 
of separation when the parties are domiciled in 
Scotland at the date of the raising of the action, 
even although the defender is not residing in Scotland 
and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Scottish 
Courts on any of the other usual grounds,/-"Hood v. Hood 
1897 24 R. 973; Bar pp.381, 384^/ and normally the 
Scottish Courts have no jurisdiction if the parties 
are not so domiciled. f ~Linder v. Linder (O.H.) 1904 
11 S.L.T. 777; Bar, ibid_7 The decrees of the Courts 
of the domicile in actions of separation affect status 
r Jelfs v. Jelfs (O.H.) 1939 S.L.T. 286 per Lord Keith 
at p. 290_7 an(3 are equivalent to judgments iri rem 
and are entitled to extra territorial recognition.
The Scottish Courts have also jurisdiction in 
actions of separation when the parties are resident 
in Scotland (even although domiciled elsewhere) and 
the exercise of the jurisdiction is necessary for the 
protection of one of the spouses. / “Le Mesurier v.
Le Mesurier 1895 A.C. at pp. 526, 527 and p. 531;
Jelfs v. Jelfs (O.H.) 1939 S.L.T. 286; Wingrave v. 
Wlngrave 1918 35 Sh. C t . Rep. 97_/
In Le Mesurier 7^1895 A.C. 517_7 Lord Watson in giving 
the opinion of the Court said "there are unquestionably 
other remedies for matrimonial misconduct, short of 
dissolution, which, according to the rules of the 
ius gentium, may be administered by the Courts of the 
country in which the spouses, domiciled elsewhere, are 
for the time resident. If ... the husband treats his 
wife with such a degree of cruelty as to render her 
continuance in his society intolerable, the weight of 
opinion among international jurists and the general 
practice is to the effect that the Courts of the 
residence/
residence are warranted in giving the remedy of 
judicial separation, without reference to the domicile 
of the parties" /fat pp. 526, 7; see also p. 53lJ7
Jurisdiction is only exercised on the ground of 
residence ex necessitate, and for the protection of the 
complaining spouse. Thus when a wife brought an action 
of separation for cuelty in the Scottish Courts against 
her husband who was domiciled in England but temporarily 
resident In Scotland, and the husband was on the point 
of departure for England at the time of the service of 
the summons and left three days later, the Court refused 
to exercise jurisdiction because there was no necessity 
for It to interfere: it was only when necessary that
the Courts of the residence would exercise the 
jurisdiction which properly belonged to the Courts of 
the domicile, f "Jelfs v. Jelfs (O.H.) 1959 S.L.T. 286_7 
For the Courts of the residence to interfere, the acts 
complained of would have to be committed within the 
country.
A decree granted by the Courts of the place of 
the parties1 residence is not entitled to extra­
territorial recognition, and is only effective while 
the parties are within the jurisdiction which pronounced 
it; such decrees have a purely local and temporal 
effect, and will not affect the status of the parties.
The law which our Courts will apply when they have 
jurisdiction in an action of separation whether on the 
ground of domicile, or residence ex necessitate, 
is Scots law. Cheshire p. 374; Walton p. 373J
The English cases on jurisdiction in actions of 
separation are not authoritative in Scotland. In 
England the Courts of the residence are held to have 
jurisdiction because the English Courts are bound by 
sec. 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 to apply the 
practice/
practice of the English Ecclesiastical Courts, which 
was to grant decrees of divorce £i mensa et thoro when 
the partieswtere resident in England, irrespective 
of the domicile of the parties: f ~Armytage v.
Armytage 1898 P. 178; Anghinelli v. Anghinelll 
1918 P. 247; Graham v. Graham 1923 P. 31; Sim v.
Sim 1944 P. 87~J thus in England the function of the 
Courts of the residence is not limited to interference 
Qx necessitate, the offences complained of need not 
have been committed in England,/""Armytage v. Armytage 
1898 P. 178/ and it has been opined that decrees of 
judicial separation do not affect status f ~Anghinelli 
v. Anghinelli 1918 P. 247J
Jurisdiction in Actions of Adherence 
The Scots Courts have jurisdiction In actions of 
adherence when the defender is resident in Scotland, 
r AB V. CD 1845 7 D. 556; Gordon v. Gordon 1847 9 D. 
1293. "It la not doubtful that there may be residence 
without domicile sufficient to sustain a suit for 
restitution of conjugal rights, for separation, or 
for aliment" - Le Mesurier 1895 A.C. at p. 531_7 
or when the parties have been domiciled in Scotland 
and the defender has deserted the other here and left 
the c o u n t r y , I n s t .  1, 6, 44_7
Jurisdiction in Actions of Aliment 
The Scots Courts have jurisdiction in actions 
of aliment on any ground on which there would be 
jurisdiction against the defender in an action for 
payment of a debt./"M*Neill v. M*Neill (O.H.) 1919 
2 S.L.T. 127; Bell v. Bell 22nd February 1812 F.C.; 
Walton p. 3 7 8 7  
In/
In addition, If the action is one for separation and 
aliment and the domicile of the parties is Scottish 
the Scots Courts have jurisdiction for both parts 
of the action irrespective of whether the defender 
is subject to the jurisdiction for a debt. / "Jelfs v. 
Jelfs (O.H.) 1939 S.L.T. 286; Linder v. Linder (O.H.) 
1904 11 S.L.T. 777J  It is submitted that the rule
that whatever is ancillary to a consistorial action 
follows the jurisdiction in the main part of the 
action applies here as it does in divorce. /"Contra 
Duncan & Dykes p. 183, 197J
Jurisdiction in actions of damages for breach
of contract to marry.
This type of action is In the same position, 
as regards jurisdiction, as an action on an ordinary 
contract, / "Sine lair v. Smith 22 D. 1475; Bald v. 
Dawson 1911 2 S.L.T. 459_/ anc3 action for damages 
for seduction is in the same position as one on any 
other delict. / "Buchan v. Grimaldi 1905 7 F. 917J  
Whether an action for breach of promise to marry is 
competent depends on the lex fori. If competent, 
the law to be applied depends on whether the issue 
is the existence of a valid engagement to marry, or 
the consequences which ensue from a breach. It is 
submitted that the former Is governed as regards 
capacity, formal validity and essential validity by 
the same systems of law as govern these matters in 
the case of marriage; /""Rabel i, p. 199 J
and the latter by the law of the matrimonial domicile. 
/ "Hansen v. Dixon (1906) 23 T.L.H. 56. But see Eabel,
1, pp. 199 ct
The law of the matrimonial domicile will determine 
what "separable heads of claim", if any, are allowable. 
£~ See/
£~See "Remedy - Damages11. The obiter remarks 
at the end of Hansen v. Dixon are wrong: whether
damages are due is not a matter of remedy, but of 
substance j
(A) W h e r e  t h e r e  1 b  n o  m a r r i a g e  c  o n  t  r  a  c  t
( i )  M o v e a b l e s
When there is no marriage contract the property rights of the 
spouses inter se, so far as moveables are concerned, are governed 
by the law of the domicile of the husband, There has occasionally 
been a suggestion that this rule should be stated more broadly, ard|
t h e  h u s b a n d ,  b u t ,  i f  t h e  p a r t i e s  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
i n t e n d e d  t o  s e t t l e  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  d i d  s e t t l e  t h e r e ,  
w o u l d  b e  t h a t  c o u n t r y - .  T h u s  L o r d  S h a n d  s t a t e s :  " W h e r e  t h e r e  i s  n o  
m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  b e t w e e n  s p o u s e s  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  
r e s p e c t  o f  p r o p e r t y  b e l o n g i n g  t o  e i t h e r  o r  b o t h  w i l l  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ,  o r  r a t h e r  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  d o m i c i l e ,  i . e .  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n t e n d  t o  
s e t t l e  a s  t h e i r  f u t u r e  d o m i c i l e . ”  -  C o r b e t  v .  W a d d e l l  1 8 7 9  7
I t  w i l l  o n l y  a , r i s e  w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  a  r e a l  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  i n  
w h i c h  t h e  w i f e  h a s  a  p r o p r i e t a r y  i n t e r e s t  w h i c h  s h e  s a . n  e n f o r c e  
d u r i n g  h e r  l i f e t i m e ,  b e c a u s e  o t h e r w i s e . t h e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  
s p o u s e s  b e i n g  r e g u l a t e d  b y  h i s  d o m i c i l e  f o r  t h e  t i m e  b e i n g  y  i 
s e e  p o s t  -  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  w o u l d  b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  l a w 7 o f  
h i s  d o m i c i l e  u n t i l  t h e y  w e n t  t o  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  t h e r e a f t e r  
b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  n e w  c o u n t r y  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e .  
T h u s  i f  a  w o m a n  d o m i c i l e d  i n  c o u n t r y A  m a r r i e s  a  m a n  d o m i c i l e d  i n  
c o u n t r y  B  w i t h o u t  a  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  h e r  
m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  f a l l s  t o  h i m  o r  u n d e r  h i s  i u s  m a r m t i  t  a n d  i f  s o ,  
w h a t  p r o p e r t y ,  E g e r t o n  v .  F o r b e s  N o v .  2 7 t h  1 8 1 8  P . O . ;  L a s h l e y i  v ♦  
M o r e l a n d  2 1 s t  D e c .  1 8 0 9  P . O . ;  C l a r k  v .  M e w m a r s h  1 8 3 6  F . C .  X I  
3 9 5 ;  N e w  l a n d s  v .  O h a l m e r i '  T r u s t e e s  1 8 3 2 ,  1 1  S *  0 5  J  « d  t h e
t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  s h o u l d  b e  g o v e r n e d  b
m a t r i m o n i a l • ? h i c h  w o u l d '  n o r m a l l y  b e  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f
R 0 2 0 0  a t  p .  2 0 8 .  T h i s  s e e m s  r e a s o n a b l e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  n o
. i i.
d i r e c t  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  i t .  C o n t r a  D i c e y  p .  3 9 8 ,  C h e s h i r e  p .  4 9 2
q u e s t i o n  o f  w h a t  r i g h t s  s h e  h a s  i n  a n y  p r o p e r t y  s0  f a l l i n g ,  
jT D u c h e s s  o f  B u c k i n g h a m  v .  W i n t e r b o t t o m  1851 15 I). 1129J7 t h e  
q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  g i f t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  s p o u s e s  a r e  p r o h i b i t e d ,  o r  
r e v o c a b l e ,  / ~ \ nJ a l t o n  p .  349_J? a n ( 3  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  h u s b a n d  
f o r  h i s  w i f e ’ s  a n t e n u p t i a l  d e b t s ,  /"Walton p .  350; C o n t r a  Be
G r e u c h y  v. W i l l s  1 8 7 9  4  C . P .  3 6 2  ( l e x  l o c i  c e l e b r a t i o n i s
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  s o m e  c o u n t r i e s ,  e . g .  E n g l a n d ,  
m a r r i a g e  r e v o k e s  a  p r e v i o u s  w i l l .  T h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  h e l d  t o  b e  
o n e  a s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  m a r r i a g e  o H  t h e  p a t r i m o n i a l  r i g h t s  o f  
t h e  s p o u s e s ,  a n d  a c c o r d i n g l y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  
h u s b a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  g o v e r n s .  / ~ ~ W e s t e r m a n  ’  s  
E x e c u t o r  v .  S c h w a b  1 9 0 5  8  F .  1 3 2 ;  L o u s t a l a n  v .  L o u s t a l a n  L . P .  
1 9 0 0  P .  2 1 1 _ _ 7  I f  t h a t  l a w  h a s  n o  s u c h  r u l e  a b o u t  r e v o c a t i o n  
o f  w i l l s  b y  m a r r i a g e ,  t h e  w i l l  i s  n o t  r e v o k e d ,  f ~W e s t e r m a n ’ s  
E x e c u t o r  v .  S c h w a b ;  I n  t h e  G o o d s  o f  R e i d  1 8 6 6  L . P .  1  P .  &  B. 7 4 ;  i 
I n  r e  G r o o s  1 9 0 4  P .  2 6 9 J  a n d  I f  i t  h a s ,  t h e  w i l l  i s  r e v o k e d .  
/ B a t t y e ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  B a t t y e  1 9 1 7  S . C .  3 8 5 J
S u p p o s e  t h e  h u s b a n d  c h a n g e s  h i s  d o m i c i l e  a f t e r  m a r r i a g e ,  
w i l l  t h e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  i n t e r  s e  b e  r e g u l a t e d
b y  t h e  n e w  o r  t h e  o l d  d o m i c i l e ?  W h e n  r i g h t s  a r e  c o n f e r r e d  o n  
t h e  h u s b a n d ,  . s u c h  a s  a  r u l e  t h a t  a l l  h i s  w i f e ’ s  m o v e a b l e  
p r o p e r t y  i s  a s s i g n e d  t o  h i m  b y  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  w i t h o u t  a  r e a l
c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  b e i n g  c r e a t e d  i n  w h i c h  t h e  w i f e  h a s . a  
p r o p r i e t a r y  i n t e r e s t  w h i c h  s h e  c a n  e n f o r c e  d u r i n g  h e r  l i f e t i m e ,  
t h e  a n s w e r  i s  t h e  n e w  d o m i c i l e :  t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  r i g h t s  c h a n g e
w i t h  a  c h a n g e  I n  h i s  d o m i c i l e .  B u t  w h e n  t h e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  
o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  i n t e r  s e  c a n  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  i m p l i e d  c o n t r a c t ,  
c r e a t i n g  a  r e a l  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  w i f e  h a s  a  
p r o p r i e t a r y  i n t e r e s t  w h i c h  s h e  c a n  e n f o r c e  c u r i n g  h e r  l i f e t i m e ,  
t h e  a n s w e r  i s  t h e  o l d  d o m i c i l e .  T h u s  p a r t i e s  m a r r i e d  i n  
S c o t l a n d ,  w h e r e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  w i f e ’ s  m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  w a s  
a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d  b y  t h e  m a r r i a g e - a  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  
d i d  n o t  e x i s t  i n  w h i c h  t h e  w i f e  h a d  a  p r o p r i e t a r y  i n t e r e s t  w h i c h  
s h e  c o u l d ,  e n f o r c e  d u r i n g  h e r  l i f e t i m e ;  t h e  p a r t i e s  l a t e r  b e c a m e  
d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d ;  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  a  d e p o s i t  r e c e i p t  
i n  a  S c o t c h  b a n k /
a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  c o u n t r y  B .
' r
f e l l  r a n d e r  t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  i u s  m a r i t i  o r  n o t  h a d  t o  h e  d e t e r m i n e d  
b y  t h e  l a w  o f  E n g l a n d .  ^  H a l l ' s  T r u s t e e s  v .  H a l l  1 9  R  4  I d  D *  1 0 8 7  J
OL-
S i m i l a r l y  t h e  r i g h t  t o  i u s  r e l i c t a e ^ a n d  l e g i t i m  f r o m  t h e  d e c e a s e d  
f a t h e r ’ s  e s t a t e ,  w h i c h  a r e  n o w  t h e  o n l y  r e l i c s  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  
c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s ,  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  l a v /  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s '  l a s t  d o m i c i l e :  
i f  t h e  h u s b a n d  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  t h e y  a r e  d u e  f r o m  h i s  
w h o l e  e s t a t e  w h e r e v e r  s i t u a t e d ,  o t h e r w i s e - n o t .  ^  H o g  v .  H o g  1 7 9 1  
M o r .  4 8 1 9 ,  3  P a t .  2 4 * ;  N i s b e t t  v .  N i s b e t t ’ s  T r u s t e e s  1 P 3 3  1 3  S .
3 1 7 ;  R o b i n s o n  v .  R o b i n s o n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  1 9 3 0  S . C .  ( H . L . )  9 0 ;  h a n d e r s o n  
v .  S u t h e r l a n d  1 8 9 9  1  P .  PP1  J  T h e  h u s b a n d  c a n  c h a n g e  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
f r o m  S c o t l a n d  t o  E n g l a n d ,  a n d  i f  h e  d o e s  t h e  w i f e  i s  w i t h o u t  i u s  
r e l i c t a e ■  S t e e l  v . .  S t e e l  1 8 8 8  I P  R ,  09 ^  p e r  L o r d  F r a s e r  a t  p .  9 0 4  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  a  F r e n c h  m a n  a n d  a  F r e n c h w o m a n  m a r r i e d  i n  F r a n c e  
w i t h o u t  a n y ' c o n t r a c t ,  s o  t h a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  F r e n c h  l a w  t h e i r  r i g h t s  
i n t e r  s e  a s  t o  p r o p e r t y  w e r e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  
o f  g o o d s ,  w h i c h  c o n s t i t u t e d  " a n  a c t u a l  b i n d i n g  p a r t n e r s h i p  p r o p r i e t a -
P D e  fJjju&A v. Lu^ rfca—-r 1^00 $•£ . ^  I p«-T
ry r e l a t i o n s h i p  f i x e d  b y  t h e  l a w ^  ”  j j ^ i o r d  C h a n c e l l o r  a t  p .  2 9  1  
w h e r e b y  t h e  w i f e  w a s  n o t  o n l y  e n t i t l e d  t o  h a l f  o f  t h e  c o m m o n  
p r o p e r t y  o n  t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  d e a t h ,  b u t  c o u l d  s u e  d u r i n g  t h e  s u b ­
s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i f  h e r  d o w e r  w a s  i n  d a n g e r  f o r  a  s e p a r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  e s t a t e s ;  t h e y  c a m e  t o  E n g l a n d  w h e r e  t h e y  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e ;  
t h e  h u s b a n d  l e f t  a n  E n g l i s h  w i ! H  b y  w h i c h  h e  d i s p o s e d  o f  a l l  h i s  
p r o p e r t y :  i t  w a s  h e l d  t h a t  a s  t o . m o v e a b l e  g o o d s  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  
w i f e  u n d e r  F r e n c h  m a r r i a g e  l a w  w e r e  n o t  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  c h a n g e  o f  
• d o m i c i l ^ a n d  t h a t  t h e  w i d o w  w a s  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  s h a r e  o f  h e r  h u s b ­
a n d ’ s  p e r s o n a l  e s t a t e  t o  w h i c h  s h e  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  e n t i t l e d  i f  
t h e y  h a d  r e m a i n e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  F r a n c e . *  D e  N i c o l s  v ^ C u r l i e r
A . C .  S I  ” J  .  •
T h i s  s t a t e  o f  t h e  l a w  i s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  O n  p r i n c i p l e  t h e '  
a n s w e r  s h o u l d  a l w a y s  b e  t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  i n t e i  
d e  s h o u l d  b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  d o m i c i l e  a t  
t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e .  T h e  w i f e  h s , d  i n  m i n d  w h e n  s h e  m a r r i e d  
t h a t  s h e  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  l i v e  w i t h  h i m  i n  h i s  d Q m i c i l e ,  a n d  t h a t  
t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  w o u l d  b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h a t  l a w .  T h e r e ,  i s
w i f e ' s  e s t a t e  t h a n  s h e  u n d e r s t o o d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
t h a t  h e  w o u l d  h a v e ,  a n d  t h e  c o n v e r s e  a l s o  h o l d s ,  f  M o l i n a e u s ,
C o b  i Q- .S ta tu e  j >  C t  l o n ^ u c t  Hci in  ib-U'S L o t *  I ib u S >  U u ttir ic '5  S -sv v ijtty , /I p» p • J J cd. p p .  l+e55J L
^ Q o m n c n t a r y  o n  t h e  G o  d o "  1  p i  j  T h a t  t h e  l a w  d o e s  n o t  a c c o r d  w i t h  
p r i n c i p l e  i s  d u e  t o  t w o  c o n f l i c t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  
o n  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  | o  o d s .  -
  T h e  f i r s t  w a s  L a s h l e y  v .  H o g  £  M o r .  4 6 1 9 ,  1 7 9 9  3  P a t .  # 4 7  J
w h e r e  t h e  f a c t s  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  M r .  H o g ,  a  n a t i v e  o f  S c o t l a n d ,  
a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  E n g l a n d  a n d  m a r r i e d  t h e r e .  B y  E n g l i s h  l a w  
t h e  m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  w i f e  w a s  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d  b y  j
m a r r i a g e ,  b u t  s h e  h a d  n o  r i g h t s  t o  t h i s  p r o p e r t y  e i t h e r  d u r i n g  t h e  j
l
m a r r i a g e  o r  a f t e r  h e r  h u s b a n d ' s  d e a t h .  L a t e r  M r .  H o g  r e - a c q u i r e d  h i j !  
S c o t s  d o m i c i l e .  B y  t h e  o l d  S c o t s  c o m m o n  l a w  w h i c h  a p p l i e d  a t  t h a t  j  
t i m e y t h e r e  w a s  a  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  b e t w e e n  s p o u s e s .  M a r r i a g e  
a s s i g n e d  t h e  m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  i n s o  i u r e  t o  t h e  
h u s b a n d  a s  a  f u n d  t o  b e  u n d . e r  h i s  u n c o n t r o l l e d  p o w e r  (  i u s  r n a r i t i  )  
d u r i n g  t h e  m a r r i a g e  f o r  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  ’ o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e i r  
c h i l d r e n .  I f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  w e r e  d i s s o l v e d  w i t h i n  a  y e a r  a n d  a  d a y  
a n d .  w i t h o u t  a  c h i l d  b e i n g  b o r n  t h e  p a r t i e s  w e r e  r e s t o r e d ,  a s  n e a r l y  j  
a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  t h e i r  f o r m e r  e s t a t e .  I f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  h a d  s u b s i s t e d  j 
f o r  a  y e a r  a n d  a  d a y ^  o r  a  c h i l d  h a d  b e e n  b o r n  o f  i t  w h i c h  h a d  j
b e e n  h e a r d  t o  c r y ^  t h e  f u n d  w a s  d i s t r i b u t e d  o n  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  j
t h e  m a r r i a g e  t h u s :  i f  t h e  w i f e  p r e d e c e a s e d  a n d  t h e r e  w e r e  c h i l d r e n  | 
o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  b y  t h i s  o r  a  f o r m e r  m a r r i a g e  a  t h i r d  m i g h t  g o  :
a c c o r d i n g  t o  h e r  w i l l  o r  t o  h e r  c h i l d r e n  o r  o t h e r  n e x t  o f  h i n ^ s
/
h e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  b u t  t h e  o t h e r  t w o  t h i r d s  r e m a i n e d  w i t h  t h e  
h u s b a n d  a s  h i s  o w n ,  s u b j e c t  o n l y  t o  h i s  c h i l d r e n ' s  c l a i m  f o r
l e g i t i m  o n  h i s  d e a t h ;  i f  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  o f
t h i s ,  o r  a  f o r m e r  m a r r i a g e ,  o n e  h a l f  w e n t  t o  t h e  w i f e ' s  n e x t  o f  b i n  | 
o r  l e g a t e e ^  ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  t o  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  h u s b a n d .  I f  t h e  
h u s b a n d  p r e d e c e a s e d ,  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  w i d d r w  t o o k  a  t h i r d ,  c a l l e d  i u s  
r e l i c t a e .  a  t h i r d  c a l l e d  d e a d ' s  p a r t  w e n t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d s
when the wife predeaceased the husband can not be explained except
by community of goods. It can not be explained as an incident of 
*
succession, because the husband who paid was still alive• It is 
interesting to note a comment of Lord Macna ten in De Nic<btj>s v.
^ v«ry easy
Ourlier: It is not, I think,.to see how the principle that Lord>-------------------- l\ |
Eldon £ In Hop; v. Lashley selects as the ground of his decision 
could, in the case of an English marriage and the subsequent 
acquisition of a Scotch domicile be legitimately extended so as to 
deprive the husband of his own property, and transfer it in his 
lifetime to the next of kin of : hi sjwi'fe.,f There is no need to 
"extend" Lord Eldon’s principle to decide that, because that was 
exactly what was decided in Hop v. Lashley. Mrs. Lashley claimed 
that as soon as her mother died she was entitled to a share of the 
goods in communion. She did not put forward the claim until a,fter 
her father had also died, bat that circumstance caul cl not affect 
.the basis of her claim. And in Kennedy y. Bell £ 1864 2 II* 2°7, 
and 1866 6 M, (H.L.) ~° J  children obtained payment of part of 
the goods in communionfrom their father during his lifetime, 
although he had been domiciled in Jamaica, where English law applie^ 
at the time of the marriage. — .....—   ........ '
 ------ Further, it is difficult to explain the rule that legitim
can be discharged in the antenuptial marriage contract of the 
spouses on any ground other than that legitim Is an incident of 
the matrimonial law and not the law of succession, and is derived 
from the community of goods.
The true position is that* there was community of goods in 
Scots law and Hog v* Lashley was simply a bad decision*^lt is 
binding however and because of it the unfortunate distinction which
r 11 e r i rt
was made -~eA>— tine beginning -ef this chapter has to be made. Had De 
Ficols v. Ourlier come first, the rule would probably have been 
established that all property rights of the spouses inter se 
should be regulated by the domicile of the husband at the time of 
the marriage, and ius relictae and legitim from a deceased father1s
©state being historically part of the matrimonial la?/ and relics
■of b: ■ o coum'urr1 ty of 'oo-f ooo1--1 have b -^on so regulated.
. ■ ‘ since this statutory abolition of the r if lit of the wife’ b next- 
of bin or executors to a, half or third of the goods in corenun ion 
on her predecease £ 18 Viet. c. °3 sec. 6^ and•the abolition of 
the assignation of the wife’s moveable property to the husband 
Married Women’s Property Act*1881 J the only relics of the 
Scots community of goods which are left are so similar to incid­
ents of the law of succession that they do not seem to be inapprop­
riately governed by the law of-the last domicile. Conformably to 
this attitude^ the statutory right to ius relictt and legitim 
from the estate of a deceased woman were given to the husband 
and children respectively of a woman who died domiciled in Scot­
land. Married Women’s Property Act 18pl Secs ^ A 7
Where there is no marriage contract the law of the domicile 
of the- husband at the time determines what effect divorce has 
on the property rights of the spouses as regards moveables, 
wherever situated. j^Manderson v. Sutherland 1899 1 P. 62l^ j>
If our Courts have granted a decree of divorce they will not, in an 
action for enforcement of the patrimonial rigists emanating there­
from, entertain an averment that .the domicile of the husband, is 
not Scottish ( even if that is a probable view from the pursuer’s 
averments ) while the decree of divorce stands and appeal from it 
or reduction of it is compete nt. handers on v. Sutherland, supra J 
While the law of the domicile determines whether property has 
fallen under the ius mariti, the law of the situs of the property 
determines the nature of the property and whether it is vest in 
the wife, Egerton v. Forbes 27th Nov. 1812 P.O.; Lashley v. 
Moreland 21st Dec. 1809 P.O.; Cp. Grant’s Trustees v. Ritchie’s 
Executor 1886 13 R. 646; Milligan v. Milligan 1826 4 S. 432;
Smith v. Lauder 1834 12 S. 646 J) In particular, the law of the 
situs determines -whether the property is moveable or isvr,ove»ble •
£ See infra p. J
(ii) Immoveables
The property  rights o f  the spouses as regards 
3tnmoveabl oo where there  j e no m a r r i a g e  contract ape governed 
by t h e  l e y ,  s i t u s  o f  t h e  I m m o v e a b l e s .  /~Welch v »  Torment 1 8 8 9  
1 6  B .  8 7 6 ;  B e v d  •  1 8  P .  ( I - T . L . )  7 2 _ y  F o r  example terce i s  
p a y a b l e  t o  t h e  w i d o w  of t h e  p r o p r i e t o r  o f  S c o t t i s h  l a n d s  e v e n  
w h e n  t h e  d e c e a s e d  w a s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y .  / ~1 r a i n  v .  
T r a i n 1 s  Executrix 1 8 9 9  2  F .  146__7 
p® if |rols,/~19 
half" that when a trench c o u p l e  m a r r i e d  s o  t h a t  t h e  F r e n c h  r u l e  
o f  community o f  g o o d s  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e m ,  w h i c h  t h e  E o u s e  o f  L o r d s  
s a i d  was ,fan a c t u a l  binding p a r t n e r s h i p  p r o p r i e t a r y  r e l a t i o n  
f i x e d  b y  the l a w ;11 / ~ f ) e  T f t c o l s  v .  C u r l i e r  1 9 0 0  A . C .  p e r  t h e  
L o r d  C h a n c e l l o r  at p .  2 9 J  a n d  t h e y  s u b s e q u e n t l y  b e c a m e  
d o m i c i l e d  i n  1 n r l a n d  w h e r e  the h u s b a n d  a c q u i r e d  E n g l i s h  
leaseholds, the wife w a s  e n t i t l e d  o n  h e r  h u s b a n d ' s  p r e d e c e a s e  
t o  t h e  h a l f  s h a r e  o f  t h i s  i m m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  a l l o w e d  b y  
F r e n c h  l a w ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h a t  s h e  h a d  n o  s u c h  r i g h t  u n d e r  
t h e  l e x  situs .  O n  t h e  m a r r i a g e  o f  t h e s e  F r e n c h  p e o p l e  t h e r e  
w a s  a n  i m p l i e d  c o n t r a c t  d e f i n e d  b y  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  F r e n c h  
6 o d e ,  w h i c h  h a d  t h e  s a m e  b i n d i n g  e f f e c t  a s  a n  e x p r e s s  c o n t r a c t .  
T h i s  r e s u l t  h o w e v e r  c o u l d  n o t  o c c u r  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  S c o t t i s h  
l a n d ,  f o r  e v e n ,  i f  i t  w e r e  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  I n  
r £  B e  h i  c o l s  w a s  s o u n d ,  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t  a  " c o n t r a c t 11 
r e l a t i n g  t o  l a n d  w h i c h  i s  f o r m a l l y  v a l i d  b y  t h e  l e x  l o c i  
a c t u s  i s  v a l i d ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t ' t h e  S c o t s  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
f o r m a l  w r i t i n g  f o r  a c o n t r a c t  r e l a t i n g  t o  l a n d '  n e e d  n o t  b e  
s a t i s f i e d ,  y e t  t h e  l e x  fori, S c o t s  l a w ,  w o u l d  s t i l l  g o v e r n  
a s  r e g a r d s  e v i d e n c e ,  a n d  a  c o n t r a c t  r e l a t i n g  t o  l a n d  c a n  n o t  
b e  p r o v e d  without w r i t i n g  o f  s o m e  k i n d .  T h e  s o l e m n i t y  o f  
w r i t i n g  w h i c h  i s  r e q u i r e d  b y  S c o t s  l a w  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  may n o t  be n e c e s s a r y  s i n c e  t h a t  s o l e m n i t y  i s  n o t  
r e q u i r e d  b y  F r e n c h  l a w ,  but w r i t i n g  o f  s o m e  k i n d  i s  s t i l l  
necessary to prove t h e  contract .  B u t  i n  a n y  e v e n t  t h e  
prinoiple o f  t h i s  E n g l i s h  c a s e  i s  doubtful. T h e  French 
C i v i l /
0 0  2  C h .  4 1 0  7  «  n  E n g  1  a .  s h  0 o u r t
Civil Code has no force to extend beyond the b o u n d a r i e s  o f  
France so as to affect i m m o v e a b l e  property situated in another 
country. Story concludes ’ ’ t h a t  in the case o f  a m a r r i a g e  
w i t h o u t  any express nuptial contract, the lex loci contractus 
( a s s u m i n g  t h a t  i t  furnishes a n y  just basis to imply a  tacit 
contract) will govern as to all movable property, and as to 
a l l  i m m o v e a b l e  property within that country, and as to 
p r o p e r t y  i n  other countries, it will govern movables, hut 
not i m m o v a b l e s ,  t h e  former h a v i n g  n o  situs, and t h e  latter 
b e i n g  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  l e x  r e l  s i t a e . ”  / “ S e c *  1 5 8 ;  C o n t r a  
J . l .  F a l c o n b r i d g e  1 9 5 7  L I ! I  L . Q . L .  5 4 0 _ 7
( R )  W h e r e  t h e r e  is a  m a r r i a g e  contract 
W h e n  t h e  p a r t i e s  h a v e  m a d e  a  v a l i d  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  t o  
s e t t l e  w h a t  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  s h a l l  b e ,  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
c o n t r a c t  g o v e r n s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  c o m p r e h e n d e d  i n  i t ,  n o t  
o n l y  w h e n  t h e  p a r t i e s  a r e  d o m i c i l e d  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d o m i c i l e ,  
b u t  w h e r e v e r  t h e y  m a y  b e c o m e  d o m i c i l e d ,  C l  D u n c a n  v .  C a n n a n  
1 8  B e a v .  1 2 8 ;  L e  Micols v .  C u r l i e r  1 9 0 0  A . C .  2 1  p e r  L o r d  
b r a m p t o n  a t  p .  4 6 _ _ 7  s n c  n o  matter w h e r e  i t  i s  p u t  i n  s u i t .  
f ~ A n s t r u t h e r  v .  A d a i r  1 8 3 4  2  M y  &  K .  5 1 2 _ _ 7
C a p a c i t y  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  a  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  d e p e n d s  o n  
t h e  p a r t y ’ s  d o m i c i l e .  E a c h  p a r t y  m u s t  h a v e  c a p a c i t y  b y  t h e  
l a w  o f  h i s  o r  h e r  d o m i c i l e .  / " " S e e  " C a p a c i t y  "J
A  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  I s  f o r m a l l y  v a l i d  i f  e x e c u t e d  e i t h e r  
I n  a c c o r d a n c e  with the l e x  l o c I  c o n t r a c t u s  o r  ’ ’ t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  
o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t 1 1 ,  that is t h e  l a w  w h i c h  g o v e r n s  i t s  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  essential v a l i d i t y ,  w h i c h  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  a s  
■ a f t e r m e n t i o n e d .  f ~B u s h b y  v .  R e n n i e  1 8 2 5  4  S .  1 1 0 .  S e e  
C o n t r a e t  . . .  Formal V a l i d i t y ^ /
The construotion and essential validity of a marriage contract 
Construction. In construing a contract and determining the rights
of the parties1 thereunder, the o b j e c t  i s  to a s c e r t a i n  w h a t  
t h e  parties intended, and when a  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  i n v o l v e s
a  f o r e i g n  l a w  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  l o g i c a l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t .
T h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i s  g o v e r n e d ,  a n d  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  p a r t i e s
u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r a c t  a r e  a s c e r t a i n e d ,  b y  t h e  l a w  b y  w h i c h  t h e
p a r t i e s  i n t e n d e d .  T h e  p a r t i e s ’  i n t e n t i o n  a s  t o  w h i c h  l a w
s h o u l d  a p p l y  m a y  b e  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t ,
a n d  i f  s o  t h a t  l a w  w i l l  b e  a p p l i e d .  f ~ E a r l  o f  S t a i r  v .  H e a d
1 8 4 4  6  B .  9 0 4 ;  M o n t g o m e r y  v .  Z a r i f i  1 9 1 8  S . C .  ( K . L . )  1 2 8 ;
B a y l e y  v .  J o h n s t o n e  ( O . H . )  1 9 2 8  S . N .  1 5 3 ;  D r u m m o n d  v .
B e 1 1 - I r v i n g  1 9 3 0  S . C .  7 0 4 ;  C o r b e t  v .  W a d d e l l  1 8 7 9  7  P .  2 0 0
p e r  L o r d  S h a n d  a t  p .  2 0 8 .  C o n t r a s t  C o r d o n  v .  W o r l i e  1 6 3 3
Mor. 4460_7 T w o  e x a m p l e s  m a y  b e  g i v e n  t o  show h o w  f u l l y
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  h a s -  b e e n  a p p l i e d .  F i r s t l y ,  i n  a  m a r r i a g e
c o n t r a c t  t h e r e  m a y  b e  a n  u l t i m a t e  d e s t i n a t i o n  t o  t h e  h e i r s
o r  n e x t  o f  k i n  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  o f  f u n d s  c o n t r i b u t e d
b y  t h a t  s p o u s e  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  c h i l d r e n  of
t h e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  o f  t h e  d e a t h  o f  b o t h  s p o u s e s .  S u c h  a n
in
u l t i m a t e  d e s t i n a t i o n  i s / m a n y  r e s p e c t s  l i k e  a  w i l l  b y  t h e  
p e r s o n  c o n c e r n e d ,  f ~L i s t e r ’ s  J . F .  v .  S y m e  1 9 1 4  S . C .  2 ^ 4 J  
b u t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  b e q u e s t  i s  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  b y  t h e  s a m e  
l a w  a s  t h a t  b y  w h i c h  t h e  p a r t i e s  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
c o n t r a c t  w a s  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d ,  / " " h a r l  o f  S t a i r  v .  H e a d ,  s u p r a ;  
L i s t e r ’ s  J . F .  v .  S y m e ,  s u p r a  /  S e c o n d l y ,  w h e n  t h e r e  i s  a  
d e c l a r a t i o n  i n  a  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  t h a t  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  s h o u l d  
b e  c o n s t r u e d ,  a n d  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  p a r t i e s  u n d e r  i t  r e g u l a t e d ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  c e r t a i n  l a w ,  t h a t  l a w  w i l l  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p a r t i e  
r i g h t s  u n d e r  i t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  d i v o r c e .  z ~ » °  n t g o r n e r y  v .
Zarlf1  1 9 1 8  S . C .  {  H . L . )  1 2 8 ;  D r u m m o n d  v .  B e 1 1 - I r v i n g  1 9 3 0  
S . C .  7 0 4 ;  B a y l e y  v .  J o h n s t o n e  ( O . H . )  1 9 2 8  S . N .  1 5 3 _ 7
Where the parties do not expressly state in the marriage contract
t h e  lav/ by w h i c h  they intend It t o  be c o n s t r u e d  a n d  t h e i r  r i g h t s
u n d e r  i t  t o  be g o v e r n e d ,  t h e i r  c o n t r a c t  Is g o v e r n e d  by t h e  l a v  by
w h i c h  the p a r t i e s  i m p l i e d l y  i n t e n d e d  i t  t o  be g o v e r n e d .  Thieve I s  a
presumption t h a t  t h e y  i n t e n d e d  i t  t o  be g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  of t h e
m a t r i m o n i a l  d o m i c i l e  (  w h i c h  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e o n  d e f i n e d  as the law
o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  u n l e s s
a n o t h e r
t h e  p a r t i e s  i n t e n d  t o  a n d  d o  s e t t l e  i m m e d i a t e l y  i n  4  c o u n t r y ,
when i t  i s  that c o u n t r y  C o r b e t  v .  w g d ^ e l l  1 8 7 c  7  p .  p n o  p e r  L o r d
S h a n d  a t  p .  8 O R ;  B r o w n  v. B r o w n  ( O . H . )  1 9 1 1  9  S . L . T .  ;  C o .
I n  r e  F i t z g e r a l d ,  s u r m a n  v .  F i t z g e r a l d  1 9 0 4  1  O h .  573  per C o z e n s  
H a r d y  L .  J  •  a t  p .  *83  ,  a n d  V a u g h a n  L i l l i a n s  L . J .  a t  p .  594  J  T h u s  
t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  M s  d o m i c i l e  h a s  b e e n  
h e l d  t o  e x c l u d e  t h e  l e x  r e i  s i t a e  o f  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r t y ,  B r o w n  
v. B r o w n  ( O . H . )  1 9 1 3  2  S . L . T .  3 1 4  J  ' I n  t w o  t h . C "  l a w  " - o f  t h &
d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  w a s ' - k c - l d  t o  a p p l y  w h e r e  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e
]
d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  w i f e  w a s  d i f f e r e n t ,  b u t  i n  b o t h  c a s e s  t h e r e  w a s  a  
s u p p o r t i n g  f e a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t  w a s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  
o f  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e .  E a d i e ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  H e n d e r s o n  1 9 1 9  
1  S . L . T .  3 1 4  2 5 3 ;  D u n c a n  v .  J a r m a n  1 8  B e a v .  1 8
T h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e .  l a w  of L i s  domicile a p p l i e s  I s  n o t  a  
v e r y  s t r o n g  o n e .  I t  i s  n o t  t o  b e  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  
t h a t  a  w i l l  i s  m e a n t  to b e  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d .  £ o n e  E n g l i s h  j u d g e  i n d e e d  s a i d  (  a l t h o u g h  
h i s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  n o t  a d o p t e d  )  t h a t  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i« f o r  t h e  1 e x  
l o c i  c o n t r a c t u ? ,  a " *  ~ o t  f o r  t h e  l e x  d o m i c i l i i  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  -  
C h a m b e r l a i n  v .  N a p i e r  1 9 8 0  1 5  C h .  8 1 4  p e r  H a l l  V - C .  J  T h e  o n l y  
r e p o r t e d  c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  l a d y  b e f o r e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  
t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  w e r e  d i f f e r e n t  a n d  i n  w h i c h  t h e i r  a n t e ­
n u p t i a l  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  w a s  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  n i s  
d o m i c i l e ^ h a d  t h e  s u p p o r t i n g  f e a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t  w a s  e x p r e s s e d  
i n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e .  I  E a d i e * s  T r u s t e e s  v .  
H e n d e r s o n .  s u p r a :  D u n c a n  v .  H a n n a n  j  L o s t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t e d
c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  w e r e  d i f f e r e n t  a r e  e x a m p l e s
e r a !  c i 3 u o r a ;  i
ri
C o r n e r ,  v .  - m a d d c !  ?  I n  r o  F i t z
T h e  . o t h o r  c l r c u e a t , c s ?  
w h i c h  a r e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  ?  e i t h e r  i n .  s u p p o r t  o r  r e b u t t a l  o f  t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  *  s  d o m i c i l e ,  t o  d e t e r m 1 . n o  t h e  i n . t s n t i . o n  o f  t h e  
p a r t i e s  a s  t o  t h e , . l a s  w h i c h  i s  t o  g o v e r n ,  a r e  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  l a d y  b e f o r e  m a r r i a g e ,  i f  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h a t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ,  
C o r b e t  v .  W a d d e l ,  I n  r e  F i t z g , e r a l d ,  I n  r e  B a n k e s  ,  s u p r a ,  J  t h e  
c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  t h e  t r u s t e e s  r e s i d e . ^  C o r b e t  v .  h a d d ' d  ,  s u p r a  J • 
t h e  l e g a l  l a n g u a g e  i n  v / l i i c h  t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  e x p r e s s e d ; . £  C h a m b e r l a i n  
v .  N j y p i e r ,  s u p r a  J  t h e  p l a c e  o f  e x e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  £  C o r b e t  
v.% W a d d e l ,  s u p r a ;  R a m s a y  v .  O o w a n  1 8 3 3  1 1  S .  0 ^ 7 ;  C h a m b e r l a i n  v .
N a p i e r ,  s u p r a  J  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t  c o n t a i n s  a  c l a u s e  o f  • 
c o n s e n t  t o  r e g i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  B o o h s  o f  C o u n c i l  a n d  C e s s i o n ,
C o r b e t  v .  h a d ^ e l l ,  s u p r a  J t h e  s i t u s  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  c o m p r e h e n d e d  
b y  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  i t  i s  h e r i t a g e .  £  O g i l v i e  v .
D u n d a s  1 8 8 6  2  i .  I S .  214;  C h a m b e r l a i n  v .  N a p i e r ,  B r o u n  v .  B r o w n ,  
s u p r a .  J  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a n  a n t e n u p t i a l  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  i n  S c o t s  % 
f o r m  w a s  e x e c u t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d .  T h e  l a d y  w a s  a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t s w o m a n .  
T h e  g r o o m  w a s  a  d o m i c i l e d  E n g l i s h  m a n ,  a s  w a s  h i s  f a t h e r ,  w h o  w a s  
a l s o  a  p a r t y .  T h e  t r u s t e e s  w e r e  S c o t c h .  I t  w a r  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  l a w  
o f  S c o t l a n d  h a d  t o  g o v e r n  i t s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y .
£  C o r n e t  v .  " ‘ a ^ e l  f s u p r a  j j
T h e  t r u s t 1 3  o f  t h e  h u « b ? . n d * s  * p r * r > n ? a n t ' i r  m » y  b e  « © p c s r a V i l e  f ~ o m  t h e  
t r u s t s  o f  t h e  w i f  e f  s  p r o p e r t y ,  a n d  t h u s  g o v e r n © ' *  b y  a  d i f f e r e n t  l a w .
A  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t ^ e n t e ^ s d  i n t o  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  w h e r e  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
t o o l ,  p l a c e ,  b y  a  d o m i c i l e d  E n g l i s h m a n  d e s c r i b e d  a s  r e s i d i n g  i n  
E n g l a n d  S c o t l a n d  a n d  a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t s w o m a n .  T r u s t s  w e r e  d e c l a r e d  
o f  E n g l i s h  r e a l  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  i n  E n g l i s h  f o r m ,  a n d  o f  
m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  w i f e  i n  S c o t c h  f o r m .  I t  w a s  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  
t r u s t s  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 1 s  p r o p e r t y  w e r e  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  b y  E n g l i s h  
l a w ,  a n d  t h e  t r u s t s  o f  t h e  w i f e f s  p r o p e r t y  b y  S c o t s  l a w .  ^  C h a m b e r l a i n  
v a  N a p i e r  1 8 8 0  I n  C|i.ft614 J
W h e r e  t h e  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  i s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  n o n - t e c h n i c a l  
l a n g u a g e ^ a n y  C o u r t  s e i s e d  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  w h i c h  
s p e a k s  t h a t  l a n g u a g e  m a y '  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  c o n t r a c t  f o r  i t s e l f .
O p .  t h e  r u l e  w i t h  r e g ; a r d
t o  w i l l s  p .
rConstruction of a  marriage contract includes the question whether 
J. funds or p r o p e r t y  have b . ~ - e n  assigned b;T it, but the nature o f  +he 
j: property, a s  transmissible o r  not, is t o  b e  determined b w  the l a v ;
: o f  t h e  s i t u s  o f  t h e ' p r o p e r t y .  ^ G r a n t s  T r u s t e e s  v .  R i t c h i e ’ s  E x e c u t o r
■ 1886 13 E .  643; Cp. E g c r t o n  v .  F o r b e s  27 t h .  N o v .  1812 FIC.r l a h l e y  
v #  M o r e l a n d  21st D e c .  1809 F . O . ;  M i l l i g a n  v .  M i l l i g a n  1826 4 3. 43° ;  
S m i  t h  j it*— Twnirl o r  1834 12 8. 64? J j T h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  property as 
m o v e a b l e  o r  i m m o v e a b l e ,  i s  dote r a i n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  i t s  s i t u s .
£  S e e  p. J  '
i f l s e n t i a l  v o . l i d . i t y .  T h e  s a m e  l a v /  t h a t ' g o v e r n s  t h e  construction o f  a  
m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  g o v e r n s  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y .  Under t h e  h e a d i n g  
. o f  “ e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y "'5 c o m e  s u c h  q u e s t i o n s  a s  w h e t h e r  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
c o n t r a c t  i s  r e v o c a b l e  o r  n o t ,  £  R a m s a y  v .  Q o w a n ,  S a d i e f s  T r u s t e e s  v .  
H e n d  e r s o n ,  s u u r a  Jj o r  w h e t h e r  a n  a l i m e n t a r y  l i f e r e n t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  
a  m a n  i s  a  v a l i d  p r o v i s i o n ,  f - Q o r b a t  v .  W a d d e d .  I n  r e F i t z g e r a l d ,
—| \/ali<l
s u p r a  J  w h e r e  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s ^ b y  o n e  o f  t h e  n o s s i b ?  e  
l a w s  a n d  n o t  b y  a n o t h e r ,  t h a t  i s  a n  e l e m e n t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  f i r s / f c  
l a w  b e i n g  t h e  l a w  a p p l i c a b l e  l a w ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  p a r t i e s  presumably 
d i d  n o t  i n t e n d  t o  m a k e  a n  i n v a l i d  s t i p u l a t i o n ,  a n d  a  d e e d  m u s t  b e  
c o n s t r u e d ,  u t  v a l e a t ,  m a g i s  q u a m  p e r e a t  C o r b e t  v .  W a d d e l ,  I n  r e  
F i t z g e r a l d ,  s u p r a  J
W h e r e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i c  t h e  c e v o c a b i l i t y  o f  a  m a r r i a g e  o o n ’m i c y  
a  d i s t i n c t i o n  s o m e t i m e s  h e s  t o  b e  m a d e  b e t w e e n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e
■ e s s e n t i a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  ,  i . e .  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  s u a  
n a t u r a  r e v o c a b l e ,  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  a n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  c a p a c i t y , '
o f  o n e  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  t o  r e v o k e ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r .  T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  
. i s ,  a  d m .  i  r  a  b  1  y  i  1 1  u  s  t  r  a  t  c -  d  b  y  S a w r c y  - C o o k s o n  v .  S a w r e y  - C o o k s o n f  s  
• T r u s t e e s ^  ^  1 9 ® b  8 F .  1 * 7  J  ' h e r e  . a  m i n o r  S c o t s w o m a n ,  i n  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  
o f  m a r r i a g e  w i t h  a  d o m i c i l e d  E n g l i s h m a n ,  e x e c u t e d  a  u n i l a t e r a l  
t r u s t  d e e d .  I t  w a s  h e l d  ( 1 )  f r o m  a l l  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e  d e e d  w a s  a  
S c o t s  d e e d ,  a n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  i t  w a s  s u a  n a t u r a  r e v o c a b l e
must be determined by Scots law; (8) the question whether as a 
married woman domiciled in England she had capacity t o  revoke it 
must be determined according to the law of England; (3) consequently 
an averment that by the lav; of England t h e  effect of marriage is
j _ s  t o  incapacitate a w i f e  iron revoking r i g h t s  c r e a t e d  by hc-r* by 
' a n y  u n i l a t e r a l  d e e d  i n  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  o f  m a r r i a g e  a s  r e l e v a n t ,  b u t  
t h a t  t h e  e n r u i r v  a s  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  E n g l a n d  m u s t  be l i m i t e d  t o  t i r e
f ■ '
■ Question o f  t h e  w i f e f  s  c a p a c i t y  to r e v o k e , a n d  s e - o u l  cl n o t  i n c l u d e
j  a n y  q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  r e v o c a b l e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  d e e d  i t s e l f J  T h i s
l e a s e  c a n  b e  c o n t r a s t e d  f a v o u r a b l y  w i t h  a n  E n g l i s h  d e c i s i o n  o n
similar f a c t s ,  where' the d i s t i n c t i o n  w a s  n o t  made, and t h e  whole
q u e s t i o n  t r e a t e d  a s  o n e  o f  c a p a c i t y .  £  V i d i t z  v .  0 * H a g a n  1 9 0 u  ?
O h . ’ 8 7  ( / i . C . )  O r  3 t i s e d  b y  C h e s h i r e  n .  8 1 7  J
I f  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l a w  o f  a  t n a r r i a w -  c o n t r a c t  i s  t h e  l a w  o f
c o u n t r y  B ,  a n d  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  c o u n t r y  A  i n t e r p r e t '  1  t h e  combfcspt
cf?<VS
f o r  themselves b e c a u s e  i t  d w g n o t  c o n t a i n  t e c h n i c a l  w o r d s ,  t n e  e =  
e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  s t i l l  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  l a v  o f  
c o u n t r y  B .  ^  B o e  v .  A n d e r s o n  1 8 6 2  2 4  D .  7 3 2  -  a n a l o g o u s  c a s e  o f
a  w i l l ]
The Effect of Divorce on the Property Ri ' t" of. the Spouses.
. There there is a marriage contract, tie law wiii'cl governs its 
construct'.: on and essential validity deterr'ines what effect tfee d-ivon® 
lias on the partiesf r :ghto thereunder, f fontgomery v. Zarifi 
193.8 -S.C. (H.L.) 1 P 8  ; D r uiniri on rl y . Be-1 1  - I r v i n 1 9 3 0  3 . 0 .  7 0 4 :
Ba.v 1 c:■/ v * Jol'inr tone f 0 .H •) 1038 3.7, 3 R7 : Cat? -.car t v . 9ft.th.cart 
( C . H .  )  1 9 0 4  ® S  S . L . T .  1 8 2  T - . . . . . . .
— — Where there i° no marriage contract*, the law of the domicile of 
the husband ruler as to moveables, wherever situated, and the 
lex situs as to immov•ab 1 es. J iwmdcvwon v. Sutturland 13 09 1 F.]6°] ; Cathcart v. Cathcart 1nrk4 IP S .L .T . 3
 Lord ioncreiff said in one case; f 1'.a^ dc- sor T7,. 3u.ther 1 and,
supra at p. 639 J Now, according +o our la?;, a husband cannot, 
after com ittinr adu-11ery i.n 3co11 and , deprive the wife of her 
remedy of divorce an d h e r pat r im on 1 a 1 r i 3' ts c on s e q u en t up on it 
by changing his domicile.n It is submitted that this is a wrong 
view, resuming it to be sound that our Courts have jurisdiction in 
divorce in exceptional cases, where the husband was not domiciled 
in Scotland at the time of the action, on the ground that when, the • 
husband was formerly domiciled in Scotland the wife had acquired a 
vested right to divorce , h ? coul d 1101 haie. acquired a vested * right 
to the patrimonial consequences of divorce according to Scots lav;, 
for the patrimonial consequences do not follow from, the adud tery 
but from the divorce. She may have acquired an indefeasible right to 
divorce from the Scots Courts when he as domiciled in Scotland 
and committed the adultery, but she only acquire^ the patrimonial 
rights which follow f^om divorce w h e n  she obtained the divorce, 
and then he was domiciled elsewhere• Further, Lord noncreifffS' 
dictum rests on the assumption that our law cays that legal, rights 
prestable on divorce: what our law says is- that the guilty party 
is to be treated as dead, and it is only if the guilty party did 
in fact die domiciled in Scotland that legal rights emerge.
T H E  R l t i h T o  A imu -  D u T I H h  O P  T H E  J i r O U H E O  O T H E R  T H A N  
P R O P E R T Y  R I G H T S
T h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  o v e r  h i s  w i f e  a n d  t h e  r i g h t  
o f  e i t h e r  p a r t y  t o  a d h e r e n c e  c a n  n o t  b e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h a t  
c o n f e r r e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  d o m i c i l e  n o r  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  t h a t  c o n f e r r e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e i r  r e s i d e n c e .  
l_ O p .  p a t e r n a l  p o w e r  o v e r  c h i l d r e n :  S e e  ' C u s t o d y  o f
C h i l d r e n ’ ;  E r a s e r  p .  1 8 1 8 ;  D i c e y  p .  b < ± 8 _ /  " W o u l d  a  
h u s b a n d  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  b e  p e r m i t t e d  t o  x e e p  h i s  w i f e  i n  
a n  i r o n  c a g e ,  o r  b e a t  h e r  w i t h  r o d s  o f  t h e  t h i c k n e s s  o f  a  
J u d g e ' s  f i n g e r ,  b e c a u s e  h e  h a d  m a r r i e d  h e r  i n  E n g l a n d ,  
w h e r e  i t  i s  s a i d  t h i s  m a y  b e  d o n e ? ”  o r  d o n  v  .  l y e
P e r g .  C o n s -  R e p -  A p p  -  2 7 6  p e r  L o r d  M e a d o w b a n k  a t  p .  3 6 1 J  
T H e  T e x  l o c i  c e l e b r a t i o n i s  i s  l e f t  e n t i r e l y  o u t  o f  a c c o u n t .  
T h u s  i t  w a s  n o  a n s w e r  t o  a  d e m a n d  f o r  a d h e r e n c e  w h i c h  v s a s  
v a l i d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  o f  r e s i d e n c e  a n d  o f  t h e  
m a t r i m o n i a l  d o m i c i l e  t h a t  u n d e r  t h e  l e x  l o c i  c e l e b r a t i o n i s  
t h e  p a r t i e s  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  s e p a r a t e d  u n d e r  s e n t e n c e s  
b e c a u s e  t h e  m a r r i a g e  h a d  b e e n  a  c l a n d e s t i n e  o n e •
L  H e r b e r t  v .  H e r b e r t  ( 1 8 1 9 )  2  H a g g .  C o n s .  2 6 8 ;  V » e s t l a x e ^ 3 3 _/ 
I n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  a l i m e n t  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  
s p o u s e  w h o s e  o b l i g a t i o n  i s  i n  q u e s t i o n  g o v e r n s .  /_ M a c d o n a l d  
v .  M a c d o n a l d  1 6 4 6  8  D -  8 3 0  ( l i a b i l i t y  t o  a l i m e n t  c h i l d r e n )
C p  .  A l i m e n t  o f  C h i l d r e n  J
L E G I T I M A C Y ,  L E G I T I M A T I O N  A N D  A D O P T I O N  
L E G I T I M A C Y
T o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  a  c h i l d  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  o r  n o t  
t h e r e  a r e  t w o  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  e n q u i r y .  F i r s t ,  w e r e  h i s  
p a r e n t s  l a w f u l l y  m a r r i e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  o u r  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P r i v a t e  L a w  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  h i s  b i r t h ?
I f  t h e  a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  i n  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  
t h e  c h i l d  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  a n d  n o  f u r t h e r  i n q u i r y  i s  
n e e d e d .  T h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  m u s t  b e  t e s t e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  o u r  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P r i v a t e  
L a w ,  a n d  i t  w i l l  n o t  d o  t o  s a y  t h a t  b e c a u s e  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  i s  v a l i d  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  c h i l d  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  
c h i l d ,  o r  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  p a r e n t s ,  o r  
t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r ,  t h e r e f o r e  w e  m u s t  
r e g a r d  t h e  m a r r i a g e  a s  v a l i d  a n d  t h e  c h i l d  l e g i t i m a t e ?
/ ~ S h a w  v .  G o u l d  1 8 6 8  3  E .  &  I .  A p p .  5 5 ;  I n  r e  P a i n e  
1 9 4 0  C h .  4 6  ( s e e  1 9 4 0  L . Q . R .  p .  2 3 ) J  
a l t h o u g h  s o m e  d i c t a  p o i n t  t o  s u c h  a  r u l e . / ~ F e n t o n  v .  
L i v i n g s t o n e  1 8 5 9  2 1  D .  ( H . L . )  1 0 ;  I n  r e  D o n ’ s  E s t a t e  
( 1 8 5 7 )  4  D r e w  1 9 4 ,  p e r  K i n d e r s l e y  V . C .  a t  p p .  1 9 7 ,  8 ;
I n  r e  G o o d m a n ' s  T r u s t s  ( l 8 8 l )  1 7  C h .  D .  2 6 6  p e r  
C o t t o n  L . J .  a t  p .  2 9 2 ;  C h e s h i r e  p p .  3 7 6  e t  s e q u .  _J
I f  t h e  a n s w e r  i s  i n  t h e  n e g a t i v e  t h e  s e c o n d  s t a g e  
o f  t h e  e n q u i r y  b e g i n s .  T h e  c h i l d  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
i l l e g i t i m a t e .  S o m e  c o u n t r i e s ,  e . g .  S c o t l a n d  a n d  
F r a n c e ,  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  p u t a t i v e  m a r r i a g e  
b y  w h i c h ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  p a r e n t s  m a y  n o t  b e  l a w f u l l y  
m a r r i e d ,  o w i n g ,  e . g . ,  t o  a  s u b s i s t i n g  p r i o r  m a r r i a g e  
a f f e c t i n g  o n e  o f  t h e m ,  if o n e  p a r e n t  i s  i n  b o n a  f i d e  
i g n o r a n c e  o f  t h e  i m p e d i m e n t ,  t h e  c h i l d r e n  a r e  
l e g i t i m a t e •  If t h e  p a r e n t s  a r e  n o t  m a r r i e d  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  o u r  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P r i v a t e  L a w  t h e
c h i l d r e n  a r e  l e g i t i m a t e  i f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  p u t a t i v e  
m a r r i a g e /
m a r r i a g e  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p a r e n t ’ s  
d o m i c i l e  a n d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h a t  l a w  a r e  f u l f i l l e d . / " M o o r e  v .  S a x t o n  
( 1 9 1 6 )  9 0  C o n n .  1 6 4 .  I n  S h a w  v .  G o u l d  1 8 6 8  3  I .  a n d  I. 
A p p e a l s  5 5  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  p u t a t i v e  m a r r i a g e  w a s  
r e c o g n i s e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p a r e n t s '  d o m i c i l e ,  b u t  
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h a t  
l a w  w e r e  n o t  f u l f i l l e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  i g n o r a n c e  w a s  
i g n o r a n c e  n o t  o f  f a c t  b u t  o f  l a w  -  s e e  p p .  7 9 ,  9 7 ,  -  
C p .  I n  r e  S t i r l i n g  1 9 0 8  2  C h .  3 4 4 a n d  o t h e r w i s e  a r e  
n o t  l e g i t i m a t e .  I f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o n e  p a r e n t  d i f f e r s
. vjtich
f r o m  t h a t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  ( t h a t  c a n  h a p p e n  i f  t h e  p a r e n t s  
a r e  n o t  m a r r i e d )  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  p a r e n t  
w h o  i s  i n  b o n a  f i d e  i g n o r a n c e  o f  t h e  i m p e d i m e n t  r u l e s -  
L S m i  . j  t h  V o  S m i  J  t h  1 9 1 8  1  S . L . T .  1 5 6  J  T h e  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  p a r e n t s  i n  
d e t e r m i n i n g  a  c h i l d ' s  l e g i t i m a c y  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  
d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  p u t a t i v e  m a r r i a g e  
i s  a p p l i c a b l e  o r  n o t ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  n o  g e n e r a l  r u l e  
t h a t  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  a  c h i l d  i s  t o  b e  t e s t e d  b y  t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  c h i l d ,  f i t  1 3  
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  s a y  w h a t  i s  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  
o r i g i n  o f  a  c h i l d  w h o s e  l e g i t i m a c y  i s  i n  q u e s t i o n  
b e c a u s e  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  d e p e n d s  o n  w h e t h e r  h e  
i s  l e g i t i m a t e  o r  n o t  -  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  o r i g i n  o f  a  
l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d  i s  t h a t  o f  h i s  f a t h e r  a n d  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  o r i g i n  o f  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d  i s  t h a t  o f  h i s  
m o t h e r _ 7  o r  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  p a r e n t s  o r  
o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  c h i l d ' s  b i r t h ,  
f S m i j  t h  v .  S m i j t h  1 9 1 8  1  S . L . T .  1 5 6 _ /  a s  h a s  b e e n  
s u g g e s t e d ,  f F e n t o n  v .  L i v i n g s t o n e ,  I n  r e  D o n ' s  E s t a t e ,  
I n  r e  G o o d m a n ' s  T r u s t s ,  C h e s h i r e ,  s u p r a _j 
W h a t  h a s  b e e n  s a i d  a b o v e  a p p l i e s  o n l y  t o  m a r r i a g e  a s  
w e  u n d e r s t a n d  i t .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  p o l y g a m o u s  
" i i i a r r i a g e s " /
" m a r r i a g e s " ,  i f  t h e  c h i l d r e n  a r e  l e g i t i m a t e  b y  t h e  l a w  
o f  t h e  f a t h e r ’ s  d o m i c i l e  t h e y  w i l l  b e  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  
3 u c h , ^  I n  r e  U l l e e  1 8 8 5  5 5  L . T .  ( N . S . )  7 1 1 ;  S e e d a t s
E x e c u t o r  v .  T h e  l i a s  t e r  ( S o u t h  A f r i c a n  C a s e )  1 9 1 7  
A p p .  D i v  .  S O * ; ,  1 9 3 2  4 8  L . q . R .  S 4 4 n .  a n d  S 4 9 _ _ /  a n d  o n  
t h e  d e a t h  o f  t h e i r  f a t h e r  i n t e s t a t e  e n t i t l e d  t o  
s u c c e e d  t o  h i s  e s t a t e  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  l a w  o f  
h i s  d o m i c i l e . / ~ I n  r e  A b d u l  M a J i d  B e l s a h ,  T i m e s  
n e w s p a p e r  D e c e m b e r  1 6 t h ,  1 8 t h  1 9 s 6 ,  J a n u a r y  1 4 t h ,  1 8 t h  
1 9 2 7 _ /
L E G  I T I  m A T  I  O N
A c c o r d i n g  t o  s o m e  s y s t e m s  o f  l a w  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  
c h i l d  m a y  ' b e  l e g i t i m a t e d  b y  ( l )  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  
o f  h i s  p a r e n t s  o r  ( 2 )  b y  r e c o g n i t i o n  o r  a c k n o w l e d g m e n t ,  
w h i c h  i n  m a n y  c o u n t r i e s ,  e * g »  G e r m a n y ,  I t a l y ,  
S w i t z e r l a n d  a n d  H o l l a n d  r e q u i r e s  a  f o r m a l  d e c l a r a t i o n  
a n d  a n  o r d e r  b y  a  c o m p e t e n t  a u t h o r i t y ,  b u t  i n ,  e . g .  
C a l i f o r n i a  r e q u i r e s  n o  s u c h  f o r m a l i t i e s .  /_ E . A .  i i a n n  
i n  1 9 4 1  l i V I I  L . ^ . R .  1 1  2 _ 7
n e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e
I t  i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  i f  t h e  f a t h e r  o f  t h e  
c h i l d w a s  d o m i c i l e d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  c h i l d ' s  b i r t h  
a n d  o f  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  i n  a  c o u n t r y  w h i c h  
r e c o g n i s e d  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e ,  
a n d  i f  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h a t  l a w  f o r  l e g i t i m a t i o n  
a r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  t h e  c h i l d  i s  e v e r y w h e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  
b e  l e g i t i m a t e d , ^  D a l h o u s i e  v .  M ' H o u a l l ,  M u n r o  v »  M u n r o  
1 8 4 0  1  R o b i n . 4 7  5 ;  H o e  v .  V a r d i l l  I 8 6 0  2  J .  4 3 1 ;  
M ' D o u a l l  v .  A d a i r  1 8 5 2  1 4  I ) .  5 2 5 ;  U d n y  v .  U d n y  1 8 6 9  
7  M .  ( H . L .  )  8 9 ;  A i k r n a n  v .  A i k m a n  I I I  M c Q , .  8 5 4 ;
I n  r e  G o o d m a n ’ s  T r u s t s  1 8 8 1  1 7  C h .  I ) .  2 6 6 ;  I n  R e  
H o n ' s  E s t a t e  ( 1 8 5 ? )  4  D r e w .  1 9 4 ;  I n  r e  A n d r o s  1 8 8 3  
2 < ±  C h .  D .  6 5 7 ;  E r a s e r ,  H a r e n t  a n d  C h i l d  p .  5 7 ;
a n d  i f  t h e  f a t h e r w i j s  d o m i c i l e d  a t  t h e s e  t i m e s  i n  a  
c o u n t r y  w h e r e  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  i s  
n o t  r e c o g n i s e d ,  t h e  c h i l d  c a n  n o t  b e  l e g i t i m a t e d .
L Hose v * Ho ss 1830, 4  W .  and S. 289; Fenton  v .  
Livingstone 1859 21 D. (H.L.) 10; Strathmore Peerage 
Case 6  fat. 64b; ohedden v .  i-atric-K. 5  Jr'at. 194;
E r a s e r ,  E a r e n t  a n d  C h i l d  p .  5 4 _ /  B o t h  t h e  E n g l i s h  
a n d  t h e  S c o t t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  a g r e e d  o n  t h i s  a n d  
i t  h a s  m o r e  t h a n  o n c e  b e e n  l a i d  d o w n  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  
L o r d s .  B u t  d i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  w h e n  t h e  f a t h e r  i s  
d o m i c i l e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  
b i r t h  a n d  o f  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e ,  a n d  w h e n  o n e  
c o u n t r y  r e c o g n i s e s  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  d o e s  n o t  r e c o g n i s e  
l e g i t i m a t i o n .  T h e  p o i n t  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  d i r e c t l y  
d e c i d e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  o r  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  b u t  t h e r e  
a r e  s t r o n g  i n d i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  S c o t s  c a s e s  t o  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e f f e c t ,  a n d  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  
r u l e  W h e n  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  i s  d i f f e r e n t
a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  b i r t h  a n d  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i t  i s  h i s  
d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  l a t t e r  t i m e  w h i c h  c o u n t s  a n d  a  c h i l d  
i s  l e g i t i m a t e d  i f  l e g i t i m a t i o n  p e r  s u b s e q u e n s  m a t r i m o n i u m  
o c c u r s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  d o m i c i l e  a t  
t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  a n d  o t h e r w i s e  i s  n o t  
l e g i t i m a t e d .  /  D a i h o u s i e  v .  M ' D o u a l l  a n d  M u n r o  v .  M u n r o  
1 8 4 0  R o b i n  4 7  5 ,  p e r  L . J . C .  B o y l e  a n d  L o r d s  M e a d o w b a n k ,  
E u l l e r t o n ,  J e f f r e y  a n d  C u n n i n g h a m e  a t  p .  5 0 4 ,  L o r d s  
G - l e n l e e ,  M e d w y n ,  M o n c r e i f f  a n d  C o c k b u r n  a t  p .  5 4 2 ,  L o r d  
C o r e h o u s e  a t  p p .  5 7 0  a n d  5 7 4 ,  L o r d  B r o u g h a m  a t  p .  6 1 2  
( c o n t r a  L o r d  M e d y n  a t  p .  4 8 7  a n d  L o r d  C h a n c e l l o r  
C o t t e n h a m  a t  p .  6 1 l ) ;  U d n y  v .  U d n y  1 8 6 9  7  M .  ( H . L . )  8 9  
p e r  L o r d  C h a n c e l l o r  H a t h e r i e y  a t  p .  9 4 ;  B a r  p .  4 7 4 ;  
S a v i g n y  p .  3 0 2 ;  E r a s e r ,  E a r e n t  a n d  C h i l d  p p .  6 1  a n d  62 /  
T h e  E n g l i s h  C o u r t s  h o w e v e r  d e c i d e d  t h a t  b e f o r e  a  
c h i l d  c o u l d  b e  l e g i t i m a t e d  i t s  f a t h e r  h a d  t o  b e  d o m i c i l e d  
b o t h  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  b i r t h  a n d  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i n  a  
c o u n t r y /
c o u n t r y  w h i c h  r e c o g n i s e d  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  
m a r r i a g e .  /  I n .  L ®  G o o d m a n ' s  T r u s t s  1 8 8 1  1 7  C h .  D . 2 6 6 ;
I n  r e  G r o v e  1 8 8 7  4 0  C h .  D .  2 1 6 ;  I q i  r e  W r i g h t '  s  T r u s t
( 1 8 5 9 )  2  K .  a n d  J .  5 9 5 ;  U d n y  v .  U d n y  1 8 6 9  7  M .  ( H . L . )
8 9  p e r  L o r d  C h a n c e l l o r  H a t h e r l e y  a t  p .  9 4 ;  I n  r e  
m u c k ' s  S e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  1 9 4 0  1  C h .  8 6 4 ;  D i c e y  R u l e  146 _ y  
T h i s  c u r i o u s  r u l e  i s  j u s t i f i e d  t h u s :  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y
s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  c i v i l  a n d  c a n o n  
l a w  w h i c h  a p p l i e d  t h e  f i c t i o n  t h a t  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  
c o n c e p t i o n  o r  b i r t h  o f  t h e  c h i l d  t h e  p a r e n t s  e n t e r  
i n t o  a  c o n t r a c t  t o  m a r r y  w h i c h  i s  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  t h e  
s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  a n d  t h a t  b y  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  
m a r r i a g e  t h e y  a r e  m a r r i e d  r e t r o a c t i v e l y  t o  t h e  
c o n c e p t i o n ;  t h i s  i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  d a t e  o f  
b i r t h  a  t e m p u s  i n s p i c  i e n d u m .  T h e n  i t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  a  
c h i l d  m u s t  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a t  b i r t h  f r o m  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  o f  i t s  p u t a t i v e  f a t h e r  a  c a p a c i t y  o f  b e i n g  
l e g i t i m a t e d ,  w h i c h  i s  c a r r i e d  i n t o  e f f e c t  i f  h e  i s  
l e g i t i m a t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  
d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e , a n d  m u s t  n o t  
h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a n  i n c a p a c i t y  f o r  b e i n g  l e g i t i m a t e d .
/ E . g .  I n  r e  G r o v e  ( 1 8 8 8 )  4 0  C h .  D .  2 1 6  a t  p .  2 3 3 J  
T o  a l l o w  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  
t h e  b i r t h  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  i s s u e  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  w h i c h  i s  a d o p t e d  i n  i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n ,  
d i v o r c e  a n d  m a n y  o t h e r  i s s u e s  o f  s t a t u s , n a m e l y  t h a t  
i t  i s  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  f o r  t h e  t i m e  b e i n g  
w h i c h  d e t e r m i n e s  s t a t u s ,  a n d  t h a t  i f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
c h a n g e s  t h e  l a w  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  i s s u e  o f  s t a t u s  c h a n g e s  
t o o .
A  f u r t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  l o o k i n g  o n l y  a t  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i s  g i v e n  b y  
B a r  " L e g i t i m a t i o n  o f  b a s t a r d s ,  . . . .  i s  n o t h i n g  b u t  a  
l e g a l  e q u a l i s a t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  c h i l d r e n ,  i l l e g i t i m a t e l y  
b e g o  t t e n , /
b e g o t t e n ,  w i t h  l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d r e n .  T h e  l a w  w h i c h  
r u l e s  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d r e n  m u s t  t h e r e f o r e  
r e g u l a t e  t h e  l e g i t i m a t i o n  o f  b a s t a r d s ;  a n d  a s  t h e  
f o r m e r  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  p e r s o n a l  l a v *  o f  t h e  
f a t h e r ,  t h e  l a t t e r  m u s t  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  a l s o  b y  t h e  
p e r s o n a l  l a w  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  d a t e  w h e n  t h e  f a c t  
s a i d  t o  i n f e r  l e g i t i m a t i o n  t o o k  p l a c e .  If, t h e n ,  
t h e r e  i s  a  question o f  l e g i t i m a t i o n  p e r  s u b a e q u e n s  
m a t r i m o n i u m ,  t h e  c h i l d  i s  l e g i t i m a t e ,  i f  t h a t  i s  t h e  
r e s u l t  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l  l a w  w h i c h  t h e  f a t h e r  e n j o y e d  
a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e . ”  / " B a r ,  G i l l e s p i e ’ s  
t r a n s l .  2 n d  Ed. p .  454J  As t o  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  a  c h i l d  
a c q u i r e s  a t  b i r t h  a  c a p a c i t y  o r  i n c a p a c i t y  t o  b e  
l e g i t i m a t e d  B a r  s a y s  " i t  m i g h t  a s  r e a s o n a b l y  b e  
m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  
c h i l d  i s  b o r n  f o r b a d e  m a r r i a g e s  b e t w e e n  c o u s i n s ,  a n d  
t h u s  p r o n o u n c e d  a  c h i l d  i n c a p a b l e  o f  s u c h  a  m a r r i a g e  
t h i s  c h i l d  c o u l d  n o t ,  i n  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  h i 3  o r i g i n a l  
i n c a p a c i t y ,  c o n t r a c t  a  m a r r i a g e  i n  t h a t  d e g r e e  a f t e r  
h e  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a  n e w  d o m i c i l e ,  t h e  l a w  o f  w h i c h  i s  
i g n o r a n t  o f  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n . "  /  Gillespie’s t r a n s l .  
p. 45b; G p  o  F.A. M a n n  i n  1941 LVII L.^.R. a t  p .  115,
12l /
T h e  t r u e  r e a s o n  o f  c o u r s e  f o r  t h e  E n g l i s h  C o u r t s
a d o p t i n g  t h e  r u l e  t h e y  d i d  w a s  t h e i r  r e l u c t a n c e  t o
a d m i t  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e ,  w h i c h  w a s
n o t  p a r t  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  c o m m o n  l a w ,  i n  a n y  c a s e  w h e r e
t h e  p a r t i e s  h a x |  h a d  s o m e  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  E n g l a n d .
T h e  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  n o w  c h a n g e d  i n  E n g l a n d .
S e c t i o n  1 o f  t h e  L e g i t i m a c y  A c t  1926 fl6 and 17 G e o .
5  c .  6 0 _ 7  i n t r o d u c e d  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t
m a r r i a g e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  p e r s o n s  w h o s e  f a t h e r s  w e r e  a t
t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d  o r  W a l e s ,
a n d  t h e  s a m e  A c t  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  w h e r e  t h e  p a r e n t s  o f  an
i l l e g i t i m a t e  p e r s o n  m a r r y  o r  h a v e  m a r r i e d  o n e  a n o t h e r ,  
w h e t h e r /
w h e t h e r  b e f o r e  o r  a f t e r  t h e  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  A c t ,  
a n d  t h e  f a t h e r  o f  t h e  i l l e g i t i m a t e  p e r s o n  w a s  o r — w a s  
o r  i s ,  e , t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  d o m i c i l e d  i n  a  
c o u n t r y ,  o t h e r  t h a n  E n g l a n d  o r  W a l e s ,  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  
w h i c h  t h e  i l l e g i t i m a t e  p e r s o n  b e c a m e  l e g i t i m a t e d  b y  
v i r t u e  o f  s u c h  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e ,  t h a t  p e r s o n ,  i f  
l i v i n g ,  s h a l l  i n  E n g l a n d  a n d  W a l e s  b e  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  
h a v i n g  b e e n  s o  l e g i t i m a t e d  f r o m  t h e  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  
t h e  A c t  o r  f r o m  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  w h i c h e v e r  
l a s t  h a p p e n s ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h a t  h i s  f a t h e r  w a s  
n o t  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  b i r t h  o f  s u c h  p e r s o n  d o m i c i l e d  
i n  a  c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  
m a r r i a g e  w a s  p e r m i t t e d  b y  l a w .  /  S e c  8  ( l ) _ y  T h i s  
A c t  c i o e s  n o t  a p p l y  t o  S c o t l a n d .  T h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  h a s  
r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  t h e  s o u n d e s t  r u l e  i s  t o  l o o k  o n l y  a t  
t h e  f a t h e r ’ s  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e -  
h o w  i t  m a y  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h  c a s e s  b e f o r e  t h e  
L e g i t i m a c y  A c t  1 9 2 6  a r e  p e r s u a s i v e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  
S c o t l a n d  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  a t  c o m m o n  l a w  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  b o t h  t i m e s  m u s t  c o n c u r ;  t h i s  r u l e  
h a s  b e e n  a l t e r e d  b y  s t a t u t e  i n  E n g l a n d ,  b u t ,  i t  m a y  b e  
s a i d ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  n o  s t a t u t e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  S c o t l a n d  
t o  a l t e r  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  r u l e ,  i n  S c o t l a n d  t h a t  r u l e  
r e m a i n s ,  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  
a t  b o t h  t i m e s  m u s t  c o n c u r .  / " " * C p .  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  i n  
R e  L u c k ’ s  S e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  1 9 4 0  1  O h .  8 6 4 J  
H o w e v e r  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  b e  v e r y  f o o l i s h  
f o r  o u r  C o u r t s  t o  f o l l o w  t h e s e  E n g l i s h  p r e c e d e n t s ,  
w h i c h  a r e  n o t  b i n d i n g  o n  t h e m ,  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a  r u l e  
w h i c h  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  p r i n c i p l e  a n d  i s  n o  l o n g e r  t h e  
l a w  i n  E n g l a n d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w h e n  t h e  o b i t e r  d i c t a  
i n  t h e  S c o t t i s h  c a s e s  o n  t h e  p o i n t  a r e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  
t h e  r u l e  w h i c h  a c c o r d s  w i t h  p r i n c i p l e ,  a n d  w i t h  t h e  
l a w  a s  n o w  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  o n l y  
t h e /
t h e  f a t h e r ’ s  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
c o u n t s .
L e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  r e c o g n i t i o n  o r  a c k n o w l e d g m e n t
I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  s a m e  r u l e  a p p l i e s  h e r e  
a s  i n  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  
t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  
t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o r  a c k n o w l e d g m e n t  a l o n e  g o v e r n s *  T h e r e  
a r e  n o  c a s e s  i n  b c o t x a n d  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t *  T h e r e  i s  o n e  
d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a x  i n  E n g l a n d  i n  1 9 4 0  t o  
a  d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t .  /_ I n  r e  L u c k ’ s  S e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  
1 9 4 0  1  C h .  8 6 4 V
A  d o m i c i l e d  E n g l i s h m a n  h a d  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d  
i n  C a l i f o r n i a .  L a t e r  h e  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  
C a l i f o r n i a  a n d  s i g n e d  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  h e  p u b l i c l y  
a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h e  c h i l d  a s  h i s ,  t h a t  h e  r e c e i v e d  h i m  
i n t o  h i s  h o m e  w i t h  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  h i s  w i f e ,  a n d  t h a t  
h e  i n  a l l  r e s p e c t s  t r e a t e d  h i m  a s  l e g i t i m a t e  a n d  
a d o p t e d  h i m  a s  s u c h .  B y  C a l i f o r n i a n  l a w  t h i s  o p e r a t e d  
t o  l e g i t i m a t e  h i m  f r o m  b i r t h .  I n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l  
L i r  W i l f r i d  G r e e n e  k . R .  a n d  L u x m o o r e  L . J .  ( b c o t t  L . J .  
d i s s e n t i n g )  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  c h i l d  w a s  n o t  l e g i t i m a t e d .  
T h e i r  r e a s o n i n g  w a s  t h a t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  l e g i t i m a t i o n  
o y  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  E n g l i s h  c o m m o n  
t a w 9 t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  b o t h  a t  t h e  
b i r t h  a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  h a d  
t o  p e r m i t  l e g i t i m a t i o n , a n d  t h a t  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  
r e c o g n i t i o n  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  s a m e  r u l e  
a t  c o m m o n  l a w ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  
t h e  f a t h e r  b o t h  a t  t h e  b i r t h  a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  h a d  t o  p e r m i t  l e g i t i m a t i o n ;  t h e  L e g i t i m a c y  
A c t  1 9 2 6  h a d  a l t e r e d  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e ,  a n d  h a d  p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  a l o n e  g o v e r n e d ,  b u t  t h a t  A c t  h a d  n o t  a l t e r e d
t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  a s  t o  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  
w h i c h  t h e r e f o r e  r e m a i n e d  i o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  b o t h  t i m e s  
h a s  t o  c o n c u r .
H o w e v e r  i f  w e  a r e  r i g h t  i n  s a y i n g  a b o v e  t h a t  a t  
c o m m o n  l a w  i n  S c o t l a n d  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  s u b s e q u e n t  
m a r r i a g e  i s  g o v e r n e d  s o l e l y  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  t h e n  t h e  
r e a s o n i n g  o f  I n  r e  L u c k ’ s  S e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  d o e s  n o t  
a p p l y .  F o r  S c o t l a n d  p r e s u m a b l y  t h e  r u l e  i n  r e g a r d  t o  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  b y  r e c o g n i t i o n  w i l l  b e  t h e  s a m e  a s  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  t h e  l a w  o f  
t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  
a l o n e  a p p l i e s .  T h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  a s  r e g a r d s  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  m a y  t h e r e f o r e  b e  p u t  t h u s  T h e  l a w
o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  a t  t h e  d a t e  w h e n  t h e  
a c t  o c c u r r e d  w h i c h  i s  s a i d  t o  l e g i t i m i s e  a l o n e  g o v e r n s  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  l e g i t i m a t i o n .
A d o  p t i o n
A n  a d o p t i o n  o r d e r  c a n  n o t  b e  m a d e  u n d e r  t h e  
A d o p t i o n  o f  C h i l d r e n  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t  1 9 5 0  /~20  a n d  2 1  
G e o r g e  5 ,  c .  5 7 J  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a n y  a p p l i c a n t  w h o  i s  
n o t  r e s i d e n t  a n d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  o r  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  a n y  c h i l d  w h o  i s  n o t  a  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t  a n d  s o  
r e s i d e n t .  /  S e c .  2  <5)_7 T h e r e  i s  n o  a u t h o r i t y  a s  
t o  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h i c h  a n  a d o p t i o n  o r d e r  
p r o n o u n c e d  u n d e r  a  f o r e i g n  l a w  w o u l d  b e  r e c o g n i s e d  
h e r e  a s  a  v a l i d  a d o p t i o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  i t  
w o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  v a l i d  i f  m a d e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  
o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  a d o p t e r  a n d  o f  t h e  a d o p t e d  a t  
t h e  t i m e  o f  a d o p t i o n ,  o r  ( w h e n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  
a d o p t e r  a n d  a d o p t e d  a r e  d i f f e r e n t )  i f  m a d e  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  a d o p t e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  
a n d  i f  a d o p t i o n  i n  a  s i m i l a r  m a n n e r  w a s  c o m p e t e n t  i n  
t h e /
t h e  c o u n t r y  o f  t h e  a d o p t e d ’ s  d o m i c i l e  o r  i f  t h e  
a d o p t i o n  w o u l d  b e  t h e r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  v a l i d .  / ~ C p .  P . A .
M a n n  i n  1 9 4 1  L V I I  L . q . R .  a t  p .  1 2 5 _ /
T h e  l a w  o f  t h e  a d o p t e d ’ s  d o m i c i l e  m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d -  
U n d e r  s o m e  s y s t e m s  o f  l a w  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a d o p t i o n  i s  t h a t  
t h e  c h i l d  c e a s e s  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  c h i l d  o f  i t s  r e a l  
p a r e n t s  a n d  t a k e s  t h e  s t a t u s  a n d  p a t r i m o n i a l  r i g h t s  o f  
a  c h i l d  o f  t h e  a d o p t i n g  p a r e n t s .  T h e  u s u a l  c a s e  o f
a d o p t i o n  i s  t h e  a d o p t i o n  b y  A ,  a n  e n t i r e  s t r a n g e r  t o  B ,  
o f  t h e  c h i l d  o f  B .  B o w  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s r e g a r d  t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  l e g i t i m a t e d  c h i l d ’ s  d o m i c i l e  i n  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  / ~ S e e  c o m m e n t s  o f  C o u r t  o f  A p p e l  o n  E a r w e l l  
J . ’ s  j u d g m e n t  i n  R e  L u c k ’ s  S e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  7  b e c a u s e  
t h e  c h i l u  i s  a l r e a d y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  f a t h e r  b y  t h e  
f a c t  o f  p a t e r n i t y ,  a n d  l e g i t i m a t i o n  c a n  o n l y  w o r k  t o  
t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  c h i l d ,  b u t  a d o p t i o n  m a y  i n t e r f e r e  
w i t h  t h e  w h o l e  s t a t u s  o f  a  c o m p l e t e  s t r a n g e r  a n d  m a y  
a f f e c t  t h e  c h i l d ’ s  i n t e r e s t s  e i t h e r  b e n e f i c i a l l y  o r  
a d v e r s e l y .  T h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  i n  s o m e  r e s p e c t s  s i m i l a r  
t o  m a r r i a g e ,  w h e r e  t h e  d o m i c i l i a r y  l a w  o f  b o t h  p a r t i e s  
h a 3 t o  b e  r e g a r d e d .  £~F  . A .  M a n n ,  i b i d ,  p .  1 2 4 J
T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  l e g i t i m a t i o n  a n d  a d o p t i o n
L e g i t i m a t i o n  c r e a t e s  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  l e g i t i m a c y .
T h a t  i s  i s  n o t  a  d i f f e r e n t  s t a t u s  i s  c l e a r  f r o m  E n g l i s h  
c a s e s  w h i c h  r e c o g n i s e d  l e g i t i m a t i o n  a t  a  t i m e  w h e n  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  w a s  n o t  k n o w n  t o  E n g l i s h  l a w , /  I l i  T ) o n ’  s  
E s t a t e  ( 1 8 5 7 )  4  D r e w  1 9 4 ;  I n  r e  G o o d m a n ’ s  T r u s t s  1 8 8 1  
1 7  C h .  I)* 2 6 6 ;  I n  r e  A n d r o s  1 8 8 5  2 4  C h .  D  •  6 5 7 _ 7  
a n d  w h e n  t h e r e  w a s  a  c l e a r  r u l e ,  a s  t h e r e  s t i l l  i s ,  t h a t  
C o u r t s  t a m e  n o  c o g n i s a n c e  o f  a  s t a t u s  u n k n o w n  t o  t h e i r  
o w n  l a w ,  a s  l e a s t  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t r a n s a c t i o n s  o c c u r r i n g  
w h o l l y  o r  p a r t l y  o u t w i t h  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  
c o n f e r s  t h e  u n k n o w n  s t a t u s .  / " S e e  ’ S t a t u s ’ _ /  T h e  r i g h t s  
a n d /
j g l t l m a t  i o n  
e c  o r  d i n g  t o  
j T e  l a w  o r  ~  
f i e  f a t h e r 1 s  
o m i c l l e  ~ ~
I
a n d  d u t i e s  w h i c h  a t t a c h  t o  t h e  f a t h e r  o f  a  l e g i t i m a t e d  
c h i l d ,  a n d  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r i g h t s  a n d  d u t i e s  o f  t h e  
c h i l d ,  a n d  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  o f  t h e  c h i l d  a r e  
n o t  i m m u t a b l y  f i x e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  
f a t h e r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  l e g i t i m a t i o n  b u t  c h a n g e  i f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  o r  r e s i d e n c e  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  c h a n g e s  j u s t  a s  i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  a  n o r m a l  f a t h e r  a n d  c h i l d ,  a n d  i f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  i s  c h a n g e d  t o  a  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  l e g i t i m a t i o n  i s  
u n k n o w n  t h e  r i g h t s  a n d  d u t i e s  w h i c h  a t t a c h  t o  t h e  f a t h e r  
a n d  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  w i l l  b e  t h e  s a m e  a s  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  a  n o r m a l  f a t h e r  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y .
In o n e  e x c e p t i o n a l  i n s t a n c e  f u l l  e f f e c t  i s  n o t  
g i v e n  t o  l e g i t i m a t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  f a t h e r * s  
d o m i c i l e .  I t  h a s  b e e n  h e l d  t h a t  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  s o n  o f  
a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t s m a n ,  b o r n  a b r o a d ,  w h o  w a s  l e g i t i m a t e d  b y  
t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  o f  h i s  p a r e n t s  a n d  w a s  t h u s  
c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  l e g i t i m a t e  a s  f r o m  b i r t h ,  w a s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  
not a  n a t u r a l  b o r n  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t .  T h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e
d e c i s i o n  w a s  t h a t  if a  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  r e n d e r e d  h i m  
n o t  o n l y  l e g i t i m a t e  b u t  a  n a t u r a l  b o r n  s u b j e c t  o f  His 
M a j e s t y ,  a  p a r t y  m i g h t  b e  m a d e  i n i  i n v i t u m  a  s u b j e c t  o f  
H i s  M a j e s t y .  H e  m i g h t  b e  l a w f u l l y  f i g h t i n g  a g a i n s t  t h i s  
c o u n t r y ,  b u t  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  w o u l d  m a k e  h i m  a  
t r a i t o r .  L a w  s o  a n o m a l o u s  a s  t h i s  c o u l d  n e v e r  h a v e  b e e n  
c o n t e m p l a t e d  b y  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  f ~ S h e d c e n  v .  P a t r i c k  
1854 17 D ( H . L . )  18; A b r a h a m  v .  Attorney G e n e r a l  1934- p »T7j 
L e g i t i m a t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  f a t h e r ’ s  d o m i c i l e  
w i l l  b e  r e c o g n i s e d  e v e n  w h e n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  
i m m o v e a b l e s ,  a n d  t h e  c h i l d  w o u l d  n o t  b e  l e g i t i m a t e  i f  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  l e g i t i m a c y  vifepe t e s t e d  b y  t h e  l e x  s i t u s  f ~ F e n t o n  
v *  L i v i n g s t o n e  1859 21 L. ( H . L . )  11 i s  a  d o u b t f u l  a u t h o r i t y  
t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y _ J 7  T h i s  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  p r o v i s o  t h a t  t h e  
l e x  s i t u s  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  a  r u l e  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  
t h a t /
that only persons who are legitimate in a certain manner 
can succeed. In hoe (or Birtwhistle^v . Vardill /"~1830 
2 J. 431; 1840 1 Robin 627; Cp. In re Lon 1857 3 Jur. N.S. 
1192_7 a domiciled Scotsman had an illegitimate child 
and subsequently married its mother. By Scots law this 
legitimated the child for every purpose including the 
taking of land. It was held however that the child 
could not succeed to land in England, for although his 
status was ruled by the law of the domicile and he was 
considered legitimate in England, English law as the lex 
situs ruled the question of succession to English land, 
and the English rule of succession wbs that the child, 
to succeed, had not only to be legitimate but had to be 
born in lawful wedlock. This case recognised the 
legitimation and was decided against the child only 
because of a peculiar rule in the English law of 
succession to land.
Loe v. Vardill only applied to the inheritance of 
real estate in intestacy or under a settlement in favour 
of “heirs” . It never of course applied to intestate 
succession to personalty f In re Goodman1s Trusts 1881 
17 Ch. D. 266J  or to a bequest of personalty, for a 
bequest of personalty in an English will to the children 
of a foreigner means to his legitimate children and 
“those children are legitimate whose legitimacy is 
established by the law of the father’s domicile”, f ~In re 
Andros 1883 24 Ch. 637 per Kay J. at p. 642; In re 
C-oodman’s Trusts 1881 17 Ch. B. 266_7 and it never even 
applied to a devise of realty to “children” under an 
English will. f ~In re Grey’s Trusts 1892 3 Ch. 88_7 
Further, the effect of Doe v. Vardill has now been 
almost completely removed by recent English statutes: 
firstly, Sec 45 (1) of the English Administration of 
Estates Act 1925 abolished “all existing modes, rules 
and/
and canons of descent"; /""See 1927 XLIII L.Q.P. 22;
Dicey p. 560 n. (k)// and, secondly, Section 3 (1) of 
the English Legitimacy Act 1926 provided that a 
legitimated child is entitled to take, in like manner 
as if he had been born legitimate, any interest in the 
estate of an intestate dying after the date of the 
legitimation, under any disposition coming into operation 
after the date of legitimation, or by descent under an 
entailed interest created after the date of legitimation; 
so that Loe v. Vardill only operates now in certain 
curious exceptional instances which have been allowed to 
survive./“Legitimacy Act 1926 secs. 10 (1) and 3 (3 )_7 
The position in adoption is different. Adoption 
according to our law transfers all the rights and 
liabilities as regards the custody, maintenance and 
education of the child from the real to the adopting 
parents, but it does not deprive the child of his rights 
of succession to his real parents’ estate, nor does it 
confer on him any right of succession as a child of the 
adopter. /""Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930 
20 and 21 Geo V c. 37 sec. In other countries the
adopted child becomes a child of the adopters in all 
respects including the reciprocal rights of succession 
between adoptans and adoptatus, and the adoptans may or 
may not retain a right of succession to his blood 
relations. It is submitted that a change of domicile 
subsequent to adoption should not change the effect of 
adoption to that of an adoption under the new law, but 
that the questions whether the adopted child is a 
relative of the adopter’s family and whether he remains 
a relative of his own family should be immutably governed 
by the law of the domicile of the adopting parents at the 
tirre of the adoption. Where this law says that the 
child/
child remains a relative 01 the former parents the 
child's rights of succession in the former parents' 
estate are governed by the law of the domicile of the 
former parents' at death, and the former parents' rights 
of succession in the child's estate will be those by 
the law of the domicile of the child at the date of the 
child's death, and where this law says that the child 
becomes a relative of the new parents the child's 
rights of succession will be those of his new parents' 
domicile at death, and so on. Suppose for example that 
A adopts B in France when they are domiciled there. 
According to French law the adoptatus becomes in all 
respects a child of the adoptans, including the 
reciprocal rights of succession between adoptans and 
adoptatus. A later acquires a domicile In England 
where the same view is taken of adoption as in 
Scotland, and dies there intestate. B will be 
entitled to succeed to such share of A's estate as 
the English la?; of intestacy allows a child. Another 
way of putting the matter is to say that the law of 
A's last domicile determines what class of persons - 
such as his children - are to take, while the law governing 
the adoption determines whether or not B comes within the 
class of children entitled to succeed. JT-Cp. In re 
Goodman's Trusts 1 8 8 1  1 7  Ch. I). 266_/ A  different 
solution of the question has been suggested: B is 
not entitled to succeed, because the question Is not one 
of adoption but succession to A's estate, which is to be 
governed by English law as the law of his last domicile 
and by the English municipal law of succession Not the 
English law of adoption, which, on no view of the matter 
can affect the issue •_7 children adopted abroad and 
children legitimated abroad before 1 9 2 7  are excluded.
F .A . Mann/
M a n n  i n  1 9 4 1  L V I I  L . q . R .  p p .  1 2 9  e t  s e q u .
T h i s  v i e w  r e q u i r e s  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  I n  r e  G o o d m a n *  s  
T r u s t s ,  a n d  t h e  r e s u r r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  c a s e s  w h i c h  i t  
o v e r - r u l e d .  I t  d e r i v e s  s o m e  s u p p o r t  f r o m  D o e  ( o r  
f l i r f r w h i s t l e )  v .  V a r d i l l  1 8 3 0  2  J .  4 o l ;  1 8 4 0  1  R o b i n .  
6 2 7  J
T h e  r i g h t s  a n d  p o w e r s  o f  a n  a d o p t i n g  p a r e n t  o v e r  
h i s  a d o p t e d  c h i l d  a n d  h i s  d u t i e s  o f  c a r e  a n d  a l i m e n t  
o f  t h e  c h i l d  w i l l  o f  c o u r s e  v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
a d o p t i n g  p a r e n t s  d o m i c i l e  a n d  r e s i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  t i m e  
b e i n g ,  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  n o r m a l  p a r e n t  a n d  c h i l d  
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  a n d  n o  m a t t e r  w h a t  k i n d  o f  a d o p t i o n  
i s  e n t a i l e d .
CUSTODY OE CHILDREN
T h e  c u s t o d y  o f  a  c h i l d  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  s t a t u s *
/  R a d o y e v i t c h  v .  R a d o y e v i t c h  1 9 3 0  S . C .  6 1 9  p e r  L o r d  
P r e s i d e n t  C l y d e  a t  p .  6 2 4 ;  J e l f  s  v .  J e l f s  ( 0 * H . )  1 9 3 9  
S . L . T .  2 8 6  p e r  L o r d  K e i t h  a t  p .  2 9 0 J  T h e  S c o t t i s h
C o u r t s  h a v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  c u s t o d y  
a n d  a c c e s s  w h e n  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  c h i l d  i s  S c o t t i s h  
/7 M a g u a y  v .  C a m p b e l l  1 8 8 8  1 5  R .  6 0 6 ;  F e n w i c k  v .  H a n n a h *  s  
T r s .  1 8 9 3  2 0  R .  8 4 8 J  e v e n  w h e n  t h e  c h i l d r e n  a r e  r e s i d i n g
P h  \ I v/- P h  i l i p S
o u t s i d e  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  / ^ 1 9 4 4  L X  T . L . R .  3 9 5 _ ^ 7  a n d  w h e n  
t h e y  e x e r c i s e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t h e y  a p p l y  S c o t s  l a w ,  b u t  i f  
t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  c h i l d  i s  f o r e i g n  t h e y  h a v e  n o  
j u r i s d i c  t i o n .  / ^ ~ B a r k w o r t h  v .  B a r k w o r t h  1 9 1 3  S . C .  7 5 9 J  
I n  m a k i n g  a n  o r d e r  a s  t o  c u s t o d y  t h e  S c o t s  C o u r t s  w i l l ,  
i f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  m a k e  i t  d e s i r a b l e ,  i n c l u d e  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  
t o  f o r e i g n  m a g i s t r a t e s  t o  a s s i s t  i n  t h e  c a r r y i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  
o r d e r , /  M u i r  v .  M i l l i g a n  1 8 6 8  6 m . 1 1 2 5  -  t h e  c h i l d  h a d  
b e e n  r e m o v e d  t o  a n  u n k n o w n  a d d r e s s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  o r d e r s  
o f  t h e  C o u r t _ /  T h e  C o u r t  o f  c o u r s e  w i l l ,  w i t h o u t  d e c i d i n g  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  s t a t u s ,  e n t e r t a i n  a  p r o c e s s  f o r  t h e  
d e l i v e r y  o f  a  c h i l d  r e s i d e n t  i n  S c o t l a n d  b r o u g h t  b y  a  
f a t h e r  d o m i c i l e d  a b r o a d ?  /  M a r c h e t t i  v .  M a r c h e t t i  1 9 0 1  
3 F .  8 8 8 _ J 7  o r »  i n  the  c a s e  o f  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d ,  b y  a  
m o t h e r  d o m i c i l e d  a b r o a d . / ^ G o a d b y  v .  M a c c a n d y s ,  J u l y  7 t h  
1 8 1 5  F . C . _ /  o r  b y  a n y  p e r s o n  w h o  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  c h i l d  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  o f  c u s t o d y  o f  t h e  c h i l d .  / " " T h e  
B u t e  G u a r d i a n s h i p  C a s e  1 8 6 1  4  M c ^ .  1  _ /  i f  t h e  p e r s o n  
a g a i n s t  w h o m  t h e  i j r o c e s s  i s  d i r e c t e d  o b t a i n e d  p o s s e s s i o n  
o f  t h e  c h i l d  c l a n d e s t i n e l y  o r  b y  f o r c e ,  / " M a r c h e t t i ,  s u p r a ,  
T h e  B u t e  G u a r d i a n s h i p ,  s u p r a _ _ / o r  c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  a n y  t i t l e  
t o  c u s t o d y .  /  G o a d b y  v «  m a c c a n d y s ,  s u p r a _ /  B e f o r e  o r d e r i n g  
d e l i v e r y  t h e  C o u r t  m a y  e n q u i r e  f i r s t  w h e t h e r  a n y  h a r m  e i t h e r  
p h y s i c a l l y  / “ ‘M a r c h e t t i ,  s u p r a  J  o r  p a t r i m o n i a l l y  Z _ M o n c r e i f f  
1 8 9 1  1 8  R .  1 0 2 9 J  w o u l d  r e s u l t  t o  t h e  c h i l d  b y  m a k i n g  t h e  
o r d e r /
order, and if so will refuse to order delivery 
/ ~Monoreiff, supraJ
A decree of a foreign Court on a question of 
custody or access, if that Court is the domicile of the 
parents, is a judgment _in rem, entitled to universal 
recognition, and will be given effect to by our Courts 
which will accept it as conclusive and will not enquire 
into the questions of custody and access which it has 
determined. /_ Westergaard v. Westergaard 1914 S.C. 977 ; 
Hadoyevitch v. R adoyevitch 1930 S.C. 619; The Bute 
Guardianship Case 1861 4 mc^. 1_/ The Scottish Courts 
however have the power and the duty of protecting 
children of foreign parents resident in Scotland and 
although one parent have the right to custody by a 
decree of the Courts of the domicile, if harm to the 
children is alleged the Court will order inquiry before 
enforcing that right, and in a proper case might refuse 
to enforce that right. / Westergaard, Radoyevitch, supra; 
hut see The Bute Guardianship case, supra_7 
i?or example in R adoyevitch v - Radoyevitch /~*1930 S.C. 619J  
a decree of divorce and for custody of the child of the 
marriage had been obtained in the Serbian Courts by a 
domiciled Serbian; the child, a girl of 8, was resident 
with her mother in Scotland. In a petition to the 
Court of Session by the father for custody the Court 
held that while the petitioner's right to custody of 
the child had already been settled by a competent 
Court, they were entitled before ordering delivery of 
the child, to be informed of the petitioner's arrange- 
:ments for the conveyance of the child to Serbia and 
for her reception there. The mother having subsequently 
averred that the child's health precluded her removal to 
Belgrade, the Court remitted to two doctors to report 
on this matter. Thereafter on receipt of their report,
and/
and on an undertaking "by the petitioner regarding the 
proper conveyance and maintenance of the child, the 
Court granted the prayer of the petition.
As to the paternal power which may be exercised 
over a child resident in Scotland, Bar’s opinion appears 
to be sound: "... a father or mother has no more right
of correction than is warranted by the law of their own 
home, and no more than the law of the place, in which 
it is proposed to exercise that right, permits'1
illespie’s transl. 2nd E d . p . 451J  Lord Justice
Clerk Boyle remarked in one case: "... there calnnot 
be a doubt, that, if in regard to the relation of 
parent and child, there existed in any modern state 
any institution similar to the patria potestas of that 
of Rome, the natives of such state would not be permitted 
to exercise here that which might be lawfully used as 
their privilege at home.,. And so in the case of_ guardian 
and ward." / Edmonstone v. Edmonstone 1st June 1816 F . Cj 
The Scots Courts have jurisdiction in actions for 
aliment of children on any ground on which there would 
oe jurisdiction against the defender for payment of a 
debt*/^"Macdonald v. Macdonald 1846 8 I). 850. Cp . juris­
diction for aliment in consistorial actions (q*v »)_7 
The law to be applied is the law of the domicile of the 
parent, whose obligation is in question; and the 
domicile at the time of the action, and not at the time 
of the marriage or birth of the child. /~~Macdonald, 
supra; criticised by Baty, Polarized Law p. 78_/7 
The question whether the parent has the use and enjoyment 
of his minor children's property, in addition to the 
right of administration, is also governed by the law 
of the domicile of the parent for the time being.
L G-ambier v. Gambier 1855 7 Sim. L6B__/
The Guardianship (RefugeeChildren) Act 1944 
/*"7 and 8 Geo 6 Chap. 8__/ which is to xast as long as 
the/
the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1959 /  194^ Act 
see. 5 (5)J  provides that the Secretary of State may 
appoint a guardian of any person who is for the time 
being resident in England if the ward arrived in the 
United Kingdom after 1956 in consequence of war or of 
religious, racial or political persecution, and has not 
at the time of his arrival attained the age of 16 years, 
and provided that no parent of the ward is in the United 
Kingdom and that the ward lias not attained PI years of 
age and, in the case of a female, has never been married. 
Where such a guardian is appointed he shall have the same 
powers and duties if he had been appointed guardian of 
the person of the ward by the High Court, and the 'ward 
shall be treated, for the purpose of any question arising 
in respect of the guardianship in Scotland or Northern 
Ireland, as if he were domiciled in England. ^  Sec. 1_/ 
The Secretary of State may appoint a tutor to any person 
who is. for the time being in Scotland who arrived in the 
United Kingdom after 1956 in consequence of war or of 
religious, racial or political persecution, provided 
that no parent of the child is in the United Kingdom 
and that the ward is under 14 in the case of a male and 
IP in the case of a female. Such a tutor shall have 
the same powers and duties as he would have if he had 
been appointed tutor to the pupil by the Court of Session, 
and the pupil shall be treated, for the purpose of any 
question arising in respect of the tutorship in England 
or Northern Ireland, as if he were domiciled in Scotland. 
/_ Sec. P_/
CUSTODY OF LUUATICS 
Statutory provision exists for the recapture and 
restoration to custody of lunatics in England who escape 
to Scotland or Ireland, and vice-versa / .Lunacy Act 
1890 Secs. 86 - 89_7
GUARD I AIM'SHIP Off THE PROPERTY OF 
" QHILDREn ADD LUnATICS
The Scottish Courts have jurisdiction to appoint 
factors loco tutor is or curators boni s when the ward 
is (aj domiciled in Scotland /"Murray v. Baillie 1849
(b) resident in Scotland /"Reid v. Reid 1887 24 S.L.R.
(c) has property in Scotland./"Sawyer v* Sloan 187 5 3 R. 
271; Burns 1851 14 D. 311; Donald son v. B rown 1627 Lor. 
4647; Hay 1861 2o D» 1291J  It is recognised however 
that the Courts of the domicile have the pre-eminent 
interest in this matter, and as a result an appointment 
will not be made, in the case of moveables, if a guardian 
has already been appointed in the country of the domicile* 
"I do not think the principle of International Law admits
H
of any doubt* It is quite unnecessary that a fresh 
guardian should be appointed to manage personal estate, 
even when situated in another country'1 /~Sawyer v.
Sloan per Lord President Inglis at p. 272* Contrast 
the English practice - J ohnstonev • Beattie 1843 10 Cl. 
and F . J 7 Further, the appointment of a factor or 
curator on the ground that there is property situated 
in Scotland or that the ward is resident in Scotland 
will be recalled on the subsequent appointment of a 
guardian in the domicile.Sawyer v. Sloan 187 5 3 R.271 __/ 
The appointment of a curator bonis to a domiciled 
Englishman on the ground that he vrns present in Scotland - 
when he became insane and that he had a small amount of 
property here, was in one case specifically declared to 
be an interim appointment so that embarrassment might 
not be caused in the event of proceedings being taxen 
in the domicile for the appointment of a permanent 
guardian./"Reid v. Reid, supra_7
11 D . 710;
Z B O j
A/
A person resident outwith the jurisdiction will not
t h e
he appointed a factor or curator bonis by^Scots Courts, 
/"Robertson 1846 9 D. 210; Napier 1902 IX 3.L.T. 459; 
but see Sco tt 18bl 15 I). 951J  but such a person may be 
appointed in an action of choosing curators,^ -uord 
Macdonald v. Kis Next of Kin 1864 2 M. 1194;
F ergussun v. Dormer 1870 8 m l . 426_/ or in a petition 
by a widow under the Duardianship of Infants Acts for 
the appointment of a co-tutor to act along with herself 
/~~Sim v. R o bertson 1901 5 P. 1027_/ provided that it is 
shown to be necessary or desirable to appoint a person 
resident outwith the jurisdiction and the foreigner 
prorogates the jurisdiction. In an old case it was 
held that a United States subject who was curator-in-law 
of his brother, a lunatic in Scotland, was not entitled 
to uplift sums due to the lunatic in Scotland. / "Miller 
Ve A llen 1792 Mor. 4651J
by statute / judicial Factors (Scotland) Act 1889 
52 and 55 Viet. c. 59 sec. 15__7 an official extract of 
the appointment of any judicial factor, trustee, tutor, 
curator or other person judicially appointed shall have 
throughout the british Dominions, as well out of Scotland 
as in Scotland, the full force and effect of an assignment 
or transfer, executed in legal and appropriate form, of 
all funds, property, and effects situated or invested in 
any part of the British Dominions, and belonging to or 
forming part of the estate under his charge; and all 
debtors and others holding such funds, property, or 
effects, shall be bound, on production of such official 
extract, to pay over, assign or transfer the same to 
such judicial factor, trustee, tutor, curator, or other 
person.
This will depend on the effect given to his 
appointment in the foreign country, out a Scots factor 
or curator is bound to account to the Court of Session 
for any portion of the pupil’s estate situated abroad, 
and recovered by him, either by voluntary payment made 
to him as factor or curator or by force of a title 
acquired and legal proceedings adopted in the country 
in which the funds are situated, and which may be 
necessary, either to compel payment, or to entitle him 
to receive it; and in the event of the factor being 
unable to account his cautioner is liable for his 
defalcations no matter where the property in question 
was situated. / Simpson v. Doud and Me Caul 1855 17 D . 
514; ffergU3Son v. Menzies 1850 8 S. 782_J In appointing 
a curator or factor the Court will not limit his 
authority so as to exclude property situated abroad 
even although it is said that a guardian is being 
appointed abroad so as to deal with property situated 
there./ Bari of Buchan v. Harvey 1859 2 D. 275_/
The Scots Courts will recognise the title of a* 
foreign guardian, provided that he is the guardian 
according to the law of the domicile, and, if that law 
requires appointment by the Courts, provided that he 
has been so appointed./-Seddon 19 R. 101 and 20 R . 67 5; 
E lder, .1903 5 F. 307; see also Webb v. Clelandts Trs.
1904 6 F. 274J  to moveables in Scotland belonging to 
the ward. / Ro se v. Grant 1835 7 J. 403_/ Such a 
foreign guardian can uplift moveable funds due to the 
ward, and hi3 receipt is a valid discharge. /  Ogilvy v. 
Ogilvy’s Trs. (O.K.) 1927 S.E.T. 85; Grant v. Thomson 
1855 15 S* 878, Gordon v. Earl of Stair 1835 13 S.1075; 
Seddon, Eider, supra_/ and can sue on behalf of his 
ward in reference to moveable property. /~~Gordon v.
Earl of Stair, supra; Nasmyth v. Nasmyth 1624 Mor.4455; 
Duncan/
Duncan & Dykes p. 243; contra Baynes v. B a n  of 
Sutherland 1750 1 Pat. 454, which would probably not 
be followed nowJ  As Lord President Inglis said in 
the passage quoted above, it is not necessary to 
appoint a fresh guardian here to administer rnoveable 
property here when there is a guardian appointed by 
the Courts of the domicile. /~See also Nasmyth v .
Nasmyth, supra_/ The practice is similar to that 
adopted in bankruptcy and in contrast to the position 
of executors. , where the foreign guardian has not 
been properly appointed as such oy the Courts of the 
domicile but he is the father, or presumably any other 
relative properly having custody of the children, the 
Court may order payment of income from funds in Scotland 
to the foreign guardian for behoof of the children.
Z Webb v . Clelland’s Trs. 1904 6 F. 274; Edmiston v . 
Miller ’s Trs. 1871 9 M. 987J
The position of heritage is different. /~~Sawyer v. 
Sloan 1875 3 R. 271 per Lord President Inglis at p.272J  
A foreign guardian has no right to Scotch heritage 
belonging to the ward, and if it is conveyed to him he 
cannot grant a valid discharge therefor. ' / Gordon v.
Earl of Stair 1835 13 S. 1073; Murray v. Baillie 1849 
11 D. 710; Y oung v. Thomson 1831 9 S. 920; Allen v. 
Robertson 1855 18 D. 97; Ogilvy v . Ogilvy’s Trs. (Q.H.) 
1927 S.L.T. 83J  The practice is to make another 
appointment in Scotland caf a factor loco tutoris or a 
curator bonis to deal with the Scotch heritage./ Ogilvy 
Vo Qgilvy’s Trs. supra; Fraser, Parent and Child p.750_/ 
This factor or curator will not be the guardian appointed 
by the domicile since our Courts only appoint persons 
to be factors or curators who are resident in Scotland 
and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Scots Courts. 
This factor or curator may, in a petition at the foreign 
guardians/
guardian’s instance, be authorised to pay income to 
the foreign guardian for the upkeep of the ward.
/~Murray v. Baillie, Allen v. Robertson, supra_J7
In McFadzean’s case / 1917 S.C. 142_J7 a petition 
was presented to the nooiie officium by a person 
domiciled in Alberta, Canada, as guardian and admini3- 
:trator-in-law of his pupil son who resided with him, 
for authority to complete a title in the pupil’s name 
to heritage in Scotland which had become the pupil’s 
through the death, intestate, of his mother. The 
heritage was a one-sixth share of property for which 
an offer.had been received and which the co-owners 
wanted to sell and which it was expedient to sell.
The father wanted authority to complete title and sell. 
The Court, on production of evidence that the petitioner 
had been duly appointed guardian and administrator-in­
law according to the law of Alberta, and that he was a
person of substantial means, granted the prayer of the
petition. This was a commonsense view in the 
circumstances, but a stricter attitude would have been 
to appoint a factor loco tutoris and give him power to 
sell. Another method would have been to have the 
Albertan Court make an order that the sale was expedient 
and the Court of Session would have assisted in carrying 
out this order, as is done in trust petitions.
/""Allan’s Trs. 1897 24 R. 718; Pender’s Trs. 1903 5 F.
504; Harris’s Trs. 1919 S.C. 432J  
The powers of a guardian as regards moveables are 
governed by the law of the country which appointed him; 
and^by the law of the place where the property in 
question is situated, /~~Morison 1901 4 P. 144 (contrast 
Mathieson 1857 19 I). 917) Contra Dicey p. 574J  and 
his privileges and liabilities will be determined by 
the law of the country which appointed him. Section 
131/
131 (3) of the English Lunacy Act 189G enacts that a 
curator bonis appointed to a lunatic in Scotland who 
has personal property in England, "shall have all the 
same powers as to such property .... as might be 
exercised by the Committee of the estate of a lunatic” 
in England, but this enactment has been treated by the 
Court of Session as not only unnecessary, but as failing 
to express the full powers which a curator boni3 has 
over property in England, and the Court of Session has 
held that a curator bonis has powers of sale of sale 
of moveable property in England greater than those 
given in England to the committee of the lunatic, the 
extent of the power being determined by Scots law, the 
law of the Court which appointed him. / Morison, supra_J 
The same Act provides that the English or Irish committee 
of the estate of a lunatic who has property in Scotland 
shall have all the same powers as to such property as 
might be exercised by a tutor at law after cognition 
or a duly appointed curator bonis to a person of unsound 
mind in Scotland. But this Act only extends to 
England, and if Morison /~supra_/ is correct our Courts 
should hold that, notwithstanding the enactment, the 
powers of an English and Irish committee in Scotland 
are merely those of an English or Irish committee- 
The enactment may be regarded as extending the committee’s 
title to funds in Scotland but not as enlarging his 
powers over such funds to an extent which he does not 
have over funds in England-
The powers of a foreign father over the moveable 
property of his child will be those which the law of 
his domicile gives him. /"Eraser, Parent and Child 
p. 731_y
Since there must always be^Scots factor or 
curator to deal with Scots heritage, no conflict arises 
in regard to powers here, the powers of the Scots 
factor/
factor or curator being those of Scots law. / Young v. 
Thomson 9 S. 9LO is a curious misunderstanding of the 
principles of this department of the law J The powers 
of a foreign father over the Scots heritage of his 
chixd will be those of Scots law £  Eraser, Parent and 
Child p . 7 b<:_/
the .juris di ct1..or of scottfch 0ou~t«
jquestration way be awardee* by the Scottish Gourts in t.h« following 
jpcum stances --
iiret, itx t.ne o«,a0 of a living debtor subject to the jurisdic­
tion of the supreme Courts of Scotland:
(ilj On bit* own oetition, with tn« concurrence of a sufficient cred­
itor;
J Qn +b a r>rti t * or' of » «uf ficien+i c^edi +or» ■pr,o vidod deb+or
notour banlrru.pt, and have within a "ear before the da*© o p the 
presentation oA t^e tlon resided or boh a duelling bouse
or *lae= of i- oco*ln.r-1* ( s~<? Gairdner v. Ma«Arthnr 'O.K.'
-l ' " ...
1918 2 o .L # x • IP1* | or i n t . h o  / ■ » /%f* n  © 0 7 r t r t s . r u ’' t°1r,,T b ?3;7'f'’'wui''‘+ '
if it had within such tin© carried on business in Scotland, end any
partner had so r*esiied or had a duelling hou»e or if th° company
have had a place of* business in Scotland.
second,in the case of a deceased. debtor who at the date of his
death was subject to the jurisdiotionof the supreme Courts of
Scotland;
(a ) un the petition of a mandatory to whom he has granted a mandate 
to apply for sequestrationj
(B) On the petition of a sufficient creditor. |f Bankruptcy(Scotland)
Act lalb sec. 11 . bee. lb of the Bankruptcy Act of 1856 is in
the same terms, so decisions under it are still valid^J
’"Subject to the supreme (Jourts of scot land" means subject in
respect of residence within the jurisdiction "or at lecrt forty
daysjjoel v .ui11 1859 21 Q.929^ by the poccession of boots heritage,
fuoel v. w i n ,  supra) Groll 1863 1 m.fosj or by carrying on business
at some definite place in hootland.jwou&y^ lisj The ground* of
limited jurisdiction, such as is founded by arreutment, jjOroil,
supra; joel v. 6111.surra, per n.«i .Ganglia at p.93sj reconvention,
or ratione contractus.^ L.J*C. Inglis, ibidj do not suffice for
award of sequestration. That the debtor is in Scotland io also
insufficient if he is resident abroad and has no heritage here 
^  Strickland (G.E.) 1911 1 S.L*T. 212 J
an
T h e  U n i t y  a n d  U n i v e r s a l i t y  o f b a n k r u p t c y
B a n k r u p t c y  o r  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  i s  a ,  l e g a l  p r o c e s s  w h e r e b y  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  a n  i n s o l v e n t  p e r s o n  i s  v e s t e d  i n  a  t r u s t e e  f o r  
b e h o o f  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s .  B a n k r u p t c y  i n  m o s t  f o r e i s n  c o u n t r i e s  
h a s  t h e  s a m e  e f f e c t  a s  h e r e ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  t h e  w h o l e  m o v e a b l e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t ,  w h e r e v e r  s i t u a t e d ,  i s  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  
t r u s t e e .  f  G o e t z e  &  S o h n  v .  A d e r s  1 8 7 4  2  R .  1 * 0 ;  B a r  p p .  1 0 1 1  
e t  s e q u . *  I n  t h e  U . S .  h o w e v e r  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  r u l e  i s  t h a t  a n  
a s s i , j i m e n t  u n d e r  a  s t a t e  i n s o l v e n t  l a w  o p e r a t e s  o n l y  u p o n  
p r o p e r t y  w i t h i n  t h a t  s t a t e  -  C h e s h i r e  p .  4 7 8 ,  B e a l e  p .  f  
I t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  o n l y  o n e  b a n k -  
r u p t . c y 7  a n d  t h a t  i t s  e f f e c t  s h o u l d  b e  r e c o g n i s e d  i n  e v e r y  c o u n t r y .  
T h e s e  t w o  d e s i d e r a t a  h a v e  b e e n  c a l l e d  t h e  u n i t y  a n d  u n i v e r s a l i t y  
o f  b a n k r u p t c y .  I n  S c o t l a n d  t h e  u n i t y  a n d  u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  b a n k ­
r u p t c y  a r e  b o t h  r e c o g n i s e d  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t , ,  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t ­
i o n a l  L a w  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  a l t h o u g h  i n c o m p l e t e  i n
p a r t s  t h r o u p h  l a c k  o f  j u d i c i a l  p r e c e d e n t ,  i s  g e n e r a l l y  s a t i s ­
f a c t o r y  a n d  c o n s i s t e n t .  T h e  p o s i t i o n  i s  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  
E n g l a n d ,  w h e r e  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  b u t
T w o  m e t h o d s  o f  s e c u r i n g  t h e  u n i t y  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  h a v e  b e e n  
a d v o c a t e d :  f i r s t ,  b a n k r u p t c y  c a n  o n l y  b e  d e c l a r e d  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  
o f  t h e  d e b t o r ' s  d o m i c i l e ;  s e c o n d ,  t h e  r u l e  6 f  s u b m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  
c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  b a n k r u p t c y  w a s  f i r s t  d e c l a r e d .  T h e  f i r s t  
v i e w  h a s  b e e n  a d v o c a t e d  b y  j u r i s t s ,  Z B a r  p .  1 0 1 7 ;  S a v i n g y  p .
c a s e s  w h i c h  m i g h t  g i v e  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  
r e c o g n i s e d  h e ^ e .  F o r  e x a m p l e  -
" T h e  g r e a t  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  m o v e a b l e s  f o l l o w  t h e  l a v ;  o f  t h e  
o w n e r ' s  d o m i c i l e  i s  n o t  m o r e  f i r m l y  s e t t l e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  i n t ­
e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n  t h a n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  b a n k r u p t c y .  H e n c e ,  w h e n ­
e v e r  t n e  C o u r t  o f  t u e  d o m i c i l e  h a s  b y  p r o c e e d i n g s  i n  b a n k r u p t c y  
v e s t e d  t h e  m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e  i n  a  t r u s t e e  o r  a s s i g n e e  f o r  t h e
n o t  t h e  u n i t y  o f  b a n k r u p t c y .  £  C h e s h i r e  p .  4 7 8 ' ;  X I X  L . Q . R .  2 9 *
T h e  U n i t y  o f  B a n k r u p t c y
s o m e  e q u i v o c a l  p a s s a g e s  i n  s o m e  o f  t h e  S c o t s
4-.
p u r p o s e  o f  e q u a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a m o n £  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  n o  p a r t  o f  t h e  
o v e a b l e  e s t a t e ,  w h e r e s o e v e r  s i t u a t e d ,  c a n  b e  t o u c h e d  o f  a f f e c t e d  
s X O e p t  t h r o u j i  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  p r o c e e d i n g s  a n d  b y  t h e  o r d e r s  o f  
t h e  C o u r t  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  t h o s e  p r o c e e d i n g s  t a k e  p l a c e ,  
f n e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h a t  C o u r t  i s  e x c l u s i v e . "  ^ P h o s p h a t e  S e w a g e  
g o .  v ^ . L a w s o n ^ s J g r i i s t ^  1 3 7 8  P  R .  112 * ,  p e r  I d .  P r e s .  I n g l i s  
a t  p .  1 1 3 8  J  -  _ _ _  .
?—  " S u p p o s e  a  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  b e  i s s u e d  a g a i n s t  a  m a n  n o t  d o m i c ­
i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  t h i s  c a n n o t  r e c e i v e  e f f e c t  i n  E n g l a n d ;  a n d  i n  
t h e  s a m e  m a n n e r ,  a l t h o u g h  a  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  b e  e v e r  s o  
f a i r l y  o b t a i n e d ,  y e t  i f  i t  b e  p r o d u c e d  h e r e ,  a n d  w e  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  
t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  w a s  n o t  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d  b u t  i n  S c o t l a n d  I  
s h o u l d  h o l d ,  i n  t h a t  c a s e ,  t h a t  w e  a r e  n o t  b o u n d  t o  g i v e  e f f e c t  
t o  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n . "  £  R o y a l  B a n k  v .  S c o t t  S m i t h  S t e i n & C o ,  B u c h a n a n  
3 2 0 ,  p e r  L o r d  ^ a r m a t y n e  a t  p .  3 3 8 .  O p .  u o r d  w o b e r t s o n .  20 t h  J a n .
18 l o  jp • u  * jl
- £ h e » e  d i c t a  a r e  v e r y  m i s l e a d i n g ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  
j c o t e  l a > »  d o e s  n o t  t e s t  t n e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a  f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  
b y  w h e t h e r  t h e  d e b t o r  w a s  d o ^ i c i l ^ d  i n  t h e  c o u n t r T r  w h i c h  a w a r d e d  
i t . .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  o u r  C o u r t s  a w a r d ,  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  u n d e r  t i e  
b a n k r u p t c y  s t a t u t e s  w h e n  t h e  d e b t o r  i s  n o t  d o m i c i l e d  h e r ^ j k n d L  I t  
h a s  b e e n  h e l d  u n d e r  t h e * * ©  s t a t u t e s  t h a t  t h e  m e r e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
d e b t o r  I s  d o m i c i l e ' 5  h e r e  I s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  w a r r a n t  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
w h e n  h e  i s  n o t  o t h e r w i s e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  £  S t r i c k ­
l a n d  1 9 1 1  1  S . L . T .  2 1 2  J  S e c o n d l y ,  o u r  C o u r t s  r e c o g n i s e  a n d  g i v e  
e f f e c t  t o  f o r e i g n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n s  o f  d o m i c i l e d .  S c o t s m e n .  £  O b e r s  
v .  P a t o n £  T r s .  2 v  E .  719 J  T h e  w o r d  " d o m i c i l e "  i n t h e  a b o v e  p a s s a g e s  
d o e s  n o t  m e a n  " d o m i c i l e  o f  s u c c e s s i o n "  b u t  s i m p l y  "  f o r e n s i c  
d o m i c i l e " .  ^  Q b e r s  v .  P a t o n f s  T r s .  s u p r a ,  p e r  I d .  p r e s .  R o b e r t s o n  ,  
a t  p .  7 i &  J T h e  v e r y  m i s l e a d i n g  w o r d s  o f  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  
w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  q u o t e d  s h o u l d  b e  r e a d  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  w h a t  h e  
s a i d  i n  a  p r e v i o u s  c a s e :  " I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  " d o m i c i l e "  
a s  u s e d  b y  a l l  j u r i s t s  i n  t h i s  b r a n c h  o f  t h e  l a w ,  m e a n s  n o  m o r e  
t h a n  t h e  p l a c e  o f  r e s i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  t i m e ,  w h e t h e r  p e r m a n e n t  o r  
t e m p o r a r y  . . . .  T h e r e  i s  n o  q u e s t i o n  o f  s t a t u s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  
p r o c e e d i n g s .  ^ P Q l  v »  G - i  1 f  l | p *9  ^  P P *  9 3 8 ;  9  J ______
U n i t y  i n  b a n k r u p t c y  i s  s e c u r e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  n o t  b y  a p p l y i n g  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  d o m i c i l e ,  b u t  b y  a p p l y i n g  t h e  r u l e  o f  p r i o r i t y .
W h e n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  a w a r d e d  a b r o a d  a n d  t h e  w h o l e  m o v e -
\
a b l e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t  w h e r e v e r  s i t u a t e d  v e s t e d  i n  a  
f o r e i g n  t r u s t e e ,  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  b e  g r a n t e d  h e r e ,  e v e n  
i f  t h e r e  i s  p r o p e r t y  h e r e ,  a n d  e v e n  I f  t h e  p e r s o n  w h o  i s  
p e t i t i o n i n g ;  i s  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r u s t e e .  / ~ G o e t z e  &  S o h n  v .  A d e r s  
1 8 7 4  2  R .  1 5 0 ;  R o y a l  D a n k  v .  S c o t t  S m i t h  S t e i n  &  C o .  2 0 t h  
J a n u a r y  1 8 1 3  F . C . ;  G i b s o n  v .  Y u n r o  1 8 9 4  2 1  B .  8 4 0  p e r  L o r d s  
K I n c a i r n e y  a n d  Y o u n g ;  Q u e e n s l a n d  M e r c a n t i l e  G o .  v .
A u s t r a l a s i a n  I n v e s t m e n t  G o .  1 8 8 8  2 5  B .  9 3 5  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  
I n g l i s _ 7  S e c t i o n  1 6  o f  t h e  B a n k r u p t c y  ( S c o t l a n d . )  A c t  1 9 1 3  ■  
p r o v i d e s  t h a t  " n o  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  s h a l l  b e  a w a r d e d  b y  a n y  C o u r t  
a f t e r  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  a  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  h a s  a l r e a d y  
b e e n  a w a r d e d ,  i n  a n o t h e r  C o u r t  a n d  i s  s t i l l  u n d i s c h a r g e d " ,  
b u t  f r o m  t h e  c o n t e x t  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  a  
s e q u e s t r a t i o n  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  a w a r d e d  i n  a n o t h e r  C o u r t  i n  
S c o t l a n d .  T h e  s a m e  w o r d s  a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  1 8 5 6  A c t  ( S e c t i o n  1 8 )  
a n d  w e r e  n o t  r e l i e d  o n  i n  t h e  j u d g e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o u r t  i n  t h e  
l e a d i n g  c a s e  w h i c h  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  p r i o r i t y ,  
n a m e l y  G o e t z e  J  S o h n  v .  A d e r s .  T h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e  j u d g m e n t  w a s  
t h a t  n o  p a r t i a l  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  c o u l d  b e  a w a r d e d  u n d e r  t h e  
B a n k r u p t c y  A c t s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  c o u l d ,  o n l y  g r a n t  a  
u n i v e r s a l  t i t l e  c o - e x t e n s i v e  w i t h  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  g r a n t e d  t o  
t h e  f o r e i g n  t r u s t e e  a n d  w h i c h  w o u l d  c o m p e t e  w i t h  i t .  T h i s  
w o u l d  b e  a n  i m p o s s i b l e  p o s i t i o n  a n d  w o u l d ,  b e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w .  / ~ ~ C p .  T h e  r a t i o  
o f  B a n k  o f  S c o t l a n d  v .  Y o u d e  ( O . H . )  1 9 0 8  1 5  S . L . T .  8 4 7 J
O u r  C o u r t s  a r e  s o  u n f a v o u r a b l e  t o  c o n c u r r e n t  b a n k r u p t c i e s
\
t h a t  w h e n  a  p e t i t i o n  w a s  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
e s t a t e s  o f  a  p e r s o n  w h o  h a d  b e e n  d e c l a r e d  b a n k r u p t  i n  V i c t o r i a ,  
e v e n  t h o u g h ,  t h e  E n g l i s h  B a n k r u p t c y  A c t  1 8 6 1  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  i f  
a n y  p e r s o n  h a d  b e e n  d e c l a r e d ,  b a n k r u p t  i n  I n d i a  o r  a n y  o f  t h e  
c o l o n i e s  a n d  p o s s e s s e d  p r o p e r t y  i n  E n g l a n d  S c o t l a n d  o r  I r e l a n d  
o r /
o r  i n  a n y  c o l o n y  i t  s h a l l  h e  l a w f u l  f o r  t h e  t r u s t e e  t o  a p p l y  
f o r  a n d  o b t a i n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  C o u r t  i n  
E n g l a n d  S c o t l a n d  o r  I r e l a n d  o r  t h e  C o l o n y ,  t h e  C o u r t  o p i n e d ,  
w h i l e  d i s p o s i n g  o f  t h e  p e t i t i o n  f o r  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o n  o t h e r  
g r o u n d s ,  t h a t  i t  w a s  n o t  b o u n d  t o  a w a r d  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  w i t h o u t  
e n q u i r y ,  b e c a u s e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  w a s  s u c h  a  g r e a t  m a c h i n e  
c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  s o u g h t  t o  b e  a c h i e v e d .  S h a w  5  
S . I . E .  A n d  a  S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  w a s  r e f u s e d  b e c a u s e
o f  a  p r i o r  E n g l i s h  o n e  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r s  o f f e r e d  t o  
p r o v e  t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h  b a n k r u p t c y  w a s  p r a c t i c a l l y  d e a d ,  t h e  
t r u s t e e  h a v i n g  b e e n  d i s c h a r g e d :  t h e  b a n k r u p t  h a d  n o t  b e e n
d i s c h a r g e d ,  a n d  t h e  e f f e c t  u n d e r  t h e  E n g l i s h  B a n k r u p t c y  A c t s  
w a s  t h a t  t h e  O f f i c i a l  R e c e i v e r  w a s  t h e  t r u s t e e  a n d  t h e r e  w a s  
s t i l l  a  d e p e n d i n g  b a n k r u p t c y .  Z Y  a n k  o f  S c o t l a n d  v .  Y o u d e ,  
s u p r a _ 7
U n i t y  i s  f u r t h e r  p r e s e r v e d  b y  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  t h e  
r e c a l l  o f  a  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  w i t h i n  f o r t y  d a y s .  / ^ B a n k r u p t c y  
( S c o t l a n d )  A c t  1 9 1 3  S e c .  3 0 J  R e c a l l  m a y  b e  g r a n t e d  o n  t h e  
g r o u n d  o f  a  p r i o r  f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y .  / “ " Y o u n g  v .  B u c k e l  
1 8 6 4  2  M. 1 0 7 7 ;  G i b s o n  v .  M u n r o  1 8 9 4  2 1  R .  8 4 0  p e r  L o r d s  
K i n c a i r n e y  a n d  Y o u n g _ _ /  B u t  i f  t h e r e  I s  a  p r i o r  f o r e i g n  
b a n k r u p t c y  a n d  t h e  p e r i o d  f o r  r e c a l l  I s  p a s t ,  i t  i s  n o t  
c o m p e t e n t  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n .  [  C - i b s o n  v .  F u n r o ,
supra__7
C o n c u r r e n t  b a n k r u p t c i e s  s o m e t i m e s  i n a d v e r t e n t l y  o c c u r .
I f  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  g r a n t e d  h e r e  i n  i g n o r a n c e  o f  a  
p r i o r  b a n k r u p t c y  e l s e w h e r e ,  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r u s t e e  m a y ,  i f  r e c a l l  
o f  t h e  S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  i s  n o  l o n g e r  c o m p e t e n t ,  o b t a i n  
p a y m e n t  f r o m  t h e  S c o t c h  t r u s t e e  o f  t h e  m o v e a b l e  f u n d s  w h i c h  
t h e  S c o t c h  t r u s t e e  h a s  I n g a t h e r e d ,  a n d  i n  a  c o m p e t i t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t r u s t e e s  i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  S c o t c h  t r u s t e e ;  
r F a l c o n e r  v .  W e s t o n  1 8 t h  N o v .  1 8 1 4 ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  W e s t o n  v .  
R a l e  o n e r  1 7 t h  D e c .  1 8 1 7  F . C b u t  h 0  m a N  n o t  r e c o v e r  f r o m  
t h e  S c o t c h  t r u s t e e  t h e  p r o c e e d s  o f  h e r i t a g e .  /  W e s t  o n  v .  
F a l c o n e r ,  s u p r a _ 7 — :   ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - " "
W h e n  a  c o m p a n y ,  -which c a r r i e d  o n  b u s i n e s s  i n  A u s t r a l i a  
a n d  i n  Scotland, w a s  m a d e  bankrupt i n  A u s t r a l i a  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t l y  
s e q u e s t r a t e d  h e r e ,  t h e  C o u r t  which a w a r d e d  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
a p p a r e n t l y  being u n a w a r e  o f  t h e  p r i o r  A u s t r a l i a n  b a n k r u p t c y ,  
a n d  t h e  t w o  b a n k r u p t c i e s  w e r e  p r o c e e d i n g  c o n c u r r e n t l y  w i t h  
t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  a l l  p a r t i e s ,  e a c h  t r u s t e e  l i m i t i n g  h i m s e l f  t o  
t h e  f u n d s  s i t u a t e d  i n  h i s  o w n  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  C o u r t ,  w h i l e  
recognising t h a t  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  t r u s t e e  c o u l d  h a v e  o b j e c t e d  
t o  t h e  S c o t t i s h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  a n d  r e n d e r e d  i t  i n e f f e c t i v e ,  
s i n c e  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  t r u s t e e  h a d  n o t  d o n e  t h a t ,  r e c o g n i s e d  
t h e  S c o t t i s h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  u p h o l d i n g  a  
d e l i v e r a n c e  o f  t h e  S c o t c h  t r u s t e e  d e c l a r i n g  a n  e q u a l i s i n g  
d i v i d e n d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a  c r e d i t o r , w h o  h a d  s e c u r e d  a  d i v i d e n d  
i n  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  a n d  w a s  c l a i m i n g  i n  t h e  
S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n . ,  s h o u l d  n o t  , o b t a i n  m o r e  t h a n  h i s  f a i r  
s h a r e .  f ~ S t e w a r t  v .  A u l d  1 8 5 1  1 3  D .  1 3 3 7 J  T h i s  w a s  a  
d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  t h e  s t r i c t e s t  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  u n i t y ,  b u t  
u n i t y  w a s  p r e s e r v e d ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  p r e v e n t i n g  a  c r e d i t o r  
f r o m  r a n k i n g  u n f a i r l y  i n  b o t h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n s .  T h e  s a m e  
r u l e  a g a i n s t  r a n k i n g  t w i c e  a p p l i e s  w h e n  t h e  f o r e i g n  
b a n k r u p t c y  i s  o f  a  b r a n c h  f i r m  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  f i r m ,  t r a d i n g  
u n d e r  a  s e p a r a t e  n a m e ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t n e r s  a r e  t h e  
s a m e  i n  b o t h .  / ~ C l y d e s d a l e  B a n k  v .  A n d e r s o n  1 8 9 0  2 7  S . L . R .  
4 9 3 J 7  a  ’ h e  s a m e  r u l e  o f  " h o t c h p o t "  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  
w h e r e  c o n c u r r e n t  b a n k r u p t c i e s  a r e  c o m m o n .
c r e d i t o r  w h o  h a d  s e c u r e d  a  d i v i d e n d  i n  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  s e q u e s t ­
r a t i o n  a n d  w a s  c l a i m i n g  i n  t h e  S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  
o b t a i n  m o r e  t h a n  h i s  f a i r  s h a i e .  ^  S t e w a r t  v .  A U l d  1 8 S i  i s  D .
1557 J
W o u l d  o u r  C o u r t s  r e c o g n i s e  a  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  w h i c h  w a s  a w a r d e d  
a b r o a d  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a  p e r s o n  w h o s e  o n l y  p l a c e  o f  b u s i n e s s  
a n d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  w h o s e  a s s e t s  w e r e  s i t u a t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  b u t  
w h o  w a s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  C o u r t  o n  s o m e  
l e s s e r  g r o u n d ,  s u c h  a s  r e s i d e n c e ?  T h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  o f  i m p o r t a n c e  
n o t  o n l y  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  b u t  i n  t h e  t o p i c  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s ­
a l i t y  o f  b a n k r u p t c y ,  f o r  t h e  Q u e s t i o n  m a y  a r i s e  w h e n  t h e  f o r e i g n  
t r u s t e e  a s k s  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  h i s  t i t l e  h e r e ,  w h e t h e r  t h a t  
f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  w a s  c o m p e t e n t l y  a w a r d e d .
I n  q a e s t i o n s  T h e  S c o t t i s h  C o u r t s  w i l l  n o t  l i s t e n  t o  o b j e c t i o n s
w i t h  B r i t i s h  t h a t  a n  E n g l i s h  o r  I r i s h  C o u r t  h a d  n o t  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
c o u n t r i e s  ^ W i l k i e  v .  C a t h c a r t  1 8 7 0  9  M .  1 8 8 ;  S a l a m a n  v .
. T o d d  1 9 1 1  S . C .  1 2 1 4 ;  Y o u n g  v . T B u c k e l  2 M .  1 0 7 7 ;  R o y a l  E a n k  
o f  o c o t l a n d v .  S c o t t  S m i t h  S t e i n  &  C o  2 0 t h  J a n .  1 8 1 3  P . O . :  
Q . u e e n s l a n d  e t c .  C o .  v .  A u s t r a l a s i a n  e t c .  C o .  1 8 8 8  2 5  R .  9 5 5  J  
o r  t h a t  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  p r o c e e d i n g s  w e r e  i r r e g u l a r l y  c o n d u c t e d ,  
M o y e s  v .  W h i n n e y  1 8 6 4  3  M .  1 8 3  j w h i c h  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  i n  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  E n g l i s h  o r  I r i s h  C o u r t .  W h e n  a  b a n k r u p t c y  i s  p r o c ­
e e d i n g  i n  o n e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  I s l e s  t h e r e  i s
p r o c e d u r e  f o r  s e c u r i n g ,  b y  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  C o u r t  s e i s e d  o f
t h e  b a n k r u p t c y ,  t h a t  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  b e  r e c a l l e d  s o  a s  t o  a l l o w  
i t  t o  p r o c e e d  i n  a n o t h e r  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  B n i - k i s h  c o u n t r y  
o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  I s l e s .  W h e n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  a w a r d e d  i n  
S c o t l a n d  a n d  i t  a p p e a r s  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  S e s s i o n  o r  L o r d  O r d i n a r y  
u p o n  p E t i t i o n  b y  t h e  A c c o u n t a n t ,  o r  a n y  c r e d i t o r  o r  o t h e r  p e r s o n  
h a v i n g  i n t e r e s t ,  w i t h i n  t h r e e  m o n t h s  o f  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  t h a t  
a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  i n  n u m b e r  a n d  v a . l u e  r e s i d e  i n  E n g ­
l a n d  o r  I r e l a n d ,  a n d  t h a t  f r o m  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  
t h e  b a n k r u p t  o r  o t h e r  c a u s e s  h i s  e s t a t e  a n d  e f f e c t s  o u g h t  t o  b e  
d i s t r i b u t e d  a m o n g  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  u n d e r  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  o r  i n s o l v e n t  
l a w s  o f  E n g l a n d  o r  I r e l a n d  t h e  C o u r t  m a y ,  a f t e r  e n q u i r y ,  r e c a l l  
t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n . £  B a n k r u p t c y  ( S c o t l a n d )  4 ° ^  1 9 1 $ ,  s e c *  A
s i m i l a r  s e c t i o n  a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  B a n k r u p t c y  ( S c o t l a n d )  A m e n d m e n t  
A c t  1 8 6 0 .  T h e r e  i s  a  r e c i p r o c a l  s e c t i o n  i n  t h e  B a n k r u p t c y  A c t  
1 9 1 4  s e c .  12  I f  t h e  t w p  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  p r e s e n t  a n d  t h e
b a n k r u p t c y  i s  p r o p e r l y  a n  E n g l i s h  o n e ,  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n  n u m b e r  
a n d .  v a l u e  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  w i s h  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  t o  p r o c e e d  i n  
S c o t l a n d  w i l l  n o t  b e  s u f f i c i e n t t o  p r e v e n t  r e c a l l .  £  O o o n e r  v .  
B a i l l i e  1 8 7 8  n  R ,  J  T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  d o e s  n o t  a p p l y  w h e n  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  i n  n u m b e r  a n d  v a l u e ( L i v e ,  n o t  i n  E n g l a n d  
o r  I r e l a n d ,  b u t  a b r o a d .  ^  S m i t h  P a y n e  &  S m i t h s  v .  R i s c h m a n n  
1 8 6 9  8  M .  1 0 0  J  R e c a l l  h a s  b e e n  g r a n t e d  e v e n  w h e n  t h e  b a n k r u p t  h a d  
o b t a i n e d  h i s  d i s c h a r g e ,  t h e r e  b e i n g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  w h o l e  
p r o c e e d i n g s  h a d  b e e n  c o n d u c t e d  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t  
a n d  n o t  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s ^  £ B r a n d o n  v .  S t e p h e n s  1 3 6 2  2 4  D .  2 6 3  J 
a n d  w h e n  t h e  b a n k r u p t  w a s  n o t  s u b j e c t  a t  t h e  t i m e  t o  t h e  j u r ­
i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  b a n k r u p t c y  C o u r t s , w h e r e  i t  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  
t h a t  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  s h o u l d  p r o c e e d . ,  M o s e s  v .  G i f f o r d  1 8 6 6  4  
M .  1066  J  i n  a s c e r t a i n i n g  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  i n  n u m b e r  
a n d  v a l u e ,  a l l  p a r t i e s  a r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  c r e d i t o r s  w h o  h a v e  
l o d g e d  a f f i d a v i t s  a n d  v o u c h e r s  o f  d e b t .  £  H a i n e s  v .  S h a w  1 q£*o o/
D .  3 8 3 J  T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  p r e v e n t s  i n s o l v e n t  p e r s o n s  c o m i n g  f r o m  
o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  I s l e s  t o  S c o t l a n d  s o l e l j r  t o  o b t a i n  
s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o n  m o r e  f a v o u r a b l e  t e r m s  i n  S c o t l a n d .  £  S m i t h  v .  
R o s t r o n  I 8 6 0  2 3  D .  1 4 0 ;  B r a n d o n  v .  S t e p h e n s ,  s u p r a ;  C o o p e r  v .
]B a i l l i e ,  s u p r a ;  M o s e s  v .  G i f f o r d ,  s u p r a  
I n  q u e s t i o n s  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t  a t  o u r  C o u r t s  w o u l d  r e c o g n i s e
w i t h  n o n -  a  f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  a w a r d e d  o n  a n y  g r o u n d  o f
B r i t i s h  f o r -  j u r i s d i c t i o n  w h i c h  w e  r e c o g n i s e  a s  s u f f i c i e n t
e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  o u r  C o u r t s  t o  a w a r d ,  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e
f
i s  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h i s  i n  a  d i c t u m  o f  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  
R o b e r t s o n  -  " I t  i s - i m p e s s - i - b l e  s e e m s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  
i m p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h i s  C o u r t  t o  d e c l i n e  o n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  r e c o g n i s e  
i f  d o n e  a b r o a d  w h a t  i t  i t s e l f  i s  b o u n d  t o  d o  a n d  d o e s  d a i l y  a t  
h o m e . ”  | p b e r s  v .  P a t o n s  T r u s t e e s  l p 9 7  04  p .  7 1 9  J I t  m u s t  b e  
c o n f e s s e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  p a s s a g e  i n  w h i c h  t h i s  s e n t e n c e  o c c u r s  t h e  i e s ?
l e a r n e d  j u d g e  i s  o n l y  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  p l e a  t h a t  o u r  C o u r t s  c o u l d  
p o t  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  F r e n c h  b a n k r u p t c y  o f  a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t s m a n  
w g o  c a r r i e d  o n  b u s i n e s s  i n  F r a n c e .  H e  w a s  n o t  f a c e d  w i t h  t h e  m o r e  
a c u t e  p r o b l e m  o f  a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t s m a n  w h o  c a r r i e d  o n  b u s i n e s s  i n  
S c o t l a n d  a n d  w h o  h a d  b e e n  d e c l a r e d  b a n k r u p t  a b r o a d ,  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
h a v i n g  b e e n  f o u n d e d  o n  a  l e s s e r  g r o u n d  l i k e  r e s i d e n c e .  B u t  a s  o u r  
C o u r t s  a w a r d  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o n .  t h e  g r o u n d  o f  r e s i d e n c e W h e n  t h e  
d e b t o r  h a s  h i s  d o m i c i l e  o f  r e s i - 4  s u c c e s s i o n  i n  a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y  
a n d  h a s  c a r r i e d  o n  h i s  o n l y  b u s i n e s s  i n  t h a t  o t h e r  c o u n t r y ,
^  J o e l  v .  G i 1 1  1  °  c 9  2 1  D .  9 2 9  J  i t  s e e m s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t h e  ^ e g r e e  
o f  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  d e c l i n e  t o  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a  b a n k ­
r u p t c y  a w a r d e d  i n  t h o s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a b r o a d .  I n  t h e  s a m e  c a s e  
L o r d  M c L a r e n  s a i d  " w h e n  i t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l  
i s  t h e  p r o p e r  C o u r t  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  1  t h i n k  t h i s  m u s t  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  
t o  m e a n  a  t r a d i n g  d o m i c i l .  I  c a n n o t  d o u b t  t h a t  e v e r y  t r a d e r  w h o  
i s  u n a b l e  t o  p a y  h i s  d _ e b t s  i s  l i a b l e  t o  h a v e  h i s  e s t a t e  s e i z e d  
a n d  d i v i d e d  a m o n g s t  h i s  c r e d i t o r s  b y  j u d i c i a l  a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y  w h e r e  h e  c a r r i e s  o n  b u s i n e s s . "  ( a t  p .  7 3 3  J T h i s ,  
c o m b i n e d  w i t h  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  p h r a s e  ’ ’ t r a d i n g  d o m i c i l e ”  i n  o n e  
o r  t w p  o t h e r  c a s e s  £  G o e t z e  &  S o h n  v .  A d e r s ,  s u p r a . ;  C - r a c i e  v .  
G r a c i e ’ s  T r u s t e e s  ( O . H . )  1 9 0 9  9  S . L . T .  9 1 J  m i g h t  f o u n d  a  p l e a  
t h a t  a  f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  i s  o n l y  e f f e c t i v e  i f  g r a n t e d  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t ’ s  t r a d i n g  d o m i c i l ” ,  b u t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
g e n e r a l  m e a n i n g  o f  t h i s  p h r a s e  i s  a o m r e n t ,  i t  a r r e a r s  n o w h e r e  
e l s e  i n  o u r  l a v / ,  i t s  p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n  w o u l d  h ©  d i f f i c u l t ,  a n d  
i t s  i n f r e q u e n t  u s e  i n  o b i t e r  d i c t a  d o e s  n o t  s e e m  t o  w a r r a n t  t h e  
r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  v e r y  m u c h  s i m p l e r  a d d  m o r e  l o g i c a l  r u l e .
E f f e c t s  o f  t h e  U n i t y  o f  B a n k r u p t c y
A l l  c l a i m s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  m u s t  b e  m a d e  i n
t h e  C o u r t  w h i c h  i s  s i e s e d  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y .  A  c r e d i t o r  c o u l d
constitute his debt in Scotland, when his debtor had been made
bankrupt in England, R o y  v »  Campbell 1 2  B .  1 0 2 8 ;  P h o s p h a t e
S e w a g e  C o .  v .  L a w s o n ’ s  T r u s t e e  1 8 7 8  5  R .  1 1 2 ? ,  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t
Inglis at p. 1138J  but when the same creditor;who had not
claimed or proved his debt in England, raised an action m  the 
Court of Session tonhave it found and declared that he was
^titled to a dividend from the bankrupt’s estate equal to the 
dividend drawn, by the other creditors, his action was dismissed 
Lg incompetent, because the proper forum, was the Court of Bank­
ruptcy in England. £ Roy v. CampbellTs Assignees IpKv If D. R1 J
In their cha.racter of assignee 
the jurisdiction of no Court e
; or trustees they are subject to 
^cept the Courts of the country
w i t h i n  w h i c h  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  p r o c e e d i n g s  h a v e  b e e n  i n s t i t u t e d ,  
a n d  t h e  c o n c u r s u s  c r e d i t o r u m  h i s  b e e n  established. ^ P h o s p h a t e
v .  L a w w r o n - t  a  T r u s t e e  , — o u p r a - j  W h e n  c r e d i t o r s  o f  a n  
E n g l i s h  b a n k r u p t  h a d  o b t a i n e d  a  Scotch d e c r e e  a g a i n s t  t h e  E n g l i s h  
t r u s t e e  c o n s t i t u t i n g  t h e  d e b t ,  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  e n t i t l e d  t o  e x e c u t e  
d i l i g e n c e  o n  t h a t  d e c r e e  a g a i n s t  f u n d s  p a y a b l e  t o  t h e  t r u s t e e  i n  
S c o t l a n d ,  s i n c e  t h a t  w o u l d  g i v e  t h e m  a  p r e f e r e n c e .  £  I n  t h e  c a s e  
i n  p o i n t  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  l o d g e  a  r i d i n g  c l a i m  o n  t h e  
s u c c e s s f u l  c l a i m  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  t r u s t e e  i n  a  S c o t c h  M u l t i p l e -  
p o i n d i n g  -  T h o m s o n  & •  C o .  v .  F r i e s e - G r e e n e T s  T r u s t e e  1 9 4 4  S . C .
3 3 6  J C o m p e t i t i o n s  b e t w e e n  c r e d i t o r s  f o r  f u n d s  o f  the bankrupt 
s h o u l d  b e  b r i e f  i r i  I ]  e C o u r t  of h e r b ruptcy, arf  rot where t h e  
f u n d s  a r e  s i t u a t e d ,  even t h o u g h  t h e  C o u r t s  t h e ^ e  h a v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  
£  O k e l l  v .  F o d e n  1 8 8 4  1 1  R .  9 0 6  J
A l l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  r a n k i n g  a n d  o f  t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  o f  t h e  c r e d ­
i t o r s  i n t e r  s e  a r e  d e c i d e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e x  f o r i  o f  t h e  
b a n k r u p t c y ,  L u s k  v .  E l d e r  1 8 4 3  5  D .  1 2 7 3 ;  E x  p a r t e  M e l b o u r n e  
1 8 7 0  L . R .  6  C h .  0 4  ]  T h e  r u l e  m a y  b e  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  t h e  f o l l o w ­
i n g  e x a m p l e .  A  m a n  c a r r y i n g  o n  b u s i n e s s  i n  S c o t l a n d  w a s  s e q u e s t r -
.1
a t e d .  H e  w a s  a  p a r t n e r  o f  a  c o m p a n y  i n  E n g l a n d .  A  c r e d i t o r  o f  
t h e  E n g l i s h  c o m p a n y  c l a i m e d  i n  t h e  S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n .  A c c o r d ­
i n g  t o  t h e  S c o t c h  r u l e s  o f  r a n k i n g  h e  w a s  e n t i t l e d  t o  b e  r a n k e d  
p a r i  p a s s u  w i t h  t h e  p e r s o n a l  c r e d i t o r s  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t .  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  E n g l i s h  r u l e ,  h e ,  b e i n g  a  c r e d i t o r  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ,  w a s  n o t  
e n t i t l e d  t o  r a n k  u n t i l  t h e  p e r s o n a l  c r e d i t o r s  h a d  b e e n  s a t i s f i e d .  
I t  w a s  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  S c o t t i s h  r u l e  o f  r a n k i n g  h a d  t o  a p p l y .
^  L u s k  v .  E l d e r ,  s u p r a  j |  I t  s e e m s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
t h i s  c a s e  f r o m  a  s u b s e q u e n t  o n e ,  £  W i l l i a m s o n  v ,  E k & e r  T a y l o r  
{ ( 3 1 8 4 5  8  D .  1 5 6  J w h i c h ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  w a s  d e c i d e d  w r o n g l y .
A  c l a i m  w a s  m a d e  i n  a  S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o n  a n  E n g l i s h  b ' o m d
of annuxty,.which had b e e n  g r a n t e d  w i t h o u t  v a l u a b l e  consideration.. 
The effect of this accordinp-; to E n g l i s h  1 t h n t  ■—
:}l I
It c o u l d  n o t  c o m p e t e  w i t h  t h e  c l a i m s  o f  o n e r o u s  c r e d i t o r s .  I n  
S c o t s  l a w  i t  c o u l d .  H i e  E n g l i s h  r u l e  w a s  a p p l i e d ,  t h e  C o u r t  
h o l d i n g  t h a t  t h i s  q u a l i t y  o f  b e i n g  g r a n t e d  w i t h o u t  v a l u a b l e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w a s  o f  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  a n d  n o t  a  m e r e  ' 
m a t t e r  o f  r e m e d y .  T h i s  s e e m s  h o w e v e r  t o  b e  a  p u r e  Q u e s t i o n  o f  
t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  i n t e r  s e ,  w h i c h  t h e  l e x  f o r i  o f  
t h e  b a n k r u p t c y ,  n a m e l y  S c o t s  l a w , s h o u l d  h a v e  r u l e d .  £  C o n t r a s t  
a x  p a r t e  M e l b o u r n e ,  s u p r a .  '  I t  i s  n o t i c e a b l e  t h a t  L u s h  y .  E l d e r  
w a s  n o t  q u o t e d  f e i t h e r  i n  t h e  d e b a t e s  o r  i n  t h e  j u d g m e n t s ^  
W h e n  a  c o m p a n y ,  w h i c h  c a r r i e d
S c o t l a n d  w a s  m a d e  b a n k r u p t  i n  A  
e s t r a t e d  h e r e ,  t h e  C o u r t  w h i c h  
b e i n g  u n a w a r e  o f  t h e  p r i o r  A u s t  
b a n k r u p t c i e s  w e r e  p r o c e e d i n g  c o  
a l l  p a r t i e s ,  e a c h  t r u s t e e  l i m i t  
i n  h i s  o w n  c o u n t r y ,  u n i t y  w a s  p  
C o u r t  r e f u s e d  t o  a l l o w  a  c r e d i t o  
i n  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
w i t h o u t  d e d u c t i n g  w h a t  h e  h a d  r e  
D ,  1 3 3 7 ^  T h i s  r u l e  a p p l i e s  e v e n
o n  b u s i n e s s  i n  A u s t r a l i a  a n d  i n  
a s t r a l i a  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t l y  s e q u -  
i w a r d e d  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  a p p a r e n t l y  
k a l i a n  b a n k r u p t c y ,  a n d  t h e  t w p  
i c u r r e n t l y  w i t h  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  
n g  h i m s e l f  t o  t h e  f u n d s  s i t u a t e d  
( e s e r v e d  t o  t h i s  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  
r  w h o  h a d .  o b t a i n e d  a  d i v i d e n d  
t o  c l a i m  i n  t h e  S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
c e i v e d .  £  S t e w a r t  v .  A u l d  1 8 * 1  I S  W'
i s  o f  a  b r a n c h  f i r m  o f  t h e  S c o t  
n a m e ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t n e r s  
d a l e  B a n k  v .  A n d e r s o n  1 8  9 0  27  S  
f o r e i g n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  w a s  a  p r d x  
p u k e  p r i n c i p l e  w o u l d  a p p l y  w i t h  
T h e  s a m e  r u l e  o f  " h o t c h p o t n  i s  r  
c o n c u r r e n t  b a n k r u p t c i e s  a r e  c o m m
w h e n  t h e  f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  
i s h  f i r m ,  t r a d i n g  u n d e r  a  s e p a r a t e  
a r e  t h e  s a m e  i n  b o t h .  £  C l y d e s  -
L . R .  4 9 3  J  I n  t h o s e  c a s e s  t h e  
r  o n e .  A  f o r t i o r i  t h e  s a m e  
a  s u b s e q u e n t  f o r e i g n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  
e c o g n i s e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  w h e r e
o n .
I f  a  c r e d i t o r  s e c u r e ^  a n  a d v a n t a g e  o v e r  t h e  o t h e r  c r e d i t o r s  
b y  b e i n g  g r a n t e d  a  p r e f e r e n c e  o r  b } / -  u s i n g ,  d i l i g e n c e  i n  a  f o r e i g n  
c o u n t r y  s u b s e q u e n t  t o  a  S c o t c h  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  h e  ^ i i ^ d c o t  b e  
a l l o w e d  t o  c l a i m  i n  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  h e r e  w i t h o u t  a c c o u n t i n g
f o r  h i s  a d v a n t a g e j  £  S e l k r i g  v .  D a v i e s  I I  D o w  - 9 3 0 ;  B e l l  C o m m .
. . w h e t h e r  he claims the Scotch Se^ esfrarft'.n *>rnet.
1 1  ;  B a r  p .  1 0 4 7 ;  G o u d y  p .  9 £ *  J a n d ^ h e  c a n ,  i f  s u b j e c t
t o  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  S c o t c h  C o u r t s ,  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  r e s t o r e  
w h a t  h e  h a s  o b t a i n e d ,  a n d  t h a t  e v e n  a l t h o u g h  h e  i s  a  f o r e i g n e r .
J 'fop a* action o"f festitationJ u r i s d i c t i o n ^ m a y  b e  f o u n d e d  
g o g — t h - i s  p u  r p o  s  3 b y  a n y  c o m p e t e n t  w a y ,  e v e n  b y  a r r e s t m e n t  o f  
m o v e a b l e s  i n  S c o t l a n d  t o  f o u n d  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  £  w h i t e  v .  B r i g g s ,  
s u p r a  J  o r  b y  r e c o n v e n t i o n .  ^  B a r r  v .  S m i t h  &  - C h a m b e r l a i n  1 3 7  9  
7  R .  ^ 4 7 ;  Q r d  v .  B a r t o n  l n ^ r y  7  D .  5 ’ 4 1  —  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  ' * r e . s  a  
c l a i m  b y  t h e  f o r e i g n e r  i n  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  J T h e  E n g l i s h  
t e x t  w r i t e r s  a r e  u n w i l l i n g  t o  a d m i t  t h i s  r u l e  t o  t h e  f u l l ,  a n d  
c o n o i d ' 5 ' ! '  t h a t  i f  t h e  c r e d i t o r  w h o  h a s  o b t a i n e d  a n  a d v a n t a g e  
a b r o a d  i s  a  f o r e i g n e r ,  a n d  d o e s  n o t  c l a i m  i n  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
i t  m i g h t  n o t  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  c o m p e l  h i m  t o  r e s t o r e .  T h e r e  i s  
s u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  v i e w  i n  o b i t e r  d i c t a
" A s  w a s  s a i d  b y  L o r d  E l d o n  f S e l k r i g  v .  D a v i e s ,  s u p r a  J
’ I t  h a s  b e e n  d e c i d e d  t h a t  a  p e r s o n  c a n n o t  c o m e  i n  u n d e r  a n  
E n g l i s h  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  w i t h o u t  b r i n g i n g  i n t o  t h e  c o r a r a o  
f u n d  w h a t  h e  h a s  r e c e i v e d  a b r o a d ^ *  a n d  L o r d  E l d o n  g o e s  o n  t o  
p o i n t  o u t ,  w h a t  i s  o b v i o u s l y  t h e  c a s e ,  t h a t  a  c r e d i t o r ,  b e c a u s e  
h e  h a p p e n e d  t o  J s e _  p e r s o n a l l y  i n  E n g l a n d ,  w o u  1 d  n o t  b e  o b l i g e d
t o ,  . b r i n g  t h i s  s u m  i n t o  t h e  c o m m o n  f u n d  -  h e  m i g h t  k e e p  i t  i f  h e
l i k e d  _ -  h e  m i g h t  i g n o r e  t h e  b a n k r u p t o y  p r o c e e d i n g s  a l t o g e t h e r  
i f  h e  p l e a s e d ;  B u t  i f  h e  d i d  n o t  i g n o r e  i t , . i f  h e  s o u g h t  t o  
t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  i t  t h e n  o n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  h e  w h o
a s k s  f o r  e q u i t y  m u s t  d o  e q u i t y ,  h e  m u s t  b r i n g  i n t o  t h e  c o m m o n  
f u n d  t h a t  w h i c h  h e  h a d  a l r e a d y  r e c e i v e d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  o b l i g ­
a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s a m e  d e b t o r s ,  B a n c o  d e  P o r t u g a l  v .  W a d d e l l  1 8 8 0  
5  A . C .  p e r  L o r d  G a i r n ^ s  a t  p .  1 3 7  A l l  t h a t  L o r d  E l d o n  i n  f a c t  
s a i d  h o w e v e r  w a s  " W h e t h e r  t h e  a s s i g n e e s  c o u l d ,  b y  l a w  i n  a n o t h e r  
f o r m ,  g e t  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o u t  o f  h i s  h a n d s ,  w ^ = s  a n o t h e r  q u e s t i o n  ! ! _ —  
a t  p p .  2 4 9 -  2 3 0  J
" I  d o  n o t  w i s h  t o  h a v e  i t  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  i t  f o l l o w s  
f r o m  t h e  o p i n i o n  I  a m  n o w  g i v i n g  (  I  r a t h e r  t h i n k  t h e  c o n t r a r y
w o u l d  b e  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  I  a m  n o w  u s i n g  ) ,  t h a t  
a  c r e d i t o r  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  l a w s ,
n o r  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e m ,  o b t a i n i n g  p a y m e n t  o f  h i s  d e b t ,  a n d  a f t e r ­
w a r d s  c o m i n g  o v e r  t o  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  w o u l d  b e  l i a b l e  t o  r e f u n d  t h a t  
d e b t .  I f  h e  h a d  r e c o v e r e d  i t  i n  a n  a d v e r s e  s u i t  h e  w o u l d  c l e a r l y  
n ° t  b e  l i a b l e .  B u t  i f  t h e .  i .
-L <
■aw of that country preferred
h i m  t o
the a s s i g n e e ,  t h o u g h  I  m u s t  s u p p o s e  t h a t  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w r o n g ,  y e J ‘
I  d o  n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  m y  h o l d i n g  a  c o n t r a r y  o p i n i o n  w o u l d  r e v o k e  
t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,  h o w e v e r  1 m i g h t  d i s a p p r o v e  
o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o n  w h i c h  t h a t  l a w  s o  d e c i d e d . , f  /  S i l l  v .  W o r -
(mi) p.fci3 L
g w i o k ^ l  H .  B l a c k s t .  p e r  L o r d  L o u g h b o r o u g h l  1
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  e a c h  o f  t h e  m o d e r n  E n g l i s h  t e x t  w r i t e r s  h a s  
e v o l v e d  a  d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  e l a b o r a t e  r u l e s .
W e s t l a k e  s a y s  t h a t  a  c r e d i t o r  i s  l i a b l e  t o  r e f u n d  i f  h e  i s  
a  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t ,  o r  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  o r  i f  h e  m u s t  b e  
r e g a r d e d  a s  E n g l i s h  b e c a u s e  t h e  d e b t  i s  o w e d  t o  a  h o u s e  o f  
b u s i n e s s  i n  E n g l a n d  o f  w h i c h  h e  i s  a  m e m b e r ;  o t h e r w i s e  t h e  
c r e d i t o r  m a y  r e t a i n  w h a t  h e  h a s  r e c o v e r e d . £  S e c s  1 4 2 , 3  T h e  
f i r s t  p a r t  gf  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  n o t  a t  v a r i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  d e c i s i o n s ,  
e i t h e r  E n g l i s h ,  ^  S i l l  v .  W o r s w i o k , s u p r a ;  H u n t e r  v .  P o t t s  1 7 9 1  
4  T . R .  1 8 2 ;  P h i l l i p s  v .  H u n t e r  1 7 9 3  2  H . B 1 ,  4 0 2  J o r  S c o t t i s h *
[  S y m  v .  T h o m s o n  1 7 3 8  M .  1 1 3 7 :  O r d  v ,  B a r t o n  1847  9 p ,  M b ;
W h i t e  v .  B r i g g s  1 P 4 3  3 1 9 4 0 .  a n r i  B a r r  f t  S m i t h  v .  C h a m b e r l a i n
1 8 7 9  7  R .  2 4 7 j  B u t  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  t h e  s t a t e r n e 1 n t  t h e r e  
i s  n o  d i r e c t  a u t h o r i t y ,  f o r  i n  n o  c a s e ,  S c o t t i s h  o r  E n g l i s h ,  h a s  
t h e  C o u r t  r e f u s e d  t o  o r d e r  r e s t i t u t i o n .
D i c e y  s a y s  £  p .  3 7 2  J :  F i r s t l y ,  i f  t h e  c r e d i t o r  h a s  r e c o v e r e d  
t h e  j u d g e m e n t  o f  a  f o r e i g n  C o u r t  d e l i v e r e d  w i t h  t h e ;  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  
E n g l i s h  b a n k r u p t c y ,  n o  a c t i o n  w i l l  l i e  i n  E n g l a n d  a t  t h e  i n s t a n c e ,  
o f  t h e  t r u s t e e ,  b e c a u s e ,  i n  a c c o o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  f o r e i g n  j u d g m e n t s ,  a  t i t l e  s o  a c q u i r e d  i s  v a l i d i n  
E n g l i s h  C o u r t s .  T h i s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  a d m i t t e d  t o  b e  c o n t r a r y  t o  o n e  
o f  t h e  c a s e s  > S i l l  v .  W o r s w i c k ,  s u p r a  j C p .  B e n n e t  v .  J o h n s t o n ,
W i n t e r  S e s s i o n  1 8 1 9 ,  B e l l  C o m m  i i  3 7 4  J    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
F u r t h e r ^  a l t h o u g h  t h e  j u d g m e n t  m a y  b e  v a l i d  b e t w e e n  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o
t h e  f o r e i g n  s u i t ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  t h e  a m o u n t  r e c o v e r e d  
i s  t o  b e  h e l d  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  t r u s t e e  h e r e .  £ C h e s h i r e  p .  487  J
S e c o n d l y ,  D i c e v  s a y s  t h a t  w h e r e  a  c r e d i t o r  r e c o v e r s  p r o p e r t y
a b r o a d  w i t h o u t  l e g a l  p r o c e s s ,  o r  b y  l e g a l  p r o c e s s  w i t h o u t  n o t i c e  
o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y ,  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  s h o u l d  b e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e
f o r e i g n  l a w  r e c o g n i s e s  t h e  t i t l e  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  t r u s t e e .  I f  i t  
d o e s  n o t ,  t h e  c r e d i t o r  c a n  n o t  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  r e f u n d ,  e v e n
a l t h o u g h  h e  i s  a  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t .  T h i 3  s t a t e m e n t  i s  o p e n  t o
t h e  s a m e  o b j e c t i o n  a s  t h e  f i r s t .  £  C h e s h i r e  i b i d  J
C h e s h i r e  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  t h e  c r e d i t o r
i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  b a n k r u p t c y  C o u r t ,
w h e n  h e  i s  l i a b l e  t o  r e f u n d ,  o r  n o t ,  w h e n  h e  c a n  k e e p  h i s  g a i n s ,  
r 1 he
[ _  P *  P  J  I t  i s  b a n k r u p t c y  j u r i s d i c t i o n > A n o t  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
i n  g e n e r a l ,  w h i c h  h a s  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d . .  I f  b a n k r u p t c y  j u r ­
i s d i c t i o n  c a n  n o t  b e  e x e r c i s e d  a g a i n s t  a  d e b t o r ,  d e s p i t e  h i s
p r e s e n c e  i n  E n g l a n d ,  u n l e s s  o n e  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  s p e c i f i e d  i n
t h e  B a n k r u p t c y  A c t s  i s  f u l f i l l e d ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  j u r ­
i s d i c t i o n  c a n  n o t  b e  e x e r c i s e d  a g a i n s t  a  c r e d i t o r  u n l e s s  t h e  
s a m e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  h i m  a h .  t h e  t i m e  
h e  r e c e i v e s  t h e  p a y m e n t .  "  L o g i c a l l y  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  f o s s e s ;  a  w i d e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  a  c r e d i t  
o r  t h a n  o v e r  a  d e b t o r  a g a i n s t  w h o m  a n  a d j u d i c a t i o n  o r d e r  i s  
s o u g h t "  T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  S c o t t i s h  c a s e s ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  n o  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  u n d e r  S c o t t i s h  l a w  t o  s e q u e s t r a t e  a  d e b t o r  o n  t h e  
g r o u n d  o f  a r r e s t m e n t  o f  m o v e a b l e s ,  £  C r o i l  1 8 6 3  1  M .  5 0 9 ;
J o e l  v .  G i l l  1 8 5 9  2 1  D .  9 2 9  p e r  L . J . C .  I n g l i s  a t  p . 9 3 8  J
o r  r e c o n v e n t i o n , £  L . J 0 C .  I n g l i s ,  i b i d  J  b u t  a  c r e d i t o r  c a n  
b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  r e s t o r e  a n  a d v a n t a g e  w h i c h  h e  h a s  o b t a i n e d  
a b r o a d  i f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  f o u n d e d  a g a i n s t  h i m  b y  a r r e s t m e n t ,
£ r r h i t e  v .  B r i g g s  1847  5 1  I ’ M - B  J  o r  b v  r e c o n v e n t i o n .
^  B a r r  A  S m i t h  v .  C h a m b e r l a i n  1 8 7 9  7  f t ,  2 4 7 *  O r d  v .  B a r t o n  
1 ° 4 ^  9  D ,  5 4 1 J
I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o r r e c t  v i e w  i s  l a i d  d o w n  i n  a  
d e c i s i o n  o i  t h e  w h o l e  C o u r t  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  w h i t e  v .  B r i g g s  ,  ^  1 8 4 3  
5  D .  1 1 4 8  J  A  b i l l  o f  e x c h a n g e  w a s  s e n t  b y  A ,  a  m e r c h a n t  i n  
L o n d o n ,  t o  B ; a  c o m m i s s i o n  a g e n t  i n  G l a s g o w ,  t o  b e  d i s c o u n t e d
t h e r e ,  a n d  w i t h  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  r e m i t  t h e p r o c e e d s  t o  A .  n
p r o c e e d s
h a d  t h e  b i l l  d i s c o u n t e d ,  b u t  a p p l i e d  t h e  t o  h i s  o w n
p u r p o s e s .  A  w a s  p r e s s i n g  f o r  a  r e m i t t a n c e ,  s o  B  a d m i t t e d  h i s  
d i f f i c u l t y  a n d  t h e n  i n d o r s e d  a n a  r e m i t t e d  t o  h i m  b y  p o s t  
a n  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  a  H i v e r p o o l  h o u s e  w h i c h  w a s  - r e c e i v e d  i n  d u e  
c o u r s e  b y  A  a n d  a c k n o w l e d g e d ,  w i t h i n  s i x t y  d a y s  t h e r e a f t e r  B  
w a s  s e q u e s t r a t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d .  T h e  t r u s t e e  a r r e s t e d  t o  f o u n d
jurisdiction against the English merchant a , and brought an
a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  h i m  c o n c l u d i n g  f o r  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d o r s a t i o n....
a n d  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  b i l l * .  T t  w a ~  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  
l a w  o f  o c o t l a n d  h a d  t o  b o  a p p l i e d ,  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  w a s  
s t r u c k  a t  b y  t h e  A c t  1 6 9 6  c .  5  A n n u l l i n g  v o l u n t a r y  d i s p o s ­
i t i o n s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  c r e d i t o r s  m a d e  w i t h i n  6 0  d a y s  o f  b a n k ­
r u p t c y  ,  a n d  t h e  i n d o r s a t i o n  w a s  r e d u c e d  a n d  t h e  E n g l i s h  
m e r c h a n t ‘ d e c e r n e d  t o  r e p a y  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  b i l l .  T h i s  c a s e  
w a s  a s  f a v o u r a b l e  a s  a n y  c o u l d  b e  f o r  t h e  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t o r ,  
b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  t h e  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  A c t  o f  1 6 9 6
w h i c h  w s s  a p p e a l e d  t o .  T h e  E n g l i s h  c r e d i t o r  o b t a i n e d  t h e  b i l l . ,  
a n  E n g l i s h  o n e ,
y \ n o t  a f t e r  b u t  b e f o r e  s e n u e s t r a t i o n ,  a n d  w h e n  t h e  d e b t o r  w a s  
Q u i t e  c a p a b l e  o f  g r a n t i n g  i t .  T h e  r i g h t -  t o  t h i s  E n g l i s h  a s s e t  
v e s t e d ,  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  m e r c h a n t  . L a t e r ,  o n  t h e  d e b t o r  
b e c o m i n g  b a n k r u p t ,  t h n  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e
S c o t c h  A c t  d e f e a t e d  h i s  r i g h t  a n d  t h e  E n g l i s h  m e r c h a n t  w a s  
b o u n d  t o  r e p a y .  T h e  m a j o r i t y  j u d g e s  p r o c e e d e d  o n  t h e  v i e w  
t h a t  t h e  A c t  o f  1 6 9 6  a n n u l l i n g  p r e f e r e n c e s  w a s  g e n e r a l  i n  
s c o p e  a n d  c o n t a i n e d  n o  e x c e p t i o n  w h e n  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  w a s  i n  
f a v o u r  o f  E n g l i s h  o r  o t h e r  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t o r s .  W h y ,  t h e y  s a i d ,  
s h o u l d  d e e d s  g r a n t e d  t o  f o r e i g n e r s  b e  e x c e p t e d  w h e n  f o r e i g n e r s  
a r e  a d m i t t e d  t o  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h i s  l a w  i n  S c o t l a n d  a n d  t h e y  
h a v e  t h e  f u l l  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  a n n u l m e n t  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  m a d e  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  s c o t c h  c r e d i t o r s ?  L o r d  C u n n i n g h a m ©  s a i d :  T h e
l a w  a n n u l l i n g  p r e f e r e n c e s  w a s - g e n e r a l -  w i t h i n  a  l i m i t e d  t i m e  
p r i o r  t o  b a n k r u p t c y ,  i s  n o t  a n  u n j u s t  o r  i m m o r a l  l a w ,  w h i c h  
e x p o s e s  t r a d e r s  f r o m  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  t o  a n y  i n j u s t i c e  o r  h a r d s h i p  
o f  w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  c o m p l a i n .  O n  t h e  c o n t r a r y  i t  
i s  a  w i s e  a n d  s a l u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n  f o r  p r e v e n t i n g  f r a u d s .  I t  
w a s  n o t  i n t r o d u c e d  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  c r e d i t o r s  r e s i d e n t  i n  
S c o t l a n d  a l o n e ,  b u t  w a s  c a l c u l a t e d  t o f e e c u r e ,  a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  
a n  e q u a l  a n d ^ u s t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  i n s o l v e n t /  s  p r o p e r t y  
a m o n g  h i s  w h o l e  j u s t  a n d  l a w f u l  c r e d i t o r s ,  f o r e i g n ' a s  w e l l  a s  
d o m e s t i c .  A S  t h i s  l a w  t h e n  i s  s t r o n g l y  f o u n d e d  i n  j u s t i c e  a n d  
g o o d  p o l i c y , '  i t  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  h i g h  e f f e c t  i n  a l l  c i v i l i s e d
states who cultivate the crTs of p*«e* encourage commercial
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intercourse v v i t h  e a c h  o t h e r .  th*t r u l e ,  i f  \ t  c o u l d  b e
shown that a Scots trader had obtained a preference in 
America, within the period prohibited by their law, T should 1
The rule therefore seems to be that our Courts will compel 
a creditor, who has obtained a preference abroad,to restore it, 
if that creditor is in any way subject to the jurisdiction so 
that that decree can be made effective. There is no reason to 
suppose that the same reasons would not apply to the restit­
u t i o n  of advantages obtained abroad by diligence, for although 
the Act 16 96 c. 5 might not apply to that, since there had 
been no voluntary assignation, the 1913 Bankruptcy Act*which 
gives the trustee a title to all moveables wherever situated^- 
would be held to have just as universal an application asthe 
16 96 ACT . Contra Goudy p.246 J \
This rule was formerly statutory. The old Act of 1814 
[54 (r°o. xxi o. 187 s&c. 51 j provided t* a o a oreditor 
obtaining any preference, either by diligence or by the vnluntw 
ary act of the debtor, after the date of the sequestration 
out of ti»e estate of the debtor situated beyond the jurisdiction 
of the Court should be obliged to communicate it for the 
general behoof, etherwise he was to be liabie-te-eemisun 
excluded frofri all participation in dividends, and to be liable 
to an action at the instance of the trustee to. communicate 
such preference, so far as the jurisdiction of the Court 
could reach him. There was no similar provision in the 18 66 
Act, which repealed this Act,nor in the 1913 ACt. It is clear 
that at common law the same rule anplies as under that old 
Act: White v . Briggs was not laid down on that provision in 
thel814 Act, but on the general considerations mentioned, ancD^ 
the same result has been arrived at as to the kind of 
jurisdiction which will found an action of restitution while
hold it equally competent for the American assignees to sue 
the creditors in the Courts of this country for restitution, 
as it is for B e l l fs trustee to maintain the -oresent action.”
at p. 1167
the Act was in force^l Qrd v. Barton 1847 9 D
after its r e p e a l , Barr & Smith v. Chamberlain 18^9 7 R. 247 T  
If a creditor of a bankrupt sequestrated in Scotland is 
attempting to obtain satisfaction by diligence or action 
out of the funds of the bankrupt situated abroad, the Scott­
ish Courts will interdict him from doing so, provided of 
course that such creditor is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Scottish Courts so that the interdict can be made effect­
ive. i Lindsay v. Paterson 1840 2 T). 137S: Young v. Barclay 
1846 8 D. 774 1 A claim in the s e q u e s t r a t i o n , founding 
jurisdiction reconventione w i l l  entitle the Court to restrain 
proceedings a b r o a d .  ^ Liquidators of the California Redwood 
Co Ltd v. Merchant Banking Co.of London 1886 13 R. 1202 J 
But if the creditor that is proceeding against the bankrupt 
abroad is a firm.and one of the partners is subject to the 
jurisdiction but another not, the Court will refuse interdict. 
£ Liquidators of the California Redwood Co v. Walker 1886 •
13 R. 810 J And section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, 
which provides that any order pronounced by a bankruptcy 
Court in any one ofo the countries of the British Isles
be by t|ie countries of ffie (British IsleSy
will not give jurisdiction over persons in England or Ireland 
so as to enable the Court to pronounce an interdict against 
them and enforce it through the interposition of the Cou$rts 
of those countries. (^Liquidators of the California Redwood 
Co Ltd v. Walker, supra J
W h e n  a creditor in a Scotch sequestration has obtained 
partial satisfaction by doing diligence against foreign 
heritage, the same two questions arise: (a) is he liable
to an action of restitution by the Scotch trustee, and (b)
must that advantage be deducted from the dividends which
\
he draws if he claims in the scotch sequestration ? To 
the first question, in spite of an opinion to the contrary,
£ Goudy p. 604 J it seems proper to give a negative answer:
the Act and Confirmation in favour of the Scotch trustee
does not give him a right to foreign immoveables; and if
the trustee creditor has o b t a l n e d t h e  proper J  ^  
or diligence abroad, yfehat oliowo thirt b. . - 
t>«. U s  tU  fctU  U tUe property
which is the law which governs title; accordingly the 
trustee has neither right to the property by the law of 
the country which appointed him,, nor title by the lex 
situs, and. can not succeed in an action of restitution.
The second question is more difficult. It has been held 
by the Privy Council that when a creditor proved the amount 
of his debt in an Indian sequestration, and after receiving 
dividends on the whole debt,brought an action against 
immoveable estate in Java and recovered a sum which was 
three fifths of his whole debt and greatly exceeded all 
the dividends which till then had been paid to all the 
creditors, he was not only immune from an action of 
restitution by the Assignees, but was entitled to receive 
future dividends pari passu with the other creditors so 
long as he did not receive more than twenty shillings in 
the pound. "The principle is, that one creditor shall 
not take a part of the fund which otherwise would have 
been available for the payment of all the creditors, and 
at the same time be allowed to come inpari passu with 
the other creditors for satisfaction out of the remainder 
of that fund: and this principle does not apply where
that creditor obtains by his diligence something which 
did not and could not form a part of that fund'.' /"Cockerell 
v. bicx e n s II Moo, Ind. A p p . 35b; 3 Moo. P.C. 99__/ This
decision is no longer applicable in England because the 
recent Bankruptcy statutes there have provided that the 
bankruptcy shall extend to all property "whether real or 
personal and whether situate in England or elsewhere", 
Bankruptcy Act 1914 sec. 167. dicey p. 372 n._y but 
it is exactly in point in Scotland. However it is 
contrary to the principle of Stewart v. A u l d  ^/_ 1851 13 I). 
1337_7 is unfair, and it is submitted would probably not 
be applied in Scotland now. l_ Goudyp. 60 5; Bar p . 1049_y
The Univers ality of b ankruptcy
(A.) Moveables.
|jity or 0
V  tC o u r T
JCrup^y <" Irc- 
sUll b« e r '*
questions in a Scottish a«nu«3tration the act and warrant in
h Dri fi pn favour of th« tnusi^e ijqsp iun» i'.rauflf^rn and v^stc
■ri«B in him "the whole moveable estate and effects of the
bankrupt wherever situated” . There are similar provisions 
in the bankruptcy statutes for En g l a n d . £  Bankruptcy Act 1914 
secs 53,167 J and Ireland, f Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 
(Ireland) Act 1857 sec. 267 J
Any order made by a Court having jurisdiction in b a n k ­
ruptcy in England shall be enforced in Scotland and Ireland 
in the Courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy there in 
the same manner in all respects as if the order h a d  been 
made in the Court which has to enforce it; and in like manner
any order made by a Court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy
Ireland^ r
in Scotland shall be enforced in England and -S c o t l a n d * f B a n k ­
ruptcy Act 1914 sec. 191: the terms of the Bankruptcy Act 
1883 were similar. See Wilkie v. Oathoart IB^O 9 M.16P j)
[ j ; «  T h e  H i g h  C o u r t  a n d  C o u n t y  C o u r t s  i n  E n g l a n d ,  t h e  C o u r t s  h a v i n g
j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  b a n k r u p t c y  I n  S c o t l a n d  a n d  I r e l a n d . ,  a n d  
e v e r y  B r i t i s h  C o u r t  e l s e w h e r e  h a v i n g  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  b a n k ­
r u p t c y  o r  i n s o l v e n c y ,  a n d  t h e  o f f i c e r s  o f  t h o s e  C o u r t s  respect­
ively, ahalx a c t  in aid of and b« auxiliary t o  eacn o t h e r  
in a l l  m a t t e r s  o f  b a n k r u p t c y ,  a n d  a n  o r d e r  o f  t h e  C o u r t  
s e e k i n g  a i d ,  w i t h  a  r e q u e s t  t o  a n o t h e r  o f  t h e  s a i d  C o u r t s ,  
s h a l l  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e n a b l e  t h e  l a t t e r  t o  e s e r c i s e  j u r -  
i s d i o t i o n .  f l b i d  s e c .  1  2 2 .  T h i s  r e p e a t s  s e c .  1 1 8  o f  t h e  1 8 8 3  
A c t .  S e e  M u r p h y ’ s  T r .  (9rH.) 1 9 3 3  S . L . T .  8 3 2 ;  S c r i v e n o r  , v .  
H o m e ’ s  T r s .  ( O . H . )  I 9 ° «  S . N .  2 1 ?  "re.  3 t e « l e  ( O . H . )  1 8 8 4  
1 S.L.T. 8 0?J
T h e  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  t h e  a s s i g n a t i o n  o f  the whole m o v e -  
a b l e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t  t o  t h e  t r u s t e e  b y  t h e  b a n k r u p t ­
c y  law o f  o n e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  I s l e s  i s ,  b y
s t a t u t e ,  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  e f f e c t i v e  i n  a l l  H.M. D o m i n i o n s .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  b a n k r u p t  c a n  n o t  d e a l  w i t h  h i s  p r o p e r t y ,
n o r  c a n  d i l i g e n c e  b e  e f f e c t i v e l y  u s e d  a g a i n s t  i t ,  i n  a n y
i j r i t i o n  c o - J i t r y .  w i x e . *  a e q u o . , t r a - L i o . . .  x i a o  p i - e u o u .  l y  b a e n  a w a r d -
e u  i i i  o n e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  I s l e s .
T h e  S c o t t i s h  C o u r t s  w i l l  l o t e k a t  a n d  c o n s t r u e  t h e  t e r m s  01
t h e  English or I r i s h  bankruptcy •-statutes, w h e r e  t h e y  d o  n o t
c o n t a i n  t e c h n i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  E n g l i s h  o r  I r i s h  b a n k r u p t
l a w ,  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  e s t a t e  h a s  b e e n  c o n v e y e d  t o  t h e  t r u s t e e
u n d e r  t h o s e  s t a t u t e s . ^ S a l a m a n  v *  T o d d  1 9 1 1  S . C .  1 2 1 4 ;
Y o u n g  v .  B u c k e l  2  M .  l O 7 ?  J  
questions with
I n / n o n  - B r i t i s h  Phere the effect o f  the f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  i s
foreign- c o u n t r i e s  to v e s t . s i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r u s t e e  t h e  w h o l e  m o v e -
a b l e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t ,  w h e r e v e r  s i t ­
u a t e d ,  h i °  t i t 1 t o  m o v e a v l e  p r o p e r t y  s i t u a t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  
i s  r e c o g n i s e d ,  G r a c i e  v .  G r a d e ' s  T r s . , ( O . H . )  1 9 0 9  P  S  . L  e T .
9 1 ;  Q b e r s  v .  P a t o n ' s  T r s .  1 8 9 7  P 4  R .  7 1 9 :  G o e t z e  &  S o h n  v .
A d e r s  1 8 7 4  2  R .  1 5 0  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t  p .  163 j 
a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  d i l i g e n c e  i n  S c o t l a n d  a g a i n s t  p r o p e r t y  o f  
t h e  b a n k r u p t  s i t u a t e d  h e r e  i s  o f  n o  e f f e c t .  £  S t r o t h e r  v .
R e a d  J u l y  1 s t  1 8 0 3  M o r .  F o r u m  O o m p e t e n s  A p p .  p .  4 .  O v e r ­
r u l e s  Q g i l v i e  v .  C r e d i t o r s  o f  A b e r d e i n  1 7 4 7  M o r .  4 5 5 6  a n d  o t h e r -  
p r e v i o u s  c a s e s .  A p p r o v e d  S e l k r i g  v ,  D a v i e s  I I  D o w  2 3 0 .  T h e r e  
was n o  specialty in these cases because a t  that t i m e . i n  
b a n k r u p t c y  m a t t e r s  E n g l a n d  a n d  S c o t l a n d  s t o o d  i n  t h e  p o s i t ­
i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  -  G o e t z e  & S a h n  v .  A d e r s  1 8 7 4  2  
R .  1 6 0  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t  p ,  1 6 3 ,  b u t  i n  a n y  e v e n t ,  
t h e  s a m e  j u d g m e n t  w a s  g i v e n  w h e r e  a  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  
i s s u e d  i n  A m e r i c a ,  w a s  h e l d  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  a n  a r r e s t m e n t  u s e d ,  
s u b s e q u e n t l y  i n  S c o t l a n d  -  M a i t l a n d  v .  H o f f m a n  1 8 0 8  M o r .
A p p .  B a n k r u p t ' N o •  2 6 J  T h e r e  i s  n o  n e e d  t o  i n t i m a t e  t h e
f o r e i g n  a w a r d ,  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  t o  t h e  h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h
f o r e i g n
f u n d s  b e f o r e  t h e  t i t l e  o f  t h e  S e e b b f a h  t r u s t e e  b e c o m e s  
e f f e c t i v e , '  £  S t r o t h e r  v .  R e a d ,  S e l k r i g  v .  D a v i e s ,  s u p r a  J  
b u t  i n t i m a t i o n  i s  n e c e s s a r y  o f  a  f o r e i g n  t r u s t  d e e d  f o r  
c r e d i t o r s ,  a n d  t h a t  i n t i m a t i o n  m u s t  s a t i s f y  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f f
SCO
1063
t s  l a w .  Donaldson v .  F i n d l a y  B a n n a t v n e  A -  C o .  1855* Q>7 D .
j
The foreign decree of bankruptcy is a sufficient title
to the trustee to ingather funds in Scotland. A petition
for the confirmation of a Chilean sequestration of the estates
of a deceased person was considered to be incompetent,
and tn. the same petition a crave for authority to unlift
the proceeds of certain Scottish policies of assurance on
the life of the deceased was refused as ineempefeBf
unnecessary. ^  Araya v .  Ooghill 1 9 2 1  S.C. If the debtors
of the bankrupt are unwilling to recognise the title of
the foreign trustee,the foreign trustee should sue them in
)
a simple action for paymenkor raise a multiplepoinding in tha
n a m e  o f  t h e  d e b t o r a s  n o m i n a l  r a i s e r . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
W h e n  a  p e r s o n  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  b a n k r u p t  i n  P r a n c e ,  a n d .  a
" s y n d i c ” ,  i . e .  t r u s t e e ,  a p p o i n t e d  there, w h o  b y  F r e n c h
t o  s u e  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r s ,  h i s  t i t l e  
b a n k r u p t c y  law h a d  the e x c l u s i v e  r i g h t / t o  b r i n g  a n  a c t i o n
o f  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  S e s s i o n  o f  a  d e e d  w h i c h
prejudiced the creditors was sustained .|o(U*o-v. I tv.
Suppose o scots debtor paid the bankrupt after he had
been sequestrated abroad u n k n o w n  to the debtor, would the
d e b t o r  b e  l i a b l e  t o  p a y  a g a i n  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r u s t e e ?  T h e r e  4 s
n o  a u t h o r i t y ,  b u t  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  t h a t  o n  e q u i t a b l e  g r o u n d s ,
i f  t h e  d e b t o r  w a s  i n  b o n a  f i d e  i g n o r a n c e  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n
b a n k r u p t c y  w h e n  h e  p a i d ,  h e  c o u l d  n o t  b e  c a l l e d  u p o n  t o
p a y  a g a i n .  I f  t h e  d e b t o r  p a i d  t h e  b a n k r u p t  a f t e r  h e  h a d  b e e n
r e n d e r e d  b a n k r u p t  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  d e b t o r  w o u l d  h a v e  t o
p a y  a g a i n  t o  t h e  t r u s t e e ,  b u t  t h a t  i s  b e c a u s e  b a n k r u p t c y
i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  a  p u b l i c  a c t  o f  w h i c h  e v e r y o n e  h a s  n o t i c e .
B u t  a  d e b t o r  c a n  n o t  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  k n o w  t h e  a d j u d i c a t i o n s
o f  f o r e i g n ^  C o u r t s .
" i t  i s  o n l y  a s  o p e r a t i n g  a  c o n v e y a n c e  o f  m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e
t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  p r o c e e d i n g s  r e c e i v e  e f f e c t .
£  G o e t z e  v .  A d e r s  1 8 7 4  2  R .  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t
p .  0 1 5 4  ]  T h u s  a  r a d i c a l  r i g h t  r e m a i n s  t o  t h e  b a n k r u p t  i*
r
S»«ct c f  Property even though ffcot is c ci^ e by H e
G r a c i e  v .  G r a c i e ' s  T r s .  ( O . H . )  1 9 0 9  2  S . L . T o  9 1  J i n  a  
v g J l U h b i  w B  c f h ^ ~ ] J l& W ( o l r a § ' t & f e f e e g  c u t t i n g  d o w n  v o l u n t a r y
p r e d e p e p e e S
p r e f e r e n c e s  a p p l y ;  ( l B l a o k b u r n  2 2  n d  P e b  1 8 1 0  P . O .  S e e  
h o w e v e r  S c o t t i s h  N a t i o n a l  I n s u r a n c e  v .  J a m e s  1 8 8 6  1 3  R .
9 2 8  J  a n d  a l t h o u g h  t h e  t i t l e  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r u s t e e  i s  
r e c o g n i s e d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  e x c l u d i n g  s u b s e q u e n t  d i l i g e n c e  
a g a i n s t  p r o p e r t y  s i t u a t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  i f  t h e  f o r e i g n  
b a n k r u p t c y  l a w  i s  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  a n d  c u t s  d o w n  d i l i g e n c e  w h i c h  
w a s  v a l i - d l y - l a i d - o r - a t - t h e - t i m e  u s e d  p r i o r  t o  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y ,  
i t  w i l l  n o t  b e  a l l o w e d  t h a t  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  e f f e c t ,  i n  S c o t ­
l a n d  s o  a s  t o  e x c l u d e  d i l i g e n c e  w h i c h  w a s  v a l i d l y  l a i d  
o n  a t  t h e  t i m e .  £  H u n t e r  v .  P a l m e r  1 8 ? -  3  s .  B u t  a
c r e d i t o r  w h o  u s e d  a r r e s t m e n t s  i n  S c o t l a n d  a f t e r  t h e  d a t e  
o f  a n  A m e r i c a n  c o m m i s s i o n  b u t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  a s s i g n m e n t  
w a s  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  R e t r o a c t i v e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  a s s i g n m e n t  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  A m e r i c a n  l a w  -  M a i t l a n d  v .  H o f f m a n n , s u p r a  J 
O u r  C o u r t s  h o w e v e r  w i l l ,  i n c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  a l l o w  o u r  r e t r o ­
s p e c t i v e  b a n k r u p t c y  s t a t u t e s  t o  c u t  d o w n  v o l u n t a r y  p r e f e r e n c e s  
o r  s e c u r i t i e s  g i v e n  t o  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t o r s  p r i o r  t o  b a n k r u p t c y ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t o r  v a l i d l y  o b t a i n e d  h i s  r i v n t  a t  
t " c  t i m e .  [  w h t t w  v .  B r i g g R  1 8 4 ?  1 1 4 8  J
? B )  I m m o v e a b l e s .
T h e  u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  i s  n o t  r e c o g n i s e d  e i t h e r  
b y  o u r s e l v e s , £  P h o s p h a t e  S e w a g e  C o  v .  L a w s o n s  T r u s t e e  
1 8 7 8  6  R .  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t  p .  1 1 3 8  J o r  b y  
m o s t  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s ,  B a r  p .  - J  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  i m m o v e ­
a b l e s .  T o  i m m o v e a b l e s  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  s i t u s  g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i e s .
I n  questions Among the B r i t i s h  countries there i s
w i t h  B r i t i s h  c o u n t r i e s .  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  s e c u r i n g  u n i v e r s a l i t y .
T h u s  i n  a  S c o t t i s h  s e q u e s t r a t i o j n  t h e  a c t
a n d  v ^ a r r a n t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  t r u s t e e  i p s o  i u r e  t r a n s f e r s  a n d  ®  
v e s t s  i n  h i m  a l l  r e a l  e s t a t e  s i t u a t e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  ,  I r e l a n d ,  
o r  a n y  o f  H . M .  D o m i n i o n s ,  b e l o n g i n g  t o  t h e  b a n k r u p t ,  t o  t h e  
s a m e  e f f e c t  a s  i f  h e  h a d  b e e n  r e n d e r e d  b a n k r u p t  i n  E n g l a n d  
I r e l a n d  o r  a  D o m i n i o n ; .  A s  r e g a r d s  a l l  f r e e h o l d ,  c o p y h o l d  a n d  
l e a ^ e h g l d  g y t ^ g  a o t  a n d  w a r r a n t  o f  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Jh a s  t o  b e  r e g i s t e r e d  i n  t h e  c h i e f  C o u r t  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  w h e r e  i t  i s  s i t u a t e d , i n  t h e  l i k e  m a n n e r  a s  a n  a d ­
j u d i c a t i o n  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  o r  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  p r o c e s s  o u g h t  t o  
b e  r e g i s t e r e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h a t '  c o u n t r y ,  F f b  i s  i s  
t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a l l  p e r s o n s  c o n c e r n e d  m a y  h a v e  t h e  s a m e  
m e a n s  o f  a s c e r t a i n i n g  w h e t h e r  a n y  p e r s o n  h a s  b e e n  a d j u d ­
i c a t e d  b a n k r u p t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  S c o t l a n d  a s  t h e y  
h a v e  o f  a s c e r t a i n i n g  w h e t h e r  a n y  p e r s o n  h a s  b e e n  a d j u d g e d  b a n k ­
r u p t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
i s  s i t u a t e d .  J  a n d  n o p u r c h a s e r  f o r  v a l u a b l e  c o n ­
s i d e r a t i o n  o f  s u c h  p r o p e r t y  s h a l l  b e  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  b a n k ­
r u p t c y  u n t i l  s u c h  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  Where, a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w s  
o f  T h a i l a n d  I r e l a n d  o r *  o t h e r *  I T . ” .  D o m i n i  o n e ,  a n ”  d e e d  o r  
c o n v e y a n c e  r e q u i r e s  r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  e n r o l m e n t ,  o r  r e c o r d i n g ,  
t h e  a c t  a n d  w a r r a n t  o f  c o n f i r m a t i o n  s h a l l  b e  s o  r e g i s t e r e d  
e n r o l l e d ,  o r  r e c o r d e d .  P u r c h a s e r s  f o r  v a l u a b l e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  
a n d  w i t h o u t  n o t i c e  o f  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ^ p r i o r  t o  t h e  r e g ­
i s t r a t i o n  e n r o l l m e n t  o r  r e c o r d i n g  o f  t h e  a c t  a n d  w a r r a n t ,  a r e *  
n o t  t o  b e  a f f e c t e d . .  £  B a n k r u p t c y  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t  1 9 1 3  s e c .  9 7 .  
S e e  M u r p h f r f s  T r .  ( 0  * . K . )  1 9 3 3  S . L . T .  6 3 9  j  T h e r e  a r e  s i m i l a r  
p r o v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  s t a t u t e s  f o r  I r e l a n d , £  B a n k r u p t  -  
c y  a n d  I n s o l v e n c y  ( I r e l a n d )  A c t  1 8 5 7  s e c .  2 6 8 , 9  J  a n d  E n g l a n d ,  
^ B a n k r u p t c y  A c t  1 9 1 4  s e c s  5 3 , 1 6 7  J  
I n  q u e s t i o n s  A  s c o t c h  t r u s t e e  i s  n o t  g i v e n  a  t i t l e  t o
w i t h  n o n -  f o r e i g n  i m m o v e a b l e s .  T h e  E n g l i s h  £  B a n k r u p t c y
B r i t i s h  f o r -  A c t  1 9 1 4  s e c s  3 3 ,  1 6 7  J a n d  I r i s h  { ^ B a n k r u p t c y  a n d
Insolvency m
e i g n  countries ( I r e l a n d )  A c t  1 8 5 7  s e c .  2 6 8  J t h e  s t a t u t e s
p u r p o r t ,  t h o u g h  i n e f f e c t i v e l y ,  t o  d o  t h i s .  T h e  S c o t c h  t r u s t e e  
c a n  o b t a i n  a  t i t l e  t o  f o r e i g n  i m m o v e a b l e s  b y  t h e  b a n k r u p t  
g r a n t i n g  a  c o n v e y a n c e  i n  h i s  f a v o u r ,  a n d  t h e  O o u r t ,  c a n  
c o m p e l  t h e  b a n k r u p t  t o  g r a n t  s u c h  c o n v e y a n c e s  u n d e r  p e n a l t y  
o f  i m p r i s o n m e n t  a n d  f o r f e i t u r e  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  
b a n k r u p t c y  A c t s .  £  B a n k r u p t c y  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t  1 9 1 3  s e c .  7 7  J 
B u t  i f  a  c r e d i t o r  a t t a c h e s  f o r e i g n  i m m o v e a b l e s  b e f o r e  t h e  t r u t  
t e e  c o m p l e t e s  h i s  t i t l e  t o .  t h e m , t h e  c r e d i t o r  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y ,
b e  g e n o p e r i l y  b e  p r e f e r r e d  b y  t h e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y .  C o r r e s ­
p o n d i n g l y ,
p e r s o n s  using diligence against s c o t c h  immoveables are 
p r e f e r a b l e  t o  a foreign trustee who obtained his title 
as trustee before the diligence,but had not completed it 
according to our conveyancing requirements when the diligenc* 
was executed, Weston v. Falconer 17th Dec. 1817 P.O.:
R o y a l  Bank v. Scott Smith Steinfr Go. 80 th J an IRIS P.O.;
Seller If y. Davies 1814 TI Dow ° 3 0 J
The Court of Session will assist a foreign trustee 
to dispose of Scotch heritage. Thus a Chilean trustee was 
authorised to sell Scotch heritage, but on the condition 
that out of the proceeds bonds over the property and the 
expenses of sale be paid, that the' sale should not operate 
conversion, and that the proceeds should be consigned with 
the Accountant of Court to await the orders of the Court, 
r Araya v. Coghill 1921 S.C. 462
Whereas a foreign trustee appointed in a prior foreign 
bankruptcy may obtain payment of moveable funds ingathered 
by a Scotch trustee appointed by a subsequent Scotch sequ­
estration, and will be preferred to him in a competition for 
moveable funds in Scotland, £ Palconer v. T*reston 18th Nov.
1814 Fi-C. referred to in Weston v . Pa 1 ooner 17th Dec 1817 
P.O. J  he may not recover from the Scotch trustee the proceeds 
of heritage. W e s t o n  v »  Falconer, supra J
. v
Universality of Bankruptcy, continued .
Pischarge of the b a n k r u p t  
in B r i t i s h  T h e  d i s c h a r g e  of a  b a n k r u p t  in a Scotch s e q u e s t r a t i o n
c o u n t r i © w h i c h  r e l e a s e s  h i m  " o f  a l l  d e b t s  a n d  o b l i g a t i o n s  c o n t r a c t e d  b y  
h i m  o r  f o r  w h i c h  h e  i s  l i a b l e  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
£ B a n k r u p t c y  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t  1 9 1 3  s e c .  1 4 5  J " s h a l l  r e c e i v e  
e f f e c t  w i t h i n  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  a n d  I r e l a n d  a n d .  a l l  H . M ’ s  
o t h e r  D o m i n i o n s "  £ I b i d  s e c .  144 J I n  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  s t a t u t e  
f o r  E n g l a n d  £ B a n k r u p t c y  A c t  1 9 1 4  s e c .  2 8  a n d  1 2 1  J and 
I r e l a n d , £ B a n k r u p t c y  a n d  Insolvency (I r e l a n d ) A c t  1°87 
s e c .  148 a n d  B a n k r u p t c y  A c t  1 9 1 4  s e c .  1 2 1  J t h e r e  a r e  p r o v i s ­
i o n s  w h i c h  s e c u r e ,  m o r e  o r  l e s s  e x p r e s s l y ,  t h a t  t h e  d i s c h a r g e
i s  r e c o g n i s e d  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  I s l e s ,  a n d  a s  t h e s e  s t a t u t e s  a r e  
p a s s e d  b y  t h e  I m p e r i a l  P a r l i a m e n t * t h e  d i s c h a r g e  g r a n t e d  
u n d e r  t h e m  w i l l  b e  e f f e c t i v e  i n  a l l  H . M .  D o m i n i o n s .  £ o i 1 1  v .  
B a r r o n  1 8 6 8  L . R .  2  P . O .  1 6 7 ;  E l l i s  v .  M c H e n r y  1 8 7 1  L . R .
]G . P .  2 2 8 ,  2 3 4  J B u t  a  d i s c h a r g e  g r a n t e d  b y  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  
a  D o m i n i o n  u n d e r  a  s t a t u t e  o f  t h a t  D o m i n i o n  i s  i n  t h e  s a m e  
p o s i t i o n  a s  a  d i s c h a r g e  g r a n t e d  b y  a  f o i w g n  C o u r t , -  i . e .  
i t  o n l y  d i s c h a r g e s  d e b t s  o f  w h i c h  t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  i s  t h e  l a v /  
o f  t h e  D o m i n i o n .  £  G o u d y  p . O O b j  
In q u e s t i o n s  A t  t h e  o u t s e t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  to d i s t i n g u i s h
( v i t i l  w o n -  a  d i s c h a r g e  o f  the debts o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t ,  a n d  exemption from
B r i t i s h  f o r -  s o m e  o f  t h e  r e m e d i e s  a g a i n s t ,  a n d  d i s a b i l i t i e s  o f ,  a
d c  b te-r.
eifln c o u n t r i e s  |YO o u d v  p. 3 0 6  J I n  E n g l a n d  a n d  S c o t l a n d  t h e r e  
i s  a n  a b s o l u t e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  a l l  p r i o r  d e b t s ,  b u t  i n  s o m e  
c o u n t r i e s  the d e b t o r  i s  o n l y  l i b e r a t e d  f r o m  f u t u r e  i m p r i s ­
o n m e n t  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  £ s t o r y  8 t h  e d .  s e c .  3 3 8  J  
O b v i o u s l y  t h e  b a n k r u p t ' s  d i s c h a r g e  c a n  h a v e  n o  h i g h e r  
e f f e c t  o u t s i d e  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  the C o u r t  w h i c h  d i s c h a r g e d  
h i m  t h a n  i n s i d e ,  a n d  s o  w h e n e v e r  a  f o r e i g n  d i s c h a r g e  i s  
p l e a d e d  a s  h a v i n g  e x t i n g u i s h e d  a  d e b t f i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
e n q u i r e  w h e t h e r  i t  h a s  t h a t  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  o f  b a n k ­
r u p t c y .  I f  t h e  d e b t  i s  n o t  e x t i n g u i s h e d ,  i t  m a #  b e  e n f o r c e d
isoq FTP D
i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  f  S t o r y  8 t h  E d .  s e c .  3 3 9 : L^JJby \j_ 1
T a k i n g  t h e  c a s e  w h e r e  the d i s c h a r g e  e x t i n g u i s h e s  a l l
p r i o r  d e b t s ,  w h a t  e f f e c t  h a s  t h i s  o u t s i d e  t h e  c o u n t r y  o f
b a n k r u p t c y ?  O u r  C o u r t s  w i l l  r e c o g n i s e  s u c h  a  d i s c h a r g e  a s
d i s c h a r g i n g  a l l  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  w h i c h  t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  i s  t h e
th<i c o u n t r y  o f  b a n k r u p t c y ]  £  S t o r y  s e c .  3 8 6 ;  O h e s h m r e  p .  ^ - 2 0 ;
G o u d y  p .  - 6 0 6 ;  B e l l  C o m m .  7 t h  E d .  i i  p .  3 7 9 ;  D i c e y  p .  6 0 3 :
M a r s h a l l  v .  Y e a m a n  &  S p e n c e  1 7 4 6  M o r .  4 6 6 8 ;  C h r i s t i e  v .
4 5 6 9
S t r a i t o n  1 7 4 6  M o r .  R T ¥ 0 - ;  R o y a l  B a n k  v .  S c o t t  S m i t h  S t e i n  _
:  &  C o .  2 0 t h  J a n .  1 8 1 3  F . C . ;  a t  t h a t  t i m e  E n g l a n d  w a s  i n  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  a s  r e g a r d s  b a n k r u p t c y  -  G o e t z e  
v .  A d e r s  1 8 7 4  2  R 0  1 5 0  p e r  l o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t  p .  1 5 3 ;
b u t  i n  a n y  e v e n t ,  t h e  s a m e  p r i n c i p l e  w a s  a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  a  b a n k r u p t c y  m  N e w  Y o r f ;  A r m d u r  v .  C a i f a p b e l l  1 7 9 8  M o r i
ligations of v/sfhich the proper law is Scottish, or the law 
of a third foreign country, are not discharged. £ Cheshire 
p. A 90; Story sac. • Goudy p. ene; Bell 'Comm. 7 th Ed.
II "pn; Dicey p. ; Creditors of Galbreath v. Galhreath 
1762 For. 4774; Watson v. Renton. 179 °  Mor. 4782; Rose v .
LcLeod 1827 4 s. 508; Richardson v. Lady Hadinton 2 Shaw 
App. Cases 4 06; Antony Gibbs & Sons v. La Societe Industrielle 
et Qommeroiale Des Metaux 1890 8 5 q.B.D. 5 9 9
i t  h a s  b e e n  o p i n t ? d  t h a t  i f  c r e d i t o r  h a s  p l a n n e d  i n  
a  f o r e i g n  b a n k r u p t c y  a n d  d r a w n  d i v i d e n d s , n o  c o u l d  n o t  c b a l l - r  
e n g e  t n e  r i g h t  o f  t h o s ©  b a n k r u p t c y  p r o c e e d i n g ©  t o  d i s c h a r g e  
f i i s  d e b t .  £  n u n c a n  L  u y i i c s  p .  A d ? ;  b a r  p .  1 0  u o ,  J  j )
—  However it was held in an old case that a creditor is not te 
barred from proceeding against the person of the debtorin 
Scotland, and by parity of reasoning it would applyto 
proceedings against his heritage, because he had claimed in 
the bankruptcy proceedings of that debtor abroad, even 
althou gh claiming operated, in the country seised of the 
bankruptcy, as an election of the remedy of sequestration.
£ Robinson v. Coupar 11th Feb 1811 F.C. J
U nation 
fcrTTeath
Succession.
V/hether a person must be presumed dead, and if so, 
from what date, is a problem which frequently arises when 
a person has been missing for some time. The death 
usually affects a question of inheritance or a question 
as to whether a marriage is dissolved by the death of one 
of the spouses. The former only is considered here.
By the Presumption of Life Limitation (Scotland)
Act 1891 /”5 4 &  55 Viet. c. Sec. 5, when any person
has disappeared and has not been heard of for seven years 
or upwards, the Court, on the petition of any person 
entitled to succeed to any estate on the death of such 
person may find that such person has disappeared and 
find what was the date on which he was last known to be 
alive and that he died on some specified date, which 
shall be, if there is no sufficient evidence that he 'died 
at any definite date, 7 years after he was last known to 
be alive; ,fProvided always, that nothing herein contained 
shall entitle any person to any part of the intestate 
moveable succession of a person who has disappeared if 
the latter was not a domiciled Scotsman at the date at 
which he is proved or presumed to have died.”
A foreign declaration of death would not be 
recognised in the case of a domiciled Scotsman.
If a person domiciled abroad has been declared dead 
by the Courts of his domicile, that should be regarded as 
a judgement in rem and conclusive here. / “Bar p. 294J  
If a person domiciled abroad has not been declared, dead 
by the proper process of the Courts of his domicile it 
should be competent to declare him dead in the Scottish 
Courts in accordance with our law /~The common law, since 
The Presumption of Life Limitation (Scotland) Act 1891 is 
not applicable to such a case j  with respect to such of 
his assets as are situated in this country. /~~Cp. German 
Civil Code, Rabel, i p. 165, Breslauer, Private 
International/
Lex situs
governs
questions
o f m i s '
International Law of Succession p. 64__7
Another problem is to determine which of two relatives 
died first when they suffer a common calamity. Each 
country has a different set of presumptions to decide 
this question. This is simply the determination of fact 
and the presumptions matter of evidence, and accordingly, 
the order of death is determined according to the rules 
of evidence of the lex fori. /""Contra Bar p. 805,
Label i, p.l67_7 In one English case f ~In re Cohn 
1944 171 L.T. 377J  where the question was whether a
daughter had survived her mother, both having been killed
in the same air-raid, the law of the domicile of the mother, 
the succession to whose property was in issue, was held to 
govern. The domicile of the daughter happened to be the
same as that of the mother. It is submitted that the
German presumption for simultaneous death, which was 
applied because German lav/ was the law of the testatorfs 
domicile, was purely a presumption of evidence: the lex
fori should have governed. /~This case raises a difficulty' 
problem of Classification (q.v. >_7
The law of succession in moveables to the effect of 
pointing out who has the right to succeed is, generally 
speaking, the lex domicilii, but questions as to the title 
of the successor are governed by the lex situs of the 
property. /[""Bar p. 836, Craigie v. Gardiner 12th June 1819
<Hnd
Thus where A dies^A’s heir also dies before expeding 
confirmation, the question whether the property of A vested 
ipso jure in the heir so as to descend to the heir's heirs, 
or goes instead to the next heirs of A is determined by the 
lex situs. f ~Milligan v. Milligan 1826 4 S. 432; Smith 
v. Lauder 1834 12 S. 646; McLaren p. 41_7
In some countries, for example Scotland and England, 
the only person who has a title to uplift and administer 
the property of a deceased is one to whom authority has 
been granted by the Court. /“""The title of a testamentary 
executor/
'Effect of 
confirmation
'probate e 
limited t  
ju r i sd ic t io n
o own
executor to personalty of which he has obtained possession 
is complete without confirmation, which is however necessary 
in order to give him an active title against debtors to the 
estate who decline to pay without it” - Orr-Ewing 1885 
15 R. (E.L.) per Lord Watson at p. 26J  Such a person, 
who is referred to here as the executor, has the duty of 
ingathering the estate of the deceased, paying his debts, 
and distributing the balance to the beneficiaries entitled 
thereto. In other countries no judicial title is required, 
the estate of the deceased passing directly to his heirs, 
subject to their acceptance, who are entitled to the 
property and liable (usually personally liable unless 
they take the succession cum beneficio inventarii) for 
the debts of the deceased. /""Cheshire p. 500_J7 The 
question whether a judicial title is required to intromit 
with the papers and property of a deceased, and the effect
of vitious intromission without a title, are to be
determined according to the law of the situs of the
property. f ~Fischer v. Earl Seafield 1 S. 435 (2nd ed.
p. 437); Dingwall v. Vandosme 1619 Mor. 4449;
Archbishop of Glasgow v. Bruntsfield Mor. 4449;
McLaren p. 44_J7
The Scots Courts will grant confirmation when, and 
only when, there are moveable assets of the deceased 
situated within Scotland. /""Currie p. 4185__7 virtue 
of the Revenue Act 1808 /""See also Confirmation and Probate 
Act 1858 Sec. 9j/ the Scots executor must give up an 
inventory of the whole property of the deceased wherever 
situated, but It is only with regard to property situated 
In Scotland that the confirmation gives an effective title, 
and similarly the validity of all foreign grants of probate 
or administration are limited to property within their 
territory, although they may purport to give a title to 
property everywhere. /""Currie p. 17J  ’’The grant of 
probate does not of its own force carry the power of 
dealing/
dealing with goods beyond the jurisdiction of the Court 
which grants it, though that may be the Court of the 
testators domicil” f ~Blackwood v. The Queen 1882 8 A.C. 
(P.C.) 82 at p. 92.Statutory provision exists for resealing 
in England grants of confirmation probate or administration 
made In Scotland, Northern Ireland (Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act 1925 Secs 168, 169, as amended by 
Administration of Justice Act 1928 sec. 10) British 
possessions (Colonial Probates Act 1892, Colonial Probates 
(Protected States and Mandated Territories) Act 1927) 
and foreign countries in which His Majesty has jurisdiction 
(1913 3 & 4 Creo-V c. 16) (0-enfIrmat-i-on- of Executors— (Serotr)
(_ C o r '- f i rm a ti 'o n  of E*&co1o-r5> j )  f\ c t  l i g
Act 1858 see* 14 and resealing in ScotlandAand Northern 
Ireland (Probate and Letters of Administration (Ireland)
Act 1857 Sec. 94; Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1932 S. 2) grants of probate of letters 
of administration obtained in England, whereupon the 
confirmation, probate, or letters of administration have 
the same validity as if they had been granted by the Court 
by which they are reseale In this respect confirmation
or a grant of probate differs from sequestration. Where 
the heirs of the deceased have right to all debts or goods 
belonging to him without any judicial process, that right 
is similarly limited to goods within the territory of that 
law, and confirmation in Scotland is required to obtain a 
title to deal with property situated in Scotland, Brown 
& Duff v. Bizet 1666 Mor. 4498_7 even if the deceased 
died domiciled in a country where such a rule obtains.
Until a foreign heir confirms to property situated here 
it remains in bonis defuncti and it is not possible, for 
instance, to arrest the property to found jurisdiction 
against the foreign heir, f ~Houston v. Stirling 1824 2 S. 
672; Cameron y  Chapman 1838 16 S. 907J7 unless there is 
a special assignation and disposition of the subject in 
question/
question by the defunct to the foreign heir or 
representative when that is a good title without 
confirmation,/""1690 c. 26, saved by 4 Geo IV c. 98 sec 4; 
Bell v. Willison 1831 9 S. 266; Lyle v. Falconer 1842 
5 D. 236_7 and in which case it is possible to arrest the 
property to found jurisdiction against the foreign heir 
even though he is not confirmed./"-Inverrarity & Co. v. Moffet 
1840 2D. 813_7
As regards corporeal goods in_ transitu at the time of
death, or goods sent from one country to another after
death, the executor who first reduces them into possession 
within the territory from the law of which he derives his 
grant, has title to them,/""Westlake par. 95; Currie p. 130; 
Hutchison v. Aberdeen Banking C o . 1837 15 S. 1100_7 
Thus a Scotch executor has the right to be confirmed not 
only to the moveable property of the deceased which was 
situated in Scotland at the time of death, but also to any 
corporeal moveables which may be brought into the country 
subsequently, provided that the27 have not been lawfully 
reduced into possession previously by some foreign heir 
or executor, when of course he has title to them.
The rules for determining what is the situs of 
various kinds of property are considered elsewhere
/"infra p. J
\ Which executor In consequence of the rule that the law of the situs
has"litle to
grant discharge governs all questions of title, the question which 
of a debt due
Fo deceased? executor, where there ai’e more than one, has a title to
receive and discharge a debt due to the deceased depends 
on the situs of the debt, for the executor appointed by 
the Courts of the situs has that right. f ~Earl of 
Breadalbane v. Innes 1736 1 Pat. 181_7 In Hutchison & C o . 
v. Aberdeen Banking Co. /~1837 15 S. 1100__7 a domiciled 
Englishman had died intestate, and a Scotch debtor had, 
at the request of his relatives, sent money due to him to 
England/
To whom is
confirmation
granted^
England to be paid to his legal representatives. The 
money was subsequently handed over to an English creditor 
of the deceased who obtained letters of administration; 
a Scotch creditor obtained appointment in Scotland as 
executor-creditor and sued for a second payment of the 
money. It was held that the transmission of the money to 
England in the first place was lawfully and regularly done 
as the proper forum of distribution, that the money was 
then situated in England and properly paid to the English 
administrator, and accordingly the Scotch executor 
creditor could not succeed in his action.
It has been suggested that if a Scots debtor of the 
deceased had reasonable grounds for believing that a 
foreign executor was the bona fide representative of the 
deceased, and paid to him, he would be discharged. 
/""Cheshire p. 510; Story J  but there is no
authority for this, it is contrary to principle, and 
there is not even any equitable ground on which it can 
be defended: if a creditor dies and his executor demands
payment the debtor should not pay until he sees the 
executors title; if that title when exhibited, is a 
foreign one, that should put the debtor on his guard to 
enquire whether the executor really has a right to 
payment, and if the debtor does pay him in spite of the 
foreign title, that is a piece of carelessness for which 
he deserves no consideration. It is submitted that there 
is no exception to the rule that only the executor of the 
situs of a debt can validly discharge it.
In the interests of unity of administration, if the 
deceased died domiciled abroad and an executor has been 
appointed by the Courts of his domicile, that executor 
will normally be appointed executor here too, whether the 
deceased died testate or intestate. Marchioness of 
Hastings 1852 14 D. 489. ,fThe practice is to allow foreign 
executors to come here and obtain confirmation so as to 
give/
give them a title to that portion of the moveable estate 
of a defunct which happens to be situated in this country 
and that whether the executor be an executor-nominate or 
and executor-at-lawn—  Goetze v. Aders 1874 2 R. Per Lord 
President Inglis at p. 153_7 But this will not be done 
where the foreign executor is not competent to act as 
such in Scotland, for example because he is under age. 
f ~In re Duchess I)1 Orleans 1859 1 Sw. & Tr. 253. But 
resealing cannot be refused because the executor appointed 
in the other British country is incompetent to act as an 
executor here - In re Rankine 1918 P. 134_7 Nor can 
anyone be appointed executor who has not himself a title 
founded either on the express nomination of the deceased 
or his propinquity or his direct interest as a creditor 
or a legatee, and accordingly when, in a competition in 
the English Court of Probate between several claimants for 
the office of executor, a temporary administrator was 
appointed during the dependence of the suit, he had no 
title to be decerned executor-dative qua administrator 
in Scotland. /"Viftilffin v. Lees 1872 10 M. 797_/ T1*10 
comity of appointing the same person executor here only 
means that we will appoint the executor according to the 
domicil of the deceased and when the English Court of 
Probate appointed an administrator on the English estate 
of a deceased who died domiciled in Paraguay, he was not 
entitled to be decerned executor-dative qua administrator 
here, f ~Whlffln v. Lees, supra_/ If the deceased died 
domiciled in a country where the office of executorship 
is unknown, the foreign heir or universal successor will 
be appointed./"In re Achillonpoulos 1928 Ch. 433_/
In bankruptcy Scotland recognises the principles both of 
unity and universality. In the administration of 
successions Scotland recognises the principle of unity, 
but not of universality.
A foreign grant of probate or administration is a
sufficient/
s u f f i c i e n t  i n c h o a t e  t i t l e  t o  e n a b l e  t h e  f o r e i g n  e x e c u t o r  
t o  s u e  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  f o r  d e b t s  o r  g o o d s  s i t u a t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  
d u e  t o  t h e  d e c e a s e d ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  h e  c o n f i r m s  b e f o r e  
e x t r a c t .  f ~ W a r d  l a w  v .  M a x w e l l  1715 M o r .  4500; C l e r k  v .  
B r e b n e r  1759 M o r .  4471; S t e w a r t  v .  M a c d o n a l d  1826 5 S .  29J 
O t h e r w i s e  a  f o r e i g n  g r a n t  o f  p r o b a t e  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  
n o  t i t l e  t o  s u e  i n  S c o t l a n d .  O f  c o u r s e  a  f o r e i g n  e x e c u t o r  
c a n  s u e  f o r  a  r i g h t  d u e  t o  h i m  p e r s o n a l l y  a s  e x e c u t o r  i f  i t  
i s  n o t  o n e  w h i c h  h e  t a k e s  b y  c o m i n g  i n t o  t h e  s h o e s  o f  t h e  
d e c e a s e d .  T h u s  i f  a  f o r e i g n  e x e c u t o r  o b t a i n s  j u d g e m e n t  
a g a i n s t  a  d e b t o r  i n  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  h e  c a n  s u e  o n  t h a t  
f o r e i g n  d e c r e e  h e r e  w i t h o u t  e x p e d i n g  c o n f i r m a t i o n  h e r e ,  
f ~ I n  r e  M a c n i c o l  L . R .  1874 19 E q .  8 1 _ 7  a n ( 3  s i m i l a r l y  w h e r e  
t h e  f o r e i g n  e x e c u t o r  o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o b t a i n s  s u b s e q u e n t  
t o  t h e  d e a t h  a n y  r i g h t  d u e  t o  h i m  a s  s u c h  e x e c u t o r  o r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  w h i c h  w a s  n o t  p a r t  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ’ s  
e s t a t e ,  t h e  e x e c u t o r  o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  c a n  s u e  h e r e  w i t h o u t  
e x p e d i n g  c o n f i r m a t i o n .  f ~ V a n q u e l i n  v .  B o u a r d  1865 15 C . B .  
( M . S . )  341J  ¥ / h e r e  f o r e i g n  l e t t e r s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o r  
a  f o r e i g n  g r a n t  o f  p r o b a t e  / " " b u t .  n o t  g r a n t s  f r o m  E n g l a n d  
o r  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d _ 7  a r ' Q  p r o d u c e d  a s  a  t i t l e ,  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  
o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  j u d g e  m u s t  b e  a u t h e n t i c a t e d  b y  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  
o f  a  N o t a r y  P u b l i c ,  B r i t i s h  C o n s u l ,  o r  m a y o r  o f  t h e  t o w n .  
f ~ D i s b r o w  v .  M a c k i n t o s h  1852 15 D .  123; D i c k s o n  i i  1320J  
B y  s t a t u t e ,  w h e n e v e r  a  c o n v e n t i o n  s h a l l  b e  m a d e  w i t h  a  
f o r e i g n  s t a t e  w h e r e b y  o u r  c o n s u l s  o r  v i c e - c o n s u l s  s h a l l  
r e c e i v e  t h e  s a m e  p o w e r ,  t h e  K i n g  m a y  d i r e c t  b y  O r d e r  i n  
C o u n c i l  t h a t  w h e n e v e r  a n y  s u b j e c t  o f  s u c h  f o r e i g n  s t a t e  
s h a l l  d i e  w i t h i n  H.M. D o m i n i o n s ,  a n d  t h e r e  s h a l l  b e  n o  
p e r s o n  p r e s e n t  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  s u c h  d e a t h  w h o  s h a l l  b e  
r i g h t f u l l y  e n t i t l e d  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  t o  t h e  d e c e a s e d ’ s  e s t a t e ,  
i t  s h a l l  b e  l a w f u l  f o r  t h e  c o n s u l  o r  v i c e - c o n s u l  o f  s u c h  
f o r e i g n  s t a t e  t o  t a k e  p o s s e s s i o n  a n d  h a v e  t h e  c u s t o d y  o f  
t h e  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ,  a n d  t o  a p p l y  t h e  
s a m e  i n  p a y m e n t  o f  h i s  o r  h e r  d e b t s  a n d  f u n e r a l  e x p e n s e s ,  
a n d /
the
mor
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and to retain the surplus for the benefit of the persons 
entitled thereto; but such consul or vice-consul shall 
immediately apply for and shall be entitled to obtain from 
the proper Court, Letters of Administration of the effects 
of such deceased person, limited in such manner and for 
such time as to such Court shall seem fit. /~24 & 25 Viet, 
c. 122 sec. 4/7 A convention has been made with Japan. 
/""Order in Council 26th December 1906 S.B. & 0 1906 p. 2.
See In re Aikyo 1924 130 L.T. 32/7
Administration is governed by the law of the country 
which appointed the executor. / “Story sec. 524; Westlake 
secs 109, 110; Dicey p. 791_7 When the same Individual 
Is an executor in two countries, X and Y*he must administer 
the assets which he obtains under the grant in X according 
to the law of X?and those he obtains under the grant in Y 
according to the lav; of Y, even though for convenience he 
may have collected all the assets into one of the countries. 
/ “Cook v. Gregson 1854 2 Brew 286; Westlake s. 111/7 But 
if a Scotch executor5 without obtaining a foreign con­
firmation,, succeeded in reducing foreign assets of the 
deceased into possession^he would be liable to account for 
them in this country as if he had received them by 
authority of the Scottish confirmation. /"Westlake s. 103/7 
Whether the executor is entitled to remuneration, and if 
so at what rate, is governed by the law of the country 
which appointed him. f ~Bogle v. Henderson 1831 10S. 104; 
Westlake s. 109J  An executor must pay all debts of which 
he has notice according to the rules of the law of the 
country which appointed him, as to the priority of debts, 
and that whether the debts are due to fellow countrymen 
or foreigners, and whether the deceased was domiciled in 
the country of appointment or abroad. f~In re Kloebe 1884 
28 Ch. D. 175; Dicey p. 791; Westlake s.110. This is 
contrary to Lawson v. Maxwell 1784 Mor. 4473 where the 
proper/
The disposal 
of the sur­
plus estate 
il'ter admin­
istration is 
completed.
proper law of the contract was held to determine whether a debt 
was privileged. It is difficult to see how this decision 
could be followed. Suppose according to the proper law of 
debt A, A had priority over all debts of class B, and according 
to the proper law of debt B, B had priority over all debts of 
class A, what then? How can a competition be decided by
several different systems of law? Surely it must be decided 
by one, namely the lav; of the place of administration. This is 
the rule in Bankruptcy, that the lex fori of the bankruptcy 
settles the q u e s t i o n I t  has been remarked by an English
judge that "in a case in which French assets were distributed 
so as to give Frertch creditors, as such, priority, in dis­
tributing the English assets the Court would be astute to 
equalize the payments, and take care that no French creditors 
should come in and receive anything till the English creditors 
had been paid the proportionate amount." f ~In re Kloebe, supra, 
per Pearson J. at p. 177_y The extent of the executor’s 
liability for the ancestor’s debts raises difficulties. A 
Scottish executor is only liable for the ancestor’s debts to the 
extent of the succession which he takes from the deceased, but
many foreign heirs are personally liable for their ancestor’s 
debts, even beyond the amount by which they have benefited as a 
result of the death, unless they take the succession with the 
benefit of an inventory. If a foreign creditor sues a Scotch 
executor is the executor personally liable, and if a Scotch 
creditor sues a foreign heir can he take advantage of the 
foreign heir’s personal liability? It seems that this question 
also is answered in accordance with the law of the country 
which appointed the executor, or the law under which the foreign 
heir accepted the succession. /"Bar p. 835_7 Accordingly the 
answers to the two examples put are no and yes respectively. 
r Klnloch v. Fullerton 1 7 3 9  Mor. 4456, AFFD 1 Pat. 265_7
When he has cleared all debts, the executor, if he is the 
executor of the domicil of the deceased, must distribute 
the surplus estate to the persons beneficially entitled thereto. 
If/
If the domicil of the deceased is abroad and there is an 
executor appointed by the Courts of the domicil, he may, if 
that is the convenient course, pay the surplus over to him 
for distribution to the beneficiaries, when the receipt of 
the executor of the domicil is a sufficient discharge; 
/McLaren p. 44; Westlake s. 1C5_/ he should only do 
this after, and can not be forced, to do this before, he 
has completed the business of administration, that is 
collected the estate and paid the debts. /"Preston v.
Melville 1841 2 Bob. 8 8 ;  Young v. Pamage 1838 16 S .  5 7 2  
is of doubtful authority_7 Nor is there any legal necessity 
for his proceeding in this way at all: if it is more
convenient to do so he should himself distribute the surplus 
among those beneficially entitled thereto according to the 
lex domicilii. "Why the property should be remitted to the 
forum of the domicil, in order that it shall be sent back 
again to be distributed, and why the Court should be 
incompetent to act effectively and finally in the suit 
which has been instituted, by decreeing a distribution among 
the several persons entitled, and transmitting to Russia the 
shares of the next of kin resident there, I am unable to 
comprehend". f ~Snohin v. Wylie 10 H.L-C. at p. 24  per
Lord Chelmsford. His opinion has been approved and Lord 
Westbury’s opinion to the contrary disapproved in Orr-Ewing 
1885 13 R. (H.L.) 1, per Lord Chancellor Halsburv at p. b j  
It is a reason for not remitting the surplus to the domicil 
if there are debts of the deceased which are prescribed by 
our law but not by the lex domicllii, for remission in that 
case would have the effect that the executor of the domicil 
would satisfy these creditors, whose debts had prescribed, 
and thus the fund for distribution to the beneficiaries 
would, be unfairly diminished. f~In re Lorrillard 1922 2 Ch. 
638J
All questions relating to the execution of trusts are 
to be determined by the law of the domicil of the trust. 
Trusts are said to be "Scotch Trusts" or "English Trusts".
To determine whether a trust is a "Scotch Trust" or an 
"English Trust", that is to determine the domicil of the 
trust, the domicil of the testator, the domicil and 
residence of the trustees, the situation of the trust 
property, the place of performance of the trust, the law 
which is to govern the construction of the trust deed, are 
looked to- /"Duncan & Dykes p. 21b j  If all or most of 
these factors point to Scotland, it is a "Scotch Trust", 
or, in other words, the domicil of the trust is in 
Scotland. /""Directions by the testator as to what law is 
to govern the powers and immunities of the trustees - see 
Orr-Ewing 1885 13 E. (H.L.) 1 at p. 23 - will be conclusive 
as to the questions referred to, and this will be a weighty . 
factor in determining the domicile of the trust for other 
matters - Duncan & Dykes ibid// ^  should be noted that 
it is the law of the domicil of the trust and not the law 
of the domicil of the testator which regulates questions 
as to the execution of trusts. The domicil of the trust 
is usually, but not always, r e .  g. Ferguson v. Marjorlbanks 
1853 15 D. 637J  the same as the domicil of the testator. 
When a testator domiciled, in Jamaica by his will executed 
there bequeathed in trust to certain named persons resident 
in Scotland the residue of his estate to be applied by them 
in the erection and endowment of a free school in Bathgate, 
and the school after erection was to be under the management 
government and direction of these "trustees their heirs and 
assigns", it was held that the trust was a Scotch one and 
that the law of Scotland and not the law of Jamaica was to 
determine who were the heirs and assigns. Ferguson v. 
Mar.joribanks 1853 15 D. 637J  The question was a narrow
one, because it was contended that the issue was the 
construction/
construction of the trust deed, and that the .lex domicilii 
of the testator should have governed, but the Court probably 
took the correct view in deciding that this was a question 
of execution. Lord President McNeill pointed out that the 
trust was in two parts, firstly certain parties were to 
receive the bequest and erect the school, which had been 
done, and the second part of the trust was for carrying 
on the perpetual government and management of the school.
It was with regard to the second part that the question 
arose. /"Note however that Lords Cuninghame and Fullerton 
thought that the law of Scotland would have applied even 
if the question had arisen before the money had been paid 
over./7 T*10 of the domicil of the trust applies to 
questions as to the propriety of investments,/"Ferguson v. 
Marjoribanks, supra, per the Lord Ordinary, Rutherford at 
p. 639__/ and to the powers of trustees./^Harris’s Trs.
1919 S.C. 432; Pender’s Trs. 1903 5 F. 504; Carruther’s
Trs. & Allan’s Trs. 1896 24 R. 238 and 24 R. 718; Stewart’s
Trs. 1913 S.C. 647/7
A way in which the question of the powers of trustees 
often arises in practise is when trustees under a foreign 
trust want power to do some act in Scotland, for example 
sell Scotch heritage, which they have not power to do under 
the trust deed. An application by foreign trustees for 
power to sell Scotch heritage under the Scotch Trusts Acts 
will be refused, because such a matter is one for the
Courts of the domicil of the trust and the law of the
domicil of the trust. /""Carruther*s Trs. & Allan’s Trs* 
1896 24 R. 238J  But if the Courts of the domicil of the 
trust have considered the question and say that it is 
lawful and expedient that the trustees should have the 
power of sale, the Court of Session will, on appeal to its 
nobile officium, give effect to this by granting power of 
sale in exercise of its auxiliary jurisdiction. /~Allan’s 
Trs./
Trs . 1897 24 K. 718; Fender's Trs* 1903 5 P. 504;
Harrisf s Trs. 1919 S.C. 432_/ Harris's Trs. /~supra_/ 
is an illuminating case: trustees under an English
trust, holding land in Scotland which the truster had 
specially excepted from the operation of a clause 
conferring powers of sale, obtained an order of the High 
Court of Justice in England declaring that a sale of the 
land was expedient and in the interests of the beneficiaries, 
and would be competent under English statutes which did 
not extend to Scotland, and authorising the trustees to 
apply to the Court of Session for power to sell the land.
It was pointed out by Lord 1'undas, who dissented, that a 
petition to the Court of Session either under the Trusts 
Acts or to its nobile officium for authority to sell must 
have failed. Nevertheless the Court granted authority 
to sell in exercise of its auxiliary jurisdiction, holding 
that the powers of the trustees fell to be regulated by 
the English Courts to which the trust as an English trust 
was subject. The settlement of a scheme for the 
regulation and management of a charity is similarly one 
for the law and Courts of the domicile of the trust, and 
when the domicil is abroad the Court of Session exercises 
a similar auxiliary jurisdiction./"'Lipton's Trs. 1943 S.C. 
521J7
The Courts of the domicil of the trust alone have 
jurisdiction to appoint new trustees. f ~Brockie & Another 
1875 2 R. 923; Stewart's Trs. 1913 S.C. 647; Hall & Others
I
-
k ' i
Petitioners, 7 M. 66 V_7 If the trust is a foreign one the
Scots Courts will not appoint new trustees even if the trust
includes landed estate in Scotland. /"Brockie, Hall, supra/
The appointment of trustees by the Courts of the domicil
of the trust is recognised here even with regard to the
*
title to Scotch heritage,/ ”lbid_7 and an application can be 
made/
/the domicil 
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made to the mobile offIcium of the Court of Session for 
authority to have the names of the trustees altered in 
respect of the Scottish property. f ~Evans-Freke1s Trs.
1945 S.N. 42 j  A defect in the title of trustees owing 
to informalities in the assumption of trustees will be 
cured by the appropriate order of the Courts of the domicil 
of the trust. f ~Rossmore's Trs. v. Brownlie 1877 5 R. 201__7
If there is nothing in the trust deed to the contrary, 
trustees can, if it is in the interests of the trust, 
remove the trust funds and trust administration to another 
country, and they can not be interdicted from doing so; 
f~Orr-Ewing 1885 15 R. (H.L.) 1, per Lord Blackburn at p. 
21_7 but it is doubtful whether the Court will give express 
authority for such a step. Simpson1s Trs* 1907 S.C. 87; 
StewartTs Trs. 1913 S.C. 647J
In Scots law heritable debts are chargeable against 
heritage, and moveable debts against the moveables; the 
heir in either capacity is liable to pay the creditor, 
no matter what Is the nature of the debt, but is entitled 
to relief against the other part of the estate if the debt 
truly affeirs to it. In other countries different rules 
prevail. For example according to the former law in 
England the personal estate might be liable for a mortgage 
over land due by the predecessor. Difficult questions arise 
therefore when the estate consists of heritage and moveables 
situated in different countries if the heritage and 
moveables are taken by different persons.
The problem might arise in two forms: firstly, is
the creditor of the debt on the one hand, entitled to 
exact payment from the heir or executors on the other: 
in the case of immoveables the lex situs governs this 
question, Kinloch v. Fullerton 1739 Mor. 4456, 1740 1 Pat. 
265J  and the lex situs probably rules in the case of 
moveables also. Secondly, Is the heir liable in relief 
to/
to the executor or vice-versa? The solution to this 
second problem seems to be that If the debt is heritable 
the lex situs governs, and if the debt is moveable, the 
lex domicilii governs. A dies domiciled in England
leaving heritage in Scotland. Suppose he leaves a 
heritable debt, is that, in a question between the heir 
and the executors, chargeable against the Scotch heritage 
according to the Scots rule, or against the moveables 
according to the English rule? Being a question of 
heritage, the lex situs, namely Scots law governs, and 
the heir in heritage has to pay without relief against 
the executors. /~Drummond, v. Drummond. 1799 Mor. 4478,
4 Pat. 66; Frazer v. Spalding 1812 5 Pat. 642__/ But if 
the debt is moveable, the lex domicilii, English law 
governs, and the personal estate is liable, so that if 
the debt has been paid by the heir in heritage he has 
relief against the English executors. /""Winchelsea v. 
Garretty 1837 2 Keen 293. Of course the personal estate 
is also liable according to Scots law. J Conversely if 
a person had died domiciled in Scotland leaving heritage 
In England, Moveable debts would, according to the lex 
domicilii, Scotland, have been payable from the moveable 
estate /""the same result would have followed if the lav/ 
of England had been applied^/, heritable debts would, 
according to the lex situs not have been due from the 
heritage.
Actions against trustees and executors 
The mere act of obtaining confirmation in Scotland 
does not render the executor liable to the jurisdiction 
of the Scots Courts if he is not otherwise liable. 
f~~Robson v. Walsham 1867 6 M. 4; Kerr v. Halliday1 s 
Executors 1886 14 R. 251; Anderson v. Borthwick 1827
5 S. 879; Sim v. Simfs Executors Sh. Ct. G.l 238__7 
Jurisdiction/
Jursidcition exists against trustees and executors to 
enable them to be sued in the Scots Courts when either
(a) the trust is a Scotch trust, or
(b) the executors or trustees are personally subject to 
the jurisdiction in personal actions. /"Duncan & Dykes 
p. 213; McLaren pp49 et sequ •_7
(a)
How to determine whether a trust is a "Scotch trust” 
of an "English trust” is dealt with elsewhere. ^/~infra p. J  
If it is a Scotch trust, the trustees or executors are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Scots Courts in actions 
relating to the trust or the trust estate even though some 
of the trustees are not personally subject to the juris­
diction. /"Cruikshank v. Cruikshank,3 Trs. 1843 5 D. 733,
4 Bell 179; Mags, of Wick v. Forbes 1849 12 D. 299;
Kennedy v. Kennedy 1884 12 R. 275; Robertsons Tr. v. 
Nicholson 1888 15 R. 914; Ashburton v. Escombe 1092- 
1892 20 R. 187__7 If it is a Scotch trust the fact that 
an administration order has been pronounced, placing the 
administration of the estate, wherever situated, under the 
control of the High Court of Justice in England will not 
oust the jurisdiction of the Scots Courts. f ~Brown v. 
Maxwell1s Executors 1883 10 R. 1235_7 Where there are 
several executors or trustees the office is a joint and 
indivisible one, and the trustees must all be sued together. 
/"But not where the action is one for delict - for example 
for damages for improper administration - Mackay v. Mackay 
(O.H.) 1897 4 S.L.T. 337_7
If originally there was jurisdiction against trustees 
or executors because the trust was a Scotch one, that 
jurisdiction will persist even when the trustees have 
moved from Scotland, and when there are no longer any 
funds here, if there is no other single forum where the 
trustees can be sued. f~McG-ennis v. Rooney (O.H.) 1891 
18 R. 817J
These/
These principles apply equally to testamentary and to 
inter vivos trusts.
(b)
If an executor is personally subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Scottish Courts e.g. in virtue of residence in Scotland 
or possession of Scots heritage as trustee of the deceased, 
/"Charles v. Charles’ Trs. 1868 6 M. 772; Cruikshank v. 
Cruikshank’s Trs. 1843 5 D. 733_7 be Is subject to actions 
with regard to the estate, even though he has not confirmed 
in Scotland, and even though, where personal subjection to 
the jurisdiction is on the ground of residence, none of the 
estate is in Scotland; and he can not evade an action by 
beneficiaries by pleading that he was appointed by a .foreign 
court and is only under obligation to account to that court. 
/"Peters v. Martin 1825 4 S. 107; Morison v. Kerr 1790 Mor. 
4601; Bain v. Shand 1833 11 S. 688; McTavish v. Lady Saltoun 
3 Feb. 1821 F.C.; Grant’s Trs. v. Douglas Heron & Co. 1796 
3 Pat. 503J  Where moveable estate belonging to the deceased 
is situated in Scotland, and the foreign executor has 
confirmed to it,/"Houston v. Stirling 1824 2 S. 672;
Cameron v. Chapman 1838 16 S. 907J  or, in the absence of 
confirmation in Scotland,if there is a special assignation 
and disposition of the property by the defunct to the foreign 
heir or representative /"inverrarity & Co. v. Moffat 1840 
2 D. 813_7 the moveables can be arrested jurisdictionis 
fundandae causa so as to found jurisdiction against the 
foreign executor even when he is resident abroad./"McMorine 
v. Cowie 1845, 7 D. 270; Campbell v. Fucker 1809 Hume 258; 
but this class of cases is very liable to the objection of 
forum non conveniens: see post_/
But although our courts may have jurisdiction against 
the trustees or executors, and although our courts may be 
perfectly competent to try the question, they may not be the 
most convenient forum, and the plea of forum non conveniens 
may/
may be sustained to the effect of excluding the jurisdiction 
of our courts. For the plea of forum non conveniens to 
succeed there must be another competent forum which is more 
suitable for the trial of the question. It is not necessary 
that there should be a litigation proceeding in the other 
forum,/"Orr-Ewing supra, per Lord Watson at p. 29J  Thus 
where one of the executors was personally subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Scottish Courts, but both were subject 
to the jurisdiction of a foreign court where probate had 
been granted, the Court refused to allow the action to proceed. 
r ftlllon & Co. V. Dunlop & Collett 1864 2 M. 776 On the 
question of convenience a distinction falls to be made between 
actions against trustees or executors by beneficiaries or 
legatees for an accounting or for damages for breach of trust, 
on the one hand, and actions by creditors of the deceased for 
payment of the debt on the other. In the latter class of 
cases there are seldom reasons for holding that a competent 
forum is an inconvenient one, but in the former it Is 
recognised that the action ought to be in the country where 
the trustees are and the estate is being administered.
/"Orr-Ewing, supra; per Lord Watson at P. 26; Robinson v. 
Robinson’s Trs. 1930 S.C. (H.L.) 20; Martin v. Stopford Blair’s 
Executors 1879 7 R. 329J  The Scottish Courts will not
usually allow a beneficiary to sue a foreign executor who 
resides abroad for an accounting by founding jurisdiction 
against him by arrestment jurisdlctionis fundandae causa, 
/"Brown’s Trs. v. Palmer 1830 9 S. 224; Macmaster v. Macmaster 
1833 11 S. 685; See also McMorine v. Cowie 1845 7 D. 270 
where it was decided that such arrestment gave jurisdiction 
against the executors. At the stage at which the case was 
reported it had not yet been decided whether the Scots Courts 
were the forum conveniens 7 but where the action against the 
foreign executor is by a creditor of the deceased for his debt, 
the Scots Courts are not an inconvenient forum, and this kind
of action will usually be allowed when jurisdiction is 
founded by arrestment jurisdlctionis fundandae causa. 
r o ampbell v. Rucker 1809 Kume 258; Orr-Ewing 1885 13 R.
(H.L.) 1 per Lord Watson at p. 26; see however Annandale v. 
Annandale 1723 Robert. 467J  No hard and fast rules however 
can be laid down, and it is always a question of the balance 
of convenience. Thus it was convenient to entertain an 
action by a legatee founded by arrestment jurisdlctionis 
fundandae causa against a foreign executor for payment of a 
legacy, which, under the foreign will was appropriated out 
of a particular fund in this country. f~Inverrarity v. Moffat 
1840 2 D. 81 3_7 In another case it was not convenient to 
try in Scotland the part of an action of count and reckoning 
against executors which related to real estate in the West 
Indies considering that the administration of the estate was 
under the superintendence of the Court of Chancery in England 
where most of the estate was, but it was convenient to try 
In Scotland another part of the action which related to the 
apportionment of rents of Scotch heritage./"Martin v.
Stopford Blair’s Executors 1879 7 R. 329_7
A claim by a surviving spouse for legal rights or by a 
child for legitim is a claim by a creditor for a debt, and 
consequently there is no reason why it should not proceed in 
a competent forum other than the Courts of the country where 
the estate is being administered. /~Robinson v. Robinson’s 
Trs., supra •J
Since the reason assigned by the Scots Courts for 
declining to entertain actions against foreign trustees or 
executors when they come to Scotland or when funds are 
arrested here to found jurisdiction, is not that the Court 
of Session Is an incompetent but is an inconvenient forum, 
it follows that the plea of forum non conveniens must fail 
when the trustees are not liable to suit or are evading an 
accounting in the proper forum of the trust, which the law 
of Scotland regards as the only convenient forum so long as 
the/
the pursuer can there obtain the redress which he seeks.
If it is doubtful if the Courts of the forum conveniens 
have It within their power to give the pursuer a full remedy, 
or to enforce their orders against the persons of the trustees 
and the trust estate, the Court of Session will not dismiss 
the suit, but sist procedure until it is seen that the 
pursuer is obtaining satisfaction in the forum conveniens.
C Orr-Ewing, supra, per Lord Watson at pp. 26, 27;
Peters v. Martin 1825 4 S. 107 (2nd ed. p. 108); Macmaster 
v. Dickson 1834 12 S. 731J
Continuing actions against the representatives of 
a deceased litigant
When a defender dies during the dependence of an action 
and it is sought to have the action transferred against the 
deceased’s representatives, they too must be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Scots Courts, and it will not suffice 
to say that as the deceased defender was' subject to the 
jurisdiction therefore his representatives are. f ~Fie Lachlan 
v. Hob 1831 9 S. 588; Cameron v. Chapman 1838 16 S. 907; 
Mackenzie v. Drummond’s Executors 1868 6 M. 932; Duncan & 
Dykes p. 252_/ But where the deceased defender is a trustee 
on a Scotch trust, the action is transferable against the 
deceased’s representatives even though they are resident 
outside the jurisdiction, because the representatives are, 
like the deceased defender, liable to the jurisdiction of the 
Scots Courts irrespective of residence because the trust is 
a Scotch one. f ~Rintoul v. Garroway 1898 (O.H.) 5 S.L.T.
306_7
Distribution of ..iov.eatles on Intestacy
•The law of the domicile of a deceased intestate at the time of
bis death £ Lynch v. Provisional Government of Paraguay TQr7I
P.ID. ''~8. See also Cockburnv Trs. v. Dun.das 1R64 P M. 11RB 1
m o v e a M e  J
determines the class of persons who take his/estate and the
proportions to which they are. entitled. Erskine stated this
to be the rule, £ Inst. 3,9,4: citing Brown v. Brown -1744 Mor.
4604.J but his view was not followed until 1790. Instead, there 
were a number of cases where the moveables were held to be div­
isible among- the next of kin of the deceased according to the 
laws of the various countries in which the moveables were 
situated at the time of his death. £ Davidson v. Elcherson 
1778 Mor. 4613; Henderson v. McLean 1778 Mor. 4615;Morris v. 
Wright 1783 Mor. 4S16~J Bruces v. Bruce Mor. 4617 & 1790 3 Pat 
163 J adopted the principle which Erskine had stated, and which 
had been followed in one earlier caser Brown v. Brown, supra. J  
namely, that the law of the domicile of the deceased and not 
the law of the situs of the goods governs intestate succession^ 
and this principle holds to-day. Hop: v.  Hog 1791 Mor. 4 6 1 9 ;A 
1792 3 Pat. 247; Durle v. Ooutts 1791 Mor. 4624; Macdonald v. 
Laing 1794 Mor. 4627; Farrell v. Barclay 1846 8 D. 774:
MCLaren p. 17; Cheshire p. 613; Dicey p. 799; Train v. Train’ s 
Executrix 1899 2 F 146. This was also the trend of the old 
Scots Act 1426 c. 88,which provided, that the causes of all 
merchants and inhabitants of the kingdom of Scotland dying in 
Zealand Flanders or elsewhere, who transferred themselves for 
the sake of trade, a journey, or any other cause whatever 
( but not for the purpose of remaining outside the kingdom ) 
ought to be brought before the ordinary judgeswithin the king­
dom, by wrhom their wills are confirmed, it not mattering that 
certain of the goods of the person dying in this way, at the 
time he died, were in England or in parts across the sea.J
The application of the law; of the domicile is logical and 
reasonable. The law of one’s domicile is the law with which
one is most familiar. Every “person must be presumed to have 
had in mind that if he made no will his estate would devolve 
in a certain way, and the way in which he would think it would 
devolve would be according to the law with which he was famil­
iar. To give effect therefore to the lex domicilii in the 
division of an intestates estate is to divide the estate acc­
ording to what is presumed to be the deceased's intention.
Three limitations to the applicability of the law of the 
domicile must be noticed.
firstly, the statement that the law of the domicile of the
deceased determines what class of persons are to take his estate
legitimate
means that the law of his domicile will say ” his /children” ,
or ’’his brothers and sisters of the full blood” , take his
legitimate
estate. Who are his/children is to be answered, by applying
p  ,
rules of International Private Law relating to status. / "  fU 
I '/J
If a child seeks to be included on the ground that he is 
really legitimate, having been legitimated by the subsequent
fliat th-c. o f  tke child.
marriage of his parents, which is a question of^ status Ato 
be determined by the law of the domicile of the child’s father 
at the time of the alleged, legitimation. This is well illustrated
by a decision of the English Gourt of .anneal ^ in re Goodmans 
Trusts 1881 17 Ch. D. in which the facts were as follows:
^  woman domiciled in England left a legacy which fell into 
intestacy and was therefore payable to her next of kin, who 
were, according to English law, the legitimate children of her 
two deceased brothers. One of the brothers/ while domiciled in 
England^ had three illegitimate children. He acquired a domicile 
in Holland and had another illegitimate .child, then married the 
mother, which h.ad the effect according to Dutch law of legitimat­
ing all the previously born children. he tl-.cn l a d ' s  legitimate 
child. The question was whether 'h l.^ilmah d ' 7 d \ w m i  
I.oon t o m  wills her father /as domiciled in Holland could share 
along with the legitimate child. It was held that the legitimated 
child could share, for, while the rules of intestate succession 
in England were the ones which governed, because Lhe testator 
died domiciled in England, they allowed, the succession to go.
tc GLi: dren, r-nd 'be ques--.* on rh-r h r a pernor • as n legitim.
■' I 1 r not ms a gaestion of i t Ltusfor b 3 la r )f " Ionic:
01 ti_ father of theohild. It was not argued that the three
I
children who had been born illegitimate while the brother was 
domiciled in England could share;in view of the attitude ad-
^ law
opted^in Engl„...
<Pit ( ^ m h 0rt la»v 'thul' before l e ^ T f  m  o» fio n t>y J5Mf?5e^y & n t C o u l d  GC_C<
[gland there must be capability of legitimation
both by the law of the domicile of the father at the time of
subsequent 
the birth and of the/marriage.
  Conversely^ when an illegitimate child was domiciled, and
his parents were domiciled,ina country which did not reeggnise 
legitimation by subsequent marriage, and the parents subsequ­
ently married there, it was held that he was not a legitimate 
child and could not succeed to lands in Scotland ah intestato, 
though if his parents had been domiciled in Scotland he-would 
have been legitimate and would have succeeded. Sheddan v. 
Patrick 1803 Mor. For. App 9, 1«4'9 11 D. 1333 ]
Secondly, that the law of the domicile of the deceased 
is followed in regard to what class of persons take the estate 
does not mean that it can determine what happens when there are 
no persons of that class who can take it. The law of the domicile 
of the deceased may say that in that event the property is 
payable to the fisc. But where the country of the deceased’s 
domicile is a foreign.one, that part of the foreign law will 
not be given effect to. The property goes to the state where the
r -  "  d o m i c i l e d
property is situated, f Bar p.843 ) Thus ai^  Austrian died
possessed of a fund in the English Court; he left no heirs
according to Austrian law, and, in that event, according to
Austrian law, his property became liable to confiscation by
t h e  Austrian fisc. I t  was held, however, that the property went
to the Crown as bona vacantia, because the right claimed was not
in the nature of a succession. In this matter the lex situs
r u l e d .  £  I n  r e  B a r n e t t s  T r u s t s  1902 1 Ch. 847;. I n  r e  M u s u r u s
1936 2 All E.R. 1666; Dicey p. 800; Cheshire p.513. Contra
Mclaren p.£22, S a v i g n y  p.285 J
T h i r d l y ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  l e x  d o m i c i l i i  d e t e r m i n e s  w h o
a r e  t o  g e t  t h e  e s t a t e ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  i t  v e s t s  i n  t h e  
s u c c e s s o r s  b y  s u r v i v a n c e  o r  o n l y  i f  t h e  s u c c e s s o r s  h a v e
obtained a title by confirmation, depends on the lex situs of 
the property concerned. (] Milligan v. Milligan 1828 4 S. 432;
]Smibh v. Lauder 1834 1° S. 34c
Distribution of Immoveables on Intestacy 
The persons entitled to succeed to immoveables on intestacy 
are determined by the lex situs of the immoveables^ jf McLaren 
p . 17 : Oheshire- p. Fj49; Train v. Train *s Executrix 1899 2F. 146; 
Doe or Birtwhistle v. Vardill 1830 2 J. 431, 1 Rob. 027; 
Macalister1 s Executors v. Macalisterf s Trustees 18434 13 S.
171; Ross v. Rossrs Trustees July 4th 1809 F&0.J even when -fcke
. ffi<=
foreign lands have been sold.and are represented by cash in
4
Scotland. £  Macalister. supra J  The question
whether a child Is or* is ■sot legitimate, and so e^^Ibded bo 
succeed to Scottish land, is not determinable by the lex situs . 
but is a question of status which is ruled by our .principles of 
International Private Law, and in the case of legitimation 
involves reference to the domicile of the father. £ Sheddan v.
Patriot , supra.The rule in Re Goodman he Trusts 1881 17 Ch. D.
266 applies to immoveables as well as moveables - McLaren p.
20. In Doe or Birtwhistle v. Vardill,supra, which was decided 
at a time when the only way of becoming legitimate according 
to English lav; was to be'born in lawful wedlock, it was held 
that a child who had been legitimated according to the law of 
the domicile of his father, but who had not been b o m  in lawful 
wedlock, could not succeed to lands in England. It was recognised 
that the child was legitimate in England, but the English rule 
of succession to land was that a child, in order to succeed,
"had to be not only legitimate, but horn In lawful wedlock. rphiB 
decision was based on a peculiar rule of the English law of 
succession to land which was such that it was unnecessary to 
enquire into uhe status of the child under the' a^roprioue 
I w, the enquiry not b e i n g ,  allowed to progress as far as that.
*>?s4 ofciter
statement in Beattie v. Beattie 1866 * M. 181, which however is 
contrary to Sheddan v. Patrick, 1
trbe questd on whether property is moveable or immoveable is 
determined by the lav; of one situs of the property, I See p.
Collation. Collation inter heredes is regarded as an incident of
it has its place accordingly only where it is recognised by the 
1 ex dom.icilii, £ McLaren p. Qfr> J Thus where an intestate died 
domiciled in England, where collation between the heir in heritage 
and the heir in moveables was not required, leaving heritage 
in Scotland where collation was required, it was held that 
because the deceased had died domiciled, in England, the. heir did 
not have to collate> and. could tabe the heritage and a full 
share of the moveables. ^ Balfour v. Scot 1 7 8 ?  Mor. 4617 J 
Approbate and Reprobate ( Election. )
Sometimes an intended beneficiary under a will can enforce 
rights against the estate apart from, the will. He might be able 6 
to insist on legal rights, or the will may be invalid to convey 
immoveables of which he is the heir at law. In such cases a, 
question arises whether the beneficiary is' entitled at the same 
time to approbate and reprobate the will, i.e. whether he can 
claim legal provisions contrary to the testator’s intention 
and still tabe the benefits given to him under the will. Scots law 
says that he cannot. Other systems of law have no such rules, orf
t h e  r u l e s  d i f f e r .  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  _  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
— * — T h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d . e c e a s e d ’ s  d o m i c i l e  d e c i d e s  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
a p p r o b a t e  a n d  r e p r o b a t e  (  e l e c t i o n  ) ,  T r o t t e r  v .  T r o t t e r  5  S .  5 8  
A f f d .  1 8 2 9  3  W . & S .  4 0 7 ;  O a m p b e l l  v .  M u n r o  1838  1 5  S .  3 1 0 ;
M u r r a y  v .  S m i t h  1 8 2 8  6 S .  6 9 0 ;  D u n d a s  v .  D u n d a s  1 8 2 9  1  J u r .  7 ;  
R o b e r t s o n  v .  R o b e r t s o n  1 6 t h  F e b .  1 8 1 6  F . G . ;  H e w i t ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  
L a w s o n  1 8 9 1  1 8  R .  7 9 3 ;  B r o w n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  G r e g s o n  1 9 2 0  S . C .
(H.L.) 87; B e n n e t  v. B e n n e t ’ s  Trustees 1829 7 S. 817; McLaren p.
A c c o r d i n g  t o  o u r  p r i n c i p l e s vof a p p r o b a t e  a n d  r e p r o b a t e  the 
b e n e f i c i a r y  i s  o n l y  p u t  t o  h i s  e l e c t i o n  i f ,  b y  a b a n d o n i n g  t h e
the moveable rather than the immoveable succession, and.
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c l a i m  w h i c h  h e  h a d  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  w i l l . h e  m a k e s  t h e  f u n d  w h i c h  
h e  c l a i m s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  w i l l .  W h e r e  a  t e s t a t o r  
d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  l e a v e s  a  u n i v e r s a l  w i l l  d i s p o s i n g  i n t e r  
a l i a ,  o f  f o r e i g n  l a n d  i n  a  m a n n e r  w h i c h  i s  i l l e g a l  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  l b  h e  
s i t u s  o f  t h e  l a n d ,  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  i n t e n t i o n  c a n  n o t  b e  c a r r i e d  
o u t  e v e n  i f  t h e  h e i r  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  a b a n d o n  t h e  l a n d  t o  t h e  p u r p o s e s  
o f  t h e  w i l l ,  s o  t h a - t  t h e  h e i r  i s  n o t  p u t  t o  h i s  e l e c t i o n ,  a n d  c a n  
t a k e  t h e  f o r e i g n  l a n d s  u n d e r  t h e  f o r e i g n  r u l e s  o f  i n t e s t a c y  
a n d  h i s  f u l l  s h a r e  o f  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  u n d e r  t h e  w i l l .  
^ R e w i t ’ s  T r u s t e e - s  v .  L a w s o n ,  B r o w n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  V .  G r e g s o n ,  s u p r a  J
-  W h i l e  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  d e c i d e s  q u e s t i o n s
o f  e l e c t i o n ,  i f  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  s a y s  t h a t  a  b e n e f i c ­
i a r y  i s  o n l y  p u t  t o  h i s  e l e c t i o n  w h e n  t h e  t e s t a t o r  i n t e n d e d  
t o  d e a l  i n  h i s  w i l l  w i t h  t h e  e s t a t e  w h i c h  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r y  
c l a i m s  a p a r t  f r o f e  i t ,  (  & s  S c o t s  l a w  s a y s  ) ,  t h e r e  m a y  b e  a  
q u e s t i o n  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  f o r  t h e  l a w  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  w i l l ,  
w h e t h e r  t h e  t e s t a t o r  d i d  s o  i n t e n d  t o  d e a l  i n  h i s  w i l l  w i t h  
t h e _  d i s p u t e d  e s t a t e .  T h e  p r o b l e m  h a s  t h e n  t w o  p a r t s .  F i r s t ,  
w h a t  l a w  d e c i d e s  q u e s t i o n s  o f  e l e c t i o n ?  I t  i s  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d .  S e c o n d ,  i f  t h a t  l a w  c o n t a i n s  r u l e s  o f  
e l e c t i o n  l i k e  o u r  o w n ,  t h e  w i l l  h a s  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  i t s  a p p r o p r i a t e  l a w ,  w h i c h  i s  u s u a l l y ,  b u t  n o t  a l w a y s , t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ,  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e  
b e n e f i c i a r y  i s  p u t  t o  h i  
s o n  1 6 t h  F e b .  1 8 1 6  F . C .
. s  e l e c t i o n .  I  S e e  R o b e r t s o n  v .  R o b e r t -  
]
m o v e a b l e
te
L e g a l _ R i g h t s  o f  S p o u s e s  a n d  C h i l d r e n ,
I  u s  r e l i c t a e  a n d  l e g i t i m  f r o m  a  d e c e a s e d  f a t h e r ’ s  
e s t a t e  a r e ,  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  a  r e l i c  o f  t h e  o l d  S c o t t i s h  
c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  b e t w e e n  s p o u s e s ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  s h o u l d  
b e  p a r t  o f  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  l a w  a n d  n o t  t h e  l a w  o f  
s u c c e s s i o n .  T h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  
c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s ^  a n d  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
i u s  r e l i c t i  a n d  x e g i t i m  f r o m  a  d e c e a s e d  m o t h e r ’ s  e s t a t e ,  
h o w e v e r ,  m a m e  t h e s e  l e g a l  r i g h t s  v e r y  l i L e  r i g h t s  o f  
s u c c e s s i o n ,  a n d  t h e y  a r e  n o w  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  s u c h .
—  i f
/  b e e  " T h e  P r o p e r t y  R i g h t s  o f  S p o u s e s ;  Macdonald v .  
n a c d o n a l d  1 9 3 3  S . C .  ( H . L . )  7 9  p e r  l o r d  T h a n m e r t o n  a t  p . 8 5 :  
M c L a r e n  p .  3 1 .  E a l c o n b r i d g e  m i l l  n . g . R .  p p . 5 o 9 ,  5 4 0 ;
B a t y ,  " P o l a r i z e d  L a w  p .  _ _ /
A t  c o m m o n  l a w  i u s  r e l i c t a e  i s  d u e  t o  t h e  w i d o w  o f  a  m a n  
w h o  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  f r o m  a l l  m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  h i m ,  w h e t h e r  s i t u a t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  o r  a b r o a d ,  
i M i s b e t t  v .  N i s b e t t ’ s  T r u s t e e s  1 8  3 5  1 3  S .  5 1 7 ;  R o b i n s o n  v .  
R o b i n s o n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  1 9 3 0  S . C .  ( H . L . )  3 0 ;  M a n d e r s o n  v .  
S u t h e r l a n d  1 8 9 9  1  P .  6 3 1 ;  M c L a r e n  p .  3 1 _ /  a n d  l e g i t i m  i s  
d u e  t o  t h e  c h i l d r e n  o f  a  m a n  w h o  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  
S c o t l a n d ^ o u t  o f  h i s  m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e  w h e r e v e r  s i t u a t e d , '
L  v .  H o g  1 7 9 1  M o r .  4 6 1 9 ,  5  P a t .  & < ± 7 ;  M c L a r e n  p .  3 1 _ /
a n d  o t h e r w i s e  i s  n o t  d u e .  M y  s t a t u t e  i u s  r e l i c t i  i s  
d u e  t o  t h e  w i d o w e r  o f  a  w o m a n  w h o  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  
S c o t l a n d ,  a n d  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  s a m e  p r i n c i p l e s  a s  i u s  
r e l i c t a e  ,  /  M a r r i e d  W o m e n ’ s  P r o p e r t y  A c t  1 6 8 1  S e c .  6 _J 
a n d  l e g i t i m  i s  d u e  t o  t h e  c h i l d r e n  o f  a  w o m a n  w h o  d i e d  
d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  a n d  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  s a m e  p r i n c i p l e s
a s  l e g i t i m  f r o m  t h e  f a t h e r ’ s e s t a t e .  / I b i d  S e c .  7  J
 - T e r c e  a n d  c o u r t e s y  a r e  p a y a b l e  f r o m  S c o t t i s h  l a n d s
t o  t h e  w i d o w  o r  w i d o w e r  r e s p e c t i v e l y  o f  a  d e c e a s e d
p r o p r i e t o r ,  e v e n  w h e n  h e  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  a b r o a d ,  i n
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  t h a t  t h e  l e x  s i t u s
g o v e r n s  a l l  r i g h t s  o v e r  i m m o v e a b l e s .  /  T r a i n  v .  T r a i n ’ s  
E x e c u t r i x /
W h e r e  a  f o r e i g n  l a w  h a s  s i m i l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  
o u r  l e g a l  r i g h t s  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  f i r s t ,  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
w h e t h e r  t h e s e  r i g h t s  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  
o r  o f  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  l a w .  W h e r e  t h e y  a r e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
o n  t e s t a m e n t a r y  p o w e r ,  o r  r i g h t s  c o n f e r r e d  o n  t h e  
s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e  o r  c h i l d r e n  w h i c h  f a i l  s h o r t  o f  a  r e a l  
c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  s p o u s e  o r  c h i l d r e n  h a v e  
a  p r o p r i e t a r y  i n t e r e s t  w h i c h  t h e y  c a n  e n f o r c e  i n  t h e i r  
l i f e t i m e ,  t h e y  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  a n d  t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ’ s  l a s t  d o m i c i l e  g o v e r n s ,  b u t  i f  t h e  
r i g h t s  c o n f e r r e d  o n  t h e  s p o u s e  o r  c h i l d r e n  r e s u l t  i n  a  
r e a l  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  s p o u s e  o r  c h i l d r e n  
h a v e  a  p r o p r i e t a r y  i n t e r e s t  w h i c h  t h e y  c a n  e n f o r c e  i n  
h e r  l i f e t i m e ,  t h e y  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  l a w ,  a n d  
t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  
t h e  m a r r i a g e  w i l l  g o v e r n .  /  S e e  " P r o p e r t y  R i g h t s  o f  
S p o u s e s H _ y
L e g a l  r i g h t s  e x i s t  o v e r  i m m o v e a b l e s  s i t u a t e d  a b r o a d  
i f  t h e y  a r e  g i v e n  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  s i t u s  o f  t h e  
i m m o v e a b l e s .
T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  p r o p e r t y  i s  m o v e a b l e  o r  
i m m o v e a b l e  i 3 d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  s i t u s  o f  t h e  
p r o p e r t y .  /  S e e  p .  J
T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  a  c h i l d ’ s  r i g h t  t o  l e g i t i m  o r  
a  w i d o w ’ s  r i g h t  t o  i u s  r e l i c t a e  h a s  b e e n  d i s c h a r g e d  i n  -  
s a y  -  a n  a n t e n u p t i a l  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t ,  w i l l  b e  t e s t e d  
b y  t h e  r u l e s  o f  S c o t s  l a w  i f  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  l a w  w h i c h  
w o u l d  n o r m a l l y  h a v e  g o v e r n e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  
a  c o m p a r a b l e  i n s t i t u t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
w h e t h e r  a n y  s i m i l a r  r i g h t  u n d e r  a  f o r e i g n  l a w  h a s  b e e n  
d i s c h a r g e d  m a y  h a v e  t o  b e  t e s t e d  b y  t h a t  f o r e i g n  l a w .
A  c h i l d  o f  a  m a n  w h o  l o a d  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  
b r o u g h t  a n  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  h i s  f a t h e r ’ s  e x e c u t r i x  f o r  
p a y m e n t  o f  l e g i t i m .  T h e  f a t h e r  a n d  m o t h e r  o f  t h e  c h i l d  
h a d /
% -
h a d  t h e i r  d o m i c i l e  i n  E n g l a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  
a n d  h a d  e n t e r e d  i n t o  a n  a n t e n u p t i a l  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  i n  
t h e  E n g l i s h  f o r m  w h i c h  m a d e  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  c h i l d r e n  
b u t  d i d  n o t  e x p r e s s l y  d i s c h a r g e  l e g i t i m  i n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
t h e r e o f ,  ( w h i c h  i s  r e q u i r e d  b y  S c o t s  l a w ) .  T h e  
e x e c u t r i x  a v e r r e d  t h a t  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  E n g l a n d  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  m a d e  i n  t h e  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  
c h i l d r e n  o p e r a t e d  a s  a  f u l l  d i s c h a r g e  o f  a l l  l e g a l  a n d  
o t h e r  c l a i m s  w h i c h  t h e  i s s u e  s o  p r o v i d e d  f o r  c o u l d  p r e f e r  
a g a i n s t  t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  o f  t h e i r  p a r e n t s .  T h e  a v e r m e n t  
w a s  h e r d  i r r e l e v a n t .  T r e v e l y a n  v .  T r e v e l y a n  1 8 7 b  1 1  M .  
o ! 6 n o r d  . J u s t i c e  C l e r k  M o n c r e i f f  s t a t e d  t h a t :  " W e
k n o w ,  a s  m a t t e r  o f  g e n e r a l  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  
o f  l e g i t i m  h a s  n o  p l a c e  i n  t h e  l a w  o f ' E n g l a n d  . . .  I  d o u b t  
i f  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n  i s  m e a n t  t o  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  i n d e n t u r e  
w o u l d  e x c l u d e  t h e  s o n ’ s  r i g h t  a p  i n t e s t a t o ;  a n d  i f  i t  d o  
n o t  m e a n  t h a t ,  I  a m  a t  a  l o s s  t o  g a t h e r  i t s  i m p o r t . "
A t  p .  5 2 0 _ /  L e g i t i m  w a s  s u c h  a  p e c u l i a r l y  S c o t t i s h  
r i g h t  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  i t  h a d  b e e n  d i s c h a r g e d  
c o u l d  o n l y  b e  r e f e r r e d  t o  S c o t s  l a w .  /  S e e  a l s o  K e i t h ’ s  
T r u s t e e s  v .  K e i t h  1 8 5 7  1 9  D .  1 0 4 0 ;  B r e a d a l b a n e  *  s
T r u s t e e s  v .  l i a r  c h i  o n e  s s  o f  C h a n d o s  1 8  3  6  2  S .  &  M c L .  3 7 7 ;  
R o b i n s o n  v .  R o b i n s o n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  1 9 3 0  S . C .  ( H . L . )  20 _ /  
H o w e v e r  S c o t s  l a w  i s  o n l y  a p p l i e d  t o  c o n s t r u i n g  t h e  
d i s c h a r g e  c l a u s e  a n d  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  e f f e c t  a  d i s c h a r g e ,  a n d  a  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  w h i c h  i s  
i n  t e r m s  s u f f i c i e n t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  b o o t s  l a w  t o  d i s c h a r g e  
l e g a l  r i g h t s  w i l l  n o t  b e  d e n i e d  t h a t  e f f e c t  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  
f o r m a l l y  i n v a l i d  b y  o u r  l a w ,  i f  i t  i s  v a l i d  b y  t h e  l e x  
l o c i  c o n t r a c t u s ,  e v e n  w h e r e  t h e  l e g a l  r i g h t  i s  o n e  
a f f e c t i n g  S c o t c h  h e r i t a g e *  g .  L e a f i e l d  v .  G r a n t  8 t h  F e b .  
1 8 1 4  F . C . _ /  A .  w i d o w  w h o  h a s  a c c e p t e d  t e s t a m e n t a r y  
p r o v i s i o n s  o u t  o f  l a n d e d  p r o p e r t y  i n  E n g l a n d  i s  n o t  b a r r e d  
f r o m  c l a i m i n g  t e r c e  o u t  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d ’ s  l a n d s  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  A c t  1 6 8 1  c .  1 0  i s  i n  g e n e r a l  t e r m s  t h a t  a n y  
p r o v i s i o n  m a d e  b y  t h e  h u s b a n d  f o r  t h e  w i f e  s h o u l d  e x c l u d e
{ o,
h e r  t e r c e  u n l e s s  t h e  c o n t r a r y  h e  e x p r e s s e d .  
/ ' ' " R o s s  v  .  A g l i a n b y  1 7 9 7  M o r .  4 6 5 1 ,  R e v d .  M o r .  
f o r e i g n  A p p .  p .  9  _ /
Wills ... Formal validity
A  w i l l  o f  m o v e a b l e s  i s  f o r m a l l y  v a l i d ,  i . e .  w e l l  e x e c u t e d ,  
i f  e x e c u t e d  e i t h e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  
t e s t a t o r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  m a k i n g  t h e  w i l l ,  o r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  o f  e x e c u t i o n .  A  n u n c u p a t i v e  w i l l ;  h o w e v e r ,  w i l l  
n o t  c a r r y  m o v e a b l e s  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  e v e n  i f  v a l i d  b y  t h e  l e x -  
d o m i c i l i i  o r  t h e  l e x  l o c i  a c t u s ,  b e c a u s e  w r i t t e n  e v i d e n c e  i s  
r e q u i r e d  o f  a  l a s t  w i l l ,  j  S h a w  v .  L e w i s  1665  M o r #  4 4 9 4 ;
D ' . r U t W s ,  D o u b t s  T e s t a m e n t .
E r s k .  I n s t .  3 , 2 , 4 l j ^ S t o r y  c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  t h i s  r u l e  o f  S c o t s  
l a w  i s  o b s o l e t e  a n d  w o u l d  n o t  n o w  b e  f o l l o w e d  -  p a r .  9 .  
D i c k s o n ,  t o o ,  p a r .  1 0 1 0 ,  s a y s  t h a t  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  i s  e r r o n e o u s ,  
b u t  a d m i t t i n g  w h a t  h e  s a y s ,  t h a t  t h e  l e x  l o c i  m u s t  d e t e r m i n e  t i n  
s o l e m n i t i e s ^  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  a  d e e d ,  t h a t  d o e s  n o t  a l t e r  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  b e  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  p r o v e  a  n u n c u p a t i v e  w i l l .  
T h e  p r o o f  o f  a  w i l l  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  e v i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  l e x  f o r i ,
1a n d  S c o t s  l a w  r e q u i r e s  w r i t t e n  e v i d e n c e  o f  a  w i l l .
A t  c o m m o n  l a w  a  w i l l  o f  m o v e a b l e s  w a s  v a l i d l y  e x e c u t e d  i f  
e x e c u t e d  e i t h e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r s  d o m i c i l e  
o r  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  o f  e x e c u t i o n .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  
S c o t t i s h  c o m m o n  l a w  d i f f e r e d  f r o m  t h e  E n g l i s h  c o m m o n  l a w ,  
w h i c h  r e q u i r e d  a  w i l l  t o  b e  v a l i d l y  e x e c u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o
t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  h i s  d e a t h .
A  w i l l  e x e c u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e x  l o c i  w a s  i n v a l i d  i n  
E n g l a n d .  £  D i c e y  p . 8 0 4 ;  C h e s h i r e  p . d i d  J T h e  S c o t t i s h  r u l e  
t h a t  e x e c u t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e x  l o c i  s u f f i c e s  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  
g e n e r a l  a g r e e m e n t  a m o n g  t h e  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  w r i t e r s .  £  S t a i r  I n s t .  
1 , 1 , 8 ;  3 , 8 , 3 5 ;  M a c k e n z i e  I n s t .  3 , 8 , p . 3 2 6 ;  B a n k t o n  1 , 1 , 7 6 ;
E r s k i n e  I n s t .  3 , 2 , 3 9  t o  4 2  J a n d  i s  a p p r o v e d  i n  a  d e c i s i o n  o f  
t h e  w h o l e  C o u r t  P u r v i s ’  f r u s t e e s  v *  P u r v i s '  E x e c u t o r s  2 5  D .
8 1 2 ;  s e e  a l s o  L e i t h ! s  T r u s t e e s  v .  L e i t h  1 8 4 8  1 0  D .  1 1 3 7  ( W h o l e  
C o u r t ) ;  C o n n e l l  T r u s t e e s  v .  C o n n e l  1 8 7 2  1 0  M .  6 2 7 ;  M a c d o n a l d ,  
v .  C u t h b e r t s o n  1 8 9 0  1 8  R .  1 0 1  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t  p .  
f -  1 0 4 ;  K e n n i o n %  B u c h a n T s  T r u s t e e s  1 8 R 0  7  R .  5 7 0  p e r  L o r d  
J u s t i c e  C l e r k  M o n c r e i f f ;  B a r  p .  8 1 4  J  T h e  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s
w h e t h e r  i t  w a s  t h e  l e x  d o m i c i l i i  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  m a k i n g  t h e  w i l l
death which
I % .
was meant when it was said that a will was valid if executed 
according to the law of the testator’s domicile. This question 
arose very sharply in England at common law, because there the 
formalities of the testator’s domicile were the only sufficient 
ones*, if a testator executed a will according to 'the law of
his domicile at the time of execution and thereafter changed 
his domicile/ it was revoked unless it happened to satisfy the 
law of the new domicile. £ Dicey p. 821; Cheshire p. 819 J 
The question has not been the subject of an express decision in 
Scotland. It was not likely to arise in Scotland because if a 
tnstator changed his domicile and- the will on his death was 
found not to fulfil the requirements of the lex domicilii at 
death , it usually fulfilled the requirements of the lex loci
actus. The question however mlghf, have arisen if A were domiciled 
in country X,^made a will in country Y according to the law 
of country X and not of Y, and thereafter changed his domicile 
to country Z, which had other formalities. Would this will have 
been valid at common lav/? It is submitted that in Scotland, it w oil Id 
have been. In Purvis the eight consulted judges reasoned thus: 
’Supposing a testator domiciled in a foreign country at the time 
when he makes his will, according to the forms there required, 
it seems unreasonable to say that his change of' domicile to 
a country where a different form of authentication is required 
by local statutes, is eo ipso to operate as a revocation of 
that will which was validly made at the time when it was made.”
£ 1861 83 D. 812 at p. 824 ^  It might just as well be argued: 
’Supposing a testator makes a will according to the-forms 
rerequired by his domicile at the time, it seems unreasonable 
to say that his change of domicile to a country where a different 
form of authentication is required is eo ipso to operate as 
a revocation of that will which was validly made at the time 
it was made.’ |~ McLaren,pykes supplement p. 8 J
The common lau rule that a will is validly executed if 
executed according to the lex loci actus,was made statutory 
for British subjects by the Wills Act 1861. This Act altered 
the English la-, r-ir*. M ' d w » 4 r  ° ’•">11
CTfQc i 1 + p d  a c r n r d i  ii*-* l-.n r > «  1 p w of tu ** t e s t a t o r T s  1'xr-,4- a,:}™* ( ' M r  
j j r  1 +  * . /  "* , r  , f  d e c l a r a t o r y  o f *  8 c o t s  l a w  •  -
T h e  A c t ,  k n o w n  a s  L o r d  K i n g s d o w n d s  A c t ” ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  
0v e r y  w i l l  m a d e  o u t  of t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  b y  a  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t
lou I d , a s  r e g a r d s  p e r s o n a l  e s t a t e ,  b e  h e l d  t o  b e  w e l l  e x e c u t e d
i f  e x e c u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f o r m s  o f  e i t h e r  -
( 1 )  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  w i l l  w a s  m a d e
( 2 )  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  p e r s o n  w a s  d o m i c i l e d  w h e n  t f i e  w i l l
w a s  m a d e
( 3 )  t h e  l a w  o f  t h a t  p a r t  o f  H i s  m a j e s t y f s  D o m i n i o n s  w h e r e  
t h e  t e s t a t o r  h a d  h i s  d o m i c i l e  of origin. £ S e c .  1 ^
 —  F u r t h e r ,  e v e r y  w i l l  m a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  b y  a
B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t  s h a l l ,  a s  r e g a r d s  p e r s o n a l  e s t a t e ,  b e  h e l d  t o  b e  
w e l l  e x e c u t e d  i f  e x e c u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f o r m s  r e q u i r e d  i n  t h a t
£  S e c .  0 Jp a r t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  w h e r e  t h e  s a m e  i s  m a d e
S e c .  3  o f  t h e  A c t  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  Q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  t h e  J a w  o f
l a s t  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  w h i c h  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  f o r m a , !  
v a l i d i t y  o f  h i s  w i l l  o r  t h e  l a  w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f
e x e c u t i o n .  I t  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  n o  w i l l  o r  o t h e r  t e s t a m e n t a r y  w r i t i n g  
s h a l l  b e  r e v o k e d ,  n o r  s h a l l  t h e  c o n s ^ r u c t i r ^  t h e r e o f  K e  a l t e r e d  
b y  r e a s o n  o f  a n y  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a n g e  o f  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r .
I t  h a s  b e e n  h e l d  i n  E n g l a n d  t h a t  s e c t i o n  3  i s  g e n e r a l  i n  t e r m s  
a n d  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  w i l l s  o f  a l l  p e r s o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  f o r e i g n e r s ,  
a n d  I s  n o t  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  p e r s o n a l  e s t a t e ,  I n  r e  G r o o s  1 9 0 4  P „
2 6 9 ;  a p p r o v e d  b y  D i c e y  p p .  8 2 0  e t  s e q u . ;  W e s t l a k e  s e c .  8 3 ;
M a x w e l l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  S t a t u t e s  7 t h  e d .  p . 3 7 ;  M o n t e i t h  v .  
M o n t e i t h ' s  T r u s t e e s  1 8 8 °  3  R .  9 8 2  .  D i s a p p r o v e d  b y  C h e s h i r e  p .
896 a n d  M c L a r e n ,  D y k e s  S u p p l e m e n t  p.R. T h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  f a v o u r  
o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e c t i o n  a r e  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  
g e n e r a l  t e r m s ,  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n s  w h i c h  a p p l y  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  o n l y  t o  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t s ,  a n d  t h a t  i f  i t  i s  n o t  r e a d  
i n  a  g e n e r a l  s e n s e  i t  m e r e l y  r e p e a t s  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s  w h a t  h a s  
a l r e q d y  b e e n  p r o v i d e d .  T h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  i s  t h a t  t h e  
A c t  i s  e n t i t l e d  " A n  A c t  t o  A m e n d  t h e  L a w  w i t h ’ R e s p e c t  t o  W i l l s  
j r f f  B r i t i s h  S u b j e c t s ' ^  a n d  A c c o r d i n g l y  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t n a t  n o t  
o n l y  a t  c o m m o n l a w  ,  b u t  a l s o  b y  s t a t u t e ,  i t  s u f f i c e s  f o r  t h e  f o r ­
m a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  a  w i l l  t h a t  i t  m e e t s  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  l a w  
o f
of the domicile at the tire of execution.
Immoveables . A will of Scottish heritage is validly executed
if executed either according to the law of the testator1s domicile
at the time of making the will, or according to the lav/ of the
I minev»cab|-e 5>
place of execution. A will of foreign must satisfy the
, A.
formalities of execution of the lex situs, unless that
law also permits execution of wills of immoveables according to
some other law. At commonjlaw a settlement of -Seeter heritage
had to fulfil the requirements of Scots law, as the lex situs.
executed
The settlement had not only to be/according to the solemnities 
of our law, but since a will of heritage was not competent, the 
settlement had to be in the form of a de praesenti conveyance 
and the word "dispone" had to be used. A will executed abroad 
according to the law of the place of execution could not convey 
Scottish heritage, even if the testator was domiciled in the place 
of execution and wills of land were competent by that law. 
f Colonel Henderson's Chlldrenv. Murray 1623 Mor. 4481;
Me1vi1 v . Drummond- 16 7  ^ Mor. 4483; Burgess v. Stantin 1764 nor.
4484; Children of James Crawfurd- v. Pat rich Crawfurd 1 7 7 4  Mor. 4 4 P^; 
Henderson v. Selkrig 179^ Mor. ^4 0 9 . Creditors of f'illiam Robertson 
v. Disnonees of Janet Mason 1vosgor. 4491; Boss v. Ross's Trustees 
July 4th 1809 F.C.: Rich mond's Trustees v. Winton 1864 3 M. 96;
Bowie v. Bowie 1811 Hume 7 6 6 ; Mead v . Anderson 1830 4 W.&S., ^O Q :
Ersk. Inst. 3,2,41 J)Similarly' it was r e c o g n i s e d  that t^e question
I m ria o \i f<■ S
whether a Scotsman's will conveyed hcri faf:e in a foreign country deq 
depended on the lex .situs , even when the hcri Lra-ge had been sold
5ttb5Mutn t’ly tm
and the urocoeds were within the jurisdiction of the Scottish Court. 
Macalister1s Executors v. Maoalister's Trustees 1834 13 S. 171 J  
The rule ©f the lex situs however, suffered equitable limit­
ation. A. Scotch settlement of Scotch heritage might be validly 
revoked by a will made abroad according to the lex loci actus.
Leith's Trustees v. Leith 1^48 10 D. 1137; purvis'"Trustees v. 
Purvis’ Executors, supra.But if the foreign will was only an implied 
revocation by making a new disposition of the subjects, it would 
be ineffectual for that purpose - Purvis J Deeds of instructions 
to trustees regarding the disposal of heritage already conveyed
to them f Ker v. Lady Essex Kerrs Trustees 18 9 9 7 s. 4^4 J 
and wills and codicils dealing with heritage in the exercise of 
r e s e r v e d  powers f 0 am c- r on v . I i a c k i e 9 S .  601, 17 Vr . & S .  106;
Baron iiortonTs Trustees v. Lady i.enzies 1851 13 D. 1017 ]
could be attested ip. the same way as for moveable estate.
The common law rule has been changed by statute. Section 
SO of The Titles to Land Consolidation Act 1868 provided teat t.-e 
succession to lands could be settled by mortis causa deeds/ 
and that where in any deed purporting to convey or bequeath 
lands any words of conveyance wore used which.if used in a will 
with reference to moveables, woold be sufficient to confer on 
the executor or legatee a right to receive the moveables,the 
deed if executed in the manner required or permitted in the case 
of any testamentary writing by the law of Scotland, would be 
effective to carry heritage. The effect of this enactment, 
plus the rule that a will of moveables is validly executed- if
i
executed according to the lex loci actus^  laid down in Purvis , 
supra, and made statutory for British subjects in the Wills Act
1861 J  is that a will made abroad, according to the lex loci 
will now carry heritage in Scotland if the testator intends it 
to do so. £ Gonnelrs Trustee v. Gonnel 1872 10 M. 627 However 
this alteration o" the law by statute can only affect Scottish 
heritage, an" leaver unchanged the principle that if the lex situs 
of foreign immoveables insists on its own formalities- being 
observed, the formalities of the lex situs will have to be 
observed, even if the foreign immoveables have been sold^and the
oX tK e .  t ( < i A  o f  n e  m o t i o n
proceeds are^within the jurisdiction of the Scottish Courts.
^ Macali'ster * s Executors v. ' Macalisterf s Trustees 185-4 i s s.
1 7 1 3
WilIs ... Capacity 
The question whether,a testator has capacity to make a willjas 
to ’moveables is governed by the law of his domicile at the 
time of making the will, and as to immoveables by the lex situs. 
See Capacity. Story par. 465; Bar p.813 1
r ' i l l s  . , . . 0 o n 3 1 r u c t i o n  
, fc s>Tjig i u n  cl a m <:'■ n t .  a 1 r,T-i.n^ ir,i r, j_rj tr© c o n  s t r u c t  i o n  o f *  w i l l s  i s  4-e 
■ d r t o r n -i - i e - e  t h e  t e s t a t o r * s  i n t e n t i o n .  T h a t  p r i n c i p l e  i s  l o g i c a l 1  v  
c a r r i e d  o u t  w h e n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t ! o n  o f  a  w i l l  i n v o l v e s  a  f o r e i g n  
l a v v r .
A s  t h e  i n t e n t  o b j e c t  i s  t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  t e s t a t o r r s  i n ­
t e n t i o n ,  t h e  w i l l  i s  c o n s t r u e d  a . c c o r d . i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  b y  w h i c h  h e  
i n t e n d e d ,  i t  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d .  H e  m a y  h a v e  s t a t e d  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  
e x p r e s s l y  i n  t h e  w i l l ,  a n d  i f  t h a t  i s  s o ,  h i s  d e s i r e  w i l l  b e  
g i v e n  e f f e c t  t o .  S t a i r  v .  H e a d  1 8 4 4  6 f ) .  9 0 4 .  t h i s  c a s e  r e l a t e s  
t o  a  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t ,  b u t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w a s  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  a  d e s t i n a t i o n  t o  t h e  w i f e *  s  h e i r s  e x e c u t o r s  o r  a s s i g n e e s  
i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  i s s u e b f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  t h e  
d e a t h  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ,  a n d  s u c h  d e s t i n a t i o n s  a r e  t e s t a m e n t a r y  -  ^ L e e  
L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  S t r a t h c l y d e  i n  L i  s  t e r *  s  J . F .  v .  S y n e  1 9 1 4  S . C .
9 0 4  J  D e c l a r a t i o n s  a s  t o  d o m i c ! . ! . e  i n  w i l l s  a r e  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  
p o s i t i o n :  t h e s e  a r e  o n l y  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r r s  i n t e n t i o n t o  
r e t a i n  h i s  o l d  d o m i c i l e  o r  a c q u i r e  a  n e w  o n e *  t h e y  a r e  n o t  
c o n c l u s i v e  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  o f  d o m i c i l e ,  b u t  w i l l  b e  w e i g h e d ,  a l o n g  
w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  ' i n d i c i a , o f  d o m i c i l e ,  a n d  i f  t h e r e  i s  s t r o n g e r  
e v i d e n c e  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  w i l l  ' b e  d i s r e g a r d e d .
^  R o b i n s o n  v .  R o b i n s o n ' s  T r u s t e e s  ( O . H . )  1 9 3 4  S . L . T .  1 8 3 :
C o r b r i d g e  v .  S o m e r v i l l e  1 9 1 4  1  S . L . T .  3 0 3 ;  I n  r e  S t e e r  1 8 3 8
3  H . & N .  5 9 8 ;  I n  r e  A n n e s l e v  1 9 9 3  L „ R .  C h . Q .  6 9 9  J  — - - - - - -
— — -—  If p g ©  will d o e s  n o t  e x p r e s s  b y  w h a t  l a w  i t  i s  t o  b e  
c o n s t r u e d ,  i t  w i l l  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  b y  w h i c h  
t h e  t e s t a t o r  i m p l i e d l y  i n t e n d e d  i t  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d .  I t  i s  p r e s ­
u m e d  t h a t  h e  i n t e n d e d  a  w i l l ,  w h e t h e r  o f  m o v e a b l e s ,  o r  i m m o v e a b l e s ,  
o r  o f  m i x e d  e s t a t e ,  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  
d o m i c i l e .  ^  S m i t h  v .  S m i t h s  1 8 9 1  1 8  R .  1 0 3 6 ;  R o b e r t s o n  v .  R o b e r t ­
s o n  F e b .  1 6 t h  1 8 1 6  F 0 C < > ;  G o w r s  E x e c u t o r  v .  G o w  ( O . H . )  1 8 6 8  
6 S . L . R .  252; M c l n n e s  v .  L c A l l e s t e r  1 8 2 7  5 s. 8 6 2 :  H a r d m a n  
v *  R o u g e t f s  T r u s t e e s  1 8 4 2  4  D.  1 6 0 3 ;  G o w a n  v .  B r a d l e y  1 8 4 5
7 D. 433; McKargs v» B! air 1760 nor. 4611; in re Cunnington 
1924 1 Ch. 68; Ommaney v. Bingham 1796 3 Pat. 448 p~r HorJ 
Loughborough -1 p.. 457; Y e a t e s v .  Thomson 1 S.&KcL. at p. 836 
per Lord Brougham J Some writers say that in the case of a
"tK«. is tk«.T
will of immoveables it should be construed according to the lex 
situs , £ McLaren p. 32; Bar p. 830;-Halsburjj ’ s Laws of England 
c. vi p.: 4 8 J  but it is clear from jffittchell v. Baxter & Davies 
(— 4WUL-E |~1875 3 K. 208 J that there it no, difference between 
'wills of moveables and immoveables, and that in both cases the* 
presumption is for the lex domicilii. |see also Smith v. Smiths
1 ° nl ?' R • 16t<? r where the ore sump ti on in favour of the le 
donioi1ii held good i n  the face of a stron8 plea that the lex 
situs should, be applied. It appears from' the argument of the 
second parties that this was a will dealing with real estate in 
New Zealand, although the rubric mentions ’’moveable” estate.
Dicey (p. 6 0 3 ) ,  Cheshire (p. 5-5F j; Foote (p. 256-}, story (secs 4 7 9  
a - f, 4S4j say that the presumption in the case of immoveables 
is for the lex domicilii. Where however there is a destination 
of immoveables i n  favour of "heirs” it is submitted that heirs 
must be ascertained according, to the lex situs - see post. U £«. <
ley: srtus o J tx s - he-lel to c j u o a .< i cep1a.i* foreign iminevea b le£. irv eppoSi+i.n to t k e  je. -y. <4 o n -  j r I i i ~|
T h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e x e c u t i o n  o f  h i s  w i l l J  
a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  d e a t h  m a y  b e  d i f f e r e n t ,  i n  w h i c h  c a s e  i t  i s  
t h e  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e x e c u t i o n  w h i c h  r u l e s .  £  T i r e  W i l l s  
A c t  1 c 6 1  F e e .  3  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  " N o  w i l l  o r  o t h e r  t e s t a m e n t a r y  
i n s t r u m e n t  s h a l l  b e  h e l d  t o  b e  r e v o k e d  o r  t o  h a v e  b e c o m e  i n v a l i d ,  
n o r  s h a l l  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  t h e r e o f  b e  a l t e r e d ,  b y  r e a s o n  o f  a n y  
s u b s e q u e n t  c h a n g e  o f  d o m i c i l e  o f  t v e  p e r s o n  m a k i n g  t h e  s a m e "
T h i s  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  w i l l s  o f  a l l  p e r s o n s  i n c l u d i n g  f o r e i g n e r s .  -
tf
I n  r e  G r o o s  1 9 0 4  P. 2 6 9 .  S e e  " w i l l s  -  F o r m a l  V a l i d i t y .  I n  
v i e w  o f  t h i s  s t a t u t e  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  G o v / ’ s  E x e c u t o r  v .
G o w  ( 0 . H o )  1 8 6 8  6  S . L . R .  2 5 2  i s  d e c i d e d  w r o n g l y .  E v e n  a p a r t  f r o m  
t h e  s t a t u t e  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  that t h e  r u l e  m u s t  b e  c o r r e c t ,  
o t h e r w i s e  t h e  m e a n i n g  a n d  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  w i l l  ,  a n d  t h e  p e r s o n s  
w h o  a r e  t o  t a k e  u n d e r  i t ,  w o u l d  h a v e  c h a n g e d  f r o j n  w h a t  the t e s t a t b :  
i n t e n d e d  w h e n  h e  m a d e  t h e  w i l l ;  w i t h o u t  a n y  a l t e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  w i l l ;
w h i c h  c a n  n o t  b e  p r e s u m e d  t o  b e  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  i n t e n t i o n .  " T h e
subseauent
construction of the settlement is not altered by any/change of 
(domicile. The provisions of Lord Kings down.1 s Act are declarator^ 
of the law.’’ - Battye’s Trustees v. Batty7e 1917 9 .9 , 
per Lord President Strathclyde at p. 39°. It is the law of the 
domicile at tne time-of death which governs? and subsequent- charsee 
in .thatr-demi- the law of the last domicile, even if retrospective^ 
are to be disregarded. - Oockburnfs Trustees v. Dundas 1864 9 
M. 1185; Lynch v. Provisional Government of Paraguay 1871 8 
P.&D 268 1
The presumption that the lex domicilii of the testator 
governs the construction of his will can be rebutted. ’’The quest­
ion always is whether the testator has manifested an intention . 
that his will shall be construed by the law of some country 
other than that of his domicile - say the country in which the 
will is made, in the language and forms of which the will is 
expressed and framed, or in which t$e trusts created by it are 
to be executed.” Smithfs Trustees v. hacpherson 19PF S.C.
983 per Lord President Clyde at p.989: Cheshire The
factors which weigh in considering whether the presumption for 
the lex domicilii is overcome are.that the will is expressed 
in the language and forms of the law of another country/ £ Dicey, 
p.818 says that this is sufficient of itself to entail the will 
being construed by the law of that other country? but this is 
contrary to Smith*v. Smiths 1891 18 R. 1036 i However the con­
sideration is important: Rainsford v. Hannay1 e Trustees 1852- 14
D. 450; ~itcheli v. Baxter »- Davies 1875 3 p. 208: Blackett 
v. 'fliChrist IB*7! 10 8. 590 J that the will was rna.de in another 
country where the testator was resident at the time, Smith v.
S m i t h s , supra: Mitchell v. Baxter & Davies, supra j  that the 
testator's domicile of origin was in the other country,^ R a i n ­
sford v. H a n n a y 's Trustees, Mitchell v. Baxter h D a v i e r , supraJ 
that the trusts are to be executed in another country^ C a m ­
eron v. Maokie 9 S. 601, 7 W.&S. 106 J that the property willed 
is land in another country I .Cameron v. M a o k i e .surra: Blackett
i* IS Mos-g ^ *-
v. Gilchrist, supraa\ I that to construe according'to the law of 
the domicile will result in intestacy. . - j See Smith v. Smiths,
supra, which is the converse j. None of these considerations is 
sofficient in itself, but if most concur in pointing to another 
count ry^ the will may fall to be construed according to the law 
of that country. Thus where a woman of Scotch origin, married 
to a domiciled Englishman, and therefore having an English 
domici1e herself, made a testamentary conveyance of Scotch 
heritage to trustees, who were her husband and two Scotsmen, 
and the deed was prepared by .? Scotch solicitor in the Scotch 
form and was executed, in Scotland, it was held that she could, 
scarcely have had in view.the law of any other country than 
that of Scotland, which therefore was held to rule the question 
of construction, which was whether the conditio si institus 
operated. I Mitchell v. Baxter & D a v i e s , supra,J Where a. Trust
to
Disposition and Settlement was executed according to the ScotrbAK 
form,by a person of Scots origin,possessed of landed estate in 
Scotland, the trustees b e i n g  « 1 1  resident in Scotland n.nd t h e  
trust being i n t e n d e d  to b e  carried out there, it "Tac * e l d  t h a t  
the deed ‘uad to be construe^ ^mo^d* nm to tv<a l&r~ of ftcotl«.r»d/
« rrV' +he testator nac designed therein as resident in 
Vienna, where he had resided for 30 years before his death 
without ever returning to Scotland. j^Rainsford v. Hannay*s 
Trustees .supra. The domicile of the testator was rot determined 
And where a person domiciled in England bequeathed heritage in 
Scotland to his eldest son^under burden of a trust purpose in 
favour of other people, the deed being drawn by a Scotch Con­
veyancer in the Scotch form .and the main purpose being the 
conveyance of the Scotch heritage, it was held that a question 
of vesting of the trust provision had to be determined according 
to Scots law.  ^Blackett v. Gilchrist 1831 10 S. 390 J It 
was not sufficient however to rebut the presumption of the 
lex domicilii that a domiciled Scotsman left a will, made in 
■New Zealand according to the New Zealand form, dealing with real 
estate in New Zealand ( which had to be converted the trustees 
being New Zealanders^£ Smith y. Smiths, supra J The points of 
difference from the first two cases referred to were that in 
those two cases, firstly, the
domicile of origin of the testator was in the country the law of 
which was held to apply, and secondly the domiciles which 
were ignored were only derived or- acquired ones. If New Zealand 
law had been applied in the last case the estate would have fallen 
into intestacy. It does not appear from the very short judgement 
whether this consideration weighed, £ Op. In re Cunnington 
19?4 1 Oh. 68 1) but it should weigh on the principle that a deed
should be construed ut valeat magis ouam p e r e a t : one presumes
that a testator did not intend his will to be a nullity.
If the will is expressed in ordinary language, it is not n e c ­
essary for the Oourt to refer to any foreign law for aid in its
interpretation,and it is competent for the Court and is the C o u r t ’s
duty, to construe the will for itself. £ T h o m s o n ’s Trustees v. 
Alexander 1851 14 D. 217/ and Griff i t h ’s J.F. v. G r i f f i t h ’s E x e c u t ­
ors 1905 7 F. 470, over-ruling Cranstoun v. Cunninghame 1839 1 
D« 521; Trotter v. Trotter 5 S. 7 8 y 3 W .~S. 4 0 7 (where the Lord 
Chancellor in the House of Lords approved the contra^” rule);
Cowan v. ^r^dley 184 5 7 D. 433 f If it is' avve'rFe* that the words
or clauses which are in dispute are-in-dubi© have a technical 
meaning according to the foreign law, the Court will consider 
the evidence of experts in the foreign law as to- whether this is 
so or not, and only assume the duty of construction if the 
evidence is that they have no technical meaning; but where itw&s 
aserred that according to English law effects included heritage/ 
but wa.s not averred that this was so because of any technical 
meaning of the word in English law, this was not a relevant 
averment which required the Scotch Court to refer to the evid­
ence of experts, and the Court forthwith considered for itself 
was intended to r- ~y
whether"effects'/include heritage. I Griffith’s , supra J In
construing ordinary language in this way it seems proper for 
the Court to confine itself to philology, and not to advert to 
cases in its own law which have given a meaning to the words 
under construction. Thus in the interpretation of the word 
”effects^ the Inner House did not mention twp previous Scots 
decisions referred to by the Lord Ordinary, which had held that
effects did not include heritage, but proceeded on general
considerations to tha
■s to the same result.
Ira-
When a will bequeaths/moveables situated in a country other
than the domicile and the will is to be construed according to
the lex d o m i c i l i i , a difficulty arises if the will has been
expressed in the technical language of t1 e lex domicilii. It
may have purported to confer immoveable rights 3mown to the
lex domicilii, which are either not known to the lex situs.or
technical
are not known by that/name. This difficulty is resolved by 
obtaining the meaning of the technical expressions In the law of 
the testator’s domicile and asccertainlng the quality of the right 
which the testator intended to bequeath, and then conferring the 
nearest equivalent right in the language and forms of the 1exsitus 
See ’Analogy in the Conflict of Laws bv G. H. Crichton in 
XL L.Q.R. p. 472 Thus an Englishman left a will in the
English form,by whichfinter alia he devised all such of his 
lands situated in the counties of Devon, Inverness etc. as 
consisted. of"freehold of Inheritance” ”to the use of my elder son
E.F.S., and his assigns for his life, without impeachment of 
waste, and after the death of the said E.F.S. to the use of the 
first and every other son of the said E.F.S. successively, 
according to their respective seniorities in tail male, with 
remainder to the use of etc." According to the law of England 
the Inverness estate which was in didpute would have been 
"freehold of Inheritance" and this would'have been a valid settle 
ment "in tail male" if theSy had been situated in England. The 
House of Lords considered that the incidents of a tail male 
following on a tenancy for life were substantially the same 
as the son E.F.S. would have received by a Scottish conveyance 
to him in liferent allenarly and to the heir male of his body 
in fee, and that this is whatt E-fiSc- should obtain. T Studd v.
cf ~Tt_m \j. Cofpp % 1926> /
Cook 1880 ’8 E. 249, 10 R. (H.L.) *3;A Cp* Marquis of Bute v. 
Marchioness of Bute’s Trustees 1880 8 R. 191 J Only such rights 
as to immoveables as are recognised by the lex situs can-be
{^ C Lruitg-c ^  v. Cr'pp-s r of|
conferred on the beneficiary.A A domiciled Scotsman by a Trust 
Disposition in Scottish form, after conferring a life interest 
on his wife, gave his land in Scotland and his London house for
behoof of his eldest son James, and the heirs-male of his body
£  •
in fee, whom failing J ohijn and his second son, and the heirs - 
male of his body in fee, with other remainders over* By English 
law this created an estate in tail male in James: by Scots law 
such directions would not have created a strict entail - the 
interest of John and his heirs thereunder was that of heirs 
substitute (inly, and was defeasible at the will of James, who 
was entitled ( Subject to the life interest of his mother ) to 
deal with o& dispose of the premises Hy any habile conveyance,
a s  f>e^<xr ds» 1\v« London
will* It war held that the Trust 4 ev,/^ c>,oated
an English estate in ta.il male without any pow er of disnosition 
except thaT. conferred by m^lieh law, and that. James's will 
was not effective to defeat it but thQt the premises ’went on 
James’s death to John, In re Miller, Baillie v. Miller 1914 1
J
| A  f ( X ' i o w t '
The estate which thosgid-veea-tos of Scots law maintained, 
t
was not bn own to Snots, law.
There is no re as oil why one part of a will should not be 
construed by a different law from another, if that could, fairly 
be said to be the intention of the testator. Different clausesof 
mercantile contracts^ £ Hamlyn v. Talisher Distillery 1894 PI R*
(K 0L «) 2 1 J  and of marriage contracts, £ Chamberlain v. Napier 
I860 lb Ch* 614 J may be construed, by different systems of law, and 
there is'no reason why the same should not apply to wills. This 
is borne out by Marquis of Bute v. Marchioness of Butefs Trustees.
£ 1880 8 R* 191 J in which a Trust Disposition a n d •Settlement
in Scotch formjand executed in Scotland by s. Scotch lady directed 
that certain jewels plate etc. should be settled as heirlooms 
on the Marquis of Bute and after him on the heirs entitled to 
succeed to the Bute estates in the county of Glamorgan in entail. 
This was competent by English but not By Scots law. Now it is 
clear that the settlement as a wholewas to be construed by Scots 
law, but it is equally clear that this bequest was intended to 
take effect under English law, because in favour of the heirs of en&| 
tail of English estates, and although the case was decided on 
another ground, Lord President Inglis saw no reason why the
b e q u e s t  s h o u l d  n o t  r e c e i v e  e f f e c t  b y  t h e  t r u s t e e s  e x e c u t i n g  
a n  E n g l i s h  d e e d  o f  e n t a i l  o f  the j e w e l s  a n d  p l a t e . [ a t  p .  196J
Strict.1 yf thdjv&s not a question of construction but of essential 
validity, but both are governed by the same system of law. If the 
testator dealt with immoveables in one clause in the language 
°t the lex s i t u s ,and subjected them to trusts to be carried out 
in the situs by trustees resident there, end moveables in a n ­
other clause in the language of1 the law of his domicile, it 
might well be that the lex situs should, apply to the construct- 
ion of the former clause and the law of his domicile to the
In r 5  |qo?> 'ZCk. 7 3 S'.
uconstruction of the latter. f ^ See however B 1ac1 re11 v e G11chr1st
1 8 3 1  1 0  S .  8  9 0 ,  w h e r e  a  p e r s o n  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d  bequeathed 
h e r i t a g e  i n  S c o t l a n d  t o  h i s  e l d e s t  s o n  u n d e r  b u r d e n  o f  payment 
o f  £ 4 0 0  t o  t r u s t e e s  f o r  a  t r u s t  i n  favour o f  o t h e r  p e o p l e .
T h e  d e e d  w a s  d r a w n  b y  a  S c o t c h  c o n v e y a n c e r  i n  t h e  S c o t c h  f o r m ,  
a n d  i t  w a s  h e l d  t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  m a i n  -  
p u r p o s e  w a s  t h e  c o n v e y a n c e  o f  S c o t c h  h e r i t a g e / t h a t  a  q u e s t i o n  
o f  v e s t i n g  o f  t h e  t r u s t  p r o v i s i o n s  h a d  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  S c o t s  l a w ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  t e s t a t o r  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  
i n  E n g l a n d .  J  I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  s i n , v i e  w o r d  ’ ’ h e i f c s ”  m a y  
h a v e  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t w o  d i f f e r e n t  l a w s  i f  t h e  e s t a t e  
c o m p r i s e s  b o t h  m o v e a b l e s  a n d  i m m o v e a b l e s .  £  S e e  p o s t  J
C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  d e s t i n a t i o n s  t o ” h e i r s ”  o r  " n e x t  o f  k i n ” _
T e s t a t o r ’ s  W h a t  i s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a  d e s t i n a t i o n  b y  t h e  t e s t a t o r  
h e i r s  t o  h i s " h e i r s "  o r  ’ ’ n e x t  o f  k i n ” ?  T h e  ’ ’ h e i r s  d o  n o t  t a k e
b y  r e a s o n  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  t o  m a k e  a n y  w i l l ;  o n  
t h e  c o n t r a r y  t h e y  t a k e  b y  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  w i l l . £  B r o w n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  
v .  B r o w n  1 8 9 0  1 7  R .  1 1 7 4  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t  p .  1 1 8 0  
B u t  " i t  i s  p l a i n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  c o n t r o l l i n g  c o n t e x t  t h a t ,  
w h e n  a  t e s t a t o r  l e a v e s  m o v e a b l e s  t o  h i s  o w n ” h e i r s " ,  h e  i n t e n d s  
t o  b e s t o w  t h e m  o n  t h e  s a m e  p e r s o n s  a s  t h o s e  w h o  w o u l d  s u c c e e d  t o  
h i m  i f  h e  d i e d  i n t e s t a t e .  T h a t  b e i n g  s o  i t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  -  w h o  a r e  t h e  n e r s o n s  t h u s  d e s i g n a t e d ?  -  m u s t  d e p e n d
x o r  a n s w e r  o n  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  o w n  d o m i c i l e , ”  F  S m i t h ’ s  
T r u s t e e s  v .  M a c p h e r s o n  1 9 8 ^  S . C .  9 8 3  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  C l y d e  
a t  p .  9 8 8  J
It is equally plain in the absence of a controlling 
context that when a testator leaves immoveables to his 
own "heirs” , he intends to bestow them on the same 
persons as those who would succeed to him if he died 
intestate. That being so it is evident that the 
question - who are the persons thus designated? - must 
depend for answer on the lex situs. If a testator 
leaves the residue of his estate to his "heirs" and 
dies possessed of both moveables and immoveables, the 
residue will go so far as moveable to his heirs in 
mobilibus according to the lex domic ilii, and so far as 
immoveables to his heirs in heritage according to the 
lex situs. If he leaves lanu in various countries -the 
the heirs to the immoveables may vary from situs to 
situs. It has been suggested that if a testator has 
property in England, Jamaica, and British Guiana, and 
maxes a will in favour of his heir, tha-t it is not to be 
presumed that he used the expression in three different 
senses, and that ’heir’ must be construed according to 
the law of his domicile. /^Cheshire p. 544; Story 
sec. 479h quoting Burge 1858 ed. vol. ii p. 858J  
But why should ’heir’ not mean a different person for 
moveaole and immoveable property, and one person for 
immoveables in one place and another for immoveables 
in another. A  devise in a will of land in both 
England and Scotland to A and the heirs-male of his 
body in fee, whom failing B ana the heirs-maie of his 
body in fee, with limitations over, was held in Re 
killer,/~1914 1 Ch. 511J  to have a different effect 
as regards the English lands from what-it had as regards 
the Bcotch lands. If it is admitted that by using the 
word ’heir’, the testator meant to benefit the person 
who would have benefited if he had died intestate, 
then different meanings must be assigned to ’heir* in 
order to carry out the testator’s intention. The other 
view/
view is too strict an application of the rule that the 
law of the domicile of the testator must be presumed to 
govern the construction of a will of moveables or 
immoveables: to apply the rule in this case is to defeat
the testator’s intention;, the rule exists only because 
it elucidates what is thought to oe the testator’s 
intention; the intention is the over-riding principle; 
if the testator’s intention has been ascertained to be 
otherwise then the rule is not needed. In a Scots will 
where no question of foreign law arises it is clear that 
a destination to "heirs" takes the moveable property to 
those who would have been heirs in mo'bi lib us and the 
heritage to those who would have been heirs at law by the 
rules of intestate succession. /"McLaren p. 758__7 
’Heir’ then can denote two different persons at the one 
time/
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  e s t a t e .
W h e r e  t h e  f u n d s  a r e  m o v e a b l e ,  a  f u r t h e r  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  
w h e n  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  d o m i c i l e  i s  d i f f e r e n t  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  h i s  
d e a t h  f r o m  h i s  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e x e c u t i o n  o f  h i s  w i l l :  
a r e  ’ ’ h e i r s ”  a s c e r t a i n e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  
d o m i c i l e  o r  t h e  l a t t e r ?  I n  v i e w  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e A t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o  n  
o f  a  w i l l  i s  n o t  a l t e r e d  b y  a  c h a n g e  o f  d o m i c i l e , i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  
t h a t  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s o m e  c o u n t e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t h e  h e i r s  a c c o r ­
d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  d o m i c i l e  w o u l d  b e  t h o s e  e n t i t l e d  
t o  t a k e .  | ~  A n  e x a m p l e  o f  a  ’ c o u n t e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ’  c a n  b e  f o u n d  
i n  E a d i e ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  H e n d e r s o n  1919 1 S.L.T. 263, whene a d e s ­
t i n a t i o n  t o  ’ ’ t h e  t h e n  n e x t  o f  k i n  o f  t h e  s a i d  J o h n  E a , d i e ”  
o b v i o u s l y  m e a n t  h i s  n e x t  o f  k i n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  d o m i c i l e  a t
•Id e a t h  a n d  n o t  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  d e e d
T h e  p  i n t  i s  a  d i f f i c u l t  o n e .  I t  h a s  b e e n "  s a i d ;  o b i t e r ,  b y  
L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  C l y d _ e  t h a t  w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  a  d e s t i n a t i o n  t o  a  
t e s t a t o r ’ s  h e i r s ,  h e  i n t e n d s  t o  e n d o w  t h e  s a m e  p e r s o n s  w h o  w o u l d  
s u c c e e d  t o  h i m  i f  h e  d i e d  i n t e s t a t e ,  a n d  a c c o r d i n g l y  ’ ’ t h e  l a w  
o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  u l t i m u m  d o m i c i l i u m  (  s h o u l d  h e  h a , v e  m e a n t i m e  
c h a n g e d  h i s  d o m i c i l e  )  m u s t  b e  h e l d  t o  c o n t a i n  t h e  r u l e s  o f  
i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n  w h i c h  t h e  t e s t a t o r  i n t e n d e d  t o  i n v o k e  . . .
I t  m a y  u e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  (  a s  a b o v e  a x p l a i n e d  )  
o f  a n  a l t e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  d o m i c i l e  i n v o l v e s  n o  a l t e r a t i o n  
i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  w i l l .  T h e  w i l l  r e m a i n s ,  a s  i t  a l w a y s  
w a s ,  a  g i f t  t o  t h o s e  w h o  w o u l d  s u c c e e d ,  t o  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  
m o v e a b l e s  i f  h e  d i e d  i n t e s t a t e ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  
a l t e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  d o m i c i l ^  i n v o l v e s  n o t h i n g  i n c o n ­
s i s t e n t  w i t h  s e c .  3  o f  t h e  W i l l s  A c t  1 8 6 1 ” .  S m i t h ’ s  T r u s t e e s  
v .  M a c n h e r s o n  1 9 2 6  S.G. 9 8 3 ,  a t  p .  9 8 8  .  T h i s  i s  a l s o  M c L a r e n ’ s  
v i e w  -  p . 7 7 9 , a n d  h i s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  n o t  c o r r e c t e d  i n  D y k e s  S u p p ­
l e m e n t ,  w h i c h  h o w e v e r  d o e s  n o t  n o t e  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m a r r i a g e  -
c o n t r a c t  c a s e s  a f t e r m e n t i o n e d  J T h e  q u e s t i o n  w a s  l e f t  o p e n  i n  
t h e  o n l y  S c o t t i s h  c a s e  i n  w h i c h  i t  a r o s e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  a  w i l l ,  
{ B r o w n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  . B r o w n  1 8 9 0  1 7  R .  1 1 7 4 .  T h e  L o r d  O r d ­
i n a r y ,  F r a s e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  w a s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  v i e w  w h i c h  L o r d
p r e s i d e n t  C l y d e  l a t e r  e x p r e s s e d ,  b e c a u s e  h e  s a i d  ” P o  d o u b t  
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  s i m p l e  w i l l  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  t o  
b e  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  
o f  t h e  d e a t h . ”  H e  _ t h . e n  r o e s  o n  t o  s a t  t ^ a t  t h e  r u l e  i s  n o t  
c o n c l u s i v u  a n o .  a s  r e b u t t e d  p v  w  e  o  t u o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s •  J  b u t  
o n  t  u  t f ~ o m .  t v  o f  t , , r o  m a r r  i  a  rr c o n  f r a  o n  ->00 F  w p r > r i j  p  < v p  
c o n t r a c t  s  a  1  c  . ■ L i  t i c  t  J  o n  t o  o n e  i  t  e  s r o u s r o  !  ■■ o  5 .  p s  o r  n o n * ' ,  o f
on the. "fWilurc. • f  the other s p o u s e  a n d
1 ' i n  f - a l  1  i - r t "  a i l  o f f  s p r j n  o -  o f  r  o p , n r i  n  o f  f n n d a  c o n t r i b u t e d  b y
t h a t  s p o u s e ,  i s  l i f e  a  will b;. h i m  o r  h e r .  ^  L i s t e r ’  s  J.F. v .  
i f m e  1 9 1 4  S . C .  8 0 4  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  S t r a t h c l y d e  J  t h i s  d i c t u m  
o f  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  C l y d e  i s  w r o n g ;  s u c h  a  d e s t i n a t i o n  t o ’ ’ h e i r s ”  
o r  ’ ’ n e x t  o f  k i n ”  i s  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  
d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  m a k i n g  t h e  d e e d ,  
a n d  n o t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e  a t  h i s  d e a t h .  
^ L i s t e r ’ s  J . F .  v .  S y m e ,  s u p r a ;  B a t t y e ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  B a t t y e
1 9 1 7  S . C .  3 8 7 J  T h e  t e s t a t o r  i n t e n d e d  t o  e n d o w  t h e  s a m e  p e r s o n s  
w h o  w o u l d  s u c c e e d  t o  . h i m  i f  h e  d i e d  i n t e s t a t e  a t  t h e  t i m e  h e  
m a d e  t h e  w i l l .
L e g a t e e 1  s  W h e r e  a  l e g a c y  i s  d i r e c t e d -  t o  b e  p a i d  t o  a  l e g a t e e ,  whom
h e i r s  f a i l i n g  ’ ’ h i s  n e a r e s t  h e i r s ”  ,  t h o s e  h e i r s  a r e  t o  b e  a s c e r t a i n ­
e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  l e g a t e e ’ s  d o m i c i l e . a n d  n o t  t h e  l a w  o f  
t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  d o m i c i l e .  ^  S m  i  t  h  ’  s  T r u s t e e s  v .  M a  c  p l i  e  r  s  o n  1 9 8 6  
S . C .  9 8 3 ;  M i t c h e l l ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  R u l e  ( O l h . )  1 9 0 8  1 6  S . L . T .  1 8 9 ^ J  
O t h e r w i s e  t h e  p e r s o n s  c a l l e d  t o  s u c c e e d  w o u l d  n o t  b e  h i s  h e i r s .
£  S m i t h ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  h a c p h e r s o n  p e r  L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  C l y d e  a t  p .
9 9 0  J  T h e .  . c o n t r a r y  has b e e n  h e l d  in Ln.ulend „  ^ I r  re p i  i wm o i . ’ s
V .'ill 19 0 8  ]  C h .  4 8 3  J T h e  qucm-iion again a r i s e s  r —  f c  u h u  t h . c r  
i t  i s  t h e  l e g a t e e ’ s  h e i r s  A c c o r d i n g  t o  h i s  d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  
t h e  w i l l  o r  a c c o r d i n g  . t o  h i s  l a s t  d o m i c i l e .  L o r d  President C l y d e  
h a s  stated o b i t e r ,  that it is according; to his1 last domicile j.
S m i t h ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  M a o p h e r s o n  a t  p ° ° n J  a n d  t h e  same reasons d o  
n o t  e x i s t  f o r  d o u b t i n g  this opinion as f o r  d o u b t i n g  h i s  o p i n i o n
t h a t  i t  i s  t h ©  l a s t  d o m i c i l e  t h a t  c o u n t s  i n  a  destination t o  t h e  
t e s t a t o r ’ s  h e ^ r s ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  n e i t h e r  a u t h o r i t y  a g a i n s t  i t ,  n o r  
d o e s  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  s e e m  u n r e a s o n a b l e :  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  
t e s t a t o r - m u s t  b e  p r e s u m e d  t o  h a v e  k n o w n  w h o  w e r e  t h e  l e g a t e e ’ s
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heirs by his domicile at the time of making the will, and to have 
iiad a delectus in favour of those persons, is disposed of by the 
consideration that generally a destination to a man's heirs is 
an accentuation o.'- ljliof avourto him, not an exercise of del eo tu : in
fancur of ohici  ^_ :nte . J^bid, Lord Jan-is at p. 992 J
i s'*. , "j '’ j ' X  'j )r '.o do 13 c n v"! , 1 tt-  ^ i T j o r ,  i o'rr- . j  . j  j  . j  0  i
j ■ person who belongs to anoth 0 IT* ^ payabio:when the legatee
attain'7; majority, it '1"'' be majority according to the legatee's 
foreign domicile that is meant*, £ E a r  p. 889n J
bequest to ” the children of A" 'leans in foots law.. £ McLaren 
pp. 692,4 J) as in English law, the legitimate children of A. If 
the will falls to be construed by Scots or English law a question 
may arise as ho whether a c~ ' Id legitimated under s fon?d ,-r. ].rg
say by the subsequent marriage of his parents, is comprehended.
es f Mic chill
The question whether the child is legitimate is one ofAstatus to 
be determined by the law of the domicile of the father at- the date 
of the alleged legitimation, m e  rule in ^e woodman's ^rusts 
£ 1 8 8 1  17 Ch. B ,  ‘6 6 6  J applies equally to testacy and intestacy, 
and to both moveables and immoveables. £  McLaren p.20 J It must 
always be remembered, howeven that the read question in testa,te 
succession is to determine the indention of the testator, and 
i f  i t  can be said that in a benuest to t h e  children o f  A . t h eat j
t e s t a t o r  a p p e a r s ,  on a  t r u e  construction of the settlement, 
t o  have m e a n t  s u c h  c h i l d r e n  o f  A  a s  w e r e  b o r n  i n  l a w f u l  w e d l o c k ,  
t h e  c l a s s  w i l l  h a v e  to bo. restricted accordingly. £ F.A.M a n n  i n  
1 9 4 1  L V I I  L . ' Q . R .  1 2 6  |  Further, if a  f o r e i g n  l a w  governs the
X> /f
construction o f  the will, a n d  that l a v /  says that children m e a n s  n o t  
s i m p l y  legitimate c h i l d r e n ,  b u t  c h i l d r e n  b o r n  i n  l a w f u l  w e d l o c k ,  
t h e n  t h e  e n q u i r y  d o e s  n o t  g e t  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  s t a t u s ,  
f  C p .  D o e  o r  B i r t w h i s t l e  v .  V a r d i l l  1 8 3 0  2 J  •  4 2 1 ,  1  R o b .  6 2 7
•- i
S e e  L e g i t i m a t i o n
-2/7 *
C O N S T R U C T I O H  O F  1 1  F R E E  0 F  D U T Y ; 1
A  d i r e c t i o n  t o  p a y  a  l e g a c y  " f r e e  o f  d u t y ” ,, o r  
t o  p a y  a n  a n n u i t y  " f r e e  o f  a l l  t a x e s "  i n  a  S c o t t i s h  w i l l  
m e a n s ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a n y  c o n t r a r y  i n t e n t i o n  w h i c h  
a p p e a r s  f r o m  t h e  w i l l ,  t h a t  S c o t t i s h  d u t i e s  a n d  t a x e s  o n l y  
a n d  n o t  f o r e i g n  o n e s ,  a r e  t o  b e  b o r n e  b y  t h e  r e s i d u e  o f  
t h e  e n t a t e .  /  LtI 2 L A  U o r b u r y  1 9 5 9  I  C h .  5 3 8 ;  I _ n  r e  T r a c e r  
1 9 n l  1  G h •  S 3 6 _ /  A n  e x a m p l e  o f  a n  i n t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
c o n t r a r y  o c c u r r e d  w h e n  a  b r i t i s h  s u b j e c t  o r a i n a r i n y  
r e s i d e n t  i n  T u r k e y  b e q u e a t h e d  f r e e h o l d  e s t a t e  i n  F r a n c e  
" f r e e  o f  a l l  d e a t h  d u t i e s , "  a n d  n o  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  d u t y  
o r  a n y  d u t y  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  F r e n c h  m u t a t i o n  d u t y  w a s  
p a y a b l e :  t h e  F r e n c h  m u t a t i o n  d u t y  w a s  p a y a b l e  o u t  o f
t h e  r e s i d u e  o f  t h e  e s t a t e .  /_ L n  r e  q . u i r k  1 9 4 1  1  G h .  4 6 _ /  
I n  d r a w i n g  a  w i l l  w h e r e  s u c h  a  q u e s t i o n  m a y  a r i s e  i t  i s  
d e s i r a b l e  t o  u s e  a  t e r m  o f  a r t ,  s u c h  a s  " f r e e  o f  l e g a c y  
d u t y " ,  w h i c h  m e a n s  t h e  l e g a c y  d u t y  p a y a b l e  u n d e r  o u r  l a w .  
Z  1 1 1  £ £  S c o t t  1 9 1 5  1  C h .  5 9 3 _ /
Wills . ... Essential Validity
A will which has been sufficiently executed, and by a 
testator with capacity, may yet be invalid either in whole 
or in part if (1) it purports to bequeath property which 
the testator has no pov/er to bequeath, or
(2) bequeaths it in a way that the law does not permit, or
(3) if it has been executed under error or as a result of 
undue influence or force.
In Scots law an example of the first class is a will 
in which the testator purports to leave all his estate to 
charities, ignoring his wife and children, which however 
is ineffective to defeat their legal rights. Examples of 
the second class are the prohibition or accumulations 
beyond certain periods, the prohibition of the creation of 
a liferent in favour of a person not In life at the time 
of the creation, the rule that a condition attached to a 
legacy which is contra bonos mores is to be held pro non 
scripto, and that an entail of moveables can not be created. 
These two classes of essential invalidity are subject to 
different rules. /^"The English, text writers, possibly in 
consequence of their unfamiliarity with legal rights, have 
not distinguished them. It is usually stated simply that 
questions of essential validity are referred to the law 
of the last domicile of the deceased - Dicey p. 804;
Cheshire p. 530^7
(1)
Where there is a limitation of the power of the 
testator to bequeath part of his property, that limitation 
may be part of the matrimonial law, whereupon the rules ■ 
apply which are described in The Property Eights of Spouses 
and Children. /~q«v._/ Alternatively it may be a part of 
the law of succession as a restriction of the testamentary 
power, whereupon the law of the last domicile of the deceasec 
governs/
e s
g o v e r n s .  / ~ B a r  p .  8 2 7 _ _ /  W h e r e  t h e r e  i s  a  r e s t r i c t i o n  
o n  t e s t a m e n t a r y  p o w e r  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  
d o m i c i l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  m a k i n g  t h e  w i l l ,  a n d  n o n e  b y  t h e  
l a w  o f  h i s  l a s t  d o m i c i l e ,  a  w i l l  d i s p o s i n g  o f  a l l  h i s  
p r o p e r t y ,  r e s e r v i n g  t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  s h a r e  t o  w h i c h  h i s  
r e l a t i v e s  m a y  b e  e n t i t l e d  a t  h i s  d e a t h ,  w i l l  p a s s  t h e  
w h o l e  o f  t h e  e s t a t e .  I n  r e  G r o o s  N o .  2  1 9 1 5  1  C h .  5 7 2 J 7
(2)
T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  t e s t a t o r  h a s  d i s p o s e d ,  o f  
h i s  p r o p e r t y  i n  a  w a y  w h i c h  t h e  l a w  w i l l  p e r m i t  i s  
d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  m o v e a b l e s  i n  t h i s  w a y :  t h e
\ i d by
d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  v a l i d  i f  t h e ' s a m e  l a w  w h i c h  d e t e r m i n e s  t h eA
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  w i l l  ( i . e .  u s u a l l y ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y 3 
t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ) ^  j_ B o e  v .  A n d e r s o n  
1 8 6 2  2 4  L .  7 5 2 ;  O m m a n e y  v .  B i n g h a m  3  P a t .  A p p .  4 8 8 ,  
Cheshire, (p. 530 ~) McLaren, /  P. 2 4  )  and D i c e y  £  p. 804 ) 
declare t h a t  t h e  law o f  t h e  last d o m i c i l e  r u l e s  t h e  
e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  a  w i l l ,  b u t  i n  t h i s  t h e y  r e l y  t o o  
m u c h  o n  c a s e s  a b o u t  l e g a l  r i g h t s ,  a n d  i t  i s  t h e  n a r r o w e r  
q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  m a n n e r  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p r o p e r t y  c a n  b e  
d i s p o s e d  o f  t h a t  i s  h e r e  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t 5  o n .  T h e  r u l e  
h e r e  s t a t e d  i s  i n  h a r m o n y  w i t h  t h e  r u l e  i n  r e g a r d  t o  
c o n t r a c t s  a n d  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t s ,  n a m e l y  t h a t  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  
g o v e r n s  t h e i r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  g o v e r n s  t h e i r  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y .  
S e e  L o r d  C u r r i e h i l l  i n  B o e  v .  A n d e r s o n  1 8 6 2  2 4  D .  a t  p . 7 5 0 ,  
M a r q u i s  o f  B u t e  v .  M a r c h i o n e s s  o f  B u t e ’ s  T r u s t e e s  1 8 8 0  8  R .  
1 9 1 .  W h e n  a  t e s t a t o r  d o m i c i l e d  i n  c o u n t r y  A  l e a v e s  a  w i l l  
w h i c h  w o u l d  n o r m a l l y  h a v e  b e e n  c o n s t r u e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
l a w  o f  c o u n t r y  A, b u t  b e c a u s e  i t  d o e s  n o t  c o n t a i n  a n y  
t e c h n i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s  i s  b e i n g  c o n s t r u e d  b y  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  
c o u n t r y  B ,  w h i c h  i s  s e i s e d  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m ,  w i t h o u t  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  A, t h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  
w i l l  i s  s t i l l  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  c o u n t r y  A. B o e  v .  A n d e r s o n ,  
s u p r a ^  a n d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  b e q u e s t  i s  
t o  t a k e  e f f e c t .  / " M a r q u i s  o f  B u t e ,  s u p r a ;  B a r  p .  8 2 6 _ J 7
A s /
Immoveables
A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c o n t r a c t s  / ~ q * v . _ _ 7  a n ( 3  m a r r i a g e  
c o n t r a c t s ,  t h e  t e s t a t o r  c a n  n o t  n a m e  a  l a w  t o  g o v e r n
e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  t e s t a t o r  o r  t h e  w i l l
h a s  a b s o l u t e l y  n o  c o n n e c t i o n .  I f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  p u r p o r t s  
t o  d o  t h a t ,  h i s  d i r e c t i o n  i s  r e g a r d e d  p r o  n o n  s c r i p t o ,  
a n d  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  w o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  h a v e  g o v e r n e d  t h e  
e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  w i l l  i s  a p p l i e d .
T h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  o n e  p a r t  o f  a  w i l l  m a y  h e
t e s t e d  b y  a  d i f f e r e n t  s y s t e m  o f  l a w  f r o m  a n o t h e r  p a r t .
T h u s  i n  M ■ • r q u i s  o f  B u t e  v .  M a r c h i o n e s s  o f  B u t e T s  T r u s t e e s  
/ ~ 1 8 8 0  8  R .  1 9 1 _ 7  a  T r u s t  D i s p o s i t i o n  a n d  S e t t l e m e n t  i n  
S c o t c h  f o r m  w a s  e x e c u t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  b y  a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t c h  
l a d y ,  i n  o n e  c l a u s e  o f  w h i c h  s h e  d i r e c t e d  t h a t  c e r t a i n '  
j e w e l s  p l a t e  e t c .  s h o u l d  b e  s e t t l e d  a s  h e i r l o o m s  o n  t h e  
M a r q u i s  o f  B u t e  a n d  a f t e r  h i m  o n  t h e  h e i r s  e n t i t l e d  t o  
s u c c e e d  t o  t h e  B u t e  e s t a t e s  i n  t h e  c o u n t y  o f  G l a m o r g a n ,  
i n  e n t a i l .  T h i s  w a s  c o m p e t e n t  b y  E n g l i s h ,  b u t  n o t  b y  
S c o t s ,  l a w .  T h e r e  i s  n o  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  
o f  t h e  m a i n  p a r t  o f  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  h a d  t o  b e  t e s t e d  b y  
S c o t s  l a w ,  b u t  i t  i s  e q u a l l y  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  b e q u e s t ,  b e c a u s e  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  h e i r s  o f  e n t a i l  o f  E n g l i s h  e s t a t e s ,  w a s  
i n t e n d e d  t o  t a k e  e f f e c t  u n d e r  E n g l i s h  l a w ,  a n d  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
c a s e  w a s  d e c i d e d  o n  a n o t h e r  g r o u n d ,  t h e  C o u r t  s a w  n o  r e a s o n  
w h y  t h e  b e q u e s t  s h o u l d  n o t  r e c e i v e  e f f e c t  b y  t h e  t r u s t e e s  
e x e c u t i n g  a n  E n g l i s h  d e e d  o f  e n t a i l  o f  t h e  j e w e l s  a n d  p l a t e .  
/ L o r d  P r e s i d e n t  I n g l i s  a t  p .  1 9 6 J \  i . e .  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  
v a l i d i t y  o f  t h a t  c l a u s e  o f  t h e  d e e d  w a s  t o  b e  t e s t e d  b y  
E n g l i s h  l a w .  / ~ T h i s  i s  a l s o  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
g i v e n  a b o v e  t h a t  t h e  r u l e  t h a t  t h e  l e x  d o m i c i l i i  g o v e r n s  
e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  i s  o n l y  a  p r e s u m p t i o n / 7
T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  t e s t a t o r  h a s  d i s p o s e d  o f  h i s  
i m m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  i n  a  w a y  w h i c h  t h e  l a w  w i l l  p e r m i t  i s  
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  l e x  s i t u s .  f ~H e w i t ! s  T r s .  v .  L a w s o n  1 8 9 1  
1 8  R .  7 9 5 ;  B r o w n T s  T r s .  v .  G r e g s o n  1 9 2 0  S . C .  ( H . L . )  8 7 J — .
- — -  I n /
—  I n  B e  P i e r c y , / ~ ~ 1 8 9 5  1  C h .  6 3 _ J 7  a n  E n g l i s h  t e s t a t o r  
g a v e  i n t e r  a l i a  S a r d i n i a n  l a n d  t o  t r u s t e e s  t o  s e l l ;  a l t e r  
c o n v e r s i o n  t h e  p r o c e e d s  o f  s a l e  w e r e  t o  h e  h e l d  o n  c e r t a i n  
t r u s t s  v / h i c h  w e r e  i n v a l i d  u n d e r  I t a l i a n  l a w .  T h e  E n g l i s h  
C o u r t  h o w e v e r  h e l d  u p o n  t h e  e v i d e n c e  o f  I t a l i a n  l a w  t h a t  
t h e  t r u s t e e s  h a d  p o w e r  t o  s e l l  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  l a n d  i n  
S a r d i n i a .  T h a t  w a s  t h e  o n l y  m a t t e r  f o r  v / h i c h  r e f e r e n c e  
n e e d  b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  l e x  s i t u s .  T h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  p r o c e e d s  
b e i n g  m o v e a b l e ,  I t a l i a n  l a w  h a d  n o  a p p l i c a b i l i t y :  E n g l i s h  
l a w  g o v e r n e d  a n d  t h e  t r u s t s  r e c e i v e d  e f f e c t .  T h e  I t a l i a n  
l a w  s t i l l  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  l a n d  i n  t h e  h a n d s  of t h e  
p u r c h a s e r s  f r o m  t h e  t r u s t e e s ,  b u t  n o t  t o  t h e  p r o c e e d s .
( 3 )
Questions as to whether a will has been executed under 
error or as a result of undue influence or force should 
be determined in the first place by the system of law in 
accordance with which the will was executed and from which, 
in consequence, the will derives such validity as it 
possesses; if the will was executed according to the lex 
domic ilii they should be determined by the lex domicilii, 
and if according to the lex loci actus, by the lex loci 
actus; if the will was executed in accordance with the 
law both of the domicile and of the place of execution, 
the law of the domicile at the time of execution should, 
govern. /~Contra Breslauer, ’’Private International Law 
of Success:’on” p. 180 (always the law of the domicile), 
Wolff p. 593 (lex fori) ~] But the over-riding principle 
is always present that a foreign deed, although valid by 
the foreign law, will not be enforced if it is in contra- 
ivention of an essential principle of justice or morality 
and a deed impetrated by threats comes within this 
exception. f~Kaufman v. Person 1 9 0 4  1 K . r .  591_/
Wills • ••. revocation
R e v o c a t i o n  m a y  b e  b y  ( 1 )  a n  a c t  o f  r e v o c a t i o n  b y  t h e  
t e s t a t o r  o r  ( 2 )  b y  o p e r a t i o n  o f  a  r u l e  o f  l a w .  I n  t h e  f o r m e r  
c a t e g o r y  a r e  s u b s e q u e n t  w i l l s  o r  c o d i c i l s  w h i c h  r e v o k e ,  
t e a r i n g  u p  t h e  o l d  w i l l ,  d e l e t i n g  c l a u s e s  f r o m  i t ,  s e l l i n g  
t h e  a r t i c l e  b e q u e a t h e d .  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a t e g o r y  c o m e s  t h e  
S c o t s  c o n d i t 1 o  s i  t e s t a t o r  s i n e  l i b e r i s  d e c e s s e r i t .  T h e  
E n g l i s h  r u l e  t h a t  a  w i l l  i s  r e v o k e d  b y  m a r r i a g e  h a s  b e e n  
c l a s s i f i e d  a s  r e l a t i n g  t o  m a t r i m o n i a l  l a w  q . v a n d  n o t
t h e  l a w  o f  s u c c e s s i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  G e r m a n  l a w  c l a s s i f i e s  a  
s i m i l a r  r u l e  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  s u c c e s s i o n .  / ~ W o l f f  p . 1 4 6 7  
T h e  E n g l i s h  r u l e  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  s u c c e s s i o n  a n d  W e s t e r r n a n ’  s  B x e c u t o r  v .  S c h w a b  
[_ 1 9 0 5  8  F .  1 5 2  J 7  o n l y  c l a s s i f i e d  i t  u n d e r  m a t r i m o n i a l  l a w
i n  o r d e r  t o  s o l v e  t h e  e n i g m a  w h i c h  t h a t  c a s e  p r e s e n t e d .
0 )
A  m i s l e a d i n g  o b i t e r  d i c t u m  o n  t h i s  p o i n t  b y  L o r d  
J u s t i c e  C l e r k  I n g l i s  h a s  g a i n e d  a  c e r t a i n  a m o u n t  o f  c u r r e n c y :  
’ ’ T h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ,  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  
h i s  d e a t h ,  m u s t  d e t e r m i n e  n o t  o n l y  w h a t  i s  t h e  t r u e  m e a n i n g  
a n d .  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  e f f e c t  o f  a n y  w i l l  o r  d e e d  o f  s e t t l e ­
m e n t  h e  m a y  h a v e  l e f t  d i s p o s i n g  o f  h i s  m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e ,  
b u t  a l s o ,  a s  r e g a r d s  h i s  m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e ,  w h e t h e r  h e  d i e d  
t e s t a t e  o r  i n t e s t a t e ;  a n d  i f  h e  d i e d  t e s t a t e ,  t h e  l a w  o f  
t h e  d o m i c i l e  m u s t  f u r t h e r  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  p a p e r  o r  p a p e r s  
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d . ”  f ~ P u r v i s  v .  P u r v i s  
1 8 6 1  2 5  L .  a t  p .  8 3 0 ;  C p .  D i c e y  p .  8 1 5 .  D i c e y ’ s  s t a t e m e n t  
h a s  m o r e  t o  b e  s a i d  f o r  i t  s i n c e  a t  E n g l i s h  c o m m o n  l a w  a  
w i l l  h a d  t o  b e  e x e c u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  l a s t  
d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d .  J T h i s  w i l l  n o t  d o .  E a c h  o f  t h e  
a l l e g e d  t e s t a m e n t a r y  p a p e r s ,  m u s t  b e  t a k e n  i n  o r d e r ,  a n d  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  a s k e d  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  v a l i d  a s  t o  f o r m a l i t i e s  
c a p a c i t y  a n d  e s s e n t i a l s  b y  t h e  s e v e r a l  s y s t e m s  o f  l a w  w h i c h  . 
g o v e r n e d  t h e s e  m a t t e r s  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  m a k i n g  t h e  w i l l ,  a n d  
i f  s o ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  w i l l  h a s  b e e n  r e v o k e d  i n  w h o l e  o r  i n  
p a r t  b y  a  s u b s e q u e n t  w i l l  o r  c o d i c i l  w h i c h  i s  v a l i d  a s  t o  
f o r m a l i t i e s /
f o r m a l i t i e s  c a p a c i t y  a n d  e s s e n t i a l s , .  A n  a v e r m e n t  o f  c a n c e l l a t i o n  
o r  t e a r i n g  u p  o f  a  w i l l , m u s t  b e  d e a l t  w i t h  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  
b y  w h i c h  t h e  f o r m a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  w i l l  w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  
e s t a b l i s h e d  ( s o  t h a t  a  w i l l  e x e c u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e x  l o c i  
a c t u s  i n  a .  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  m u s t  b e  c a n c e l l e d ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
t e a r i n g  u p  a n d  t h e  l i k e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h a t  l a w  b e f o r e  i t  c e a s e s  
t o  b e  e f f e c t i v e )  a n d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  
t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  l a s t  d o m i c i l e .  T h e  l a w  o f  t h e  l a s t  d o m i c i l e  
w i l l  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  s a l e  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e  b e q u e a t h e d .
£  B a r  p .  8 3 2 J
(2)
T h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  
b i r t h  o f  t h e  c h i l d  d e t e r m i n e s  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  i s  r e v o c a t i o n  o r  n o t .  
T h u s  i f  a  m a n  d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  m a d e  a  w i l l ,  h a d  a  c h i l d  i n  
S c o t l a n d ,  a n d  d i e d  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  
h i s  w i l l  w a s  r e v o k e d  w o u l d  b e  d e c i d e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  S c o t s  l a w .  
A g a i n ,  I f '  a  m a n  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d  m a d e  a  w i l l  a n d  h a d  a  c h i l d ,  
a n d  t h e n  a c q u i r e d  a  d o m i c i l e  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  
h i s  w i l l  w a s  r e v o k e d  w o u l d  b e  d e c i d e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  
E n g l a n d .  [_ O p .  _ I n  r e  P e i d  1 8 6 6  P . P .  1  P .  A  D .  7 4 ;  I n _  r e _  G r o o s  
1 9 0 4  P .  2 6 9 ? w h e r e  a  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t  w a s  h e l d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
E n g l i s h  r u l e  o f  a  w i l l  b e i n g  r e v o k e d  b y . m a r r i a g e ,  b e f o r e  t h a t  
r u l e  w a s  c l a s s i f i e d  i n  We s t e r m a n ’ s  E x e c u t o r  v .  S c h w a b  1 9 0 5  8  F .  
1 3 2 ,  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  l a w . J  A s  r e g a r d s  t h e  s e c o n d  
e x a m p l e ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  h e l d  t h a t  s e c .  3  o f  t h e  W i l l s  A c t  1 8 6 1  
a p p l i e s  t o  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
t h e  w i l l s  o f  a l l  p e r s o n s ,  f o r e i g n e r s  i n c l u d e d .  f ~ I n  r e  G r o o s ,  
s u p r a .  S u p p o r t e d  b y  W e s t l a k e  s e c .  8 6 .  D o u b t e d ,  b y  C h e s h i r e  p . 5 2 6 7  
s e c t i o n  3  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  n o  w i l l  s h a l l  b e  h e l d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  r e v o k e d  
o r  t o  h a v e  b e c o m e  i n v a l i d ,  n o r  s h a l l  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  t h e r e o f  b e  
a l t e r e d ,  b y  r e a s o n  o f  a n y  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a n g e  o f  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e  
p e r s o n  m a k i n g  t h e  s a m e ;  b u t  i f  t h e  s e c t i o n  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  i t  o n l y  a f f i r m s  w h a t  i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  l a w  i n  a n y  e v e n t .
w  i  l  j  s  .  ,  ,  ,  p o w e r "  a . ■ » ■ % » ) « - » ■ »  n t . m o n t ,
p o m r t . 1  " ’ h e r  a  p o w e r  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  h a s  b e e n  g i v e n  b y ,  o r  r e s e r v e d
a l i d i t y  i n ,  a  w i l l  o r  o t h e r  d e e d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e  a  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t , ,
b y  w h a t  l a w  i s  t h e  f o r m a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  d e e d  e x e r c i s i n g  t h a t  p o w e i  
t o  b e  t e s t e d ?  T h e  w i l l  o r  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  g r a n t i n g  t h e  p o w e r  
m a y  i n d i c a t e  w h a t  l a w ,  o r  m a y  i m p o s e  f o r m a l i t i e s ,  f a n d  i f  s o ,  t h e y  
m u s t  b e  o b s e r v e d .  ^  I n  r e  K i r w a n ’ s  T r u s t s  1 8 8 3  8 3  O h .  87-: I n  r e  
h e w  a  1 ’  s  s  e  1 1 1  c m  e r .  t  T r u s t  s  1 9 1 8  2 O h .  3 9 1  j |  I f  t h e r e  i s  n o  i n d i c a t i  : 
t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a  p o w e r  i s  v a l i d l y  e x e c u t e d  i f  e x e c u t e d  e i t h e r  -  -  
f a )  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  b y  w h i c h  t h e  t e s t a t o r  i n t e n d e d  h i s  w i l l  
t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d ,  w h i c h ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  e x p r e s s  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  i s  
g e n e r a l l y ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  d o m i c i l e .  
T h u s  a  h o l o g r a p h  w i l l  e x e c u t e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  b y  a  d o m i c i l e d .  E n g l i s h  
w o m a n ,  a l t h o u g h  i n e f f e c t u a l  a s  a  w i l l  b e c a u s e  n o t  e x e c u t e d  a c c o r d ­
i n g  t o  E n g l i s h  l a w ,  w h i c h  w a s  b o t h  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  
d o m i c i l e  a n d  t h e  l e x  l o c i  a c t u s ,  w a s  h e l d  t o  b e  a n  e f f e c t u a l  
e x e r c i s e  o f  a  p o w e r  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  u n d e r  a  S c o t c h  t r u s t  d e e d .
£  K e n n i o n ’  v. Buchan’s T r u s t e e s  1880 7 R .  870 J
o r  ( B )  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a v ;  o f  t h e  p l a c e  o f  e x e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  p o w e r  
i f  i t  i s  i n t e r  v i v o s 7  o r  i f  i t  i s  m o r t i s  c a u s a . , ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a n y  
m e t h o d  o p e n  t o  t h e  d o n e e  b y  t h e  S c o t t i s h  l a w  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a , !  P r i v a , t e  L a w  f o r  m a k i n g  a  m o r t i s  c a u s a ,  d e e d . .  £  K e n n i o n  
v .  B u c h a n ’ s  T r u s t e e s ,  s u p r a ,  p e r  L o r d  J u s t i c e  C l e r k  M o n c r e i f f  a t  
p .  873: K e r  v .  L a d y  E s s e x  K e r ’ s  T r u s t e e s  1829 7 s .  464 ;  C a m e r o n  v .  
M a c k l e  9 S .  601- 7 W . & S .  106: B a r o n  H o r t o n ’ s  T r u s t e e s  v .  L a d y  
i v l e n z i e s  1861 13 D. 1017; D ’ H u a r t  v .  H a r k n e s s  34 B e a v .  324; In r e  
P r i c e ,  T o m l i n  v .  L a t t e r  1 9 0 9  i  C h .  4 4 o ;  i n  r e  W i l k i n s o n ’ s  S e t t l e m e n t  
1917 1 Ch. 620; C h e s h i r e  p .  3 9 ?  J  
C o n s t r u c t i o n  • T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  d o n e e  o f  t h e  p o w e r  h a s  o r
h a s  n o t  e x e r c i s e d  t h e  p o w e r  i n  a  v a l i d l y  e x e c u t e d  w i l l  
i s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  d o n e e ’ s  w i l l ,  t o  b e  d e t e r m i n ­
e d  b y  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  g o v e r n s '  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  d o n e e ’ s  w i l l .
In re Price. Tomlin v. Latter, supra; Granstaun v. Qunnin&hame 
1839 1 D. 621 1  A problem arises however when the donee of the
p o w e r  is d o m i c i l e d  i n  a  c o u n t r y  w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  r e c o g n i s e  
p o w e r s  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t ,  a n d  l e a v e s  a  g e n e r a l  w i l l .  i s  t h a t  
g e n e r a l  w i l l  a n d  e x e r c i s e  o f  a  g e n e r a l  p o v s e r  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  
c o n f e r r e d  u y  a  O c o t c h  w i l l ?  T h e  q u e s t i o n  c a n  n o t  h e
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  g o v e r n s  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e
w i l l  w h i c h  i s  a l l e g e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e  p o w e r ,  a n d  h a s  t o  b e
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  g o v e r n s  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e
w i l l  w h i c h  g r a n t e d  t h e  p o w e r .  I n  r e  0  i m p  s o n  1 9 1 6  1  C h .
5 0  2; i n  r e  W i l k i n s o n ' s  S e t t l e m e n t  1917 1  C h .  6 1 0 ;  I n  r e  
P e w a l ’  s O e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  1 9 1 8  2 C h .  691; I n  r e  jj tEs t e s  
s e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  1 9 0  6  1  C h .  8 9 8  a n d  I n  r e  u c h o l e f i e l d  
1 9 0 o  2 C h .  4 0 8  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  f o l l o w e d ^ /
T h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  m o s t  u s u a l  d i f f i c u l t y  i n
t h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a  p o w e r  i s  
e x e m p l i f i e d  h y  A .  d o m i c i l e d  i n  E n g l a n d  g i v i n g  B  d o m i c i l e d  i n  
S c o t l a n d  a  p o w e r  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  t o  h e  e x e r c i s e d  b y  w i l l ;
8  e x e c u t e s  a  w i l l  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  t h e  a p p o i n t e d  f u n d s ,  b u t  
b y  d c o t s  l a w ,  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  o w n  d o m i c i l e ,  h e  i s  o n l y  
e n t i t l e d  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  a  t h i r d  o f  h i s  e s t a t e  b y  w i l l  b e c a u s e  
h e  h a s  a  w i f e  a n d  c h i l d r e n ;  h i s  e x e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  p o w e r  
h o w e v e r  w o u l d ' h e  v a l i d  b y  E n g l i s h  l a w :  i s  i t  v a l i d ? _ /
o f  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a  s p e c i a l  p o w e r  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  
l a w  w h i c h  g o v e r n s  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  w i l l  
c o n f e r r i n g  t h e  p o w e r ,  s i n c e  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a  s p e c i a l  
p o w e r  i s  n o t  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  b e l o n g i n g  t o  t h e  
d o n e e  o f  t h e  p o w e r .  /_ T o u e y  v .  h o r d e r n  1 9 0 0  1  C h .  4 9 2 _J 
T h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a  g e n e r a l  p o w e r ,  
o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  g o v e r n s  
t h e  e s s e n t i a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  d o n e e ’ s  w i l l ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  
d o n e e  o f  a  g e n e r a l  p o w e r  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  a s  i f  i t  w e r e  h i s  o w n .  /  I n  r e  P r y c e ,  L a w f o r d  v •  
P r y c e  1 9 1 1  2  C h .  2 8 6 J
-Donations Mortis Causa
T h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  g o o d  d o n a t i o  
m o r t i s  c a u s a  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  l a w  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  g i f t s  i n t e r  
v i v o s  •  r e  K . o r v i n e ' s  T r u s t s  1 9 2 1  1  C h .  6 4 6 ;  W e s t l a k e
s e c .  1 2 1 6 _ _ /  T h u s  t h e  l a w  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  h a s  
m o s t  c o n n e c t i o n  g o v e r n s ,  a n d  n o t  t h e  l a w  o f '  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d .  / _  Contra In r e  C r a v e n ' s  E s t a t e  1 9 6 7  
6 A l l  3 .R .  6 6 _/ If t h e  l a w  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  
h a s  m o s t  c o n n e c t i o n  i s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  f o r  a  g o o d  
d o n a t i o  m o r t i s  c a u s a  t h e r e  m u s t  b e  e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i n g  w i t h  
t h e  d o m i n i o n  i n  t h e  p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  
h a s  b e e n  e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i n g  w i t h  d o m i n i o n  w i l l  o e  g o v e r n e d  
b y  t h e  l e x  s i t u s  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y .  /_ A d o p t i n g  a  s e c o n d a r y  
b u t  n o t  t h e  p r i m a r y  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  I n  r e  C r a v e n ’ s  E s t a t e  
1 9 6 7  6  A i l  h . R .  6 6 O f  c o u r s e  t h e  t e 3 U a t o r  m u s t  h a v e  
p o w e r  t o  m a k e  a  d o n a t i o  m o r t i s  c a u s a  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  
d o m i c i l e ,  a n d  i f  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  d o m i c i l e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  
h a s  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g o o d s  b e t w e e n  t h e  s p o u s e s  w h i c h  p r e v e n t s  
a  s p o u s e  f r o m  m a k i n g  a  d o n a t i o  m o r t i s  c a u s a  t o  a  t h i r d  
p a r t y ,  t h e n  t h e r e  c a n  b e  h o  v a l i d  d o n a t i o ,  e v e n  i f  i t  i s  
v a l i d  b y  t h e  l a w  w i t h  w h i c h  i t  h a s  m o s t  c o n n e c t i o n .
Testamentary Destinations in Tit 1 es Bonds and Share Certificates
A person when purchasing heritable property, share .certificates^ 
or receiving a bond;may take the title or the obligation to repay 
with a, special destination, e#g. to himself or his wife, or, 
to himself and his wife and. the survivor. The effect of such 
special destinations differs from country to country, and a choice
domiciled
of 1 aw is possib 1 e when a person. dies /ir country A , leaving 
property situated in country B with such a destination in the title. 
Does the law of country A or B determine the effect, of the destin­
ation?
orj tage It is clear that with regard to heritage the law of the situf
determines the effect, of the destination, in accordance with 
the general principle that only the lex situs can apply to immoveable
Moveables In regard to share certificates, documents of debt, an d 
the like, which are moveable, the principle should be to distin­
guish in the first place between testamentary di&pe&itiens- 
destinations and contractual ones. In the former category would 
come cases where A, who had bought a personal bond entirely with 
his own money, took the obligation to repay in name of himself 
and B p Such a destination should be construed oh the same principles 
as a will made by A, namely that it should be governed by the law 
by which A intended it to be governed, the very strong presumption 
being in favour of the law of Ais domicile, but another law applying 
if it was clearly the testa t o r ’s intention that it shoul* apply, 
in H e n d e r s o n ’s Trustees. £ 3>8568 5 S.L.R. 394- And th«t 
pri^cirle «hou? n aTvr»ly rhe^hs'” +hs asosP on A ’s predec­
ease or B ’s. The right to the bond should be distinguished from ^  
the title to the bond. Although the right should be governed by 
the law of $ $  domicile, the law of the situs of the bond might 
determine who had the legal title to it, leaving the right to be
'P^cL l l
Ijlu/ifikn. enforced as a trust.^ The position can be illustrated by an example! 
jn gGQtiand a destination in a bond to A and B means that A and
* 4  V i L
kJ, p.l|Y^B are joint owners, and on the death of one his trustees and the 
other take a share each. By the law of England there is a
presumption that the whole bond goes to the survivor. If A 
predeceases domiciled in Scotland, the debtor in the bond might 
be entitled to pay all to the survivor, B ,  but B  would hold half 
in trust for A's trustees.
-Unfortunately, in 0  onne 1 1 1  s  T r  u s  t  e e s  ^  ^  $ 8 8 : 6  1 3  R .  1 1 7  b  J
where special destinations were taken in a number of share and
stock certificates by a domiciled Scotsman, it was held on his death
that Scots law should apply to the certificates of Scotch companies
and English law to those of English companies. The law of the situs
c4ot»bted
of the shares was applied. This decision however.bv Lord Hunter in
A
the subsequent case of Cunninghame '  s Trustees t  1 9 2 4  S.C. 3 8 1  J  
where he opined that although English law might determine the person 
entitled to uplift the proceeds of the investments, the right 
of succession,being to a Scotsman, must be determined by Scots law.
£  S e e  a l s o  C o l e n s o ' s  E x e c u t o r  v .  D a v i d s o n  ( O . K . )  1 9 7 0  S . L . T .  3 6 9 ^  
G o v e r n m e n t  s t o c k s  a r e  n e i t h e r  S c o t t i s h  n o r  E n g l i s h ,  b u t  B r i t i s h ,  
a n d  s o  w h e n  a  d o m i c i l e d  S c o t s m a n  d i e d  l e a v i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  s t o c k  w i t h  
a  s p e c i a l  d e s t i n a t i o n , t h e r e  w a s  n o  n e e d  t o  c h o o s e  b e t w e e n  t h e  l a w  
o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  a n d  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  s i t u s ,  a n d  S c o t s  l a w  w a s  a p p l i e d .  
£  C u n n i n g h a m 1 s  T r u s t e e s ,  s u p r a ;  D r y s d a l e ' s  T r u s t e e  1 9 2 2  S . C .  7 4 1  J  
W h e n  t h e  s p e c i a l  d e s t i n a t i o n  i s  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  c a t e g o r y ,  
n a m e l y  t h o s e  o f  a  c o n t r a c t u a l  n a t u r e ,  t h e  r u l e s  f o r  c h o i c e  o f  l a w  
i n  c o n t r a c t s  s h o u l d  a p p l y .  T h u s  t w o  p e r s o n s  d o m i c i l e d  a n d  r e s i d e n t  
i n  S c o t l a n d  p l a c e d  a  s u m  o f  m o n e y ,  b e l o n g i n g  i n  p a r t  t o  e a c h ,  
u p o n  D e p o s i t  R e c e i p t  w i t h  a n  E n g l i s h  b a n k ,  a n d  t h e  r e c e i p t  b o r e  
t h a t  t h e  s u m  w a s  r e p a y a b l e  t o  t h e  t w o  p e r s o n s  o r  t h e  s u r v i v o r .  I t  
w a s  h e l d  t h a t  a l l  q u e s t i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  d e p o s i t o r s  i n t e r  
s e  f e l l  t o  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  S c o t s  l a w ,  " s e e i n g  t h a t  t h e  d e p o s i t o r s  
a r e  b o t h  S c o t c h ,  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e  s i t ­
u a t e d  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  a n d  t h a t -  t h e y  c a n n o t  b e  a s s u m e d  t o  h . a v ©  
t r a n s a c t e d  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r  o n  a n y  o t h e r  f o o t i n g  t h a n  t h a t  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i u e  r i g h t s  s h o u l d  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  o n l y  l a w  w i t h  w h i c h  
t h e y  a r e  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  a c q u a i n t e d ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e i r  o w n
c o u n t r y 1 '  •  £  D i n w o o d i e ' s  E x e c u t r i x  v. C a r r u t h e r ' s  E x e c u t o r  1895
2 3  R ,  2 3 4  p e r  L o r d  T r a y n e r  a t  p .  2 3 9 j  T h e  l a w  o f  E n g l a n d  w o u l d
have been applied in a question batween the bank and the depositors, 
because both the locus contractus and the locus solutionis were in
EQRMAL VALIDITY
A contract is validly executed if executed either 
according to the lex loci contractus /~Ersk. Inst. 3,2,40; 
Kames, Equity, p.549; Dickson on Evidenced 996,997; 
QqflfiiQghame v * Dady Seinple 1706 Mor. 4462; Fortune v* 
SJhQffan 1610 Mor. 4429; Galbraith v. Gunninghame 1626
Ib&O i 5r#mn's 5ufP- k-W7
Mor. 4430; Harper v. Jaffrev 1630 Mor. 4431; Surr*pi'cr3 v. Gt*R pWcjs 
Sal ton v. Sal ton 1673 Mor. 4431; Davidsons v. Town of 
Edinburgh 1682 Mor • 4444; Pine v » Creditors of Lord Semple 
1721 Mor. 4451; Gov an v . Bo.vd 1790 Mor. 4476;
Creditors of the York Building Ooy 1783 Mor. 4472;
Henderson v. Wilson & Melvilles 1797 Mor. 4478;
Falconer v. Heirs of Beattie 1627 Mor. 4501; Erskine v . 
Ramsay 1664 Mor. 4502; Scot v . Toiah 1676 Mor. 4502;
Great Northern Railway Co. v . Laing 1848 10D. 1408;
Earl of Hopetoun v. Scots Mines Qo. 1856 18D. 739;
Stuart v. Potter Qhoate & Prentice 1911 1S.L.T.377;
Dicey p.641; Cheshire p.243 J
or the proper law of the contract, which, when different 
from the lex loci contractus, usually means 
the lex loci solutionis /"Valery v. Scott 1876 3R. 965; 
Cheshire p. 248; Dicey p.645 J
and otherwise is not validly executed. The lex loci 
contractus and the proper law of the contract are 
alternatives, and if the requirements of either are 
satisfied, the deed is well executed, even although the 
requirements of the other are not satisfied* Thus in 
one case a deedw&s held to be validly executed which 
satisfied the lex loci contractus, but not the proper 
law; f~\Pine v. Creditors of Lord Semple 1721 Mor. 445lJ^ 
and in another a deedutos held to be validly executed 
which satisfied the proper law, though not the lex loci 
contractus { “Talery v • Scott,supra.J?
2.
if neither the formalities of the lex loci contract us 
nor those of the lex loci solutionis have been observed 
then the deed is invalid, / "Shedlock & urs v. Hannay 
1891 18R.663_/ and it is irrelevant that the formalities 
of Scots law have been observed if Scots law is neither 
loci contractus nor the lex loci solutionis •
L. I'ayler, v. Scott 1847 9D. 1504; Dickson ^998;
in Shedlock & Ors v . Hannay 1891 18R.663 Lord Kinnear 
seemed to think that the question was still open,
(at p.669)J7
Similar principles apply to contracts concerning 
immoveables. A contract regarding immoveables is 
validly executed either according to the lex loci 
contractus;/ “Cunninghame v. Lady Semple 1706 Mor. 4462; 
Govan v . Boyd 1790 Mor. 4476; Ersk. Inst, iii, 2, 40; 
Kames, Equity p.549; Dickson 5^ 1000_7 
or the lex situs (which, with land, is the lex loci 
solutionis)• Thus a contract to convey lands in 
Scotland made in another country according to the laws 
of that country will found an action of implement in 
Scotland. /Authorities cited in last note_7 a
conveyance of Scottish heritage made in a foreign 
country in the foreign form is not valid, even as an 
obligation to compel the granter to make a more formal 
conveyance. / "Dalkeith v. Book, 1729 Mor* 4464;
Ersk. ibidJ
There is a distinction between the formalities 
required to constitute a contract and the proof of the 
existence and tenor of a contract. It is only the 
former question that is subject to the principles just 
stated. The latter is always governed by the lex fori
/" See Remedy p . J
The principles just stated apply to the formalities
of Marriage-Contracts, q*v but not to Marriages,
Bills of Exchange, or Wills /~q
US 
■' 
' " 
'..
...
.J
3.
Stamping of deeds Mo country is bound to recognise
the revenue laws of another* 
Consequently there can be no 
objection to a deed on the ground that it has not been 
properly stamped according to a foreign law, even 
though that be the lex loci contractus. and the deed 
be utterly void by that law because of the lack of the 
stamp. /~Stewart v. Gelot 1871 9M. 1057J7 However it 
is difficult to appreciate why the Court of Session did 
not take this easy solution in Valery v. Scott- 
/ 1876 3R. 965J  In that case a Scotsman contracted in 
France by a letter written in the French language to pay 
a certain commission and it was objected that the letter 
was void because not duly stamped according to French 
law. The question could have been dealt with very 
simply by holding that the French revenue law could not 
have any effect in any event. But the Court proceeded 
on the ratio that the contract was a Scotch one because 
Scotland was the locus solutionis, and that even if 
stamping was a necessary solemnity by the lex loci 
contractus, it was not so by the lex loci solutionis, 
and the fulfilment of the requirements of the latter in 
the solemnities of deeds was sufficient. It is a little 
surprising that the very simple ratio of Stewart v» Celot 
was not adopted to settle the question at the outset. 
However the case is not inconsistent with Stewart v * Crelot 
In this matter another Briti oh eountry^is not 
S/gvMo counted as a foreign country,j\and consequently failure 
to comply with the stamp laws in force in another part 
'5o4l Briti nweal tfr, where the deedvfrs executed,
L t will» if the lack of a stamp renders the deed utterly
null, (as distinct from merely inadmissible as evidence, 
a question which the lex fori rules) invalidate it, 
even/
4.
even though, according to Scots law the deed would 
have been quite valid unstamped. / “Tayler v. Scott 
1847 9D. & 14; Dickson §  977 J
The English cases have resulted in a different 
set of rules. /‘"Alves v. Hodgson (1797) 7 T.R. 241; 
Clegg v . Levy (1812) 3 Gamp. 166; James v. Catherwood 
(1823) 3D. & R. 190; Bristow v. Seaueville 1850 
5 Ex. 275; Republic of Guatemala v . Hunez 1927 
1 K.B. 669 per Scrutton L.J. at pp. 690-691;
Dicey pp. 704, 858; Westlake £ 209 
if the foreign stamp law is to the effect that an 
unstamped deed is utterly null, and the foreign 
country is the locus contractus, then the unstamped 
deed is null everywhere, but if the foreign stamp 
law merely renders an unstamped deed inadmissible 
in evidence, since the lex fori governs evidence, 
a deed not stamped according to the foreign lex loci 
contractus would nevertheless be receivable in 
evidence in England. J
Capacity to Contract
Capacity to enter into a contract is dealt with 
in the general consideration of capacity. £ “*1
THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
“Interpretation” includes the meaning and legal 
effect of the contract and the extent of the 
liabilities which the parties have undertaken*
Eor example, B in Gibraltar sells anchovies to D in 
Malta, f *o«b» Gibraltar. Upon the anchovies arriving 
in Malta D complains of their quality and claims an 
allowance for shortage but does not reject them, and 
delivers to sub-purchasers from him. Upon their 
refusing to accept;D claims to rescind his contract 
with B and regain the price plus freight and damages. 
The question whether D is entitled to reject or whether 
he has lost the right because his acts and conduct 
are inconsistent with the ownership of the sellers, 
is a typical instance of the interpretation of a 
contract. /""Benaim & Co. v. Debono 1924 A.C. 514 J  
The extent of damages, the question whether any 
interest is due on a debt and if so the rate of 
interest, /"Cochrane v. Gilkinson 1857 2QD. 213- 
See Remedy p. J  and the question whether a
tenant under a lease has a power to sublet without 
that power being expressly conferred / "Mackintosh 
v. Bay 1895 22R* 345J  are other instances.
When the question is simply the construction 
of ordinary words in a contract to determine their 
meaning, the Court seised of the case, if it speaks 
the language, may decide without reference to foreign 
law. Robertson v . Brandes Schonwald & Co._ 1906 
6F. 815, per Lord McLaren at p.821_7
This principle frequently arises in the interpretation 
of wills, but it is of little value or importance in 
regard to contracts• Indeed the principle must be 
applied/
6.
applied with, caution. A clause in an English 
charter-party which ran ’’Penalty for non-performance 
of this agreement estimated amount of freight," would 
not have the effect under English law of quantifying the 
damages exactly, but would leave them to be assessed 
according to the actual loss suffered, but a foreign 
court which construed the words for themselves in their 
natural sense would, wrongly, fix the damages at the 
exact amount of the freight. £  See Godard v. Gray 
(1870) L.R. 6 Q,.B. 139 J
The interpretation of a contract is governed by 
the law by which the parties mutually ^~the intention 
must be the intention of both parties, not of one alone - 
Rex v. International Trustee 1937 A-C. 500 per Lord 
Russell of Killowen at p. 557; Hamlyn v . Talisker 
Distillery 1894 21 R. (H.L.) 21, per Lord Watson at p.25J  
intended, or are presumed to have intended the contract 
to be governed. /"~Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery, supra; 
Spurrier v. La Qloche 1902 A.C. 446, at p.450;
Rex v . International Trustee 1937 A.C. 500 per Lord 
Atkin at p. 529; Lloyd v . Guibert 1865 1 Q,.B. 115, 
at p. 123; Dicey Rules 155 and 161
J
The law by which the parties intended or are 
presumed to have intended the contract to be governed is 
often referred to, for convenience of expression, as 
"the proper law" of the contract. Another method of 
expression which has been used by the judges, particularly 
the Scottish judges, is to say that a contract is a 
Scottish contract or an English contract, meaning thereby 
that the proper law of the contract, or the law by which 
the parties intended or are presumed to have intended 
the contract to be governed, was Scottish or English. 
^f~E.g. Mackintosh v. May 1895 22R. 345
7.
If the parties to a contract expressly stipulate 
that a certain law shall govern, that law will be 
applied. Z~~jarl of Stair v. Head 1844 6D.904;
v * add ell 1879 7R.200 per Lord Shand at p»208; 
Qigvin Roper & Co. v. Monteith 1895 23R.129; Municipal 
Council of Johannesburg v. p. Stewart & Ooy. 1909 S.C. 
(H.L.) 53; Montgomery v. Zarifi 1918 S.C. (H.L.) 128; 
-Bay ley v. Johns tone (O.H.) 1928 S.H.153; Drummond v . 
Bell-Irving 1930 S.C. 704; Peist 1934 A.C. 161 (H.L.);. 
Rex v. International Trustee 1937 A.C. 500 per Lord 
Atkin at p.529; Vita good Products v . Unus Shipping Co . 
1939 A.C. 277 at pp. 289, 290 (P.C.); Mount Albert 
Borough Council v. Australasian etc. Assurance Society 
1938 A.C. 224 at p. 240 (P.C.); British South Africa Co. 
v. De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. 1910 1 Ch. 354 per 
Swinfen Eady J. at p. 381; Salt Mines Syndicate Ltd.
1895 2 S.L.T. 489J
Reference in a contract to a foreign law 
e.g. Prench law, may either mean that the parties intend 
greneh law to govern the contract or that the parties 
wish to incorporate a part of Prench law, e.g. a Prench
which
statute, into the contract, that is nevertheless to be 
governed by another law* Thus a bill of lading may 
contain a declaration that it is to be governed by the 
law of Hew York; in which case that law will be the 
proper law of the contract. Or the bill of lading may 
incorporate the Harter Act of the United States by 
reference, but the whole bill of lading be governed by 
Scots law as the law with which the contract has most 
connection, whereupon Scots law is the proper law* 
Standard Oil Co. v> Clan Line Steamers Ltd 1924 
S.C. (H.L.) 1; Dobell Steamship Rossmore Co.
1895 2 Q,*B. 408; Ex parte Pever 1887 18 Q..B.D. 660;
Vita Pood Products v. Unus Shipping Co. 1939 A.C. 277
n ,  ^  - p A-mpn tiyUJ V. CW nsi gncL^fate WhcA-T 8o«.d - l°M • K & . M U
at p.286^/7 In an English case in which the Harter Act 
vsids/
8.
w4s incorporated toy reference into an English toill of 
lading Lord Esher, M.R., said: “They then introduce 
into their bill of lading the words of the Harter 
Acts which I decline to construe as an Act, tout which 
we must construe simply as words occurring in this 
toill of lading!* / "Dotoell v . Steamship Ho ssmore Co». 
supra, at p. 413<iJ7 In a recent case toills of lading 
provided that general average was to toe settled 
according toAYork-Antwerp Rules, 1924, that in the 
case of shipments from the United States the Harter 
Act of 1893 was to apply, and that save as so provided, 
the toill of lading was sutoject to the terms and 
provisions of and exemptions from liability contained 
in the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act 1910; and 
that the contract should toe governed toy English law. 
f~Vita ffood Products v. Unus Shipping Co. 1939 A.C.277_7 
These directions could only toe given effect to toy 
considering the Acts referred to simply as words 
occurring in the contract, the whole of which was to 
toe governed toy English law.
When the parties have not expressly stipulated 
for a certain law, the contract is governed toy the 
law which it is presumed they intended should govern, 
or, in other words, the law to which it is presumed 
that the parties intended to submit themselves.
/~Rex v . International Trustee 1937 A.C. 500 per 
Lord Atkin at p. 529_7
This law is gathered from the terms of the contract 
and the surrounding circumstances. It is the law 
with which the contract has the most connection.
£ Westlake 5s 212J  There are certain
presumptions, which will toe examined shortly, for 
determining this law, tout our Courts have refused 
to treat as conclusive, rigid or arbitrary, criteria 
such/
such as lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis? 
and. have trsated the matter as depending on the 
intention of the parties to he ascertained in each 
case on a consideration of* the terms of the contract?
the situation of the parties, and generally on all 
surrounding facts1' • /"fount Albert Borough Council»
supra, at p.240J
Some of the factors which may he taken into 
consideration in determining the proper law are the 
place of making the contract /"see below_7; the 
place of performance; /"see belowJ  a reference to 
arbitration in a certain country; /"see below J  
where the contract is one of affreightment, the law 
of the flag of the ship; /"See belowJ  the language 
in which the deed is expressed; /~Spurrier v. La Oloche 
1902 A.C. 442 (P.O.); Chatenay v. Brazilian 
Submarine Telegraph Coy. Ltd. 1890 1 %.B. 79;
"The Industrie" 1894 P.58; "The Adriatic” 1931 P.241,
If the contract is a commercial one, and the language 
in which it is expressed is that of a great commercial 
nation, like England, it is an added consideration 
for the application of that law which the parties 
could reasonably be expected to have had in 
contemplation its well known provisions - "The 
Adriatic", supra; Vita Eood Products v* Unus 
Shipping Go« 1939 A.C. 277 at p« 291 (P.O.).
English Courts seem to consider that the contract 
being in the English language indicates English law, 
even though the other countries with which the 
contract has a connection speak the English language* 
"The remarkable fact that is noticed after reading 
many of the cases is the great regularity with which 
the English Courts find, by various methods, that
10.
it is the law of England that is intended by the 
parties” - Beale p.1102 J
Tfeat the contract is expressed in the technical 
legal language of a particular law; /"*Mackintosh v. M&y 
1895 22R. 345; "The Industrie" 1894 P. 58_7
rfat provisions would be valid under one law but not 
under another /""the interpretation should be Hut res 
Y.aleat quam per eat1 • P. & 0« Steam Navigation 
Oo. v. Shand (1865) III Moo. P.O. (JT.S.)272;
IS 11®. Missouri Steamship Go. 42 Ch. D.321;
ffainlyn v . Talisker Distillery 1894 21 R. (H.£.)21;
South African Breweries Btd. v. King 1899 2 Oh. 173;
Affd. 1900 1 Oh. 273J  
The domicile of the parties;
The place of residence of the parties; /~South African 
Breweries Ltd. v. King 1899 2 Ch. 173, 1900 1 Ch. 273; 
Evans v . Earl of Buchan 8D. 296; J/
The nationality of the parties; /"*Chartered Mercantile 
Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co. 
1883 10 q.B.D. 521J
The country in which a corporation is incorporated;
/~Parken v. Royal Exchange Assurance Coy. 1846 8 D.365;_7 
particularly if the question is the rights and duties 
of shareholders inter s See belowJ  the place of 
business of the parties; Parken v. Royal Exchange, 
supraJ
The situs of the goods about which the contract is 
concerned; /"Todd v. Armour 1882 SR. 901;
McNaughton v. Baird 1852 24J. 623; Connal & Co. v.
\
Loder 1868 6M. 1095J  particularly if they are 
immoveables; /'"‘Mackintosh v» May 1895 22R. 345;
British South Africa Co. v. Be Beers Consolidated
Minea 19X0 2 Ch. 5 Q 2 _ 7
and/
11.
and the fact that one of the parties is a sovereign
state* Z~R_ex v. International Trustee 1937 A.C. 50G_7
But it is not legitimate to look for the intention
of the parties in factors of a different nature to this,
e.g. in the prior communings of the parties before
entering into the contract. /"Mackintosh v. May. supra_7
Bor would it be competent to prove that one of the
parties said to a third person that he thought the
contract would be governed by a certain law, /~Contra
Lord Robertson in Pender v. Commercial Bank: of Scotland
(©.H.) 1940 S.L.T. 306J  although it is legitimate to
speculate that since a person is resident in a certain
country at the time of the contract he would obtain
legal advice there as to the meaning of the contract
according to its law. /"**Henderson's Trs. v. Henderson
1868 5 S.L.R. 394, 396J  Some of the presumptions
which guide in determining the proper law are
Presumption If the place of making the contract and the place
in favour
of lex loci of performance are in one country, there is a presumption 
contractus ^
that the law of that country rules; /~Parken v. Royal
Exchange Assurance O o. 1846 8D. 365, per Lord Moncreiff 
at p.374; Jacobs v > Credit Lyonnais 1844 12 f^ .B.D.589, 
per Bowen L.J. at p.6G0; Lloyd v. Guibert L.R. 1 Q,.B.
115 at p. 122; Dicey p.671; Cheshire p.261;
Steuart’s Answers p. 227; J
jfrhcvt admits however of an exception where it appears 
that the parties at the time of making the contract 
have a view to a different country. / "Etobinson v . Bland 
per Lord Mansfield,/the Black Rep. 256; Edmonstone v. 
Edmonstone etc* June 1st 1816 3?.C. per Lord Robertson 
at p . 147 7
"The general rule is that the law of the country 
where a contract is made governs as to the nature, the 
obligation/
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obligation and the interpretation of it. The parties
to the contract are either the subjects of the Power
there ruling or as temporary residents owe it a
temporary allegiance; in either case equally they
must be understood to submit to the law there prevailing,
and to agree to its actions on their contract."
/~P. & 0. .Steam navigation Co. v. Shand (1865),
3 Moo. P.C. (B.S.) 272 at p. 290-lJ?
Pres umption But if the whole of the contract is to be performed
in favour
of lex loci in a country different from the locus contractus, it 
solutionis ~
is presumed that the lex loci solutionis and not the
lex loci contractus will govern. /*“Parken v. Royal
Exchange Assurance Co., supra, ibid; Chatenay v.
Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. (1890) 1 q.B. 79
per Lord Esher, M.R., at p. 83; Benaim v . Pebono
1924 A.C. 514; Livesey v. Purdom & Sons 1894 21 R. 911;
Dicey p* 672; Cheshire p. 263J 
The reason for the preference for the lex loci solutionis 
is simply that the parties ar& more likely to have had 
that law in mind, not the civil law rule contraxisse 
unusquisque in eo loco intelligitur.in quo ut solveret,
£  L.. I, . s-t cxct.J
se obligavit,^ for it is only necessary to appeal to this 
rule if one starts from the premiss that the lex loci 
contractus governs. ¥/e start however from the 
principle that the proper law of the contract governs. 
Many of the early cases do lay down the rule that the 
lex loci contractus governs and therefore it ms probably 
felt desirable in the interests of consistency to appeal 
to the Roman rule when it was obviously correct to apply 
the lex loci solutionis. It is more satisfactory 
however if, in the early cases that affirm the authority 
of the lex loci contractus, the lex loci contractus is 
translated as the proper law of the contract*
13.
It is not sufficient that a small part or the 
final part of the contract should he performahle in 
another country. Thus in P. & 0. Steam Navigation Co.
,Shand;/~supra_/ when a passenger by an English
vessel belonging to an English company from Southampton
to Mauritius took and signed a ticket in England for the
carriage of himself and his baggage, it was held that
the lex loci contractus must govern, although the
contract had ultimately to be performed by the delivery
of the baggage in Mauritius, which was subject to French 
law.
Suppose a contract made in country A is to be 
performed partly in country A, and partly in B and C; 
according to what law will it be interpreted, or will 
it be interpreted according to the law of A as to acts 
performed in A and according to the laws of B and 0 as 
to acts performed in B and C? There are two cases:
Firstly, the performance in A and the performance 
in B are separable parts of the contract* In this 
case it is undoubted that the law of A may govern as to 
the acts to be performed in A and the law of B as to 
acts to be performed in B. In other words there may 
be more than one proper law of the contract - a law 
applicable to one part and a different law applicable 
to another part, f  Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery 1894 
21 R* (H.L.) 21; Chamberlain v. Hapier (1880) 15 Ch. 614_7 
Thus in Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery supra_7 a contract 
between an English and a Scots firm to be implemented in 
Scotland was signed in London and contained this clause 
"Should any dispute arise out of this contract, the same 
to be settled by arbitration by two members of the London 
Corn Exchange, or their umpire, in the usual way." It 
was held that the arbitration clause fell to be construed 
and/
14.
governed by the law of England although it was thought 
that the main part of the contract should be governed 
by Scots law. ^~Per Lord Chancellor and perhaps Lord 
Shand. Lord Watson was non-committal. Lord 
Ashbourne thought that the contract would have been 
governed by Scots law if it had not been for the 
arbitration clause, but that its inclusion showed that 
the intention was that the whole contract should be 
governed by English law. And see Lord Chief Justice 
Hewart in Jones v. Oceanic Steam navigation Co. 1924 
2 K.B. at p. 733: 1 it is not probable that the parties 
would intend that some parts of the contract should 
be governed by the law of one country and other parts 
by the law of another country”. Cp. Cozens Hardy M.B. 
in British South Africa Co. v. He Beers Consolidated 
Mines 1910 2 Ch. at p.512__7
Secondly, the obligations to be performed in A 
and B are not separable parts of the contract, but are 
the same obligations that are to be performed in both 
A and B or alternatively in A or B. ^~As in Rex v. 
International Trustee 1937 A.C. 500J  In this event 
there can only be one proper law to determine the 
obligations of the parties, although when the law of 
the place of performance of any part of the contract 
is different from the proper law, the law of the place 
of performance may rule as to the mode of performance 
of that part of the contract. /"Jacobs v. Crrfd.it 
Lyonnai s 1884 12 ^.B.D. 589 at p.6G4; Adelaide etc * v. 
Prudential 1934 A.C. 122; Mount Albert Borough Council 
v. Australasian etc. Assurance Society 1938 A.C. 224 at 
p. 241 (P.C.); Vita Pood Products v. Unus Shipping Go. 
1939 A.C. 277 at p. 291 (P.O.).
15.
The function of the law of the place of performance in 
such an event has been stated too widely in some dicta, 
ITChatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. (1891)
1 Q.B. 79 per Lord Esher, M.F., at pp. 82, 83; Hex v. 
International Trustee 1937 A.C. 500 per Lord Roche at 
p. 574; Adelaide etc. v. Prudential, supra, per Lord 
Wright at p. 151 and Lord Tomlin at p. 145; Cheshire 
p. 258 J
for although, when the proper law of a contract is the 
law of a certain country and performance is to take 
place in another country, the law of the place of 
performance may govern a question of the mode of 
performance, such as the currency in which a debt can 
be discharged, /~Adelaide v. Prudential, supra_/or the 
mode of delivery of goods, f“Lloyd v. Guibert 1865
1 Q.B. 115, at p. 126; Robertson v. Jackson 1845
2 C.B. 412; f)The Turid,f 1922 1 A.C. 397J7 including 
f^ehe -right of retention of goods, /~Moffaughton v.
1852 24 J■ 623_j7 the extent of the obligations of the 
parties can not depend on or be altered by the law of 
the place of performance, but is determined by the 
proper law. f~~Mount Albert Borough Council v. 
Australasian etc. Assurance Society 1938 A.C. 224 at 
p. 241 (P.C.); Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. 
1939 A.C. 277, at p. 291 (P.C.); F.A. Mann in 1937 
18 B.Y.I.L. at p. 108.J7
It has been suggested by Dicey that when a contract is 
to be performed as regards the obligations of one of the 
parties in country A and as regards the obligations of 
the other in B, as when one person agrees to deliver 
goods to A and the other to pay for them in B, that 
these obligations can be regarded as two contracts 
each with its own proper law, which is the lex loci 
solutionis of that partes obligations /“p. 675j 
Cp. Savigny p. 19^ There is no authority however
for/
(3) Presumption 
in favour of 
the law of 
the forum to 
which parties 
have sub-B 
mitted tkem- 
selves
(4) Where
immoveables 
concerned, 
presumption 
for lex 
situs
(5) In contracts 
of affreight­
ment pre­
sumption for 
the law of 
Fhe flag1
l b .
for this, and so far as interdependent obligations 
are concerned it seems extremely doubtful and contrary 
to principle.
If the parties have agreed that their disputes 
should be settled by arbitration in or by the Courts 
of a certain country, the presumption is that the law 
of that country Is to govern. Hamlyn v. Talisker 
Distillery 1894 21 H. (H• X.•) 21; Robertson v. Brandes, 
Schonwald & Co. 190b 8 P. 815; N.V. Kwlk Hoo Tong 
Handel Maatschappi.j v. James Finlay & Co. 1927 A.C.604; 
Balli Bros, v. Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar 1920 2 K.B. 
287; MThe Nj egos1 1956 P.90; Royal Exchange Assurance 
Corporation v. Sjoforsakrings Aktiebolaget Vega 1902 
2 K.B. 384*J
Where the contract concerns immoveables the 
presumption is for the lex situs instead of the lex 
loci contractus. /"“Mackintosh v. May 1895 22 R. 34-5; 
Edmonstone v. Edmonstone etc. June 1st 1816 F.C. per 
Lord Robertson at pp. 148, 9; Bourne v. Gairdner
• A the ca.SC- e>f a-W "tk« e»tk-er presumption^ )
1823 2 S. 212_7 Tile presumption^may be rebutted 
C British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consolidated 
Mines 1910 2 Ch. 502; In re Smith, Lawrence v. Kit son 
1916, 2 Ch. 206; Exparte Holthausen, In r<3 Scheibler 
L.R. 1874 9 Ch. App. 722J
In the interpretation of contracts of affreightment 
whether made by charter-party, f~Lloyd v. Guibert 1865 
L.R. 1 Q.B. 115; Society du Gaz de Paris v. Armateurs 
PranQais 1926 S.C. (H.L.) 13J  or bills of lading, 
f~Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands 
India Steam Navigation Co. 1883 10 Q.B.D. 521 at 
p. 529; P. & 0. Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (1865)
III Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 272; In re Missouri Steamship 
Coy. (1888) 42 Ch. D. 321; "The August” 1891 P. 328J  
the/
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the presumption is that the law of the flag of the 
ship governs, and not the lex loci contractus. 1/vhen 
the flag is that of a state which includes several 
countries having separate systems of law, as in the 
case of the United States and British flags, the law 
is the law of the country where the ship is registered^ 
/"Dicey p. 686_7 The flag will be the one which the 
ship in fact flies, even although the ship is truly of 
a different nationality, for a person contracting with 
the shipowners can see the flag which is actually being 
flown but can not be expected to divine its true 
nationality, and the remarks of Brett, L.J. in Chartered 
Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam 
Navigation Co. /" 1883 10 Q.B.D. at p. 534__7 that it 
is the true nationality of the ship that must be 
looked at only apply to questions of delict, /"Contra 
Westlake| 219J
This presumption is not only in accordance with 
the probable intention of the parties, but is also the 
most consistent and intelligible, and therefore most 
convenient to those engaged in commerce. C  Lloyd v. 
Sulbert. supra, at p. 129_7 "Thera are many ports 
which have few or no seagoing vessels of their own, 
and no fixed maritime jurisprudence, and which yet 
supply valuable cargoes to the ships of other countries. 
Take Alexandria for instance, with her mixed population 
and maritime commerce almost in the hands of strangers. 
Is every vessel which leaves Alexandria with grain 
under a charterparty or bill of lading made there, and 
every passenger vessel leaving Alexandria or Suez, be 
she English, Austrian or French, subject to Egyptian 
law? .... Again, it may be asked, does a ship which 
visits many ports in one voyage, whilst she undoubtedly 
retains the criminal law of her own country, put on a 
new/
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new sort of civil liability, at each, new country 
she visits, in respect of cargo there taken aboard?"
To hold this would be most inconvenient. /"ibid, at 
p. 128J
There was some suggestion in The Owners of the 
"Immanuel" v. Denholm /“1887 15 R. 152_7 that Scots 
law should be applied to the contract of affreightment 
there as the lex loci solutionis (Scotland being the 
country of discharge of the cargo), although the law 
of the flag was Danish and the lex loci contractus 
was Russian. The judgments are far from clear, but 
the case was decided on another ground that did not
national
involve I-HPrlr., and it seems that the question of 
T-HfVD. which did arise was truly a question of evidence, 
and therefore governed by Scots law qua the lex fori 
and not qua the proper law of the contract.
It has been argued that contracts like contracts 
of affreightment should be governed by the maritime 
law of the forum only, in consequence of the view that 
our maritime law is our version of a general maritime 
law recognised by all nations, but this argument has 
not been accepted. /"*Lloyd v. Guibert, supra. This 
seems to have been the ratio of "The Hamburg" 1864 
Br. and L.253, which has not been followed.
Cp. the argument in Aberdeen Banking Co. v. Maberley 
Cane & Co. 1855 13 S. 827 that the general law merchant 
should apply to bills of exchange *J There-seems to 
be no reason why it should have been rejected in the 
case of contracts of affreightment and yet should be 
applied in the case of delicts to property at sea. £~q.vj 
— — The principle of a general maritime law should 
apply either In both cases or in neither. Admiralty 
causes included actions on charter-parties and bottomries, 
as/
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as well as actions resulting from collisions at sea. 
/~Bell, Comm, i, 546; Ersk. Inst. 1, 3, 33; McMillan, 
Scottish Maritime Practice p. zJJ However, although it
b e t« /« e f t  t k *  <if>pi>eack "to lu ir f t im e  ahJ  » . r i t i i « «  4 e l ( c t c /
is illogical that there should he a differenceit
'A
seems reasonably certain that there is.
The presumption can be rebutted. /Chartered 
Mercantile Bank, supra, ibid; "The Industrie" 1894 P.58; 
"The Adriatic" 1931 P. 241; "The Njegos" 1936 p. 90; 
Peacock v. Olsen 1944 Sh. Ct. Rep. 173_7 Indeed the 
English Courts have recently found it very easy to hold 
that the presumption was rebutted when this brought in ^ 
English law as the governing law. When the charterparty 
is made in English in the normal English form between 
two mercantile houses in London, even although one house 
is only acting as agent for a foreign principal, English 
law is presumably intended by the parties and will 
govern the charterparty to the exclusion of the law of 
the flag. /"“"The Industrie", supra; "The Njegos",supra 
It is obvious that since the test is what law the parties 
intended and since the presumption for the law of the 
flag is simply to determine what law the parties intended, 
if freight engagement notes or bills of lading are 
entered into without any particular nationality of ship 
being specified, the presumption for the law of the flag 
becomes very weak Indeed, if not quite Inapplicable. 
/"""The Adriatic", supra^ There is no presumption that 
the law of the flag governs a policy of marine insurance 
effected by an English cargo-owner with English under­
writers for a voyage on a foreign ship; English law 
governs* f ~Greer v* Poole 1880 V Q.B.D. 272__/
The contract between the members of a corporation, 
such as that constituted by Articles of Association, is 
governed by the law of the country where the corporation 
is incorporated. /"Spiller v. Turner 1897 1 Ch. 911; 
Adelaide/
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(V) Presumption 
In the case 
of certain 
contracts for 
professional"-" 
services
:
Other
supposed
presumptions
$i'((bao /  ^<ich^ 2  K.(J, af p. pcf -
M Ql.aidQ. V. Prudential 1934 A.C. 122; f Westlake £ 223aJ7
In the questions whether a barrister is entitled 
to sue for remuneration for his services, and if so 
the rate of remuneration, the presumption is that 
the law and custom of the bar to which he belongs will 
aPPly and hot the law of the place where the contract 
engaging him is made or the law of the place where his 
services are rendered. ftWhen an advocate or other 
skilled practitioner is, by law and the custom of his 
profession, entitled to claim and recover payment for 
his professional work, those who engage his services 
must, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, 
express or implied, be held to have employed him upon 
the usual terms according to which such services 
are rendered.” /""The Queen v. Doutre 1884 9 A.C.
745 at p. 752 (P.C.)_7 same presumption applies in 
the case of solicitors f“Livesey v. Purdom 1894 21 R. 
911; In r£ Maugham (1885) 2 T.L.R. 115__7 and other 
skilled practioners in a like position /""The Queen v. 
Doutre, supra; Westlake § 21QJ
A dictum to the effect that when the government 
of a state contracts a loan in another country the 
contract is governed by the law of the state 
contracting the loan; [~Smith v. Weguelin (1869)
L.K. 8 Eq. 198 per Lord Romilly, M.B. Cp. Serbian Loans 
Case, Publications of 3rJ. Series A No. 20_7
has recently been disapproved. /"Rex v. International 
Trustee 1937 A.C. 500J7: this is no more than a factor
to be taken into consideration. It has been said that 
the rule that if possible a contract should be construed 
valeat magis quam pereat was a presumption,
/"Cheshire p. 268_7 du-t: tllis cannot be so* There 
cannot be two presumptions, to different effects, 
operating/
When room 
is left for 
CourtT s 
discretion
operating at one and the same time* This is no more 
than a factor to be taicen into consideration
presumptions, or rebut them, but it can not itself be 
a presumption.
When, according to the proper law of the contract, 
the Court has a discretion to decide one way or another, 
or to decide to order less or more, a difficult question 
faces the Court of another country which happens to be 
seised of the case and which is attempting to elucidate 
the rights of the parties by considering the proper law 
as question of fact* In one case Lord Kinloch, seised 
in the Court of Session of a question of the interpretati 
of an English bond which,according to English law,would 
have been subject to the discretion of the English Courts 
conceived that he was not restricted only to those cases 
which hade received the sanction of the English Courts, 
that therefore he did not require the opinion of English 
counsel on the special circumstances of the case, and 
that he possessed this discretion, free and unhampered 
by the rules which any other tribunal might have laid 
down for its own guidance Scott v* Sinclair 1865 
3 1/1. 918; the question however was reserved in the 
Inner House. J
-weighty ono. It may reinforce the other
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THE.MATERIAL OR ESSENTIAL VALIDITY OF A COM TRACT
The material or essential validity of a ccmtract 
is governed by the same law as governs its interpretation? 
and, indeed, cases which really deal with essential 
Validity have been quoted in enunciating the principles 
applicable to interpretation.
Three matters are comprised in ‘'essential validity" :~
Firstly the question whether a provision in a 
contract is void or voidable* The provision may be 
void or voidable under one system of law, but not under 
another. For example, in a contract for the carriage 
of a passenger and his luggage by sea there is a clause 
that the shipping company are not liable for the loss 
of baggage. By English law this is a good stipulation, 
but by French law it is invalid and void and the shipping 
company always remain liable. /~P. & 0. Steam Navigation 
Co. v ♦ Shand (1865) III Moo. P.O. (U.S.) 272; Jones v. 
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. 1924 2 K.B. 730J  The 
question whether this provision is valid or not is a 
typical issue of the essential validity of a contract.
Secondly, the question whether a contract must be 
read subject to a certain compulsory rule of law. This 
question arises when one system of law provides that 
contracts of a certain nature have to be subject to a 
certain rule, whether or not the rule is embodied in the 
contract, and even if a contrary rule is expressed, while 
another system of law has no such provision. E.g. a 
system of law might provide that all bills of lading 
should contain an express statement that they are 
subject to the Hague Rules and should be deemed to 
have effect subject thereto notwithstanding the omission 
of such express statement. /""The, To m i " 1932 P. 78;
Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. 1939 A.C. 277J  
Again/
23.
Again, a statute might provide for the compulsory 
reduction of interest on mortgages, ^  Mount Albert v . 
Australasian etc. Assurance Society 193B A.C. 224^7 
or that any obligation containing a gold value clause 
should, notwithatanding such clause, be discharged upon 
payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency 
which at the time of the payment is legal tender# 
f~Hex v. International Trustee 1937 A.C. 600J
Thirdly, whether a certain ingredient, other than 
a formality, must be present to make the contract 
binding - e.g. consideration. /~In re Bonacina 1912 
2 Ch. 394; Stuart v. Potter Choate & Prentice 1911 
1 S.L.T. 377; Dicey p. 651J
"Essential validity" is not intended here to include 
the issue of illegality, which is subject to special 
rules, and is dealt with separately below.
Such compulsory rules, either invalidating a 
provision or compulsorily imposing a positive term 
on a contract, affect the contract if they are the 
rules of the proper law of the contract, and otherwise 
do not affect the contract. /~Mount Albert, supra 7 
Now, while parties are obviously free to choose 
any law they like to determine the meaning and legal 
effect of the contract and the extent of the liabilities 
which they undertake, for in so doing they are only 
shortening the wording of the contract by incorporating 
provisions by reference to a code^  /~Orirv&n Ropeg & Cp_.
Monteith 1895 23R. 129, per Lord McLaren at p. 134; 
Martin Wolff in 1937 J.R. 110_7 some writers argue that 
the intention of the parties can not affect questions as 
to whether provisions are void, can not in other words 
determine the essential validity of the contract, for 
if that were permitted parties might evade troublesome 
provisions/
provisions of the law by stating that they intended 
some other law to govern, with which perhaps the 
contract had very little real connection. If the 
parties do declare that essential validity shall be 
governed oy a system with which the contract has 
little connection, these writers argue that notwith­
standing such declaration, the law with which the 
contract has most read, connection will govern this 
point. / martin tfolff in 1937 J.R. 121; Cheshire 
p. 256; Cheshire and J.H.C. morris, 1940 L.^.R. 320 
at p. 338; Baty, ’Polarized Law’, p. 46; Dicey 
pp. 649, 668 and App• 22_J
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The second principle simply
free to choose the proper law for the interpretation1*
of the contract but not for 
validity: Cheshire in his
means that the parties are
its material or essential 
>ook does not deal separately
with interpretation” and "essential validity”, but 
considers all together unde^ the head of "material or 
essential validity”.
Other writers have expj’essed similar views.
/"“Even Dicey pp. 649, 668 and App.22; Baty, Polarized 
Law p • 46J  _
This argument seems logical, but it is certainly 
not the attitude which has been adopted by our Courts.
Our Courts, including the House of Lords and Privy 
Council on many occasions, have expressly affirmed the 
function of the intention of the parties as determining 
the law applicable to the essential validity of contracts, 
and they have used language exactly similar to that used 
when the issue was the interpretation of a contract.
/"E.g. Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery 1894 21 R. (H.I.) 21, 
particularly per Lord Watson at p. 25; Spurrier v. La 
Cloche 1902 A.C. 446 (P.C.); P. & 0. Steam Navigation 
Co. v. Shand (1865) III Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 272, at p. 291; 
Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. 1959 A.C. 277 at 
pp. 289, 290J
There is no reported decision where the express 
intention of the parties as to the law which should govern 
essential validity was refused effect on the ground that 
the law referred to had not a sufficient connection with 
the contract. /"“"The Torni” 1932 P. 78, on which 
Cheshire relies was dissented from in Vita Food Products 
v. Unus Shipping Co. supra_7
The argument was dealt with in a recent decision 
of the Privy Council in a case which wao concerned with 
essential validity In these words:
"It is now well settled that ... the proper law 
of the contract "is the law which the parties intended
to apply.” That Intention is objectively ascertained, 
and, if not expressed, will be presumed from the terms 
of the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances 
But as Lord Atkin, dealing with cases where the Intention 
of the parties is expressed, said in Hex v. International 
Trustee /""1937 AC. 500,529J  (a case which contains the 
latest enunciation of this principle), "Their Intention 
will be ascertained by the intention expressed in the 
contract if any, which will be conclusive.” It is 
objected that this is too broadly stated and that some 
qualifications are necessary. It is true that in 
questions relating to the conflict of laws rules cannot 
be stated in absolute terms but rather as prima facie 
presumptions. But where the English rule that 
Intention Is the test applies, and where there is an 
express statement by the parties of their intention to 
select the law of the contract, it is difficult to see 
what qualifications are possible, provided the intention 
is expressed bona fide and legal, and provided there is 
no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public 
policy. In the present case, however, it might be 
said that the choice of English law is not valid .... 
because the transaction, which is one relating to the 
carriage on a Nova Scotian ship of goods from 
Newfoundland to New York between residents in these 
countries, contains nothing to connect it in any way 
with English law, and therefore that choice could not 
be seriously taken. Their Lordships reject this 
argument both on grounds of principle and on the facts. 
Connection with English law Is not as a matter of 
principle essential. The provision in a contract 
(e.g. of sale) for English arbitration imports English 
law as the law governing the transaction, and those 
familiar with international business are aware how
frequent/
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frequent such a provision is even where the parties 
are not English and the transactions are carried on 
completely outside England* Moreover in the present 
case the Hurry On, though on a Canadian register, is 
subject to the Imperial statute, the Merchant Shipping 
Act, 1894, under which the vessel Is registered, and 
the underwriters are likely to be English* In any case 
parties may reasonably desire that the familiar 
principles of English commercial law should apply!r* 
f~Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. 1959 A.C. 277, 
at pp. 289, 290. Criticised by J.H.C. Morris and 
Cheshire in , 1940 L.Q.R. 320J
However it is indubitable that although parties are 
absolutely free to choose the law which should determine 
the meaning and legal effect of the contract and the 
extent of the liabilities which the parties undertake, 
there must be some limit to the parties1 ability to 
choose the law applicable to the essential validity 
of the contract. The-part-iea could not provide that - 
a system with- which- the contract -has- no- eonnoction a-t
all i-3 to- govern- its eosent-ial validity^ Even--in-the
pa-s-aa^ e -j-uat~ q.uo ted ..from that is -not maintained-. The 
expression of intention must be "bona fide and legal". 
This possibly means that parties could not avoid a rule 
of the law with which the contract has most connection 
that a certain contract or provision is illegal and not 
merely void,simply by providing that another law is to 
govern. Consequently in the rules that follow for 
"Illegality1 the phrase "the law with which the contract 
has most connection" is used instead of "the proper law"
of the contract.------------------- ----------------
/'"Provided there is no reason for avoiding the choice on 
the ground of public policy" probably refers to the 
principle which is always present, that a law otherwise
applicable/
applicable will not be applied if to do so would be 
contrary to morality or public policy. But in addition 
to this the Privy Council thought it desirable to go on 
to specify certain connections which the contract had 
with the law chosen, namely English law* These connections 
are tenuous enough. It appears that if the law selected 
is English law there will always be this connection, at 
least In the view of the English Courts, that "the 
parties may reasonably desire that the familiar 
principles of English commercial law should apply."
/ “ibid, p. 290. Cp. "The Adriatic" 1931 P. 241/7
A Polish statute of 1926 allows the parties the 
choice between the lex loci contractus, the lex loci 
solutionis, the lex situs, the law of the domicile, 
and the law of the nationality of the parties.
/ “Martin Wolff in 1937 J.B. 110 at p. 119/7 No such 
definite rules can be laid down for this country, but 
at least it can be said that the law referred to must 
have some connection with the contract, however tenuous, 
that It will not do if the law referred to has absolutely 
no connection with the contract; and it is submitted 
that except in the case of English law, which enjoys 
the advantage of being a familiar commercial law, the 
kind of connection required will be similar to that 
required by the Polish statute. The law of the flag of 
the ship, or of the residence or place of business of 
either party might be added to the possibilities there 
given. That is the kind of connection which should be 
present.
It has also been argued that one of the 
considerations for determining the proper law of the 
contract, namely that a contract should be construed 
ut res magis valeat quam pereat is unjustifiable.
/ “Westlake ^  212/7 
It/
Jt certainly seems a more reasonable attitude to regard 
the choice of the law which is to govern essential validity 
as the first question, and the enquiry whether according 
to the governing law the contract is valid or not as a 
subsequent question o.f fact to be decided after hearing 
evidence as to what the governing law says on the topic*
The theory behind ut res magis valeat is that the parties 
presumably intended their contract to be valid, and 
therefore presumably contracted with reference to the law 
under which the contract is valid. But in every case, 
the parties presumably intended their contract to be valid, 
and therefore in every case you are bound to find that the 
law governing the essential validity is the law under which 
the contract is valid; which is an absurd result.
However there is no doubt that the consideration 
is taken into account. [ ~P. & p. Steam Navigation C o . v. 
Shand (1865) III Moo. BC. (N.S.) 272; In re Missouri 
Steamship C o . 42 Ch.D. 321; Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery 
1894 21R. (H.L.) 21; South African Breweries Ltd. v. King 
1899 2 Ch. 173, Affd 1900 1 Ch. 27/7
Some limit therefore must be imposed on the consideration 
so that the absurd result Is not arrived at. The law 
which upholds the validity of the clause or contract and 
which is found to be the governing law must be a law 
with which the contract has a substantial connection. 
Construing ut_ valeat is limited to tipping the scales 
between contesting laws which otherwise have a strong 
claim to govern the contract. Thus when other 
considerations showed that a contract was to be governed 
by English law, by which the contract was invalid, the 
fact that the contract would have been valid by Swedish 
law, which had a faint connection with the contract, 
was not enough to make Swedish law applicable and 
validate the contract. /“Royal Exchange Assurance 
Corporation v. Si of orsakrings Aktiebolaget Vega__ 1902 
2 K.B. 384. Cp./
Cp* British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines
Ltd. 1910 2 Ch. 502/7
In spite of the above rules as to essential validity, 
if an Act of Parliament directly applies to the validity 
of the contract in question, the provisions of that Act 
will govern, irrespective of the proper law of the 
contract, because the Act is binding on our Courts; but 
Courts of other countries of course will have regard to 
the proper law. f ~Mount Albert v. Australasian etc. 
Assurance Society 1958 A.C. 224; Vita Food Products v.
Unus Shipping Coy. 1959 A.C. 277; Dicey Rule 156J  
Examples of British Acts which directly apply to contracts, 
the proper law of which may well be that of a foreign 
country, are the Slave Trade Act 1843, /~(6 & 7 Viet. c. 98) 
Santos v. Illidge (1860) 8C.B. (U.S.) 861_7 The Royal 
Marriage Act 1772, / “(12 Geo. 3, c. 11) - The Sussex 
Peerage Case 1844 11 Cl. and F. 857; the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act 1924,/“14 and 15 Geo. 5 c. 22J  and the Trading 
with the Enemy Act 1939./”*2 and 3 Geo. VI c. 89_/
It is the proper law of the contract as that law 
stands at the date of the emergence of the dispute, and 
not at the date of making the contract that governs the 
essential validity of the contract. f ~Rex, v. International 
Trustee 1937 A.C. 500 (H.L.); Mount Albert v.
Australasian etc. Assurance Society 1958 A.C. 224__/
"The submission of a contract to a particular law does 
not mean submission to certain individual provisions, 
but/
but to a living and changing body of law" /“Martin Wolff 
in 1937 J.R. at p. 124_7
ILLEGALITY
A contract or a provision in a contract will not 
be enforced, nor will damages be granted for the breach 
of It,if the making of it is illegal by the law of the 
country where it is made; /“in re Missouri Steamship Co.
(1888) 42 Ch. I). 321; “The Tornif 1932 P. 78, Licey p.655
A contract or a provision in a contract being illegal is 
to be contrasted with the case where it is merely void 
or voidable. This principle however is doubtful - 
see Vita Food Products v. Gnus Shipping Coy. 1939 A.C. 277 
F.A. Mann in (1937) 18 B.Y.I.L. 97J  or if the performance 
of the obligation is illegal either by the law of the 
country with which the contract has most connection^ , 
f“Moulls v. Owen 1907 1 K.B. 746; Bex v. International 
Trustee 1937 A.C. 500; Heriz v. Blera (1840) 11 Sim. 318; 
Clements v. Macaulay 1866 4 M. 583^
or is illegal at the time for performance by the law of
the place where performance must take place.
/^Ralli Brothers v. Compania Navlera Sota Y Agnar 1920 
2 K.B. 287; Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., 
supra; Rex v. International Trustee 1937 A.C. 500 per 
Lord Wright at p. 519; De Beeche v. South American 
Stores Ltd. 1935 A.C. 148 per L.C. Sankey at p. 156;
0fToole v. Whiterock Quarry Co. 1937 S.L.T. 521;
Foster v. Driscoll (1929) 1 K.B. 470;
In Trinidad Shipping Co. v. Alston 1920 A.C. 888 (P.C.) 
the payment of rebates as contracted was illegal by 
United States law but payment had not necessarily to 
be made in the United States and accordingly the 
contract was enforced.J7 But the Court will not refuse 
to grant damages for the breach of an obligation which
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is legal by the law of the country with which it has 
most connection and. the lex loci solutionis just because 
the performance of the obligation is illegal by the 
personal law of one of the contracting partiesi/^Albion 
Life Assurance Co. v. Mills 27th June 1828 3 W. and S; 
Kleinwort v. Ungarische etc. A.G♦ 1939 2 K.B. 679;
Santos v. Illidge (i860) 8 C.B. (M.S.) 861__/? or because 
the party unwilling to perform might be subject to 
criminal penalties as a result in a country where his 
business took him,/"“Trinidad Shipping Co. v. Alston 
1920 A.C. 888J  or because performance would have been 
illegal by our law if the acts had to be performed here* 
/“"Campbell v. Ramsay 15th February 1809 F.C.; Saxby v. 
Fulton 1909 2 K.B. 208; ^uarrier v. Colston 1 Ph. 147; 
Socidtg Anonyne etc. v. Baumgart 96 L.J. (K.B.)
And even although the performance of the obligation is 
illegal by the law of the place where performance was 
contemplated, if performance need not take place there, 
the obligation will be enforced. /~~Waugh v. Morris 
1873 L.R. VIII q.B. 202; Sumner Bermain & Co * v.
Webb & Co» 1922 1 K.B. 55. But see Foster v.
Driscoll 1929 1 K.B. 470J  Similarly, although the
p p » b o .ip (y
purpose^contemplated when entering into the contract is 
illegal by the law of the place of intended performance, 
if that purpose is not expressed and if another legal 
object could be attained, the contract will be enforced. 
/~Clous & Pelissie v. Alexander 1831 9 S. 448; but again 
see ffoster v • Driscoll. supra__7
However, a contract which contemplates the ( 
violation of our law will not be enforced by our Courts 
even although it is valid by its proper law and the lex
Hope V. £We |S57 S G-75 f
loci solutionis. /^aymeli v. Read (1794) 5 T.R. 599; 
Westlake £ &14_7 Thus where a contract for the sale of 
lace was entered into abroad; and the lace was packed in 
a/
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peculiar manner by the vendor at the buyer's request 
so that it could be smuggled into this country, although 
hoth the proper lavs and the lex loci solutionis of the
"tfce \CKJJ o f
contract of sale was^the foreign country, an action 
for the price was not allowed in our Courts../"*Waymell 
v . Head, supra_/
It was formerly considered that these rules do not 
apply when the illegality is simply the contravention 
of the revenue laws of a non-British foreign country, 
on the ground no country is hound to recognise the 
merely revenue laws of a foreign state. /~~Stewart v. 
Oelot 1871 9 1. 1057; Dicey pp. 657, 660; Westlake 
£ 305 and authorities cited there._7 But this 
exception has recently been questioned. In Ralli 
Brothers v. Compania Kaviera Sota Y Aznar /~1920 2 K.B. 
287J  Lord Justice Scrutton reserved liberty "to consider 
whether it is any longer an exception to this proposition 
that this country will not consider the fact that the 
contract is obnoxious only to the revenue laws of the 
foreign country where it is to be performed as an 
obstacle to enforcing it in the English Courts* The 
early authorities on this point require reconsideration, 
in view of the obligations of international comity as 
now under stood *w /""at p. 3 0 0 In Foster v. Driscoll 
/~1929 1 K.B. 470__7 Lord Justice Sankey agreed 
"In my view the present position of the law is that the 
mere fact that a vendor of goods knows that the purchaser 
proposes to run them into a country where they are 
prohibited by some revenue law is not sufficient to 
render the contract of sale illegal, but if beyond 
mere knowledge the vendor actively engages in an 
adventure to get the goods into such country, the Court 
will not assist the parties to the adventure by 
entertaining or settling any dispute between the parties 
arising/
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arising out of the contract." /“at p . 518_7
These dicta questioning the exception are quite obiter,
and accordingly the matter may be said to be open*
In addition to the above circumstances in which 
performance will not be exacted, there is of course 
always present the principle that our Courts will not 
enforce an obligation otherwise due under a foreign 
law, if to do so would be contrary to fundamental 
morality or the distinctive policy of our law.
/“See p. J
DISCHARGE OF CODTRACTS
A debt is effectively discharged if discharged 
according to its proper law, as that law stands at the 
time of payment; / Rex v. International Trustee, below_/ 
otherwise it is not discharged.
Thus if the debtor is sequestrated and finally 
discharged according to bankruptcy laws of the proper 
law of the debt, the debt is effectively discharged, 
but a debt is not discharged by the debtor obtaining a 
discharge in bankruptcy from a system of law other than 
the proper law of the debt. /“See Bankruptcy p. J
Again, when according to the law of one country 
certain acts or circumstances, such as imprisonment of
^  Qcu ke II v/. ii ’S Su.pp>. _
the debtor, /^Gordon v. Gordon Movember 12th 1818 F.C._/ 
the existence of a counter debt, / Allen v . Kemble (1848)
6 kbo. P.C. 314J  or the acceptance of a portion of the 
debt tendered as full payment, /~Ralli v. Dennis to un 
(l85l) 6 Ex. 483J  operate as satisfaction of the debt, 
the debt is discharged if that law is the proper law of 
the debt.
Two recent illustrations of the principle may be 
given. In Soci6t6 des HOtels Be Touquet Paris - Plage 
v. Cummings ^1922 1 K.B. 451_/ The sum of 18,0 35 
francs/
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v<M5
francs^payable in Paris in 1914 under a French contract, 
and payment was not made. In 1919 after the value of 
the franc as expressed in English currency had fallen 
heavily, the creditor brought an action in England for 
the amount of sterling which would have been the 
equivalent of Francs 18,035 in 1914. During the action 
the debtor went to France and paid 18,035 francs to the 
creditor’s manager, who did not know the amount of the 
debt, nor that an action had been begun, and did not 
when taking the money intend to accept it in full 
satisfaction, but gave the debtor a receipt as for money 
deposited with him. It was held that since it was a 
French debt and since in France the payment would have 
been a good discharge of the debt, the payment must 
equally be a good discharge of the debt for the purposes 
of the English action.
In Rex v. International Trustee /~1937 A.G. 5Q0_/ 
an international loan, which contained a gold value 
clause, was contracted in 1917. In 1933 a Joint 
resolution of Congress of the United States enacted 
that every provision contained in any obligation that 
purported to give the obligee a right to require 
payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or 
currency, or in an amount in money of the United 
States measured thereby, was against public policy, 
and that such obligation should be discharged upon 
payment dollar for dollar in any coin or currency 
that at the time of the payment was legal tender for 
public or private debts. It was held that the proper 
law of the debt was the law of the United States and 
that the bond was discharged upon payment dollar for 
dollar of the nominal amount.
ppescr'i ja'tion
A prl-ne-i-jfr-le which is a limitation of the duration 
of the right or obligation entering into it at initio 
will/
will discharge the debt if it is a prescript :i on of the 
proper law of the contract, otherwise not. / ~Alexander 
v. Badenach 1843 6 D. 322. See Prescription p. J
An enactment which postpones the date for discharge 
of an obligation applies if it is a moratorium of the 
proper law, but only in that event. in re Francke and 
jfesok (1918) 1 Ch. 470; Pouquette v. Overmann 1875 L.P.
X Q.B. 525J7
When a debt is arrested and paid to the arrester after 
a decree of furthcoming, the debt is discharged if the 
decree of furthcoming was given by the Courts of the proper 
law of the debt, /"“Swiss Bank v. Boehmische Industrial 
Bank 1923 1 K.B. 673. The mention in the judgments of the 
place "where the debt is situate” Is a loose way of 
referring to the proper law of the debt_J7 but not if it 
was given by the Courts of another country; f~Martin v.
Nad el 1905 2 K.B. 2 €>J accordingly decree of furthcoming 
will only be pronounced by our Courts in respect of 
Scottish debts, for otherwise the arrestee would not be 
discharged by payment to the arrester, but might have to 
pay again to the creditor of the debt if sued by him 
abroad. /"Cases cited__7
When a fixed rate-of interest is payable on stock or 
debentures, a foreign income-tax payable by the company 
in respect thereof does not discharge pro tanto the 
obligation to pay interest if the proper law of the contract 
is not the law of the foreign country imposing the tax. 
r Spiller v. Turner 1897 1 Ch. 911; Indian & General 
Investment Trust v. Borax Ltd. 1920 1 K.B. 539_J7
Where the effect of a certain act, e.g. imprisonment, 
according to a foreign law which is the proper law of the 
debt, is not to discharge the debt but merely to preclude 
all execution on it, this will not prevent execution for 
the debt in Scotland against any property of the debtor 
which is situated here. f~Lashley v. Moreland 21st 
December 1809 F . C . _ J 7
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R A T J S  O f f  E X C H A N G E
All decrees for payment in our Courts must be 
given in British currency, and if the amount is 
expressed in a foreign currency in the contract it 
is translated into British currency at the rate of 
exchange prevailing when payment became due; and if a 
person becomes liable for the payment of damages in a 
foreign currency the amount is translated into British 
currency at the rate of exchange prevailing when the 
breach or default occurred. /~~Byslop v. G ordon 1824 
2 Shaw's App. 451; Barry v. Van den Hurk 1920 2 K.B.
709i Pi Ferdinando v. Simon Smits & Co . 1920 3 K.B. 409; 
Ralli Bros, v. Compania Navi era etc. 1920 1 K.B. 614; 
Lebeaupin v. Crispin 1920 2 K.B. 714, "The Volturno”
Is —c Bfi'tiafi flwgr Ko.f> Con fru'gfi'tal Z-td 2 C&. ffS*! f
1921 2 A.C. 544;  ^Uellendahl v. Pankhurst, Wright & Co.
v/jpwnc-t at G< v. UMk. I9UO I K-B. 'T2. ; Grau^ann I IWZ L^ ~.
1923 39 T.L.R. 628; Peyrae v. Wilkinson 1924 2 K.B.166>^ 
Over-ruling Cohn v. Boulken 1920 36 T.L.R. 767J
If the rate of exchange between sterling and the 
foreign currency is different in the locus solutionis 
and in this country, the rate prevailing in the locus 
solutionis is given effect to. f ~Ainslie v. Murrays 
1881 8 R . 636J
Difficulty occasionally arises when a contract 
stipulates for the payment of a certain number of 
"pounds” or "francs” and it is not clear whether it 
is Australian or United Kingdom pounds or french or 
Belgian francs. If they are different units of 
account which merely have the same name, as in the 
case of Belgian and French francs, it is simply a 
question of interpretation as to which unit of account 
is meant. The intention of the parties may be 
discoverable simply from examining the language of the 
contract, but if not, appeal will have to be made to 
the proper law of the contract. The proper law will 
be/
be presumed to be the lex loci solutionis and so the 
unit of account meant will be that which is legal tender 
in the place of payment. Where they are different units 
of account the proper law of the contract can not be 
the law of one country and the law determining the 
currency the law of another country. But where the 
unit of account is the same but they are of different 
value, as in the case of British and Australian pounds, 
it is presumed that the obligation is payable in the 
currency which is legal tender in the place of performance, 
even though the proper law of the contract is the law of 
another country, for in this case the currency in which 
payment has to be made does not affect the extent of the 
, obligation but only the mode of performance. /~Adelaide 
v * Prudential 1934 A.C. 12a. -Dissenting judgment of Lord 
Hasworth M.R. in Broxen Hill Proprietary C o . v. Latham 
1933 1 Ch. 373. See also Westralian Farmers v. King Line 
48 T.L.R. 598_7 The presumption is rebutted when it is 
clear that a currency other than that of the place of 
performance is intended: for example when a tailor-
cutter entered into a contract in London for three years 
employment in Hew Zealand at a salary of "seven hundred 
pounds sterling" a year, the insertion of the word 
"sterling" showed that United Kingdom currency was meant.
De Bueger v. Ballantyne & Co. Ltd. 1938 A.C. 452_J 
When a person contracts to pay a certain number of 
a certain unit of account, the obligation is to pay in 
whatever at the date of payment is legal tender and 
legal currency in the foreign country whose money is 
lent, and not simply in a bundle of the correct number 
of notes, although that may have been legal tender at 
the date of the loan; /"Pyrmont v. Schott 1939 A.C. 145_/ 
nor in the correct number of gold coins, although that 
may have been the only legal tender at the date of the 
contract/
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contract. /  Ottoman Bank of hicosia v. Chakarian 
1938 A.C. 260_7
In international loans there is very often a gold 
clause, the purpose of which may either he to specify 
the mode of performance of the obligation - e.g. in 
gold coin - or to determine the extent of the obligation 
and guard against the risk of loss which would result to 
the creditor if there was inflation of the currency in 
which the loan is repayable. The contract may stipulate 
for the repayment of a certain quantity of gold - a gold 
clause proper; payment by gold coins minted in a 
specified state, - a gold coin clause; or stipulate 
for repayment of as much paper or other money as should 
be required at the date of repayment to purchase the 
same amount of gold as could be purchased or was 
represented by the loan at its date - a gold value clause.
A. Plesch, "The Gold Clause" 2nd Ed.; B.A. Wortley in 
1936 17 B.Y.I.L. 112J  The gold coin clause specifies 
the mode of performance of the obligation, but the gold 
clause proper and the gold value clause determine the 
substance and extent of the obligation. The gold clause 
proper may become ineffective when a government interferes 
with the free market of gold, the gold coin clause when 
a government substitutes paper currency for coin, and 
even the gold value clause may be stultified by legislation 
/~Rex v. International Trustee 1937 A.C. 50G_/
The effect of gold clauses and the problems they create 
may be illustrated by ffeist v. Societe Intercommunale
i
Beige -DElectricity ^ 1 9 3 4  A.C. 161J  Peist held a
bond for £100 which was to be governed by English law, 
issued in 1928 by a Belgian company. Interest was 
payable in sterling gold coin of the United Kingdom 
of or equal to the standard of weight and fineness 
existing on the first day of September 1928. The 
Company/
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Company claimed to pay the nominal amount of the interest 
in whatever might be legal tender in England at the date 
of payment. Feist claimed such a sum in sterling as 
would purchase in the market on the day of payment gold 
of the weight of fineness contained in the gold coin of 
the United Kingdom sufficient to discharge the payment 
if falling due in September 1928. Feist’s claim was 
upheld, the House of Lords construing the clause as a 
gold value clause in spite of its appearance ex facie 
as a gold coin clause. To construe it otherwise would 
have been to give no effect to it, although it was 
obvious that the reason for its insertion was to guard 
against Britain going off the gold standard, which was 
a possibility at the date of the bond, and eventually 
happened; and it was obvious that in 1928 the parties 
were not really contemplating payment in gold sovereigns. 
But in another case payment of the ”sum of £100 sterling 
gold coin of Great Britain” was construed as a gold coin 
clause because it was in a bond dated 1884 when the 
possibility of Britain going off the gold standard would 
not have occurred to the parties, and either party might 
have contemplated payment being made in actual sovereigns. 
L B r t & Fr^ Trust Corporation v . h ew Brunswick Railway 
Go. (1956) 154 L-T. 191J  The practical importance
of determining whether the clausewas a gold coin one 
governing the mode of payment or a gold value one 
defining the obligation was that according to Section 6 
of the English Coinage Act 1870, any contract to pay 
otherwise than according to the coins which are current 
and legal tender is, if not illegal, at the best void 
and of no effect. Feist, by getting himself into the 
latter category received payment of as much normal 
legal tender as represented at the time of payment the 
predevaiuation value of the loan. In the second case 
however/
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however the creditor had to be satisfied by the 
payment of 100 devalued paper pounds* Other systems 
of law affect these gold clauses differently. Thus 
American legislation has struck at even gold value 
clauses and provides that such obligations shall be 
discharged upon payment dollar for dollar in any coin 
or currency which at the time of the payment is legal 
tender. £ ~See Rex v. International Trustee 1937 A.C. 500 
When the interpretation of a contract which might 
contain a gold clause comes up for consideration the 
first question is what is the proper law of the contract, 
and the second is, whether according to the proper law 
there is a gold clause and if so what kind of gold clause 
is it according to the proper law. When the essential 
validity or legality of a gold clause is in issue the 
first question is what is the proper law (and, if 
legality is the issue what is the lex loci solutionisj; 
the second question is whether there is a gold clause 
and if so what kind of clause according to the proper 
law (and, if legality is the issue, what kind according 
to the lex loci solutionis); and the third question is 
whether that kind of clause has been affected by the 
legislation of the proper law (and, if legality is the 
issue, the lex loci solutionis)
Thus in Ottoman Bank of Nicosia v . Chakarian 
1938 A.C. 260J  where the question was whether 
a contract of employment should be read as if there was 
a gold value clause in it, Turkish law w&s the proper 
law and by that law, according to the evidence, there 
was no such implication in the contract. Also 
Sforza v. Ottoman Batik of bieosia 1938 A.C. 282, where 
it is clearer that it is Turkish law that is being 
applied - at p. 283_7
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CARRIAGE .BY AIR
Conflicts have been avoided as regards most 
countries by the unification of the internal laws of 
the several countries as to carriage of persons and 
goods by air. Agreement as to the rules that should 
be applied was reached in the Warsaw Convention 1929 
and the rules have been enacted as law in the various 
states. /""Por the parties to the Convention, both 
original and acceding, see Carriage by Air (Parties 
to Convention) Order 1939, G.R. & 0 1959 Mo. 735J  
Por this country the Carriage by Air Act 1932
/~22 and 23 Geo. b e -  36_/ provides that the provisions
of the Warsaw Convention, which are set out in the
schedule to the Act, shall have the force of law in the
United Kingdom in relation to any carriage by air to 
which the Convention applies, irrespective of the 
nationality of the aircraft performing that carriage.
ec. l(l) of the Act J  The Convention applies to 
all international carriage of persons, luggage or 
goods performed by aircraft for reward and to gratuitous 
carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport 
under tailing. ^f~Art. l(2) of the Convention^/
”International carriage” means any carriage in which, 
according to the contract made by the parties, the place 
of departure and the place of destination, are situated 
either within the territories of two High Contracting 
Parties, or within the territory of a single High 
Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place 
within territory subject to another power, even though 
that power is not a party to the Convention. £ -l( 2) 
of the Convention; Grein v. Imperial Airways 1937 
1 K. B 50; Phi 11 ip son v. Imperial Airways 1939 1 A-E.R. 
761J7
For/
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For the carriage of passengers the carrier must 
deliver a passenger ticket and for the carriage of 
luggage a luggage ticket which shall contain, inter 
alia, a statement that the carriage is subject to 
the rules relating to liability established by the 
Convention. /"Arts. l(e) and 2(b) (ft)J  In the 
case of consignment of goods the carrier has the 
right to require the consignor to make out and hand 
over an ”air consignment note” /""Art. 6J  which shall 
contain a similar statement. /~Art. 8 (q)J  In the 
absence of these declarations the contract of carriage 
will none the less be subject to the rule© of the 
Convention, /"Arts. 3(2), 4(4), and b(9}_7
Any clause contained in the contract and all 
special agreements entered into before the damage 
occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the 
rules laid down by the Convention, whether by deciding 
the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as to 
jurisdiction, shall be null and void. /  Ibid J
An action for damages must be brought, at the 
option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties, either before the Court 
having jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily 
resident, or has his principal place of business, or 
has an establishment by which the contract has been 
made, or before the Court having jurisdiction at the 
place of destination. /"Art. 28(l)_7 Arbitration 
clauses are allowed, subject to the Convention, if the 
arbitration is to take place within one of these 
jurisdictions. /"~Art. 32_J7
Questions of procedure shall be governed by the 
law of the Court seised of the case. / A r t . 28(2}_/?
For the actual rules of international carriage 
by air, reference should be made to the Convention 
which is set out in the Schedule to the Carriage
By Air Act 1932.
Garria&e/
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Carriage by air between two countries which 
does not come within the above definition of 
"international carriage" will presumably be governed 
by the same principles as carriage by sea. j
Power is given in the Carriage By Air Act 1932 to 
make an Order in Council applying the rules of the 
Warsaw Convention to carriage by air other than 
^international carriage” as defined above, but this 
power has not yet been exercised. /~Sec. 4J
AOENCY
Questions arising out of contracts where agents 
have been involved may be
(1) Questions between agent and principal as to the 
agent*s authority or the rights and duties of agent 
and principal inter se.
(2) Questions between the agent and third parties with 
whom the agent has contracted.
(3) Questions between the principal and third parties 
with whom the agent has contracted as to the extent 
of the agent*s authority and as to whether the 
principal is bound or not.
(4) When it is admitted that the principal is bound by 
a contract between the agent and a third party, 
questions between the principal and the third party 
other than those referred to in (3).
1.
Questions in the first category are governed by 
the proper law of the contract of agency. f ~Maspons v. 
Mildred (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 530, at p. 539. Arnott v. 
Redfern 1825 2 Car. and P.88; In re Anglo-Austrian Bank 
1920 1 Ch. 69; Dicey Rule 179_7 In determining the 
proper law of a contract of agency or employment the 
place of the principal*s head office is important, 
alter/
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/""Walter Breslaner in 1938 J.H. at pp. 293,4, suggests 
that where the agent is not also an employee the place 
of performance is the most important factor, but where 
he is, the place of the principal’s business is the 
most important factor*J When a contract of agency 
or employment is executed in country A in the language 
of A, where the principal’s head office is, to be 
performed by the agent or employee in country B, the 
proper law of the contract will be that of country A 
and not B, the normal presumption that the proper law 
is the lex loci solutionis being overborne by these 
other considerations./~Arnott v. Pedfern, In re Anglo- 
Austrian Bank, supra; Oppenheimer v. Rosenthal 1937 
1 All E.R. 23; Westlake $ 218_7
As to service at sea, if there appears to be a 
conflict of laws, then, if there is in Part II (Masters 
and Seamen) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 any 
provision on the subject which is thereby expressly 
made to extend to the ship concerned, the case shall 
be governed by that provision; but if there is no such 
provision, the case shall be governed by the law of 
the port at which the ship is registered,/""Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 Sec. 265, 57 and 58 Viet. c. 60_7
2 and 4.
Questions in the second f  Spurrier v. ha Cloche 
1902 A.C. 446; Albion Life Insurance C o . v. Mills 
27th June 1828 III W. and S.J/ and fourth /""Albion 
Life Insurance Co., supra; MeNaughton v. Baird 1852 
24 J. 623; Parken v. Royal Exchange Assurance C o .
1846 8 D. 365; St. Patrick Assurance Co . v. Brebner 
1829 8 S. 51; Westlake ^223_7 categories are governed 
by the proper law of the contract between agent and 
third party.
It/
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It may be profitable to consider what effect the 
existence of a foreign principal has when deciding the 
proper law of the contract between agent and third party. 
If the agent has no power to execute contracts, but 
simply receives proposals for contracts, transmits 
them to his principal and then later delivers the 
contract, executed by his principal in his country, 
to the other contracting party, the place of the 
principals business (and therefore the place where 
the contract is executed by the principal) is an 
important factor, and the place of the agent's 
business is of little or no importance. f ~Parken v.
Royal Exchange, supra_7 But if the agent has power 
to conclude contracts, the place of the agent's business 
is important and that of the principal of little or no 
importance. f ~St. Patrick Assurance G o . v. Brebner, 
supra; Albion Life Assurance Co., supra_7 
wIf I send an agent to reside in Scotland, and he, 
in my name, enters into a contract in Scotland, the 
contract is to be considered as mine where it is 
actually made. It is not an English contract 
because I actually reside in England. If my agent 
executes it in Scotland, it is the same as if I were 
myself on the spot, and executed it in Scotland”
/^Albion Life Insurance Co . Ill W. and S. per Lord 
Chancellor Lyndhurst at p. 233_7
One of the questions that might arise in the 
second category is whether the agent was personally 
liable on the contract and this would be settled by the
proper law of the contract between agent and third party.
If the proper law laid down that an agent is personally
liable in the event of the principal not being bound,
it might be necessary to refer to a second system of 
law/
4-7.
law, namely that indicated below for determining 
whether the principal is bound.
3.
Questions in the third category are governed by 
the law of the country where the agent has contracted, 
provided that the principal authorised the agent to 
contract there. f ~Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine 
Telegraph Co. 1890 1 Q.B. 79; Millar v. Mitchell 
Cadell & C o . 1860 22 D. 833; Bennett v. Inveresk 
Paper G o . 1891 18 R. 975; Dicey Rule 180. Contra
Qirvin Roper & C o . v. Monteith 1895 23 R. 129 (proper 
£aw of the contract between agent and third party) - 
criticised below •J This law is often the same as the 
proper law of the contract between agent and third 
party, but not necessarily so. This is obviously the 
fairest rule. It would not be just to the third party 
that the question whether the agent has a certain 
authority and whether the principal were bound or not 
should depend on the proper law of the agency contract, 
of which he might not be aware; and it would be equally 
unjust to the principal to have this question governed 
by the proper law of the contract between the agent and 
the third party for he would have no protection against, 
the agent and third party subjecting him to liabilities 
which he had not intended to undertake simply by their 
stating that they contracted with reference to a certain 
law. This principle may involve a preliminary question 
of interpretation, namely deciding whether the principal’s 
authority to his agent contained authority to contract 
in a certain country. If the authority^written - as 
in a power of attorney - this preliminary question must 
be determined from the evidence of competent translators 
and experts from the country in whose language the 
authority/
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authority is written, including if necessary lawyers 
from that country. f ~Chatenay, supra_7 In one case 
where a power of attorney had been executed in Brazil 
in the Portuguese language in favour of a broker in 
London, Lord Bsher, M.R., said: ’’The authority being 
given in Brazil, and being written in the Portuguese 
language, the intention of the writer is to be 
ascertained by evidence of competent translators and 
experts, including, if necessary, Brazilian lawyers, 
as to the meaning of the language used; and if,* 
according to such evidence, the intention appears to 
be that the authority shall be acted upon in foreign 
countries, it follows that the intent of the authority, 
in any country in which the authority is to be acted 
upon, is to be taken to be according to the law of the 
particular country where it is acted upon” Chateney, 
supra, at p. 84J  If a foreign principal sends an
order to an agent in Scotland instructing him to buy, 
say, a cargo of wheat, the preliminary question will 
have to be determined whether this is an authority to 
buy wheat only in Sootland or anywhere in the British 
Isles: if it appears to be reasonable or customary
that such instructions should include authority to 
buy in England and the agent does buy in England, 
then the main question as to the extent of the agent’s 
authority and as to whether the principal is bound by 
that contract will be determined by English law.
/“ See Girvin Roper & C o . v. Monteith 1895 23 R. 129_7
The principle just enunciated for the third category 
is contrary to the ratio of Girvin Roper & C o . v.
Monteith, /~1895 23 R. 129J  A foreign principal sent 
an order to an agent in Scotland in the following terms:- 
ttBuy cargo Californian wheat well forward immediately
remittance ready telegraph”.---------------------------
The/
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  The agent, went to London and purchased a cargo
of wheat from a grain merchant there, under a contract 
which contained a stipulation that disputes should be 
settled according to the law of England . The
agent having failed to pay the price, the wheat was 
resold by the merchant, who then sued the principal 
in Scotland, after founding jurisdiction by arrestments, 
for the loss on the resale. The defender pleaded that 
he was not liable to be sued on the contract, in respect 
that he had not given the agent authority to make him a 
party to the contract. It was held that the question 
whether the foreign principal was liable to be sued on 
the contract was a dispute arising under the contract, 
and fell to be determined according to the law of 
England.
It Is submitted that the ratio of this case, 
which appears to be that the English law applies 
because it is the proper law of the contract between 
agent and third party, is inconsistent with sound 
principle and would not be followed today. The actual 
decision however is unexceptionable if put on this 
basis: the foreign principal gave the agent authority
to contract, among other places, In England, and the 
agent went and contracted there, therefore the question 
of^agent’s authority as regards that contract and the 
question whether the principal is bound by it is 
governed by English law.
Agency, as well as arising by contract, may arise 
by implication and operation of law. Two cases may 
usefully be considered, that of a wife and that of the 
master of a ship :-
By many systems of law a wife has authority to 
pledge her husband’s credit for necessaries for herself 
and the family. There Is no reason to suppose that 
this/
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this authority, in questions between the husband and 
third parties,is subject to different rules from that 
obtaining when an ordinary principal and agent tyare 
involved. Thus the authority of the wife, and the 
question whether the husband is bound or not, in a 
question between the husband and a third party, is 
governed in regard to any contract made by the wife by 
the law of the country where that contract was made, 
provided that the wife was there with her husband or 
with his consent. But if the wife be separated from 
the husband,the wife!s authority, and the question 
whether the husband is bound, decgoverned by the law 
of the matrimonial domicile, / ~Topham v. Marshall 
26th January 1808 F . C . J
The authority of the master of a ship to deal 
with the cargo during the voyage and the conditions 
under which he may exercise it (e.g. the question 
whether a bond of bottomry effectively binds the 
cargo-owner) are governed by the law of the flag of 
the ship, / ’“ltThe Gaetano and Mariaft 1882 7 P.D. 137;
,fThe Karnak” 1869 L.R. II P.O. 505; Dicey p. 692;
J
When the question is between the cargo-owner and 
a third party with whom the master has contracted on 
behalf of the cargo-owner this is not a mere presumption 
for the law of the flag, but a rule. The rubric of 
ffThe Gaetano and Mariaf! /~supra 7 reads: "The owner 
of cargo who ships it on board a foreign vessel, ships 
it to be dealt with by the master according to the law 
of the flag ... unless that authority be limited by 
express stipulation at the time of the shipment. 
Therefore a bond made by the master of a foreign ship 
hypothecating cargo laden on board such ship, if valid 
according/
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according to the law of the flag of the ship, will
he enforced by the English Admiralty Court ....
although the conditions imposed by English law as 
essential to the validity of such bond have not been 
complied with.11 The words in italics are valid enough 
if the question is one between the shipowner and the 
cargo-owner, as in Lloyd v. Guibert /~(1865) L.R. 1 Q.3. 
115; flThe Augustw 1891 P. 328; and other cases 
mentioned when considering the interpretation of 
contracts of affreightment_7 "but not when the question 
is between the cargo-owner and a third party with whom 
the master has contracted on the cargo-ownerTs behalf, 
as in r>The Gaetano and Mariatf. For it is unfair to 
the third party that his position should be dependent 
on stipulations between shipowner and cargo-owner of 
which he may not be aware - that would be like allowing 
the authority of an agent in a dispute between the 
principal and a third party with whom the agent has 
contracted, to be governed by the proper law of the 
contract of agency, which, it has already been submitted, 
is unfair to the third party, who can not be expected to 
know or enquire about the proper law of the contract of 
agency* There is no authority to support the words in 
italics when the question arises between cargo-owner 
and third party.
It must be remembered in regard to the third 
category of questions, that the law of a country as 
to the extent of an agent*s authority and as to whether 
the principal is bound or not may be different in the 
case of agents acting for principals who carry on 
business in the country on the one hand and agents 
acting for foreign principals on the other* When the 
law of a country has to be applied it is the law of 
that country as to agents acting for foreign principals, 
it/
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Meaning of 
locus
contractus
It must also be remembered, as Dicey points out /"~p«727_7 
that however questions in category 3 are answered, the 
disposition by the agent of property which is at his 
apparent disposal to a third party may be valid because 
of a law of the situs of the property. ^/"E.g. the 
English Factors Act 1889 Sec. 2, extended to Scotland 
by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890; Cammell v. Sewell 
(1860) 5 H. and N • 728J7
When the places of signing and delivery of the 
contract are different, the locus contractus is the 
place where the contract is delivered, because there 
is no binding contract until delivery takes place. 
f ~Chapman v. Cottrell 1865 3 H. and C. 865; Stuart v. 
Potter Choate & Prentice 1911 1 $.L.T. 377; Westlake 
^ 233; Chalmers’ Bills of Exchange, 10th Ed. p. 281; 
Falconbridge, Banking and Bills of Exchange, 5th Ed. 
p. 865J
When a contract is entered into by offer and 
acceptance transmitted through the post, the locus 
contractus is the place where the acceptance is posted, 
and when a contract after having been signed is delivered 
by post, the locus contractus is the place where the 
completed contract Is posted to the other party, for 
the post is regarded as the common agent of the 
contracting parties and delivery to the post is delivery 
to an agent for the addressee. Dunlop v. Higgins 
1848 6 Bell 195, 1 H.L.C. 381; Thomson v. James 
1855 18 D. 1; The Queen v. Doutre 1884 9 A.C. 745 at 
pp. 750, 751; Kobertson v. Burdekin 1843 6 D. 17; 
Strathern v. Masterman & C o . 1850 12 D. 1087; Benaim 
v. Debono 1924 A.C. 514 at p. 520 (P.O.); The Badische 
Anilln qnd Soda Fabrik v. Basle Chemical Works 1898 A.C. 
200; Parken v. Royal Exchange Assurance Coy. 1846 
8 D. 365; Henthorn/
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Meaning of 
locus
solutionis
Henthorn v. Fraser 1892 2 Ch. 27; Bank of Montreal v. 
Exhibit and Trading C o . 1906 XI Comm. Cas. 250;
Westlake ^224; Falconbridge, loc. cit. pp. 865 - 866_7
If no place of payment is expressed, the locus 
solutionis is presumed to be the place where the 
contract was made. /~Parken v. Royal Exchange 
Assurance Coy., supra.
BILLS ftF EXCIUilGEs
Requisites 
in form
The law as to Bills of Exohange is now almost entirely statutory* being
embodied in the codifying Bills of Exchange Act 1882,f 45 & 46 Viet, c. 6l]
has r J
ftfedfrhbaft provision for the Conflict of Laws.£ particularly see, 721.: The
Act, however, is not completely exhaustive, and the rules of common law,
including the law merchant, save in so far* as they are inconsistent with
the express provisions of the Act, continue to apply to Bills of Exchange,
promissory notes and cheques. £ Sec 97(2)J. The undernoted are cases on
the Qonflict of Laws which fall outwith the Act. ^ In re Gillespie, ex parte
Robarts „ 1886j 18* Q. B. D. 286$ In re Commercial Bank of South
Australia 1887 36. Ch.D. 522$ Alcock - v - Smith 1892 1 Ch. 238$
Bmblricos - v - Anglo-Austrian Bank 1905, -5h«J K. B# 677$ Moulis - v -
Owen 19ft7 -ffihelK. B. 746j
The Act provides that where a bill drawn in one country is
negotiated, accepted, or payable in another, the rights duties and
liabilities of the parties thereto are determined as follows:- [3ec 72]
The validity of a bill as regards requisites in form is
determined by the law of the place of issue, jfsec 72(1) J ’‘Issue* means
the first delivery of a bill, complete in form, to a person who takes it as
a holder, [sec *] and consequently the place of issue is the place where
the bill is first delivered to a holder, e*. g. the place where the drawer
delivers an unaccepted bill to the first indorsee, or the place where the
acceptor delivers an accepted bill to the drawer. The validity, as
regards requisites in form, of the supervening contracts, sdeh as
acceptance, or indorsement, or acceptance supra protest, is determined by
the law of the place where such contract was made. jjSec. 72(1)J The
contract is made at the place of delivery, not where the signature is
U  on fc>n i > Ranking ^
attached^ jChaLmers1, Bills of Exchange, lftth. Ed. p. 281; Westlake f 233$^ 
Chapman - v - Cottrell 1865 3 H & C. 865J Bank,of Jflontreal - y - Tihrhmt
anrl Trading On.. 19D6 XI Cothbu Ces. 25o j and this is an important rule for 
later/
later subsections also. In continental lav/ the place of the 
contract is the place where' the signature was affixed. L_ H.C. 
Gutteriage (193^) 16 Jo. Comp. Leg. 53 PP* 70 ff -
Art 4 of Geneva Convention of 1930J
The principle is in contrast with that applicable to contracts 
generally. The requisites in form of the lex loci contractus are 
not only sufficient but they are the only sufficient requirements. 
In contracts generally, there is an alternative between the 
requirements of the lex loci contractus and those of the proper lav; 
of the contract, if different. ][See Contract, Formal Validity
’’Requisites in form” means such questions as
(1) the sufficiency of initials or a mark;
(2) a rule that a bill must express the value received; /""Chalmers p.28l__7 
•but the necessity or sufficiency of consideration for a contract is a 
matter of essential validity; / i n  re Bonacina (1912) 2 Ch. 394;
Stuart v. Potter Choate & Prentice 1911 1 3.L.T. 377; Falconbridge
p. 868_/
(3) a rule that a verbal acceptance is valid; /  ibid_y
(4) the question whether the words in which a draft is expressed make
it conditional,and so not a bill of exchange; [_ Guaranty Trust Coy, of
New York - v - Hannay & Co. (1918) 2 K.B. 623_/
(5) the question whether an indorsement or acceptance can be made by a 
duly authorised agent simply signing his own name without giving any 
indication of his agency; /  Koechlin - v - Kestenbaum 1927 1 K.B* 889__/|: 
and
(6) the question whether an indorsement in blank transfers the bill.
It is clear however, that if, by a foreign law, indorsement in blank
transfers the bill to some extent, the question whether it transfers 
the right of property in the bill absolutely, or only to the extent that 
it is open to all the exceptions which would be' available against the 
indorser himself, is one of ”interpretation” to be governed by section 
72 (2). JZ. Bradlaugh - v - Be Rin (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 538, (I87O) L.R.
5 C.P. 473; Label - v - Tucker 1867, L.R. 3 Q.B. 77; Trimbey - v -
Vignier 1834 1 Bing. (N.C.) 151. But see In re Marseilles Rlwy Co.
1885 30 Ch. D. 598* where Pearson J. seems to regard the question as 
one of foroii/
Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom it is not
invalid by reason only that it is not stamped in accordance with the
law of the place of issue. /  Sec 72 (l) (a); Stewart - v - Gelot 
1871 9 M. 1057_7 But Of course this does not exempt a bill made 
abroad from the necessity of complying with the requirements of the 
United Kingdom Stamp Acts when the bill is sued on in this Country.
L  Bank of Montreal - v - Exhibit and Trading Coy Ltd. 1906 XI Comm.
Cas. 250\J 
Where/
"Interpretation"
>•
. Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, conforms, as 
regards requisites in form, to the law of the United Kingdom, it may, 
for the purpose of enforcing payment thereof, be treated as valid as 
between all persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in 
the United Kingdom. J_ Sec. 72 (l) (b)_/ Thus where a bill was drawn 
in France on an English drawee and indorsed in France by the drawer 
to an Englishman domiciled in England by an indorsement irregular 
according to French la?/, the form of the bill was irregular- on its 
first issue according to the lex loci actus, but it was valid to 
enable the applicants, who subsequently obtained the bill through an 
indorsement in England, to enforce payment against the drawee, 
because it was valid according to English law* f~In re Marseilles 
Rl?/y Co. supra. The bills however are dated before the Act, and it 
may be doubted whether the question raised is not rather the
interpretation of an indorsement than a question of for m  see
Bradlaugh - v - De Rin, Lebel - v - Tucker. Trimbey - v - Vignier. 
supra, Falconbridge p. 891_/ The proviso probably applies also, 
in favour of a holder in this country, to the case where it is a
subsequent indorsement that is invalid by the la?/ of the country
where it is made. /  Byles on Bills 20th Ed. p. 317* Contra, 
Falconbridge pp. 8 70 , 871._/ The words "For the purpose of enforcing 
payment thereof" do not include the obtaining of a declaration that 
the holder of a bill who has been paid is entitled to retain the money.
/  Guaranty Trust Coy of Rev; York - v - Hannay & Co. (1918) 1 K.B. 43.
The illogicality of this result is remarked on by Scrutton L.J. in 
the Court of Appeal, 1918, 2 K.B. 623 at p 6 70
Subject to the provisions of the Act /  see below_J, the 
interpretation of the dra?/ing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance 
supra protest of a bill, is determined by the law of the place where 
the contract is made. J_ Sec 72 (2)__/ Provided that where an inland 
bill J_ i.e. one both drawn and payable within the British Islands---
Sec 11 (1 ) J  i s  indorsed in a foreign country^ the indorsement shall as 
regards the payer /  See Alcock -v- Smith 1892 1 Ch. 238_ybe interpreted 
according to the la?/ of the United Kingdom. /  Sec 72 (2); Lebel - v - 
Tucker (1867) L. R. 3 , Q.B. T l J
i
i-X-
The subsection on interpretation applies the lex loci contractus 
to interpretation. This is a departure from principle, because on 
principle the proper law of the contract should, govern, and the proper 
law in most cases is the lex loci solutionis. / ”See Thomson on Bills 
3rd. Ed. p. 84, Falconbridge, p. 375* Art 4 of Geneva Convention 1930 
H.C. Gutteridge in 193^ 16 Jo. Comp, Leg. pp. 66 ff\J  To surmount 
this objection, Chalmers, the draughtsman of the Act, quotes Story to 
the effect that the application of the lex loci contractus is not 
really a departure from the principle that the law of the place of 
payment should govern,but is in conformity with it: "The drawer and
indorsers do not contract to pay the money in the foreign place on 
which the bill is drawn, but only to guarantee its acceptance and 
payment in that place by the drawee; and, in default of such payment, 
they agree upon due notice to re-imburse the holder in principal and 
damages where they respectively entered into the contract".
/""Chalmers p. 283_/ He admits, however, that the case of a bill 
accepted in one country but payable in another gives rise to a 
difficulty. According to the literal interpretation of the Act the 
law of the place of acceptance should govern, although according to 
principle the law of the place of payment should. There is no doubt 
thatjbecause of the Act, the law of the place of acceptance is the 
appropriate one. /~Bank Polski - v - Mulder. 1941 2^ K.B. 266, 1942 
I K. B. 497_7
The meaning of "interpretation" is obscure. The primary 
meaning of "interpretation" is the construction of expressions to 
determine their legal meaning. There is little doubt that under the 
"interpretation" of the drawing will come such questions as whether 
the bill is phrased in such a way as to be negotiable or not, 
r  Robertson - v - Burdekin 1843 Falconbridge, p. 874_/
and where the bill is payable; that under the "interpretation" of 
indorsement will come such questions as whether the indorsement has 
been made in such a way as to avoid recourse or to constitute the 
indorsee a holder in due course, J_ Aberdeen Banking Co - v - 
Maberlev Cane & Coy 1835 13 S. 827_/ or the question whether it
transfers the right of property in the bill absolutely or only to 
this/
Ur*
tills extent, that it is open to all exceptions which would be available 
against the indorser himself; /~Bradlaugh - v - De Rin (1868) L.R.
3 C.P. 538; (1870)L.R. 5 C.P. 473\J and under "interpretation” of
acceptance such questions as whether the acceptance is general or 
qualified. "Interpretation”, in short, includes the legal effect and 
extent of the obligations of the parties. /  Chalmers p. 283$
London & Brazilian Bank v. Maguire 1893 Quebec Reports 8 S.C. 353. 
Contra, Falconbridge p. 882_J
There may be more doubt however about one of the illustrations 
which Chalmers, the draughtsman of the Act, gives in his book on the 
Act, as to the meaning of "interpretation" "An English note 
payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery in a country where this 
mode of transfer is not recognised. The title to the note passes 
by such delivery!1 / p .  282j  Section 72(2) refers to the 
interpretation of indorsement, not of delivery. The case which 
Chalmers figured is in fact one which was not provided for by the Act, 
and might be compared to Alcock - v - Smith > £~1892 1 Gh. 238_7 which 
considered the question of the validity or effect of a judicial sale 
in
In Norway of a. bill payable to beareri thiswfcs a problem outwith the Act,
and to be determined by the Common law, the appropriate common law rule
being that the validity of a transfer of corporeal moveaVles must be
governed by the law of the country in which the transfer takes place.
Even if one went on the assumption that ’'indorsement* included "delivery"
and that the Act covered such a case, Sec 72 (1) would be more applicable!
"The validity as regards requisites in form of the supervening contracts
such as.   indorsement,••••• is determined by the law of the place#
where such eontract was made”
Another difficulty is whether "interpretation” covers essential
validity. In Embiricos - v - Anglo -Austrian Bank,|6.905) 1. K.B. 677^
She English Court of .appeal Ijiad to consider whether the ultimate holder of
a cheque, which had been indorsed a number of times, had a good title to it.
One of the indorsements was a forged one, made,by a person who had stolen
the cheque , to a Vienna bank, who in tufn indorsed it to the ultimate
holder. By Austrian law, the Vienna Bank had, and therefore gave, a good
title to the cheque as bona fide holders for value without gross negligence^
by English law--------- section 24 of the Bills of Exchange Act------- no
right ptoretain the bill or enforce payment could be acquired through a
forged signature. ItJAs held that Austrian law should prevail; if section
72(2) did not apply, the rule of International law applied that the-'-va444i-ty
v-tdUJl vJvWt Ao
a transfer of moveable chattels must he gcnnerned by the law of the 
country in which the transfer takes place. Vaughan Williams L.J. did not 
think that "interpretation" in sec 72 (2) covered this issue, of essential 
validity^ Bomer L.J. did not make the groudd of his opinion clear, but 
appeared to be of the same opinion) Stirling L. J. thought that 
"interpretation" in Sec 72 (2) did cover this issue. In an earlier case 
in/ the Court of Appeal the similar problem of the validity of a judicial 
sale in Norway of a Bill payable to bearervflks decided on the common law
rule/
rule that a transfer of moveable chattels is valid if valid by the law 
of the place where the transfer takes place, and not 011 this provision 
of the Act’, /  Alcock - v - Smith I892 1 Ch. 233: but this case has the 
additional feature to bring it outside the Act, that the question was 
not the validity of an indorsement but of a judicial transfer of a 
bearer bill_y and In a later case in the Court of Appeal, Sargant L.J. 
thought that in Embiricos they had carried the matter further than was 
contemplated by the actual language of the subsection. /  Koechlin - v- 
Kestenbaum 192? 1 K.B. 889, at p. 899_7 In Moulis - v - Owen /~1907 
1 K.B. 746V an action on a cheque which the defendant gave to the 
plaintiff in Algiers in payment of money lent by the plaintiff to the 
defendant to play at baccarat, a legal consideration according to the 
law of France but not according to English law, it was held that English 
law as the lex loci solutionis must prevail^ and that the cheque must be 
deemed to have been given for an illegal consideration, and Sec. 72 of 
the Bills of Exchange Act was, quite correctly, not even mentioned. 
r In De Beeche - v - South American Stores Ltd. 1935 A.C. 148, and 
Kleinwort - v - Ungarische etc. Akt i ens:ese 11 schaft 1939 2 K.B. 678 
the issue is the illegality of a contract and the bills are only an 
incidental feature_J
In short, both principle ana authority seem to show that essential 
validity is not comprehended by 1 interpretation", and accordingly the 
common law applies.
The application of the common lav/ instead of the statute makes a 
difference 'when the issue is the essential validity of the acceptance 
of a bill. The kind of problem which is referred to here is whether 
acceptance, may be restricted to part of the amount of the bill: or
whether the holder is obliged to accept part payment. If the place 
of payment is different from the place of acceptance the application 
of the common lav. instead of the statute will make a difference, because 
according to principle, as we have seen, the law of the place of payment 
should govern. Jcp. Geneva Convention of 1930 on Unification of 
International! Private Law relating to Bills and Promissory Notes Art. 7> 
and Geneva Convention of 1931 relating to cheques Art. 7 (4)_/
However/
However, when the issue is the essential validity of indorsements 
or transfers, it is submitted that the application of the common law 
instead of the statute does not make any difference. The appropriate 
common law rule is that a transfer of corporeal moveables is valid 
if valid by the law of the place where the transfer takes placeJ 
L. Embiricos - v - Anglo-Austrian Bank. Alcock - v - Smith, supra. 
Since the place of transfer and the situs of the bill are in these 
cases the same, it can be said that the transfer of a bill is 
"governed” by the law of the place where the transfer takes place__/ 
and in the case of inland bills where the question is the liability 
of the payer, according to the common law the contract of the 
acceptor is to pay to an order valid by the law of this country) and 
therefore an inland
- 7 -
inland bill transferred in a foreign country in a mannar invalid there,
•but which is valid herq, is sufficiently transferred to make the payer
liable to the indorser. (Be la Chaumette - v - Bank of England 1831L----------------------------------
2 B. & Ad. 385$ A$jU reasoning of Lebel - v - tucker . 1867 L. R. 3| Q.B.
'77/ is just as applicable to the essential validity as to the interpretation
of an indorsement* In Alcock - v - Smith , supra, in which the essential
validity of the transfer of an inland bill whs held to be governed by the
foreign law of the place of the transaction, the question did not arise
as between the indorsee and the payer! Ifc this io ■&€ fhe essential
rfcrcferc
validity of a transfer of a bill is governed at common law by the same 
principles as the winterpretation” of the indorsement of a bill is under 
Sec 72 (2) and the prfcviso thereto.
Where the issue is whether a bill has been given for an 
illegal consideration, if Moulis. - v - tweq |jL9G7 1. K.B. 746] is
doei
correct, the application of the common law/make a groat dod—trf difference. 
Moftlla tr v - Owen A gave B a cheque In -Algiers on an English bank in 
payment of money lenji by B for plgy at baccarat in Algiers. The 
consideration for the chequers legal according to French iaw, but according 
to English £aw a bill given for a gambling debt ols given for an illegal 
consideration, which, according to English &aw/ invalidated it in the hands 
of the payee or a person taking with notice of the illegality of the 
consideration. In an action 'd>n the cheque itvbs held that English law, 
as the. lex loci solutionis, must govern, and that B could not recover.
The illegal it y-and tho of foot- of the illegality,Wflie judged •"frdt"~,ae’cui,uing 
to the law of the place of drawing, which vrauld, according to Sec 72(2), 
have governed the interpretation of drawing, but according to the law of 
$he place where the allegedly illegal act would have taken effect, namely 
England. But this decision is vetry doubtful. Admittedly if a contract 
is illegal according to the lex loci solutionis it cannot be enforced, 
but Engl and Was not the locus solutionis of the contract of drawing^ and 
delivering that cheques Algiers (was. French lawwfcs both the lex loci 
contractus/ I
/ w
The illegality and the effect of the illegality were judged 
according to the law of the place of payment of the cheque. But
this decision is very doubtful. The law as to illegality in contract 
is that our Courts will not enforce an agreement which is illegal 
either by the law with which the contract has the most connection or 
the lex loci solutionis. There is also a presumption determining 
the proper lav/ that when the locus contractus and the locus solutionis 
are different, the proper law is the lex loci solutionis. These 
principles applicable to contract have been misunderstood and 
misapplied in Moulis v. Owen. England was not the locus solutionis 
of the contract of loan and of the drawing and delivery of the cheque:
Algiers was. Nor was English lav, the proper law: French law was.
French law was the only law interested to say whether the contract
between A and B of loan and of the drawing and handing over of the
cheque was one in which the consideration was illegal, and if so, 
what was the effect of the illegality. Further, even according to 
English law, the consideration for the cheque was not illegal, for 
the English statutes were to the effect that bills given for gaming 
in England were given for an illegal consideration, but not hills 
given for gaming in a foreign country where it was perfectly legal.
/  See dissenting judgment of Fletcher Moulton L.J.5 and Dicey & 
Pollock in 1907 23 L.u.R. 249J  The majority of the Court of Appeal 
as-sUmed that in applying English law they were bound to suppose, in 
opposition to the real facts, that everything took place in England. 
But if English law is to be applied it should be applied to the facts 
as they exist and not to a supposed case of the contract having been 
made end the transaction having occurred in England. ]_ Arthur Cohen 
in 1912 28 L.Q.R. pp. 129, 130-_7
That Moulis v. Owen'is wrong appears from the anomalous position 
of English law as to gaming which it involves.
At common law in England gaming was not illegal. However 
statutes intervened. The statute 1710 9 Anne c. 14 provided that all 
bills securities etc. granted for a gaming consideration or for the 
reimbursement of any money knowingly lent for gaming should be void. 
As a result, in England, not only the bills etc. are void but the 
gambling/
gambling debts are too and cannot be recovered. /_ Quarrier v. Colston
1 Ph. 147; Carlton Hall Club Ltd. v. Laurence 1929 2 K.B. 153_7
Bov/ money lent 111 a foreign country for the purpose of being used by
the borrower for gaming, the game not being illegal by the law of that
country, may be recovered in the English Courts, / "fuarrier v. Colston.
supra; Saxby v. Fulton 1909 2 K.B. 208J  But if a bill payable in
England has been granted for the money, recovery can not be obtained
*
on the bill, £ Robinson v. Bland 1760 2 Burr 1077; Moulis v. Owen.
supra_7 although it can on the loan or debt itself. / Robinson v. Bland,
supra; Society Anonvme aes Grands Etablissements du'Toucuet Paris -Plad
v * B a u m g a r t  98 L . J .  ( K . B . )  789L . 7  Thus the absurd position is that
the bill or security on the one hand and the consideration on the other
so
are considered to be/intimately connected that in regard to transactions 
within England the statutes which make the bill or security void also 
make the consideration void, but in regard to transactions occurring 
abroad it is possible to separate the bill or security and the 
consideration and hold the former void but the latter valid. But if 
Moulis v. Owen is admitted to be v/rong, and Robinson v. Bland on which 
it is founded and the cases which have followed them./~Touquet etc. 
supra__7 this inconsistency would disappear.
It is submitted that, the law which should govern the questions 
whether a bill has been given for an illegal consideration and if so 
what is the effect of that, is the law with which the transaction lias 
the nearest connection, which in Moulis v. Owen was the law of the 
place where the gaming took place and the cheque was handed over for 
the loan; and was the same law as would have governed the matter if 
ninterpretation" had covered the issue and it had been governed by 
section ~J2 (2).
The words ^subject to the provisions of the Act" indicate the 
other subsections of Sec. 72, sec. 57, which is about damages and is 
considered below, and Sec. 53? which is in these terms
(1) MA bill, of itself, does not operate as an assignment of funds in 
the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and the 
drawee of a bill who does not accept as required by tills Act is not 
liable on the instrument. This subsection shall not extend to Scotland.
(2)/ ■
(2 ) In Scotland, where the drawee of a bill has in his hands funds! 
available for the payment thereof, the bill operates as an assignment 
of the sum for which it is drawn in favour of the holder, from.the 
time when the bill is presented to the drawee." /~This is a saving 
of the Scots common law prior to the Act: Bell, Princ. 315, 359;'.
Stewart - v - Gelot 1871, 9- M. 1057? per B.J.C. Moncrieff at p. 1060;^ 
British Linen Bank - v - Carruthers 1883 10 R. 923—7 A bill drawn in 
England on a drawee in Scotland would, but for the words "subject to 
the provisions of this Act", be interpreted according to the law of 
England, as the law of the place where the drawing was made, and so 
the draft would not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of 
the Scottish drawee; but because of the inclusion of those words, sec.
72 (2) must be read subject to Sec. 53? and whenever the drawee is in 
Scotland the drawing will have the effect of assigning the sum for 
which it is drawn in favour of the holder, from the time when the bill 
is presented to the drawee. In France the rule is similar to that in 
Scotland, namely that when the drawee has funds, drawing a bill operates 
as an assignment of them in favour of the holder, /  Chalmers p. 210_J 
but the drawing of a bill in England on a drawee in France does not 
have the effect of assigning the funds,because according to Sec. ~]2 (2) 
the interpretation of the drawing must be according to the place where 
the drawing was made,and no exception to this rule in the case of 
France is contained in the Act.
Holders*
duties
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Law, which will not do. I See "The L 
pp 707, 8 [ j  The Act must be held to 
it should have said. ___
aw of a Country** p Dicey
mean what its says and not what
The Act states thatM The duties of the holder, 
with respect to presentment for acceptance or payment and the necessity 
for or sufficiency of a protest or notice of dishonour, or otherwise, 
are determined by the law of the place where the act is done or the 
bill is dishonoured" £  Sec 72(3)]
This ambiguous section is probably to be construed, 
as Dicey saysj reddendo singula singulis.|pioey p 71 ej "The duties 
of the holder with respect to presentment for acceptance or payment" 
refers to the law of the place "where the act is done" and ** the
necessity for ofr sufficiency of a protest or notice of dishonour, or
otherwise* refers to the law of the place where "the bill is dishonoured'* 
The section therefore says that the duties of the holder with respect 
to fchre presentment for acceptance of payment are determined by the 
law of the place where the bill should be accepted or paid; and the 
necessity for or sufficiency of a protest or notice of dishonour or
otherwise determined by the* law of the place where the bill is
dishonoured. In short the lex loci solutionis governs.jpicey ibid; 
Cheshire p.p 291,2; Foote pp. 460,^ 63^  JSlder - v - Young 1854 170.56;
Welsh -• v - Milne 1844 7.D. 213; Bank Pal ski - v - K»J Mulder &Coy 
1941 2| K. B. 266) 1942 1^ K. B. 497;, also cases cited below, Contra 
Cornelius - v - flanque Franco-fferbe 1941 1^ K.B. 29 per Stable 3. 
at p. 32jj. This is not an example of legislative stupidity where
three events —  presentment, protest, and notice of dishonour----
are referred to two legal systems -—  the law of the place where it 
is done, and the law of the place where the bill is dishonoured whteh---
without saying &ow the two systems are to be distributed between the
bw-t
three events, but as Cheshire says an example of lack of legislative 
clarity where the three events are referred to one system, which however
- I l ­
ls described in two ways, because to describe it as”the law of the 
place where the act is done, or should be done," is more appropriate 
to presentment for acceptance or payment, and a W  the law of the 
place where the bill is dishonoured " is more appropriate to protest 
and notice of dishonour.
The text writers however, are far from agreedks to the
theit*
meaning to be placed on the section. Westlake considers/- "Jn caseA
of failure by the drawee to accept a bill of exchange, or of failure
in £Aymdnt >by the acceptor, the necessity and sufficiency of demand,
protest, or notice of dishonour, by the last holder, in order to charge 
any other party to the bill or note, is determined by the law of the 
place where it is payable, I $  231J And he considers: that when an
indorser has been made duly liable on a bill, the notice that he must
give to his indorser, or to the drawer if there be no intermediate 
party, depends on the law governing the contract made by the 
indorsement to him or by the drawing. 232] A certain amount of 
support for this view can be ohtained from the wording of the section; 
it commences by talking of the duties of the holder with respect to
tk IS
presentment for acceptance or payment, and which can only be done by
• a
the last holder; therefore, it is^plausible view that "holder" means 
"last holder" and when the section goes on to talk about the necessity 
for or sufficiency of a protest or notice of dishonour, it is still 
referring to the last holder. Out Horne - v - Rouquette |(1878) 3^ Q.B.D. 
514|| a decision prior to the Act on which Westlake mainly reliesy 
does not help him in thf way he claims. In that case a bill of 
exchange, payable in Spain,WAs indorsed by A to B- in England, and then 
by B* to C. in Spain. Acceptance having been refused in Spain, C delayed 
for twelve days before informing B of the dishonour. B immediately 
gave notice to A. No notice of dishonour by non—acceptancev/is required 
by Spanish law. Itwfts held that the contract of indorsement by B to 
C had to be construed according to the law of the country in which it 
was made, namely Spain, and that since there was no need for hotice
according/ ^
- 12 -
according to Spanish $aw, Butts liable to C|s and -that B being
liable to C, B vlgs entitled to recover from A, to whom he had given
due notice according to the English law, thatwis the law which 
governed the contract between A<fcdB. This case decided that +he 
question whether notice of dishonour had to be given, and if so^  
how,was a matter relating to the construction of the contract of 
indorsement, andWbs to be governed by the law of the place whe're
such contract whs made* It proceeds on the rule Which was later
laid down in Sec 72(2} of the Act, that the interpretation of an 
indorsement is determined by the law of the, place where the contract 
of indorsement's ms.de* Now since the necessity for or sufficiency 
of a protest or notice of dishonour is given a subsection by itself, 
namely 72(3}, one presumes that this subsection says something 
different from/the section is probably intended to embody the effect 
qf the decision in Hirschfield 4 v * Snith,|l866 L* E. l^C.P. 34cJ 
but avoiding the tortuous and unsatisfactory ratio of that case*
A bill had been drawn in England and accepted by the drawee in France, 
payable in France. The defendant indorsed and delivered it to the 
pfiilntiff in England , and he indorsed and delivered it to a banker 
in France for presentment. The bill was presented and dishonoured. 
The last holder protested and gave notice of dishonour to the 
defendant according to the formalities and within the time prescribed 
by French law. It was held that this was good notice. Now this 
decision is really to the effect that the lex loci solutionis 
governs the necessity for or sufficiency of notices of dishonour.
But the Court, desiring to be consistent with the rule that a 
contract of indorsement id to be interpreted according to the law 
of the place where the indorsement is made, which is now embodied 
in Sec 72(2), argued thus: even though the contract pf an indorser
in England of a bill accepted payable in a foreign country is a 
contract to be governed by the law of England, and so the holder
cannot/
- 13 -
cannot sue such indorser unless lie has given due notice of dishonour 
according to the law of England, nevertheless the law of England is 
that such notice must be given as can reasonably be fsquired in the 
circumstances,and so notice valid according to the law of the place where 
the bill is payable ought, unless the case is exceptional, to be deemed 
due notice according to the law of England. The rule that an 
indorsement has to be interpreted according to the law of the place 
where it is made, has now been separated from the question of dishonour 
etc* by being treated in a different subsection,and this tinsatisfactory 
reasoning is not now,necessary. Sec 72 (2) says; that the interpretation 
of the indorsement is determined by the law of the place where it is 
made, and 72(3) that the duties the holder with regard to notices of 
dishonour etc. are governed by the lex loci solutionis. Section 72(3) 
is simply prescribing the lex loci solutionis to govern the duties of 
the holder with regard to notices of dishonour etc. as 72(4) and 72(5) 
prescribe the lex loci solutionis to determine rate of exchange and date 
of payment respectively.
The contract that a party transferring a bill for value 
makes with the transferee is to warrant that the bill shall be accepted 
by the drawee, and, having been accepted, shall, on being presented at 
the time it becomes due, be paid. In other words, he engages as 
surety for the due performance by the acceptor of the obligations which 
the latter takes on himself by acceptance . His liability is therefore 
to be measured by that of the acceptor, whose surety he is, and as the 
obligations of the acceptor are to be determined by the lex loci of 
performance, so also must those of the surety. Bouquette- v - Overmann 
1875| L.B. X.Q,*B. 525 per Cockburn C.J. at pp 536,fj The obligations 
of the acceptor are to pay on presentment and protest being made according 
to the lex loci solutionis, and beeaaoe the obligations of the 
sureties are to pay on notice of dishonour according to the lex loci 
solutionis. n It Is at least reasonable to presume that these incidents 
of Payment will be governed by the same law which applies to all the
incidents/
-  14—
°f payment1! [Foote pp. 460 -lj
A final argument for the lex loci solutionis is to consider 
the problem confronting a holder, other than the last holder, who, after K*v«'i»< 
befen^  made liable on the bill, wants to obtain recourse not only against 
the person who indorsed to him, but against all prior holders •
According to the view adopted here of the meaning of 72(3) he should 
protest and give notice of dishonour according to the lex loci solutionis, 
but Westlake’s view leaves the possibility open that he would have to 
protest and give notice according to the law of the place of each 
indorsement, which would be an unreasonable requirement. £ Which should 
be done is expressly said to be still an open question in Horne - v - 
Rouquette , supra, — —  see concluding sentence of judgement of Cotton 
L.J. — — — -- and according to Westlake is an open question^ even since 
the Act. i  f  232 • It would be very odd if 72(3) merely provided what 
has already been provided in 72(2) and did not deal with this supposedly 
outstanding questionj
AmountExpressed W&ere a bill is drawn out of but payable in the United Kingdom,
in foreign and the sum payable is not expressed in the currency of the United
currency Kingdom, the amount shall, in the ahsence of some express stipulation, be
calculated according to the rate of exchange for sight drafts at the 
place of payment on the day the bill is payable. ^Section 72 < * > J  
When a bill is drawn in the United Kingdom, payable in a foreign 
.currency, the amount is also calculated, in the absence of some express 
stipulation, according to the rate of exchange at the place of payment, 
on the day the bill is payable, juiiendahl - v - Pankhurst Wright & Co. 
1923, 39j T.L.R. 628j Peyrae ~ v - Wilkinson 1924. 2. K. B. 166}
dissenting from Cohn - v - Boulken 192CP, 36^ T. L. R. 767
DUJE DAUB Where a bill is drawn in one country, and^payable in ahother, the due
date thereof is determined* according to the law of the place where it 
is payable. ^Section 72(5)J. There may be a difference between the 
calendars used in the place of drawing- and those used in the place of
payment:
\S
payment: if so, a date expressed in a bill means that date according
to the calendar of the place of payment. If days of grace are 
allowed by the law of the country where a bill of exchange is payable, 
but not by the law of the country where it is drawn, the payment c? 
the bill is deferred until the expiration of the days of grace, and 
if Trice versa, the payment is not deferred. /Rouquette - v - Overmann, 
1875, L.R^ X.Q.B. 525 per Cockburn, C.J. at p. 535/ If a day is a 
legal holiday in the place of payment but not in the place of drawing, 
the question whether it is counted in computing the days of grace is 
determined by the law of the place of payment. /Falconbridge pp.SlO, 
911/ T/ftien a bill is payable in a foreign country, and emergency 
legislation of that foreign country enlarges the time within which 
bills are payable, the bill is not due until the period prescribed by 
the foreign legislation has elapsed, even in a question with a drawer 
or indorser in this country, /"in re Francke & Rasch (1918) 1 Ch.470; 
Rouquette - v - Overmann, supra/*
Section 57 of the Act deals with damages in the event dishonour. 
Subsection (l) of Sec. 57^ provides that damages shall be the amount 
of the bill, interest, and the expenses of noting and necessary 
/"in re English Bank of the River Plate, (1893) 2 Ch. 438/ protest. 
Subsection (2) provides that in the case of a bill which has been 
dishonoured abroad, in lieu of the above damages, the holder may 
recover from the drawer, or an indorser, and the drawer or an indorser 
who has been compelled to pay the bill may recover from any party 
liable to him the amount of the re-exchange with interest thereon 
until the time of payment. Re-exchange is the sum for which a sight 
bill, drawn at the time and place of dishonour at the then rate of 
exchange on the place where the drawer or indorser sought to be charged 
resides, must be drawn in order to realise at the place of dishonour 
the amount of the dishonoured bill and the expenses consequent on its 
dishonour. /"Chalmers p. 226_/ Subsection (l) deals with bills 
dishonoured at home, and subseotion (2) with bills dishonoured abroad, 
/ i n  re Gillespie, ex parte Robarts, (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 286, per 
Lindley L.J. at p. 292/
Subsection'(l)/
VCE1GU33
Promissory
v Notes
Subsection (1) however does not apply to a foreign bill, which has 
been drawn and issued abroad and dishonoured in this country, and as 
subsection (2) does not apply to that case either, such a case is 
not covered by the Act, so the rules of common law govern^,
/"In re Gillespie supra; Falconbridge f>S13. Contra Dicey p. 714 
and see In re English Bank of the River Plate supra/7* The relevant 
common law rule is that the holder of a bill may recover damages at 
the rate payable by the law of the place in which the party sought 
to be charged has contracted to pay the bill. ^Falconbridge pp.9G9 
910; In re Gillespie, supra; In re Commercial Bank of South 
Australia (1887) 36 Ch. D. 522. best lake 5s 234/r Thus when a bill 
was drawn in Australia on London, negotiated in Australia, and 
dishonoured in London when presented for acceptance by the 
Australian holder, the damages for which the drawers were liable 
to the holders were determined by the law of the place where the 
contract between the drawers and holders was entered into, namely 
Australia. f ~In re Commercial Bank of South Australia, supra/7 
If the drawer has been made liable in foreign damages to an indorsee 
he is entitled to recover what he has paid from the acceptor in this 
country who has dishonoured, notwithstanding that this sura is more
than^57 (1) allows. / In re Gillespie, •supra/7’
When a bill of exchange has been dishonoured abroad the only
damages which the holder can recover are those provided by sub­
section (2)j and he has no option to sue for interest under sub- ' 
section (1). /~In re Commercial TA,nk of South Australia, supra__7 
A checue is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on 
demand, and except as otherwise provided ia Part 111. of the Act, 
the.provisions of the Act applicable to a bill of exchange payable 
on demand apply to a cheque. /"section 73/7
Subject to the provisions of Part 17 of the Act, the provisions 
of the Act relating to bills of exchange apply, with the necessary 
modifications, to promissory notes. /Section 89 (1) J  The maker 
of a note shall be deemed to correspond with the acceptor of a bill,
the drawer of an accepted bill payable to drawer’s order. f section
a set do not apply,section 89 (3)__/ There a foreign note is 
dishonoured, protest thereof Is not necessary. r_ Section 89 ( 4 ) _ 7  
Section 22 (1) provides: '’Capacity to incur liability as a party to 
a bill is eo-ertensive with capacity to contract. Provided that 
nothing in this section shall enable a corporation to make itself 
liable as drawer, acceptor, or indorser of a bill unless it is 
compifcfcotk to it so to do under the law for the time being in force
relating to corporations.”  ...- . .
— — This probably only applies to a question of capacity when it 
has been determined that our law is the lav/ which governs, so it 
does not assist the problem of the choice of lav/ in regard to capacity, 
which is not dealt with in the Act. The common law therefore 
governs in view of section 97 (2)^  and the lex loci contractus is 
applicable to capacity in regard to bills of exchange, as with other
mercantile contracts. / see Capacity p. ; emd Chalmers p. 71;
Falconbridge pp. 911, 91Zj If the rule is correct which was 
tentatively suggested in regard to mercantile contracts generally,
See Capacity p. J  that the capacity of corporations can only
be determined by reference to the law under which the body v/as 
incorporated, the same result is arrived at by applying the common 
law rules of International private Law by virtue of section 97 (2) 
as-would be arrived at by regarding section 22 (1) as applying to the 
choice of lav; and not to cases to which our own law is applicable.
The discharge of an obligation on a bill is not dealt with in 
the Act, and so the common law applies. [_ Dicey p. 714 n. (&).
Contra Chalmers p. 285_7 An obligation on a bill like any other 
contract is discharged if discharged according to the proper lav/, 
otherwise not.^ / Balli v. Dennistoun 1851 6 3x. 483. gee Contract p. 
and Bankruptcy p. where many of the authorities cited are
89. (2) J  But the provisions as to bills relating to presentment 
for acceptance, acceptance, acceptance supra protest, and bills in
concerned with bill
!General
Average
QUASI - CONTRACT
Quasi^-contractual obligations are obligations 
which are similar to contractual obligations, but 
which arise not from contract but from operation of 
law •
The obligations arising from negotiorum gestig, 
the obligation to restore money paid in error, and 
the obligation of recompense, /""Bell, Princ . I 538/7 
will be governed by the law with which the transaction 
has most connection! /""Westlake § 235; J 
the obligation to restore money which has been paid 
in advance for a consideration which has not been 
received, by the proper law of the contract under 
which it was paid; the obligation to restore goods 
which have been stolen or found, /"See Todd v. Armour 
1882 9 R. 901J  and the obligations which arise from 
vitious intromission with the effects of a deceased 
person, / Dingwal v. Vandosme 1619 Mor. 4449;
Archbishop of Glasgow v. Bruntsfield 1683 Mor. 4449/7 
by the law of the place where this took place.
When a voluntary sacrifice is made of the ship
or cargo or part of either for the safety of all
concerned In the maritime adventure, all the interests
concerned, namely the owners of the ship, cargo, and
freight, have to bear a rateable proportion of the loss.
This quasi-contractual obligation, which has its origin
in the Lex Rhodia de iactu, and was recognised In the
civil law, / “Digest, XIV, 2, 1J  -enad has formed part
b w"t
of all maritime codes since,Awith slight variations. 
International agreement on a common code for general 
average, which is known as the York-Antwerp Buies, 
was arrived at in 1864, and the Rules were revised 
in 1890 and 1924. / F o r  the Buies see Carver, Carriage 
by Sea, Appendix C/7 The York-Antwerp Buies differ 
slightly/
slightly from the law of this country^and have not 
been made part of it. The Rules are commonly adopted 
in bills of lading. According to the 1890 Rules, 
"Except as provided in the foregoing rules, the 
adjustment shall be drawn up in accordance with the 
law and practice which would have governed the 
adjustment had the contract of affreightment not 
contained a clause to pay general average according 
to these rules;11 /"Rule XVIII of 1890 Rule 
but the 1924 Rules were intended as a complete code, 
and accordingly where they are adopted there will 
be no conflict of laws, but only a question of the 
construction of the Rules for the Court seised of 
the matter. / Vlassopoulos v. British and Foreign 
Marine Insurance Company 1929 1 K.B. at p. 195 per 
Roche j „_7 Where the Rules have not been adopted 
by contract between the parties, the following 
principles apply as to choice of law.
Average adjustment must be made according to 
the law of the port of destination, or, if the voyage
has terminated at another port as a result of agreement
or necessity, according to the law of the port where 
the voyage terminated. / Simonds v. White 2 B. & C. 
805; Lloyd v. G-uibert 1865 L.F. 1 Q.B. per curiam at 
p. 126; Hill v. Wilson 1879 4 C.P.D. 329; Fletcher v. 
Alexander L.R. 3 C.P. 375; Vlassopoulos, supra; 
Messina v. Petrococchino 1872 L.R. 4 P.O. 144;
Dicey Rule 168; Carver, Carriage by Sea, 5^427J  
Although average adjustment must be done according to 
the law of the port of destination or termination of
the voyage/here is no necessity for it to be computed
by an average adjuster at that port. / Wavertree 
Sailing C o . v. Love 1897 A.C. 373J  
To/
To hold that the voyage was rightly terminated by 
necessity at an intermediate port, circumstances must 
have occurred which were beyond the control of the 
parties*and such as rendered the completion of the 
voyage on the terms originally agreed upon physically 
impossible, or so clearly unreasonable as to be 
impossible in a business point of view; f Hill v. 
Wilson, supra, per Bindley J. at pp. 333, 4_7 such 
as the loss of the ship, or the ship being so damaged 
that repairs would take an unusually long time, 
f ~Mavro v. Ocean Marine Insurance Co. 1875 10 C.P. 414__7 
or the greater part of the cargo being lost at the 
inception of the voyage and the remainder not being 
worth taking on. f ~Fletcher v. Alexander, supra, 
per Bovill C.J. at pp. 382, Z j  — —  -— - -
— — - The mere temporary suspension of the voyage by 
reason of the necessity of repairing the ship at a 
port of refuge does not warrant an average adjustment 
at that port, f Hill v. Wilson 1879 4 C.P.D. 329J
It has been said that it does not necessarily 
follow that an underwriter of ship, cargo or freight, 
upon an ordinary form of policy,would be liable for 
the average so adjusted at a foreign port, f ~Harris v. 
Scaramanga 1872 7 C.P. 481 per Bovill C.J. at p. 488_J7 
but this difficulty is superseded by the inclusion in 
policies of a clause "to pay general average as per 
foreign statement", which makes the underwriters liable 
for whatever the insured has to pay according to. foreign 
average adjustment. f ~Harris v. Scaramanga, supra;
"The Mary Thomas" 1894 P. 108; Be Hart v. Compania 
Anonima de Seguros Aurora, 1903 2 K.B. 503; Mavro v. 
Ocean Marine Insurance C o . 1875, 10 C.P. 414__/
The/
3^1 \M<^e
Contribution
between
co-insurers
j
The apportionment -Sa.lvage, of salvage among the 
owners, master, pilot, crew, and other persons in the 
service of any foreign vessel, shall be in accordance 
with the law of the country to which the vessel belongs. 
/^Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 sec. 7, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, 
c. 57 J
In one English case the question of contribution 
between co-insurers was dealt with by the Court 
according to the lex fori An American Insurance 
Company and English Underwriters both insured an 
American firm. The proper laws of the contracts of 
insurance were American and English respectively.
The American Company paid most of the amount of a 
claim and sued one of the English Underwriters for 
contribution. The English Court applied English 
law. / ~American Surety Co. of New York v. Wrightson 
1910, 16 Com. Cas. 37_J7 ^t is submitted that it 
would be sounder to apply the law of the place where 
the property insured is situated.
The Situs of Moveables
It ie obvious that corporeal moveables have a situs, and the situs 
of a bale* of cotton a pwr* of* faot. JT Aft to the witu*
of goods at 30a, s«*s North Western Bar**- v. Foynter Son ?■ Mac-^ 
donalds 22 R.(H.L.) 1; Inglis v. Robertson & Baxter 189S 25 R. 
(H.L.) 70 per Lord Watson at ph. 7&,4. J  J j ^©•’eable* 
such as debts and shares do nob in faot have a situs, but it Is 
necessary in law to attribute a situs to such intangible aesets.
Stocks, aharss, patent** mt<% trade-»»ar>a are situated n**rs 
they can be «ffactually dsalt *lt>, j» the case of etoews and 
shares t M *  i» where the register of rerbe^ti la Vert. £ Attorney 
general v. Higgins 2 H.AN. Breeeard t , smith 1925 A.C. 971*
London & South American Tnreet^ent Tfiagt Ltd v. Britleh Tobacco 
Oorpsny (j\ptetrnlla) Ltd I9°7 1 Ch. 10'*; Baelz v. Public True tee 
leg? Ch. 803 J  Thu® England wnc held to be the eltus of the 
shares of a company which carried on all Its administrative wo rife 
In Holland, vfl ici rap its 'residence* for the purpose of the 
Income Tax Acte, and v'y I eh only had its register of members at the 
'registered  o f f ic e  p itueted  In England. ^ S a els  ?« p ub lic  Ttdaetee, 
wupfajl British gorefnmert stock* af>e «ot Englieh or Scottish, 
but British, and the fact that they are registered at the Bank
of England does not give them a local situation in England,and 
therefore they are held as being situated In that part of tfe 
United i&agcUm where the question concerning them is being lit­
igated • Oumnin&hamefs Trustees 1924 S.C. 581; Drysdale^
Trustees 1922 S.C. 741; Contra Egerton v. Forbes Nov. 27th 1812 
F . O . j
Debts are situated at the place where they are properly!
recoverable, “Shat is in the residence of the debtor,"where the h^, 
debtee can be sued. ^ New York Life Insurance Co. v. Public 
Trustee 1924 2 Ch. 101; Lorentzen v. Lydden 1942 2 K.B. 202 per At* 
kinson Tf* at p. 205; Republic of Guatemala v. Nunez 1927 1 K.B.
609 f- in re Maudslay Sons & Field 1900 1 Ch. 602 J .
- If the debtor is a corporation having branches in different 
countries, it has mor© than one place where it can be sued, 
but in that ©vent the terms of the contract are looked at to 
determine from it at what place the debt would be recoverable; 
so that an insurance policy^expressed to b© payable at the London 
branch of an insurance company whose head office was in Hew York, 
was situated in London and not Hew York} New York Life Insurance
Co., supra J and the debt due by a bank to a customer is situated 
at the branch where the customer has his account, and where alone 
he can demand payment* ^ Richards o u t * Richardson 1927 P. 228; 
OLare & C o .  v# Dresdner Bank 1915 2 K*B. 576 I
Assignments of Moveables 
In dealing with the validity of assignments of moveables, the
-f mu r
questions which arise may be divided into three categoriest
(1) The assignability of the moveable.
(2) The capacity of the cedent to ass ig», or of the assignee to 
accept, an assignation.
(S) The formal and essential validity of the assignment.
(4) The meaning and legal effect of the assignment ($) against 
the original debtor, (b) between the cedent and assignee or a 
third party relying on the assigneefs title, and (c) as regards
the rights acquired by the assignee.
(l) The assignability of the moveable**
The nature of a fund, as transmissible or not, is determined by
the law of the situs of the fund. £ Grants Trustees v* Ritchiefs
Executors 1886 13 R. 646; Knill v. Dumergue 1911 2 Oh. 199. It j
is submitted that in Pender v. Commercial Bank of Scotland Ltd. !
(O.H*) 1940 S.L.T* 306, the Insurance policy there in i
q u e s t i o n  w a s  s i t u a t e d  i n  E n g l a n d ,  E n g l i s h  l a w  s h o u l d  h a v e ^ a p p l i e d
to determining the assignability ©f the policy, which was the
only real question in the case, there being no question of capacity
or validity of an assignation, and the policy should have been
held to be transmissible.! But a bond does not acquire the quality
a c -*
everywhere of being/negotiable instrument^( i*e* an instrument in 
regard t© which the property and all rights under it pass to 
a bona fide holder for value by mere delivery, and in his hands 
is free from all defects of title or defences which would have been
available against a prior holder) ) merely by being a negotiable
instrument in the country where it is Issued and is payable.
*
Thus bearer bonds issued by the Prussian government, which were 
negotiable instruments in Prussia, but not s© by English mercantile 
usage, were held in the English Court of Appeal not to be negot­
iable instruments in England when the question was the title of 
am English Bamk, who had become bona fide holders for value, 
agaiast the owner, from whom they had been stole*. ^Picker v.
London& County Banking Co, 1887 18 Q.B.B. BIB J But witk 
 typical insularity the English Cotarts hare held that am i n s t r u m e n t
Issued and payable In England which Is a negotiable instrument 
by English law, though mot by French law,will pass to a bona 
fide holder for value, giving him a perfect title, by delivery to 
him in France. f De la Ohaumette v. Bank of England 1851 2 B.&Ad.
The general rule is that capacity in regard to mercantile contra 
-acts is governed by the lex loci contraotue, and in non-mercantile
transactions by the law of the domicile of each party. See 
’ C a p a c i t y T h e r e  is no authority that requires "that a differ­
ent principle should apply to assignments: the capacity of the 
cedent and assignee in a mercantile assignment ( e.g. a sale ) 
will therefor© presumably be governed by the lex -heel- -eentpaetue 
law of the place of assignment^ and in the case of other assignments 
( e.g.4 gift ) by the laws of the domicile of the cedent and 
assignee respectively. In Republic of Guatemala v. Nunez^ 1927 
1 K.B. 669J  which related to a non-meroantile assignment, 
on® of the questions was the capacity of the assignee to receive 
a gift. By the law of his domicile, Guatemala, which was also 
the place of the assignment, he had no such capacity, and in the 
 ^Court of Appeal Scrutton & Lawrence L. JJ. decided that the law 
of Guatemala had to apply, and that he had no such capacity, and 
that the gift was invalid. These learned judges did not decide 
whether the law of Guatemala was applicable as the law of the 
assignee’s domicil©, or the law of the place of the assignment, 
but on general principles it is submitted that it was applicable as 
the law of the domicile. Had the assignment been a mercantile one % 
it would have been applicable as the law of the place of assignment.
£  L#e T# Abdy 1886 17 Q.B.D. 509 the rule of South African
law which rendered^the assignment invalid was probably on© of 
capacity. - although the information as to South African law was so
.canty tkat It is difficult to syay what kind of rule was involved
(2) Capacity
i
- and if so, the decision in that case was similar to that in 
Republic of Guatemala v. Nunez, namely that an incapacity by 
the law which is the law of the domicile of the assignee and
also the law of the place where the assignment was made lnwalld-
l
ates a non^mercantile assignment.I
, (3) Formal and tBsential validity of -isaignments, f
Ineprporeal An assignment of incorporeal moveables is valid if
Moveables validly made (1) according t© th© law of the situs of
the incorporeal moveable:^ Republic of Guatemala v. flunez 1927 
1 K.B. 669, per Lawrence L.J., contra Scrutton feu-#©; Creditors of 
York Buildings £&• 1783 Mor* 4478; Dicey Rule 153; Contra 
Ahdy 1880 ^ 7--QrBrBT-150r) Taylor v* Hill 1847 9 D. 1504, and In re 
Anzlani 1930 1 Oh* 407J  or (s) according to the law with which the 
assignment has most connection, that is usually the law of the place 
where the assignment was made; £ Scottish Provident Institution 
v * Cohen 1888 16 R. 112; Falconer v. Heirs of Beatle 1627 Mor. 4501; 
Sinclair v. Murray 1656 Mor. 4501; Ersklne v. Ramsay 1664 Mor.4502; 
Scot v. Toish 1676 Mor. 4502; Great Northern Railway Oo v. Laing 
1848 10 D. 1408 J ©r, (3) in the case of a voluntary universal 
assignment, such as a voluntary trust deed for creditors, according 
to the law of th© domicile of the cedent; Dulaney v. Merry 1901 
I 1 Q.B. 536; Sill v. Worswlck 1 H.B1. 665 per Lord Loughborough at 
p. 690; Dicey pp. 621, 622J  and otherwise is invalids provided 
that if there is any question that intimation or registration or 
other formality is required to complete a real right to the incor­
poreal moveables, the questions whether such registration or intim­
ation is necessary to the acquisition of a real right, and whether 
sufficient registration or intimation has been made, are governed 
by th© law of the situs of the incorporeal moveables. £ Donaldson v. 
Flndlav Bannatvne & 0© 1855 17 D. 1053; Oonnal & Oo. v. Loder 1868 
6 M. 1095 - Lord Justioe Clerk Patton regarded the obligation there 
as a ius incorporale; Carrlck v. Dickie 1822 1 S, 447(new ed. 485); 
Stracham v. McDougle 1835 15 S. 954; Gray v. Selkirk 1708 1 Robert­
s o n ^  Appeals 1; Kelly v. Selwyn 1905 2 Ch. 117; In re Queensland 
Mercantile & Agency Co. 1892 1 Ch. 219; In re Maudslay Sens & Field 
1900 1 Ch. 602. Contra Wallace v. Davies 1853 15 D. 688, per Lord 
Ordinary Rutherfords the question was reserved in the Inner House.
The first proposition is that an assignment ©f incorporeal 
moveables is valid if validly made according to the law of the situs 
and seems obvioust a Scottish insurance policy or an interest in a
Scottish trust can be assigned in the Scottish form, no matter
where tfee assignation is mad©. It is submitted tfeat if Taylor v.
Hill £ 1847 9 D. 1504 J is an authority to the contrary, it was 
wrongly decided. Lord President Boyle in tfeat case considered that 
an assignment valid by the lex situs. Scotland, but invalid by tfe© 
la?f of the place of assignment, England, must be invalid, because if 
held valid and the debtor had to pay the assignee, the debtor might 
be sued again by the cedent in England. But the English Courts are 
bound by tfee principles of International Law and would, if the cedent 
sued there, have to recognise an assignment valid by tfe© lex situs; 
and further, since tfe© lex situs is, by definition, the place where 
tfee debt is recoverable,tfeat is the forensic domicile of tfee debtor, 
it is unlikely tfeat tfee cedent would ever have an opportunity of
a n y  b u t  t K c .  €>?  t U  «
suing tfee debtor in English Courts^. In Lee v. Abdy f 1886 17 
Q.B.D. S09^J an English case which also seems contrary to this 
proposition, it is not certain, because of the scanty statement of 
. foreign law, that the rule of tfee foreign law was a rule about the 
essential validity of an assignment * it vw.s possibly a rule about 
capacity, in which case the decision is unexc epf. 1 onabl e , and 
irrelevant to t h i s  issue.
The second proposition is that a Scottish insurance policy can 
also be assigned in a foreign country according to the law of that 
country. Thus 'where It was shown that by English law a deposit of a 
policy in security of a loan operated as an assinment, such a 
deposit made in England was held a valid assignment of a, Scottish 
policy, although the rae^ e doposat of the policy without a written 
assignat4 on would not have had that effect in Scotland. ^  Scottish 
Provident Institution v. Cohen, supra J
The third proposition is that a voluntary universal assignment,
. such as a voluntary trust deed for creditors, is valid if valid by 
law of the domicile of the cedent. An assignment of a particular 
moveable fund according to tfee law ©f tfee domicile of tfee owner would 
not, It is submitted, eo ipso be valid, although there .are dicta to 
tfeat effect, Liverpool Marine Credit Oo. v. Hunter 1868 L.R. 5 Oh# 
479, per Lord Ofeelmsford L.O. at p. 482 I A judicial bankruptcy
V
does pot need to be by tfee Courts of tfe© domicil© of tfee bankrupt in 
order to b© valid. £ See ♦Bankruptcy* J
The proviso is necessary becaus© a real right to moveables 1
can never b© .acquired except by satisfying th© lax situs as to the 
acquisition of a real right, and although an assignation may be
|
<©, valid assignation if in accordance with the law of the place where i 
it was made, as where the deposit of a Scottish insurance policy 
was a valid assignation because done in England where that was a valic 
assignation, such assignation does not confer a real right if. some­
thing more has to be done by the lex situs for the acquisition of a a 
real right, such as the intimation of the assignation, not even 
if no intimation is necessary by the law of the place where the assig 
nation wits made. Suppose the creditor of a debt situated in Scotland 
assigns it in country X to A;by an assignation valid according to
the law of country X. If, after the assignation, but before A
intimates it to the debtor, B arrests th© debt in Scotland, B has 
the first completed real right to the debt, and will be preferred to
it; nor will it avail A to say that/by the law of X, where the
.G'ti'Ofi r
assignment to him was made, there was no need of intimation. 9 Stracb 
an v. MoDougle 1855 15 S. 954; Donaldson v. Findlay Bannatyne a 
Co. 1885 17 D. 1055; In re Queensland Mercantile & Agenoy Oo.
1892 1 Ch. 219» In re Mandalay Sens & Field 1900 1 Ch. 602. Contra 
Lord Ordinary Rutherford in Wallace v. Davies 1855 15 D. 688 
When the incorporeal moveables are situated in one country and the 
assignation takes place in another, if something more than an ass­
ignation is required by the law of th© situs to transfer th© real 
right, the assignation is a valid personal contract between the 
cedent and th© assignee,by which l^ he cedent is bound, so that he 
cannot compete with th© title of th© assignee) and can be called upoi 
to do any acts which may be necessary to complete the assignee1a fcitj 
to the real right; {  Di.ey p .  6 8 5 . ]  if nothing more requires to be 
dene according to the lex situs to complete a real right, an 
assignment valid according to the law of the place of assignment, 
or, in the case Of a voluntary universal assignment, according 
to the law of the domicile of the cedent, would be.a completely 
effective assignment 
Merry 1901 1 Q.B. 558
is against the whole world. I Dulaney v,
j
Corporeal Corporeal moveables are subject to similar rules* An
Moveables assignment of corporeal moveables is valid if validly I
i
made according to the law of the situs of the corporeal moveables^ 
j Todd v* Armour 1882 9 R. 901; Valery v. Scott 1876 3 R. 965 per
-l
Lord President Inglis at p* 0yy; Dicey Rule 152 I whether made in 
the situs or elsewhere; or according to the law with which the ass­
ignment has most connection, that is usually the law of the place 
where the assignment is made* j[ Alcock v* Smith 1892 1 Ch* 238 j  
provided that if there is any question that delivery or notice to 
the custodier is required to complete a real right to the corporeal' 
moveables, the questions whether such delivery or notice is necessary 
to the acquisition of a real right, and whether sufficient delivery 
or notice has been made, are governed by the law of the situs of 
the corporeal moveable*  ^Qonnal & Oo. v* Loder I860 6 M. 1095;
Inglis v* Robertson & Baxter 1897 24 R. 758, Affd* 1898 25 R.
(H*L#) 70 J  Th© question whether registration of the bill of sale 
of a ship is required t© complete the transfer of the real right 
t© th© ship, is governed by the law of the flag of the ship. Schult 
v. Robinson 1861 24 D. 120
In tfee transfer of corporeal moveables,tfee country where tfee 
moveable Is situated is very often tfee same as tfee country wfeere 
tfee transfer took place, and obviously a transfer valid according 
to tfeat law is valid, Tfeus when. a feorse was stolen in Ireland 
and sold in market overt tfeere, by wfeicfe;according to tfe© law 
of Ireland, a valid title was given to tfee purchaser, it was held 
tfeat tfe© purchaser had a valid title and tfeat tfee owner could 
not succeed in an action for delivery of tfee feorse which fee had br­
ought in tfee Scottish Courts; j^T©dd v. Armour, supra«$ut see 
Freeman v. East India Oo* 1822 5 B& Ad.Ald. 617 J ^gaim, 
when a cheque was stolen,and tfee tfeefe# forged tfe© holder’s signat­
ure in an indorsement tot a party in Austria.and handed tfe© 
cheque to that party^in Austria, and by Austrian law tfee indorsee 
had a good title to tfee cheque,tfeat title was upheld in tfee 
English Courts, although tfe© law of England, wfeere tfee cheque 
was payable, was to the effect tfeat no right to a cheque could 
be obtained through a forged signature. £ Emblrlooe v. Anglo- 
Austrian Bank 1905 1 K.B. 677 I In these cases it is difficult
to say whether tfe© lex situs or tfe© lex loci actus governed.
(CplkSL Direotors of the Oetv Bank v. Barrow 1880 5 A.Cy.^664;
Cammell v. Sewell' 1858 3 H.&N. 617, •% 1860 5 H&N 728; in Aloock 
r. Smith, supra, too, although tfee judges said tfeat tfee lex loci 
actus should govern, tfee lex loci actus and tfee lex situs were tfee 
samej) It seems obvious however, tfeat a transfer valid by tfee 
lex situs is valid7amd it seems from Inglls v. Robertson & Bax­
ter }£ supra J and from analogous cases which deal with incorporeal 
moveables, £ q,Y.J that when tfe© goods are situated in one 
country and the transfer takes place In another, a transfer 
valid by the law of tfe© place of transfer is^ if nothing mor© 
is required.^ by tfe© lex situs to complete a real rights a valid 
tra*i#f©3v  and if something more ~is required, will alw&ys be 
valid as between tfe© parties to it and a good contract to transfer
The proviso is illustrated by cases where goods situated in 
Scotland,have been assigned in England by endorsement of tk© del­
ivery warrant granted by tke Seottisk storekeeper, and* the goods 
kave been arrested in Scotland before tk© assignee kas intimated 
kis rigkt to tk© storekeeper as required by Scots law for tke 
transfer of tke real rights the arrester obtains tke first 
real right t£© tke goods, and in a competition between kim and 
tk© English assignee is preferred to th© English assignee, even 
•although intimation is not required by tk© law of England* £ In- 
glls v* Robertson & Baxter, supra J
Th© situs referred to in all tke above principles is tk© 
situs at tke time of tke assignment in question. Intimation to 
tk® debtor, a Scotsman then residing in England, according t© 
English law, was a valid transference of tke real right in tk© 
debt to the assignee, so that a creditor of tke cedent could not 
arrest the debt in tke hands of tke debtor when k® came to Scot­
land. £  Gray v. Selkirk 1708 1 Robertson’s Appeals-l^J
Bills of - Bills of Exchange are subject to tk© same rules as other
Exchange corporeal moveables, in so far as not covered by sec. 72 
of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, so that a transfer is valid 
if valid by the law of the place where th© transfer was made.
£ Emblrlcoe v. Anglo- Austrian Bank 1905 1 K.B. 677; Koechlln 
v. Kestenbaum 1927 ft K.B** 889; Aloeok v. Smith 1892 1 Ch., 238 J 
Th© situs ©f a bill is tke place where tke piece of paper which 
forms tke bill is situated,and not tke place of payment of the 
bill. Since tke place of transfer and tk© situs at the tim© ©f 
transfer are the same in these cases, it can be said, as tke 
cases do say, that tke transfer of a bill is*governed* by tke 
law ©f tk® place where tk® transfer takes place. There is an 
exception in the case of inland bills where th® question is the 
liability ®f th© payer* an inland bill, transferred in a foreign 
country in a manner invalid there, but which is valid her®, is 
sufficiently transferred t© make the acceptor liable to tk©
indorser. £ pe la Qkaumette v. Bank of England 1831 2 B & Ad. 385; 
Lebel v. Tucker 1887 L.R. 3 Q.B. 77 J
A foreign bill, however, even one payable in this country, is 
subject t© the normal rule* so that a bill drawn in France and 
accepted in England,whieh is indorsed in France in a manner which
»lot
is invalid there, but would have been valid here, is^validly 
transferred, ^ Bradlaugh v. De Rin 1888 L.R* 3 O.P. 538 
Negotiable a negotiable instrument is ene in regard to which the
property
iiistruiienJiSE^yyamd all rights under it pass to a bona fide holder for
value by mere delivery, and in the hands ©f a bona fide holder for 
value is free from all defects of title and defences which could 
have been urged against prior holders. The rules applicable t© 
the transfer of corporeal moveables apply. The situs of such 
an instrument is the place where th© actual paper instrument is 
situated, and the situe and the place of transfer are the same, 
so it ©an be said t$at the validity ©f a transfer is governed by 
th© law of th© place of transfer. £ Alcook v. Smith 1892 1 Ch.
238 ( bill payable to bearer ) J
An instrument is a negotiable instrument if it is so regarded 
by th© law ©f the situs and place of transfer, and the character 
of an instrument as negotiable or not is not taken from the law 
of th© country where the instrument was issued and is payable.
£ Picker v. London & County BankingsCo. 1887 18 Q.B.D. 515; j
Goodwin v. Robarts 1876 L.R. 1 A.C. 476 per Lord Selborme at 
p. 1496. Contra De la Chaumette v. The Bank of England 1831 
2 B. & Ad. 385 - see Assignability of the Moveable} supra J
(4) The meaning and legal effect of the transfer.
Ta) Against the original debtor,
/
The rights of the debtor, for example a right of retention or 
steppage in transitu, and the liabilities ©f the debtor; are 
always determined by the law governing the contract between him an 
the original creditor. ^ McNaughtom v. Baird 1852 24 J. 623;
Inglls v. Uaherwood 1801 1 East. 515; ploey Rule 153J
Retention A claim to a right of retention or lien over moveables
ana H e m  may be--made ex contractu, when the proper law of the
contract governs, or ex lege, when the law of the situs governs.
In McNaughton v. Baird £  1852 24 J. 623 j| an English Merchant 
purchased in England from the agent of a Scotch merchant 500
V
/ tons of pig iron "in the Clyde, for immediate delivery ©m payment**j
( according to the sale-not© ). The English merchant paid the
price, resold the iron, and thereafter mad© other purchases from
/ ' . ■: 
the Scotch merchant. When the new purchaser claimed delivery of
the iron from the Scotch merchant, the latter pleaded that he 
was entitled to fcetaim the same until secured of the balance 
due by th© English merchant on his subsequent purchases. It was 
held that, the plea of retention was t© be decided by tfee law of 
j Scotland as th© law that governed^ the contractual relation
between the Scotch and English merchant ©n this point. The new 
purchaser was only an assignee of th© English merchant’s rights 
in the contract^and only cam© into the English merchant’s place, 
taking such rights as the English merchant had, and the right ©f 
retention arose out of the first contract @f sale. £  See also 
Inglls v, Usherwood 1801 1 East. 515 J
On the other hand, when a person lodged goods which belonged 
to a third party in the warehouse of a foreign factor, and tfee 
factor advanced money to the person who lodged tfee goods, ‘suppos­
ing them to be his property, the question whether tfee factor 
/
had a right ©f retention until fee was paid his advance was held t© 
be governed by th© law of the situs of the goods: the claim tfeat 
theewnermade for the goods was not made on any contract, but 
©m his right of ownersfetjju £ Mitchell v. Burnet 1746 Mor. 4468j
(b) Between the cedent and the assignee or a person relying 
on the assigneefs title.
Any question between the cedent and the assignee a s t ©  the effect
m«nt
of an alleged assigns^ entered into between them is obviously t© 
be governed by the law with which the assignment has most conn­
ection , which will usually be the $law of the^place where the 
assignment was made, as being the proper, law of the contract
|[  V g w ift j 's  | ( |2 ?  S . c .
between the cedent and assignee*^Thus the question whether an ass­
ignee in security who delivered the pledge back to the cedent 
so that the cedent might act as the assignee^ agent for salef 
thereby lost possession of the pledge^ae determined by the law 
with which the assignment had most connection. Q Worth-Western 
.Bank v. P®ynter Son & Macdonalds 1894 22 R 0 (H.L.) 1 J  And 
where there had been n© assignment from the alleged cedent to 
the alleged assignee, but a third party had relied on the belief 
that there had been an assignment, and averred that the alleged ee&i 
cedent was estopped by his actings from denying an assignment, 
the question whether he was estopped or not was determined by 
the law with which these actings had most connection, even although 
the lex situs ©f the right in question was said to be to a 
different effect. £ Colonial Bank v. Cady L.R* 1890 15 A.O.
267; Goodwin v. Roberts 1876 L.R. 1 A.C. 476.^ f
(c) The rights acquired by the assignee.
Any question as to the extent ©f the rights acquired by the j 
assignee is governed by the law with which the assignment has 
moot connection, which will usually be the law of the place where 1
s ■ '
the assignment was made. This question most often arises when the 
cOdent has made two or more assignments of the same subject. The 
seoend assignee can only claim such right as he acquired by the 
law of the country under which the assignation to him was made, 
and he can not subsequently enlarge the right he received under 
that law by intimation er registration according to the law of 
the situs, or by appeal t© the law ®f the situs. If the law of
the place .here the a salgwnent
10 "98 Bade has
objection to bis completing a real right to the debt by intim - 
ating to tb© debtor according to the lex situs, then the second 
assignee may acquire tfee first real right to the debt by intim­
ating bis right before the first assignee does s©; but where a 
Scottish policy of insurance was deposited by the insured in 
Ireland with A in security of a debt,' and subsequently ass­
igned, also in Ireland, to B, who had notice of the pri©r 
deposit, in security ©f another debt, and B intimated his 
assignation to the insurance company first, B, although claiming 
the first completed real right according t© the law of the situs, 
was net preferred to the proceeds of the policy, since the law 
of Ireland was that B, as an assignee with notice of a prior 
deposit, was deferred to the prior depositary, and could not 
succeed in a competition with the depositary. |f Scottish Provident 
Institution v. Robinson & Newett (0,H«) 1892 29 S.L.R. 733. Op.
Le Feuvre v. sulllvam 10 Moo. P.O. 1 1  The justice of this j
finding is that B only acquired a deferred night by the law of th 
country under which the assignment was made to him; he could 
not claim more than had been assigned to him, or enlarge his rightj
i■ i
by his own acts. Conversely A had received a right preferable to 
a subsequent assignation with notice of the deposit, and was 
only receiving what was assigned to him. £ It was pointed out ^ 
by th® Court that if the insurance company had paid in good faith 
to B, it could not have been made to pay again to A, but that 
was a different position to the one which had arisen, namely 
that the insurance company obtained notice of both claims before 
paying, and the competition was between the two assignees.Jj 
The same principle would apply if B had received an assignation 
by the law ©f the situs^and the law of the situs was that a 
second assignee with notice of a prior on© could not compete 
with the prior ©ne. A similar rati© appears in certain bankruptcy 
cases. Thus in Forbes v. Official Receiver in B a n k r u p t c y (O.H.) 
1924 S.L.T. 522 J a benefiolary, domiciled in England, with a 
vested right to a share of funds held by a Scottish marriage 
contract trustee, assigned his share by a mortgage in the English' 
form, and was then made bankrupt in England. Thereafter the assig-
his assignation to the trustee. In a competition 
between the assignee and the trustee
on the bankrupt ©state for* the share it appeared that by the law 
of England the right of a trustee in bankruptcy is postponed to 
that of a creditor holding a charge over the estate of the bank­
rupt given prior to bankruptcy but not intimated, and th© law 
of England was applied and the assignee preferred? the trustee 
could not have a right higher than that allowed to him by the 
only law by which he came to have a right at all.
This principle applies equally to assignments of corporeal 
moveables. ^ Connal & Co. v. Loder £ 1868 6 M. 1095 J
However when it is only the law of th© first assignation 
ihat says that subsequent assignations taken in the knowledge 
of it are deferred to it, and not the law of the second assignat­
ion, th© result which has just been noticed does not occur# Thus 
in Inglis v. Robertson & Baxter £ 1897 24 R# 758, Affd. 1898 25 
R# (H#L.) 70 a domiciled Englishman resident in London who 
owndd whisky in a warehouse in London Scotland, endorsed over to 
another Englishman th© warehouse-keeper^ delivery warrant# A
; i
Scotch creditor of the original ownerarrested the whisky in 
Scotland after the assignation but before the assignee had in­
timated to the warehouse-keepers# The assignee argued that by the 
law of England th© endorsement and delivery of the warrant to him 
' gave him a right to the whisky which was preferable to that of 
any creditor doing diligence subsequently, but in spite of the 
similarity of this argument to those that prevailed in the cases 
just considered, it did not avail# The law of Scotland, which was 
the law by which the arrester was claiming his right, Vas not 
to th© same effect as th© law of England. The arrester obtained 
a full and complete assignation of the real rigjht by the law by 
which the assignation to him was made, namely the lex situs# th© 
law ©f Scotland.
Of course a second^assignation might be an assignation not 
from th© cedent, but from th© firsts assignee, as for example 
where there is a public sale which gives th© purchaser a good 
title against the whole world, and thus inter alios against the 
first assignee# In that eveht, even although the first assignee 
have a completed real right according to th© lex situs, if such
r -
second assignation was according to tfee law of the situs at tfee 
time ©f tfe© second assignation, and gav© tfe© second assign©© a real 
rigfet thereby, fe© will feav© tfe© real right. £ Oammell v. Sewell Ji858 
3 i  017, 1800 5 H & N 728* but see Freeman v. Bast India Go.
1822 5 8, & Aid* 017 J And in this connection it must be remembered 
tfeat tke situs may change.
In Forbes v. Official Receiver in Bankruptcy I supra J Cp.
L.X <’*
also^Republic of Guatemala v. Nunez 1927 1 K . B .  669; and Ofeesfeire 
p. 419 J the following dictum of Lord Watson in North Western Bank 
v. Poynter Son & Macdonalds jT 1894 22 R. (m.jj.) 1 at p. 12 lj was 
adopted; wWfeen a moveable fund, situated in Scotland, admittedly 
belongs to .one or other of two domiciled Englishmen, the question 
to which of them it belongs is prima facie one of English law.M It 
is submitted tfeat tfeis dictum is teo unqualified and might prove a 
dangerous test; suppose tfe© creditor of a debt situated in Scotland 
assigns it t© a domiciled Englishman A, and before A intimates his 
rigfet to tfee debtor according to Scots law, another domiciled 
Englishman arrests tfe© debt in Scotland; this would give rise t© 
a competition between tw® domiciled Englishmen for a moveable fund 
situated in Scotland, but tfee matter would be decided by Soots law 
tfee lea: situs, the question being who had first acquired a real 
rigfet. £  In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co.1892 1 Oh. 219;
In re Mauds lay Sons & Field 1900 1 Oh. 002; St raofean v. ft Dougl e , 
Donaldson v. Findlay Bannatvne & 0®. supra; Inglis v. Robertson 
A Baxter, auptkj
\
I g* 1
second assignation was according1!© th© law of th© situ© at th© 
time of th© second assignation, and gave tfe© second assign©© a 
real right thereby, he will have the real rigfet. ( Oammell v. 
Sewell 1858 5 H.&N.J517, 186© 5 H&N 728; but see Freeman v.
East India Company 1822 5 B.ifcAld. 617 ) And in this connection 
it must b© remembered that the situs may change. (
Requisition Assignments of both corporeal and incorporeal
and confiscat- moveables may occur as a result ©f requisition or
r
i@n by a for- confiscation by a state, and th© following rules
elgn state are applicable to such circumstances•
The Courts ©f this country will not enquire into th© validity 
of th© achs ©f a foreign government, which is reeognised by th® 
government of this country as a de facto government, with regard 
to acts don© within its own territory in respect of property belong­
ing to its own subjects. £ Luther v. Sagor 1921 3 K.B. 5Sft; Princess 
Paley Olga v. Welsz 1929 1 K.B. 718; Kolbin & Sons v. Kinnear 1930 
S.C. 724 per Lord Justice Clerk Alness at p. 738 Jj Thus in Luther 
v. Sager £ supraJ when th© Soviet Republic confiscated timber belong 
Ing to a Russian company and sold it to a purchaser who imported the 
timber into this country, the former owner could not claim delivery 
of the timber from the purchaser by action in ©ur Courts. £ Luther 
-y-, Sngor, supra j  In this respect it does not matter tfeat the foreip 
government has only been recognised as the de fact© government, 
and not as th© d© lure government• £ Luther v. Sagor, supra J The 
Court accepts tfee Foreign Secretary*s statement as to the recog­
nition that is accorded to a foreign government. I Luther v. Sagor 
supra ) Princess Paley Olga v. welsz, supra, J Recognition of a 
foreign government as th© de facto or de lUre government of a 
country is retroactive to tfe© tim© when such government commenced 
its existence; £.Luther v. sagor, supra; Uhderhlli v. Hernandez 
168 U.S. 253; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 246 U.S. 297; Princess 
Paley Olxa v. Welsz,, supra; Lazard Brothers, v . Midland 1$33
Lro. /»p- $ 7 ~  I 'l V 7 '
A.C. 289,- per Lord Wright; Kolbin & Sons v. Kinnear, supra^J and
accordingly t h e  d e c r e e  confiscating timber, which was «ade after
th© Russian government had established itself as an effective 
government, but before it was recognised by ©ur government as a de 
facto government. £ Luther v, Sagor, supra J Iti may be necessary 
in some cases t© consider at what stage in its development the govern; 
ment so recognised "commenced its existence^ that is apparently, 
when it in fact became an effective governmental force, £ Luther 
v, Sagor, supra, per Bankes L.J. at p. 542 J A decree by a revol­
utionary government which had no effective control, but which
afterwards acquired it, and still later was recognised as the de
]
facto government, would, of course, have no validity. If the 
Foreign Secretary alsh certifies tfee date at which the d© facto 
government cam© into existence,? that will be accepted by the Ceurt
p  C ^ X r < - P f - C S -  p. i f O
too* Luther v, Sagor, supra^J In Luther v* Sagor the decrees 
of th© soviet government effected the confiscation ©f timber 
without compensation being paid to the former owners, and _a fortiori 
the requisition ©f goods with payment of compensation would be 
valid. But confiscation by tfee Soviet government of goods situated 
in Russia which belonged to a British subject or company, instead
of a Russian company, would not have been valid* | Wolff v. Oxholm
F t A  A  • n m c tL M  L  — — -----
1817 6 M.&S* 92y)Q
Whether a decree © f a d ©  facto foreign government can annex 
property outside the territorial limits of the foreign country,
depends firstly on the purport of the decree and its effect accord- 
tfee "
ing to/foreign law? if tfee decree does not hav© extraterritorial
effect^whem c©nstru©d by the law of the foreign qountry concerned,
naturally ©ur Courts will not give it such effect. ^ "The juplter"
(Ho. S)-1927 P. 122, Affd. 1927 P. 250: Lecouturier v. Hey 1910
A.C, 262 j  If th© foreign decree dees, according to the law ©f the
foreign country, annex goods outside its territory, ©ur Courts
will net recognise such extra-territorial effect if th© decree is a
eonfiseatory ©me that takes the property without compensation,
©r is ©f th® nature of a tax, even if the owner ©f tfee goods is
a subject ©f th© country concerned, on tfee principle that no country
is bound to recognise tfee penal or revenue laws of a n o t h e r ;
[ Lecouturier v. Rey 191/) A.C, 262; Sedgwick Collins & Co. v.
Roesia Insurance Co. 1926 1 K.B. 1, per Sargamt L.J. at p. 15;
B a n co  de V iz c a y a  v .  Don A l f o n s o  de B orb on  Y A u s t r i a  1 9 3 5  
1 K .B . 1 4 0 ;  The M a n u fa c tu r in g  C o . e t c .  v .  F r e d e r i c k  H u th  & G o .
B . Y . I . L .  1 9 3 0  2 3 5 ;  ffTh e  J u p i t e r 0 (No 3 ) 1 9 2 7  P . 1 2 2 ,  p e r  
H i l l  J .  a t  p .  1 4 4 ;  I n  r e  R u s s ia n  Bank f o r  F o r e ig n  T ra d e  1 9 3 3  
C h. 7 4 5 ,  p e r  Maugham J . ;  F f o l l i o t t  v .  O gden 1 7 8 9  1 H .B 1  1 2 4  
a t  p .  1 3 5 ;  L yn ch  v .  P r o v i s i o n a l  G overnm ent o f  P a r a g u a y  1 8 7 1  
L .B . 2 P . & D» 268__ / b u t w i l l  r e c o g n i s e  s u c h  e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l  
e f f e c t  a s  v a l i d  t o  a n n e x  g o o d s  b e lo n g in g  t o  i t s  own s u b j e c t s ,  
e v e n  g o o d s  b e lo n g in g  t o  i t s  own s u b j e c t s  w h ic h  a r e  s i t u a t e d  
w i t h i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  w hen t h e  d e c r e e  i s  o f  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  a 
r e q u i s i t i o n  o r  " n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ” w i t h  p aym ent o f  c o m p e n s a t io n .  
/ ~ L o r e n tz e n  v .  L ydden  1 9 4 2  2 K .B . 202_J7
The p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e  C o u r ts  o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y  w i l l  n o t  
e n q u ir e  i n t o  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  a c t s  o f  a f o r e i g n  g o v e r n m e n t  
e x c l u d e s  fro m  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  o u r  C o u r ts  a n y  e n q u ir y  
w h e th e r  t h e  f o r e i g n  A c t  o f  S t a t e  w as u l t r a  v i r e s  o r  
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l :  / ~ ~Contra F .A . Mann 1 9 4 3  LIX L .Q .B . a t
p .  4 3 ;  W o lf f  p .  1 7 b j  i f  t h e  f o r e i g n  d e c r e e  o r  a c t  c a n  b e  
a t t a c k e d  on t h o s e  l i n e s  i t  s h o u ld  b e  so  a t t a c k e d  i n  i t s  own 
C o u r t s .  The f i r s t  d e c i s i o n  i n  Be Amand /~ 1 9 4 1  2 K .B . 2 3 9 J  
seem s t o  ru n  c o u n t e r  t o  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e .  V is c o u n t  C a ld e c o t e
C .J .  s a i d  t h e r e :  f,An A ct o f  P a r l ia m e n t  o f  t h e  U n it e d  K ingdom
not
p r o v e s  i t s e l f  and c a n n o t  b e  c h a l l e n g e d .  T h is  i s Aso  w i t h  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t  o f  a f o r e i g n  P o w er . E v id e n c e  i s  r e q u ir e d  t o  
p r o v e  w h at i s  a q u e s t i o n  o f  f a c t ,  n a m e ly  t h e  f o r e i g n  l a w .*1 
/ ~ a t  p .  2 5 3 _ 7  He t h e n  p r o c e e d e d  t o  r e v i e w  t h e  e v i d e n c e  
u p h o ld in g  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  d e c r e e  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  la w  o f  
t h e  N e th e r la n d s ^ a n d  d e c id e d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  
d e c r e e .  B ut h e r e  t h e  C o u r t may n o t  h a v e  f u l l y  a p p r e c i a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  a rg u m en t p r e s e n t e d  w as w h e th e r  t h e  f o r e i g n  d e c r e e  w as  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  la w  o f  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s .  T h ey  
may h a v e  b e e n  d e a l i n g  o n ly  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how a f o r e i g n  
d e c r e e  i s  p r o v e d  and h a v e  b e e n  s im p ly  d i s p o s i n g  o f  t h e  
a rg u m en t t h a t  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t e  o f  t h e  N e t h e r la n d s  g o v e r n m e n t  
a s /
a s  t o  t h i s  d e c r e e  e x c lu d e d  and s u p e r s e d e d  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
f o r  f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e .  /" F . iU  M ann, LIX L .Q .R . a t  p .  159_J7 
In  Re Amand (N o . 2)} //~~1942 1 K .B . 4 4 5_J7 h o w e v e r  a n o t h e r  
D i v i s i o n a l  C o u rt u n d o u b t e d ly  d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  a rg u m en t t h a t  
o u r  C o u r ts  c o u ld  e x a m in e  w h e th e r  t h e  D u tc h  d e c r e e  w as u l t r a  
v i r e s . The C o u rt a c c e p t e d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e  c o n ­
s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  d e c r e e  c o u ld  n o t  be so  e x a m in e d ,  
b u t  r e f u s e d  t o  a p p ly  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h e  v e r y  u n u s u a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s :  d u r in g  t h e  w a r , w h i l e  G erm any w as i n
o c c u p a t io n  o f  The N e t h e r la n d s  and t h e  D u tc h  g o v e r n m e n t  
w as o p e r a t in g  fro m  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  Q ueen o f  t h e  N e t h e r la n d s  
h ad  made a d e c r e e  w h ic h  s u b j e c t e d  Amand, a D utchm an r e s i d e n t  
i n  E n g la n d , t o  c o m p u ls o r y  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  D u tc h  F o r c e s .  
I t  w as h e l d ,  a s  t h e  r u b r ic  p u t s  i t ,  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  i t  w as  
w e l l  s e t t l e d  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t s  o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y  c a n n o t  q u e s t i o n  
t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  a c t s  o f  an  in d e p e n d e n t  s o v e r e i g n  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  p r o p e r t y  and  p e r s o n s  w i t h i n  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  
y e t  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  t h a t  p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s  
t o  t h e  a c t s  o f  an  in d e p e n d e n t  s o v e r e i g n ,  t e m p o r a r i ly  r e s i d e n t  
i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  . . . .  i t  w as o p en  t o  t h e  C o u r ts  o f  t h i s  
c o u n t r y  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  d e c r e e ,  a c c o r d in g  
t o  t h e  la w  o f  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s ,  m ore e s p e c i a l l y  a s  t h e  
N e t h e r la n d s  c o u r t s ,  w h ic h  w ere  t h e  o n ly  C o u r ts  w h ic h  c o u ld  
i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  d e c r e e ,  w e r e  n o t  t h e n  
f u n c t  i o n i n g .
„ - W h e th e r -a n  a s s i g n e e  c a n  b r in g  an a c t i o n  i n  h i s  own 
name o r  o n l y  i n  t h e  name o f  t h e  c e d e n t  i s  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  
l e x  f o r i . f ~ W o lff  v .  O xholm  1 8 1 7  6 M. & S . 9 2  p e r  L ord  
E l le n b o r o u g h  a t  p .  9 9 ;  J e f f r e y  v .  M cT aggart 1 8 1 7  6 M. h  S .
1 2 6 ;  C h e s h ir e  p .  6 4 7 ;  D ic e y  p .  8 4 9 ;  W e s t la k e  s e c .  3 4 2 .
M ost o f  t h e  o ld  E n g l i s h  c a s e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a r e  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
e f f e c t ,  n a m ely  t h a t  s u c h  a r u l e  i s  a q u e s t i o n  o f  s u b s t a n c e  
and t h e  p r o p e r  la w  o f  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  r u l e s :  I n n e s  v .  D u n lo p  
1 8 0 0  8 T .R . 5 9 5 ;  O1C a lla g h a n  v .  Thomond 3 T a u n t 8 2 ;  T r im b e y
v .  V i g n l e r  1 8 3 4  1 B in g .  ( N .C .)  1 5 1 ;  A l iv o n  v .  F u r n iv a l  1 8 3 4  
1 8 3 4  1 C.M .&R. 2 7 7 ;  S u w erhop  v .  S ch in a n u e l 1 8 2 4  2 L . J .  (O .S . ) 1 5 0 y
R eal ac t io n s  
r e l a t i ng to  
moveabTes
K docree by the forum s i tu s  in  a r e a l a c t io n  r e la t in g  to  m oveables 
w i l l ,  if i t  lias been obtained without fraud and accords with Scottish 
n o tion s of su b s ta n t ia l justice, be accepted as conclusive in  th e  
S c o t t is h  C ourts. The forum s i tu s  has both  e x c lu s iv e  and co n c lu s iv e  
ju r is d ic t io n  in  r e a l a c tio n s  r e la t in g  to  m oveables. ^~C astrique v .  
Im rie 1870 L.R. 4 E. & I .  App. 414; Cammell v .  S ew ell 1858 3 E. h N. 
617, 5 H. N, 728; Aloook v .  Smith 1892 1 Ch. 238; Jones v .  Samuel 
1862 24 D. 319; Banna tyne v .  Newendorff 1841 3 D .  429; 4)unoan -&"~8yk»s 
pp. 142 -  148. Contra Bar p . 911JT Of course personal a o tio n s  
r e la t in g  to  moveables are competent in  any forum to  which th e  defender  
i s  s u b je c t . -----
-— — By a r e a l a c t io n  r e la t in g  to  moveables i s  meant one in  which th e  
ownership or a r ig h t  in  se c u r ity  over th e  moveables i s  determined or 
adjudged so as to  be b ind ing not o n ly  on the p a r t ie s  to  th e  a c t io n  or 
d ilig e n c e  but on the whole world* A-multi-pbe-—“—'P©d^iniy'irs,''‘such''an
*actiom
Only th e Courts o f  th e  s itu s  can make an order fo r  removing or 
a lte r in g  th e  name of the person in  whose name th e t i t l e  to  moveable 
property s ta n d s . But on ly  th e  Courts o f  th e  d om icile  o f a t r u s t  can 
remove or appoin t a t r u s t e e .  Therefore when th e  s o le  tr u s te e  on an 
E n glish  t r u s t ,  which had moveable property in  both England and 
S cotlan d , beoame inoapax, new tr u s te e s  were appointed by th e  Chancery 
D iv is io n  in  England and a v e s t in g  order made as regards the property  
s itu a te d  in  England, but th e new tr u s te e s  had to  ask fo r  l ib e r t y  from 
th e E n glish  Court to  apply to  the Court o f  S e ss io n , and th en  to  app ly  
to  th e  -Court o f  S e ss io n  to  have th e ir  names su b s t itu te d  for  th e  
tr u s te e  who had been removed in  the case of th e  S c o tt ish  p rop erty , 
s in c e  the E n glish  Court did not have any ju r is d ic t io n  to  make a 
v e s t in g  order in  re sp ec t o f  th e property  in  Scotland: th e  appropriate
order was made by th e  Court o f  S ess io n  in  the e x e r c ise  o f  i t s  n o b ile  
o fflc iu m ./* “*Evans-Freke1 s T rustees 1945 S .E . 4 2 ^
IMMOVEABLES
The g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  i s  t h a t  a l l  q u e s t i o n s  w i t h  
r e g a r d  to  im m o v ea b le  p r o p e r t y  a r e  g o v e r n e d  by t h e  law  
o f  t h e  s i t u s  o f  t h e  im m o v ea b le  p r o p e r t y .  </"~Story 
s e c s  4 2 4 , 4 2 8 ;  B a r  p .  4 8 3 ;  D ic e y  R u le  150 ;
C h e s h ir e  p .  5 3 6 ;
The r u l e s  a b o u t  c a p a c i t y  to  d e a l  w i t h  im m o v e a b le s ,
and  w i l l s  and  c o n t r a c t s  a b o u t  imrnoveab 1 e s /-a n d  t h e  1 i k e/
a r e  d e a l t  w i t h  u n d e r  t h e  v a r i o u s  h e a d in g s  o f  ’ C a p a c i t y 1 , 
’W i l l s * ,  an d  ’ C o n t r a c t ^  and  i n  t h e  m ain  i l l u s t r a t e  th e  
g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e .  Some f u r t h e r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  
g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  a r e  :*•
The l e x  s i t u s  d e t e r m in e s  who a r e  e n t i t l e d  to  own la n d ,  
so  t h a t  i f  t h e  l e x  s i t u s  f o r b i d s  a l i e n s  t o  own la n d ,  
a s  t h e  la w  o f  S c o t la n d  f o r m e r ly  d i d ,  o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  
th e y  may n o t  own la n d ,  no m a t t e r  w h a t t h e  la w  o f  t h e i r  
n a t i o n a l i t y  o r  d o m i c i l e  may s a y .  ^  S t o r y  s e c .  4 3 0 _J  
O n ly  s u c h  d i s p o s i t i o n s  o f  la n d  may be m ade; and  
s u c h  i n t e r e s t s  i n  la n d  c r e a t e d ,  a s  a r e  p e r m it t e d  b y  t h e  
l e x  s i t u s . T hus i f  th e  l e x  s i t u s  d o e s  n o t  p e r m it  t h e  
t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  la n d  b y  a  m o r t i s  c a u s a  d e e d ,  / ~ 3 e e  ’*W i l l s .  
F o rm a l V a l i d i t y  ( I m m o v e a b le s )  " . 7  o r  d o e s  n o t  p e r m it  
c h a r i t i e s  to  ta k e  la n d  u n d er  a  m o r t i s  c a u s a  d e e d ,
Duncan v .  Lawson 1 8 8 9  41  C h. I ) .  3 9 4  (Hewit’s Trs> v .  
L aw son  1 8 9 1  18  R. 793)_7 or d°es not permit or allow 
effect to trusts. / “B r o w n - s Trs . v .  Gregson 1920  S .C .
( H .L . ) 8 7 J  t h e n  e v e n  a l t h o u g h  t h e  la w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  
o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  and t h e  la w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  o f  m a k in g  t h e  
w i l l  do so  p e r m i t ,  t h e  w i l l  i s  i n v a l i d  and i n e f f e c t u a l  
quoad  a n y  s u c h  d i s p o s i t i o n s .  S i m i l a r l y  i f  t h e  l e x  
s i t u s  s t r i k e s  a t  a c c u m u l a t i o n s , p e r p e t u i t i e s , o r  e n t a i l s ,  
th e n  t h e s e  c a n  n o t  b e  m ade, e v e n  i f  c o m p e te n t  by t h e  
l e x  d o m i c i l i i  and l e x  l o c i  a c t u s . £  L e l s o n v . B r i d p o r t
a /
6 B e a v .  5 4 7 ; F r e k e  v .  C a r b e r y  1 8 7 5  L .R . 16  E q u . 4 6 1 ;
I n  re l i r a s s i  1 9 0 5  1 C h. 5 8 4 — — ...----- ,
"The i n c i d e n t s  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  w h ic h  c a n  be c r e a t e d  
i n  E n g l i s h  la n d  m u st b e d e te r m in e d  by t h e  law  o f  th e  
c o u n tr y  w h ere  th e  la n d  i s  s i t u a t e d  and n o t  by  t h e  law  
o f  th e  c o u n t r y  w h e re  th e  t e s t a t o r  i s  d o m ic i l e d  o r  w h ere  
th e  w i l l  i s  m ade” ^  I n  r e  M i l l e r , B a i l i e  v .  M i l l e r  1 9 1 4  
1 C h. 5 1 1 , p e r  W a r r in g to n  J .  a t  p .  5 1 9 _ 7
When an  E n g l i s h  w i l l  b e q u e a t h e d t i n t e r  a l i a  , l o n g  
l e a s e h o l d s  i n  t h e  T r a n s v a a l  to  th e  t e s t a t o r ’ s w i f e  f o r  
h e r  w id o w h o o d , w i t h  r e m a in d e r s  o v e r ,  th e  q u e s t i o n  
w h e th e r  t h e y  o u g h t  to  b e  c o n v e r t e d  a s  E n g l i s h  law  
w o u ld  h a v e  r e q u ir e d ,  o r  w h e th e r  th e  w idow  w as e n t i t l e d  
to  t h e  u s u f r u c t  w i t h o u t  f i n d i n g  s e c u r i t y ,  a s  t h e  Roman 
B u tc h  law  s a i d ,  w as d e te r m in e d  b y  t h e  l a t t e r ,  a s  t h e  
l e x  s i t u s  . I_n r e  M o ses  1 9 0 8  2  C h. 2 3 5 _ J
I\PJkk. i orLaii s i t u s  h a s  e x c l u s i v e  an a  c o n c l u s i v e
r e l a t i n g  to  , ~---------------------
jig s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  r e a l  a c t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  to  im m o v e a b le s .
C B r i t i s h  S o u th  A f r i c a  Company v . C om panhia d e  
M ocam bique 1 8 9 3  A .C . 6 0 2 ;  F o s t e r  v  . F o s t e r ’ s T r s .
1 9 2 3  B .C . 2 1 2 ;  R u th v e n  v .  Ru th v e n  1 9 0 5  (O .H .)  4 3  
S .L .R . 1 1 ;  E r s k .  1 , 2 ,  17 ; B u n ca n  & B y k e s  p p . 1 5 5  -
1 4 2  J
B u t a  p e r s o n a l  a c t i o n  r e l a t i n g  to  im m o v e a b le s  c a n  b e  
b r o u g h t  i n  any fo ru m  t o  w h ic h  t h e  d e f e n d e r  i s  s u b j e c t  
■ ^ ~ E rsk . i b i d ;  B u n can  & B y k e s ,  i b i d ;  C ra n sto w n  v .  
v * J o h n s t o n  1 7 9 6  3 V e s -  1 7 0  J
Thus v<hen an  a c t i o n  w as b r o u g h t  i n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  S e s s i o n  
. a g a i n s t  a  S c o tsm a n  to  h a v e  h im  o r d a in e d  to  g r a n t  a
c o n v e y a n c e  o f  la n d  s i t u a t e d  i n  I r e l a n d ,w h i c h  h e  had  
c o n t r a c t e d  t o  c o n v e y ,  s i n c e  t h e  a c t i o n  w as a  p e r s o n a l  
o n e  and t h e  d e f e n d e r  w as s u b j e c t  to  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  
p e r s o n a l  a c t i o n s ,  h e  w as so  o r d a in e d ;  b u t  w hen t h e  
d e f e n d e r  r e f u s e d  to  im p le m e n t t h e  o r d e r  o f  t h e  C o u r t
s ' ,
o f /
o f  S e s s i o n  and a p p l i c a t i o n  w as made to  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
S e s s i o n  to  d i r e c t  t h e  C le r k  o f  C o u r t  to  s i g n  a  
c o n v e y a n c e ,  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  wias r e f u s e d  b e c a u s e  t h a t  
w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  a  p r o c e e d in g  ir i rem  i n  r e g a r d  to  t h e  
l a n d s ,  f o r  w h ic h  th e  S c o t t i s h  C o u r t s ,  n o t  b e in g  t h e  
C o u r ts  o f  th e  s i t u s ,  had  no j u r i s d i c t i o n .  /"**R u th v en  v .
N
R u t h v e n , s u p r a __/ The p u r s u e r  c o u ld  h a v e  e n f o r c e d  t h e  
p e r s o n a l  d e c r e e  a g a i n s t  t h e  d e f e n d e r  w h ic h  o r d a in e d
th e  d e f e n d e r  to  e x e c u t e  a  c o n v e y a n c e ,  by im p r i s o n in g
\
t h e  d e f e n d e r  i n  S c o t la n d ,  b u t  t h e  o r d e r .c r a v e d  w o u ld  
h a v e  b e e n  a  ju d g m e n t i n  rem  w h ic h  t h e  S c o t s  C o u r ts  
c o u ld  n o t  make*
An a c t i o n ^ f o r  w h ic h  t h e  S c o t s  C o u r ts  w o u ld  
o t h e r w is e  n o t  h a v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n , m a y  b e  c o m p e te n t  i n  th e  
S c o t s  C o u r ts  i f  n e c e s s a r y  to  a  q u e s t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  r i g h t  
4=© S c o t t i s h  l a n d .  Thus an a c t i o n  o f  d e c l a r a t o r  o f  
l e g i t i m a c y  o f  a  p e r s o n  who ha^  n e v e r  had a  d o m i c i l e  i n  
S c o t la n d  ^»s c o m p e te n t  i n  th e  S c o t s  C o u r t s ,  b e c a u s e  & 
b r o u g h t  in  c o n j u n c t io n  w i t h  an  a c t i o n  o f  r e d u c t i o n  o f  
t h e  t i t l e s  o f  a  S c o t c h  e s t a t e ^ a n d  t h e  r e a l  q u e s t i o n ' s  
th e  r i g h t  to  s u c c e e d  to t h e  S c o t c h  e s t a t e .  ^  S h ed d en  
v> P a t r i c k  1 8 4 9  11  D . 1333_J7
O n ly  t h e  C o u r ts  o f  t h e  s i t u s  c a n  m ake a n  o r d e r  
f o r  r e m o v in g  or a l t e r i n g  t h e  name o f  t h e  p e r s o n  i n  
w h o se  name t h e  t i t l e  to  p r o p e r t y  s t a n d s .  When t h e  
J u d i c i a l  F a c t o r  on  t h e  e s t a t e  o f  a  d e c e a s e d  S c o tsm a n  
w a n te d  to  c o m p le t e  t i t l e  i n  h i s  own p e r s o n  to  h e r i t a g e  
o f  th e  d e c e a s e d  i n  b o th  E n g la n d  and  S c o t l a n d ,h e  
p r e s e n t e d  a  p e t i t i o n  to  t h e  C o u r t  o f  S e s s i o n  f o r  th e  
c o m p le t io n  o f  t i t l e  i n  h i s  own p e r s o n  to  t h e  S c o t t i s h  
e s t a t e  and  f o r  l e a v e  to  a p p ly  to  t h e  a p p r o p r ia t e  E n g l i s h  
C o u r t  f o r  t h e  a p p r o p r ia t e  o r d e r  t h e r e ,  and  t h e r e a f t e r  
a p p l i e d  to  t h e  E n g l i s h  C o u r t  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  
h e r i t a g e .  </"*Ay t o n rs  J . F .  (Q .H .)  1 937  S .L .T .  86J
The
c o n v e y a n c e
of
im m o v e a b le s
The v a l i d i t y  o f  a  c o n v e y a n c e ,  / k D a l lc e i t h  v .  B o o k  
1 7 2 9  M or. 4 4 6 4 ;  C h e s h ir e  p . 541 _ /  l e a s e ,  Adams v .  
C lu t t e r b u c k  1 8 8 3  10 Q,.B.D* 403__7 o r  m o r tg a g e  o f  
im m o v e a b le s  i s  g o v e r n e d  s o l e l y  b y  t h e  l e x  s i t u s .
An assignment o f  immoveables^which is invalid by the 
lex loci actus and the la w  o f  the d o m i c i l e  of th e  
granter^ but valid by the lex Bitus?is valid.
/  I n  r e  A n z ia n i  1 9 3 0  1 C h. 4 0 1 J   ^ ........ v : ; .......
*——~ A c o n t r a c t  t o  c o n v e y  l e a s e ,  o r  mortgage, i s  i n  a  
d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n ,  b e in g  g o v e r n e d  by t h e  'la w  a p p l i c a b l e  
to  c o n t r a c t .  / ~ S e e  nC o n t r a c t4,__7 ,
D E L I C T ^
In order to  recover damages fo r  a d e l i c t  committed abroad, i t  must be
r lt  ^
shown th a t the act complained o f  g iv e sL is  ^ su ffic ie n t th a t th e  act
*
complained o f  gave th e  pursuer a r ig h t  to  damages and at the tim e o f  
OOmmitting the a c t ,  i f  the act has been subsequently le g a l is e d  
by an Act o f  Indemnity -  P h il l ip s  -  v -  Byre 1870, L.R. £ Q, B .lJ
th e  person a lle g e d  to  have been wronged a r ig h t to  danjges from 
the a lle g e d  wrongdoer according to  both  the le x  fo r i- and -the le x  l o c i
ctrtA  " th e  l e * 1 ~ft.p i .
d e l i c t i   ^ I f  th ese  requirem ents are p resen t, an a c tio n  fo r  damages 
w i l l  l i e ,  ^fhere are no fu rth er  requirem ents! i t  i s  im m aterial th a t  
th ere  i s  no claim  by the personal law o f  the pursuer — Convery -  v-
L anartehire Tramways Co. 1905 & P. 117j Daiflfetsson -  v -  H i l l , 1901
2 . K.B. 606J and th e le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  w i l l  determ ine what separate  
item s o f  rep ara tion  can be recovered .
The primary p r in c ip le  was sim ply put by Lord Shend 
as fo llo w s; * But ju s t  as th e  le x  l o c i  con tractu s must be ap p lied  in  
referen ce  to th e terms and e f f e c t  o f  the con tract fo r  th e purpose o f  
a sc e r ta in in g  whether l i a b i l i t y  e x i s t s ,  so I th ink  the le x  lo c i  (d e ll& tl) i 
must be a p p lied , w ith  re feren ce  to  th e a c ts  committed in  order to  
a sc e r ta in  whether th ere  be l i a b i l i t y *  ^Goodman -  v -  L.N.W.R (C3.H.)
1877 14- 3.L .R . 449 at p. 451} quoted w ith  approval by Lord P resid en t  
Dunedin in  Convery -  v -  Lanarkshire Tramways Co . 8 P. 117, and by Lord
Hunter in  N agta lin  -  v -  L.M.3. 1933 S.C. 259*j| Jnjother words* the
o b lig a t io n  to make rep aration  fo r  a d e l i c t  a r is e s  from the law o f the  
p la ce  where the delictwfas committed, i t s  e x is te n c e  hr  n o n -ex isten ce  
i s  determ ined by th a t law , and the various item s o f  rep ara tion  are 
determ ined by i t .  TShen an a c t io n  i s  ra ise d  in  a country other than  
the lo c u s  d e l i c t i , the duty o f  the Courts o f  the forum i s  to  recogn ise  
and g iv e  e f f e c t  to  th e p b lig a tio n  ex d e l ic to  which h a s ar isefr  under 
the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  . The le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  i s  appropriate because  
everyone i s  bound to  obey the laws o f the country where he i s  fo r  the  
t im e . /
- 2 -
Thisy H&jts th a t the theory o f  our law; has been s ty le d  the " O b ligatio” 
th eo ry , a f te r  the word- used by the American judge, Holmes J .y who gave 
th e  theory i t s  most extreme a p p lic a tio n -  in  an American case, S la te r  -  v -/ ,i .
r~
Mexican Nat^Blwy Co.M.9C:4, 194 U .S . 120}, In that case a widow
brought an a c tio n  in  Texas fo r  damages fo r  the death o f  her husband as a
company
r e s u lt  o f  the fa u lt  o f  the ra ilw ay •Gey/(in  M exico. By Mexican law the  
on ly  red ress  given<vbs a JStecree fo r  p e r io d ic a l payments fo r  th e support 
o f  the widow during the period  the deceased might have l iv e d . The 
o b lig a t io n  ceased  when notnecessA ty  fo r  her su b s is te n c e .o r  on her m arriage,
4
and th e defendant could have "aliment** ( th a t i s  w hatit amounted to )
A
review ed i f  circum stances changed. Further, according to  Mexican #aw, 
itWlis im p ossib le  to  compromise the "alim ent" and pay a lump sum. According 
to  Texan law , the le x  f o r i , the only red ress  possibleufos th e f in a l  award 
o f  a lump sum. The Supreme Court h eld  th at the widow could not recover  
a lump sum, because not g iven  by the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i , and as the l ex f o r i  
w d s not adapted to her r e c e iv in g  the "aliemnt" the effeetwtos that she 
could not recover anything in  Texas. The r e s u lt  arrived  at i s  wrong, 
fo r  reasons which are advanced below , but the case i s  worth paying  
a t te n t io n  to  fo r  the c le a r  manner in  which i t  propounds th e " o b lig a tio "  
th eo ry . The judgment o f the Supreme C o u r t is  g iv en  by Mr. J u s tic e  
Holmes, whot said: (a t p . 126) " The theory o f the fo r e ig n  su it  i s  th a t  
the act complained o f . . .  gave r i s e  to  an o b lig a t io n , an- o b l ig a t io ,w fcdL, 
l ik e  o th er  o b lig a t io n s , fo llo w s the person , and may be enforced  wherever 
the person may be found. But as th e on ly  source o f  t h is  o b lig a t io n  
i s  the law o f th e  p la ce  o f  th e  a c t ,  i t  fo llo w s  th at th a t law determ ines 
not m erely th e e x is ten ce  o f  the o b lig a t io n , but eq u a lly  determ ines i t s  
e x te h t . I t  seems to  u s; unjust to a llow  the p M l t l f f  to  come here
&MT
a b so lu te ly ^  depending on th e  fo re ig n  law fo r  th e foundation o f  fcfcs c a se , 
and y e t  to  deny the defendant the b e n e f it  o f  whatever l im ita t io n s  on
h i s /
- 3 -
h is  l i a b i l i t y  th a t law would im p o s e .. . .  th erefo re  we may la y  on one 
aide ae q u ite  in ad m issib le  the n o tio n  th a t the law o f  the p lace  o f  
the act may be reso rted  to  so fa r  as to  show th a t the act i s  a t o r t ,  
and then may be abandoned, le a v in g  th e consequences to  be determined  
according to  the accident o f  the p lace  where the defendant may happen 
tb  be caught. n jcp . P h il l ip s  -  v -  Byre 1870, L.B. 6 Q.B., per W ille s  J.
p . sbJ
a lte r n a t iv e  to th#s theory i s  to  determ ine whether the  
act i s  a d e l i c t  by the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i , and i f  i t  i s ,  g iv e  the redress  
recogn ised  by th e  le x  f o r i , on the p r in c ip le  th at the m atters o f  
remedy are fo r  the le x  f o r i  • This a lte r n a t iv e  i s  the r a t io  o f  
Machado -  v -  ffontes £ l897  2 ^.B. 23lJ and o f  the argument o f  the
u n su ccessfu l pursuer in  H a fta lin  -  v -  L.M.S. |l9 3 3  3.C. 259^ I t  i s
SuX*q u ite  i l l o g i c a l ;  fo r  the r e s u lt  w i l l  be to  g iv e  the puruae* e ith e r  more
or le ssx  thafc he would have been e n t it le d  to  had the cause o f  actio n
been subm itted to  the system w ith  which alone i t  ha$ any r e a l connection , 
r 1 ftlonc
[Cheshire pp. 295, 6; Savigoy i s  rath er- l one l y in  s t i l l  another op in ion , 
namely th a t the le x  f o r i  alone must decide, s in ce  the laws r e la t in g  to  
d e l i c t s  are always to  be reckoned among the c o e r e it iv e ,  s t r i c t l y  p o s it iv e  
s ta tu te s .  [p .8 5 ^  This overlooks the fa c t  th a t a 4 ta te  can make no claim  
to  r u le  men’ s conduct and behaviour except w ith in  i t s  own boundaries, 
j j a r .  p* 635J
% is  then i s  the primary p r in c ip le ,th a t  the o b lig a t io n  to
make rep ara tion  a r is e s  from, and the item s o f  reparation  which are due
are determ ined by, the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i .  But to make the le x  lo c i
d e l i c t i  e x c lu s iv e ly  a p p lica b le  might e n ta il  th e  Court o f the forum-
g iv in g  a remedy fo r  an a o V  whiehwfts q u ite  innocent according to  the
fundamental p r in c ip le s  o f i t s  own law , or re fu s in g  a remedy fo r  an act^
w hich^according to  i t s  own n o tio n s o f elemental ju s t ic e  ,WAs a grave wrong.
that
Thus the requirement has been imposed, aad the act complained o f must 
a lso  be a ctio n a b le  according to  the le x  f o r i . This a d d itio n  i s  subject  
to  the c r i t ic i s m  that i t  would have been s u f f ic ie n t  to  re fu se  to  apply
the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  when a p p lica tio n  o f  i t  would in fr in g e  the  
th e /
- 4 -
the p r in c ip le s  o f  d is t in c t iv e  p o lic y  as recogn ised  in  the forum.
C heshire p . 296 j  Lorenaen 47.L .Q .R . p . 498] n Contract must be 
p e c u lia r ly  o b jec tio n a b le  b efore i t s  enforcement w i l l  be denied in  England 
on groundsof p u b lic  p o lic y .  In th e  m atter o f  t o r t s ,  however, th e mere 
fa c t  th a t the E nglish  law would not g iv e  an a c tio n  i s  s& ffic ie n t  to  
preclude recovery” ^Lorenzen, it>idj The requirement that the act
complained o f  must be actionable;, qeoording to  the l ex fo r i  i s  too  severe  
fo r  th e purpose that i t  s e r v e s .
Such then are the p r in c ip le s  u nderly ing the r u le s  
th a t in  order to  recover damages fo r  a d e l ic t  committed abroad i t  must 
be shown th at the act complained o f gave the person a lle g e d  to  have been 
wronged a r ig h t to  damages from the a lle g e d  wrongdoer according to  both  the 
le x  f o r i  and the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i }  and th a t the l ex lo c i  d e l i c t i  w i l l
determ ine what separate item s o f  rep aration  can be reoovered. The ru le  
i s  put someiyhat d if f e r e n t ly  in  a w e ll known E nglish  case in  the 
Exchequer Chamber, P h i l l ip s  -  v -  Eyre^|l8 7 0 ,  L.R. 6 | Q .B .Iat p. 28].
W ille s  J . sa id  th a t two co n d itio n s  must be f u l f i l l e d !  " F irst th e  wrong 
must be o f  such a character that i t  would hate been a ctio n a b le  i f  committed 
in  E n g la n d ....  Secondly the act must not have been j u s t i f ia b le  by the law 
o f  th e p la ce  where i t t ^ s  done? T his statem ent o f  the law has o ften  been 
approved,and has been approved by the House o f  Lords and Privy C ouncil. 
jh a rr  -  v ~ F ra c is  Times & Co. 1 9 0 ^  A*C. 176 , per Lord Macnaghten a t  
Walpole -  v -  Canadian P a c if ic  Rlwy Co. 1923, A.C. 113 (P rivy  
jCouncil)) McMillan -  v -  Canadian Northern Rlwy Co. 1923^ A.C. 120.
(P r iv y  C ouncil)) Machado -  v -  ffontes 1897; 2jj@.B. 231 (E nglish  Court o f  
Appeal)^ "The M.Moxham 1876; 1 P. 107 (E nglish  Court o f  Appeal)^ N a fta lin  
-  v -  L.M.S. 1933, S.C. 259, per Lord Murray a t p . 2 7 sjx  But th e ru le  
enunciated  above s t a t e s  th e  law more c lea r ly * - The ru le  as s ta te d  in  
P h i l l ip s  -  v -  % re le a v e s  open th e q u estio n  whether damages might be 
reoovered  i f  the act complained o f  were (a) a c tio n a b le , according to the  
le x  f o r i ,  and (b) According to  the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  where a n o t-in n ocen t
a ct l«a% did  not g iv e  a r ig h t to  damages to  the pursuer ----- e . g .  a
c r im in a l/
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crim inal act or one jaaSSr' gave a r ig h t  to  damages to  some one e lse*
The E nglish  Court o f  Appeal, m isled  by the d if fe r e n c e  between
’■actionable” in  the f i r s t  part o f  the ru le  and % ot j u s t i f ia b le ”
{
.AWvrn. «.
th a t a l i b e l  published  in  B razil a crime but not an a ctio n a b le  
wrong according to  the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  ,the law o f B r a z i l , and
an a c tio n a b le  wrong according to  the le x  f o r i , iilnglish law, 
cued would su sta in  an a c tio n  fd>r damages in  England* And in  Scott  
-  v -  Seymour^ [*862, 1 H & C. 219] Wightman J* in  the Exchequer 
Chamber sa id  th a t a B r it ish  su b ject might m aintain an a c tio n  in  th is  
country a g a in st another B r it is h  subject to recover damages fo r  a ssa u lt  
occurred abroad, although by the law o f that country no damages 
WU sere cover ab le and the only  l i a b i l i t y  to  which the wrongdoer iutas
\A/A*>
su b jec ted ^ ie  penal proceedings. There i s  no doubt however, th at th ese  
views are wrong. J^estlake f  200> contra Dicey p. 776J • The act  
complained o f  must be a c t io n a b le , i .  e . g iv e  r i s e  to  dam ages,according  
to  both the le x  f o r i  and the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i^  Machado -  v -  Fontes 
v*ds ex p ress ly  disapproved by Lord Murray in  Haffralin -  v -  L* M. 3^
£l933£ S.C. 259 . a t p . 274^ and as he th ere p o in ts  ou t, i t  i s  
in c o n s is te n t  w ith  the d e c is io n  o f the Court o f S ession  in  N a fta lin  
and in  the previous ca ses  o f  Kendrick -  v -  B u rn ett,|~1897; 25".R. 82j)
1905 8• P. 117]^ Goodman -  v -
L*N*W*R.j(0 . H.) 1877 14 S. L.R. 449] in  which ca ses  the Court o f
S ession  h e ld  th a t a fa th er  su ing  in  Scotland would not recover solatium
fo r  the death o f  h is  son in  England, because th ere  was no r ig h t  to
so latium  by the law o f England , the l ex l o c i  d e l i c t i * I t  i s  
n o tic e a b le  that when Viscount Haldane was d e liv e r in g  the judgment o f  
the P rivy Council in  Canadian P a c if ic  Rlwy -  v -  Parent%|l9 1 7 r  A.C. 195} 
he guarded h im se lf  aga in st approving o f  Machado - v - F on tes. as fo r  
Scott -  v -  Seymour«the statem ent o f  Wightman J . was the op in ion  o f  
o n ly /
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on ly  one o f  the judges# The case was decided on the ground th a t the
defendant had not p led , when h is  p lea  was c r i t i c a l l y  examined, th a t
according to th elaw  o f Naples no damages could be recovered for  a s s a u lt ,
and w ithout a c le a r  averment to  th a t e f f e c t ,  i t  must be taken th a t damages
might be recovered . W illiam s J# sa id  he was not prepared to  a sse n t to
the op in ion  expressed  by Wightman J . Crompton J# and W ille s  J . reserved
t h e ir  op in ion , as d id  Blackburn J.^ although he was in c lin e d  to  agree
w ith  Mr. J u s tic e  Wightman. I t  i s  c lea r  in  R osses -  v -  Sinfthjfce
[ l8 9 1 ; 19^R. 3 lj  th a t the S c o tt ish  judges do not approve o f the op in ion
r
expressed  by Mr. J u s t ic e  Wightman, [See The Lord Crdjj, Stormonth -D a r lin g , 
at p. 3 4 / and Lord Jus t ic e  Clerk MacDonald at p . 3zj H is op in ion  i s  
referred  to  w ith  approval by L. J .C . M oncrieff in  Horn -  v -  N. B. Rlwy 
£l878^ 5  ^ B. 105dj but Hornwfcs doubted and not fo llow ed  in  N a fta lin  -  v -  
L.M.SL £ su p r a j/
A view s im ila r  to  that held  by the Court o f Appeal^ in  
Machado -  v -  Pftntes and by Mr. J u s tic e  Wightman in  Scott -  v -  Seymour 
was advanced by the u n su ccessfu l pursuer in  R osses -  v -  S in& jee, s^upraj 
In that case  a woman who a lle g e d  th a t  she had been seduced in  England 
sued in  Scotland fo r  damages. According to  E nglish  Law, the le x  l o c i  
d e l i c t i , a woman hael no r ig h t  o f  a c tio n  fo r  sed u ction , but only her fa th e r  
or employer, whoidbs e n t i t le d  to  damages fo r  the lo s s  o f  her s e r v ic e s .  
According to  Scots law , the l ex f o r i , the woman h e r s e lf  ha^ a r ig h t to  
damages. The pursuer argued th a t s e d u c t io n *13* a ” n o n - ju s t if ia b le ”
that damujcS w e w  due
a ct in  England, that itwfas a ctio n a b le  in  Scotland,^and th ese  should be
\*thich
a sse sse d  by th e le x  f o r i , th at governed th e  remedy, th a t  th e r e fo r e- 
jiam agas-i«-due. It»4*s h eld , however, th a t th e pursuer could not recover.
” An a c t ,  in  order th a t i t  should g i f e  r i s e  to a c tio n  as bein g  a wrong, 
must be recogn ised  as a wrong, g iv in g  r i s e  to  a le g a l remedy, by the law  
o f  th e p la ce  where i t  i s  committed”, jjpsr Lord Trayner a t p . 3 f ) .
Machado -  v -  Pontes and Mr. J u s tic e  Wightman* a dictum are 
contrary to  the whole theory behind g iv in g  damages fo r  d e l i c t s  committed 
abroad, which, as a lready s ta te d , i s  th a t a person must obey the laws o f
t h e /
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the country where he i s  fo r  the times i f  he commits a wrong g iv e s
a r ig h t o f  reparation  to  th e wronged person A risin g  from the laws o f  the  
.p lace; that r ig h t i s  recogn ised  abroad i f  not in c o n s is te n t  w ith  the p o lic y  
o f  the forum. The l ex f o r i  on ly  comes in  on the q u estion  o f  p u b lic  
p o lic y . I t  i s  not the source o f  the r ig h t .
”Nbt j u s t i f i a b le ” in  the r u le ,P h i l l ip s  -  v -  Byre, means noth ing
t<L* „ r h r ~
e l s e  th a t- th e " a c tio n a b le”, lop . Cheshire pp. 298- 302J and to  use the  
word ”n o t - j u s t i f i a b le ” sim ply I n v ite s  error . The p o s it io n  has been more 
c le a r ly  s ta te d  in  th ese  ju d ic ia l  o p in io n s :-  ” There seems to  be no reason  
why a lie n s  should not sue in  Bngland fo r  personal in ju r ie s  done to  them by 
other a lie n s  abroad, when such in ju r ie s  are a c t io n a b le , both by th e law 
o f  Bngland, and a lso  by th a t o f  the country where they  are committed7 
The H a iley ” (1868)^ L.B. 2  ^ P. C. 193 a t pj*p. 202, 3.J ” In order to  
m aintain an a c tio n  ex d e l ic to  in  the Courts o f th is  country, when the  
wrong i s  committed in  another country, the wrong must be one fo r  which 
an a c t io n  can be m aintained both by the law o f  t h is  country and by the  
law o f  th e  country in  which i t  i s  sa id  to  have been done” jflSvans -  v -  
S te in  1904; 7£F. 65; per Lord Kinnear at p . 70 / adopted by Lord Ormidale 
in  Soutar -  v -  P eters (O .H .) 1912^ S.L.1C 111J ” I f  ' there i s  no 
o b lig a t io n  ex d e l ic to  by the law o f  the p lace  where th e a lle g e d  wrong i s  
done, and under the complainer i s  H irin g , th ere i s  no a c tio n  anywhere”
i
” jBvans -  v -  S te in , supra^p* 71j ” By In tern a tio n a l Laaf, i f  a cla im
i s  wrongful and a ction ab le  by the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i , and a lso  by the le x  fo r i  
i t  i s  a c tio n a b le  in  e ith e r  t e r r ito r y ,  i f  ju r is d ic t io n  e x i s t s ” ‘^ N a fta lin  -  v -  
L.M 3. 1 9 3 S. C.  259y per Lord M derson at p . 269^ ” The person
convened as defender cannot be made l ia b le  u n le ss  th ese  two fa c to r s  concur; 
JBke f i r s t  th at he i s  l ia b le  to  the olaim  made aga in st him by the laws o f  
hiw own country, and in  the second p la c e , th a t the in jured  would be 
e n t it le d  by th e law o f  h is  country to  what he cla im sf ^Kendrick -  v -  
Burnett 1897f R. 82; per Lord P res. Bobertson at p. 9 l j .
But*JLt i s  not accurate enough to  say th a t the act complained
o f /
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o f must be a ctio n a b le  both by the le x  f o r i  and the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i ,
fo r  th e  act must have been g iven  a r ig h t to  damages to  the person a lle g e d
to  have been wronged from the a lle g e d  wrongdoer, both by the le x  fo r i  and
and th e le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i .
F ir s t ly  the act complained o f must g iv e  a r ig h t to  damages 
to  the person a lle g e d  to have been wroraged according to  the l ex f o r i »
I f  a r e la t iv e  o f a person who haflf been k i l l e d  in  Scotland sued in  Bngland 
fo r  so latium  he would f a i l ,  because according to  B nglish  Law — the le x
f o r i ,  ----- onljr the executor or adm in istrator o f th e  deceased can sue under
Lord Campbell’ s A ct,
Secondly the act complained o f must g iv e  a r ig h t to  damages 
to  the person a lle g e d  to  have been w ronged-according to  the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  . 
In Boases -  v -  S inhjee jl891  19** R. 3lJ a woman sued in  Scotland
cla im ing damages fo r  having been seduced in  Bngland. jjccording to the l ex 
l o c i  d e l i c t i , B nglish  jfiaw, a woman had no a c tio n  fo r  damages for  sed u ctio n , 
but on ly  an employer or parent, harf  ^ damages being g iv en  fo r  the
lo s s  o f her serv ices^  test according to the le x  f o r i , Scots law , a woman 
could sue fo r  damages, seduction  being  a wrong to the woman h e r s e lf .  I t  
was held  th a t no a c tio n  could be maintained* W e act complained o f  not 
b ein g ,a cco rd in g  to  the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i , a wrong which gave a r ig h t to  
damages to  th e person who was a lle g in g  th at she had be^en wronged. I f  the  
ru le  g iven  in  the f i r s t  p lace  above i s  c o r r e c t , th a t th ere must be a r ig h t  
to  damages to .th e  pursuer according to  the le x  f o r i , the parent or employer 
o f  Mrs. Ross whuld have had no more su ccess  in  su ing in  Scotland fo r  
damages fo r  her seduction* Again when a person ^ t^ k il le d  in  Bngland, 
and h is  fa th er  sued fo r  so latium  in  Scotland , the cla im  fo r  so la tiu m  not 
m aintainable^because according to  the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i r a fa th er  had no r ig h t  
to  so la tiu m  for  the death o f  h is  son , the on ly  person e n t i t le d  to  sue in  
resp ect o f the death b ein g  the executor or adm in istrator o f  the deceased  
according to Ld. Campbell’ s A c tf  H agtalin  -  v -  L.M*S* 19 33*. 8*C. 259)
jtk v/. 6>urnetf |?H
Horn -  v -  N.ff. Rlwy Co. 1878^ 5.R . 1055 has not been (followed!
T hirdly  the act complained o f must g iv e  a r ig h t to  damages a g a in st
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ag a in st the a lle g e d  wrongdoer according to  the le x  fo r i .£  W estlake §  197)
'When the owners o f an E nglish  sh ip  were sued fo r  damages in  England for  
a c o l l i s io n  which occurred in  B eglian  t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters w h ile  the sh ip  
was in  charge o f a compulsory p i l o t ,  and according to  the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i ;  
hut not the le x  f o r i , the owners were l ia b le  for  the p i l o t ’ s n eg ligen ce,,
The Privy Council held,, th at an E nglish  Court w i l l  not g iv e  damages fo r  
an act committed abroad which by i t s  own p r in c ip le s  imposes no l i a b i l i t y  
on the a lle g e d  wrongdoer.' f  "The Hailey" 1868f L.R, 2*P.C. 193j
F ourth ly , th e act compi&ined o f  must g iv e  a r ig h t to  damages aga in st 
th e a lle g e d  wrongdoer, according to  th e le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i . ^W estlake^196j 
Thus where the widow was excluded^acooriwg to  th e  le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i,fro m  
cla im ing damages fo r  the death o f  her hgtsband, because her husband had, 
-during l i f e ,  agreed th a t th e a lle g e d  wrongdoeB had to  be fr e e  o f  l i a b i l i t y  
in  the event o f h is  death , no a c tio n  was m aintainable by the widow, 
although according to  th e le x  fo r i  such an agreement by the husbands 
during l i f e  would not have prevented the widow from su ing in  resp ect o f  
h is  death. £ Canadian P a c if ic  Railway -  v -  Parent 1917, A.C. 195(P rivy  
Councilij And no in te r d ic t  was granted aga in st an act which would have 
been wrongful i f  i t  had been committed h ere , but was not so according to  
the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i . | p o tte r  & Co. -  v -  Braoo de Prfeta P rin tin g  Co. Ltd* 
1891j 1 8 .R. 5 1 l j • No a c tio n  w i l l  be m aintainable a g a in st the employers 
Of the actu a l wrongdoers i f ,  according to  the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i , they are 
not su b ject to  damages ;in  resp ect o f the d e l i c t s  o f  th e ir  servants^
| ”The M. MoxhanT 1876^ l .P .  IO7J or, i f ,  the according to  the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  , 
the defence o f  common employment, jjicMilJLan -  v -  Canadian Northern Railway 
1923j| A.C. 120 (P rivy C o u n c il lo r  any s im ila r  defence,w ould  have e n ta ile d  
t h e ir  Tbeing fr e e  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  n otw ithstan d in g  the fa c t  th a t they are
l ia b le  according to  th e le x  f o r i . — ...........  ....... ....... .................
—  - - f o r  example, in  Walpole -  v -  Canadian P a c if ic  Railway j l9 2 3  A.C. 113 
(P rivy  Council) J  a man r e s id en t in  B r it is h  Columbia'^* k i l l e d  th ere  in  th e  
course o f h is  employment w ith  the Canadian P a c if ic  Railway through the  
n e g lig e n c e /
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n eg lig en ce  o f  fe llo w  employees* Under the Workomari© Compensation Act
o f  B r it is h  Columbia the deceased* had he lived *  and on h is  death h is
w&J w+Adependants, h a ^  a r ig h t $o Workmen’ s Compensation, tfaa-t  ex p ress ly
in  l i e u  o f  a l l  other r ig h ts  o f  a c tio n  a g a in st the employer, th a^ j^ s*^  
barred* A Wr—O.^Board a sse sse d  employers fo r  co n tr ib u tio n s to th e  
Workmen’ s Compensation fund on the b a s is  o f  th e ir  p a y r o lls^ c o lle c te d  
the co n tr ib u tio n s/ and paid the claim s* The ®tdow sued the ifeailway
\*S&4sfC U/O-'O ,
fiompany for  damages in  Saskatchewan,  ^ I t  was h eld  by the Privy Council 
that she ehuld not succeed: f&e act complained o f did not g iv e  r id e
according to the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  to a cla im  fo r  damages a g a in st the  
em ployers,but only 4© a cla im  aga in st the Workmen’ s Compensation Board 
fo r  compensation*
The case ju s t  re ferred  to  a lso  i l lu s t r a t e s  another p r in c ip le ,  
namely th a t the remedy g iven  by the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  must be damages 
fo r  a wrongful a c t* Wo a c tio n  w i l l  be m aintainable by a workman aga in st  
h is  tm plpyers i f ,  according to  the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i , the employer i s  
n ot l i a b le  in  damages as fo r  a fa u lt  or wrong in  resp ec t o f the act  
complained o f , but on ly  l ia b le  to  pay compensation fo r  an a cc id en t, as 
a r e s u lt  o f  a Workmen’ s Compensation sta tu te*  Even though according to  
th e l ex l o c i  d e l i c t i  the employers are p erso h a lly  l ia b le  to  pay the  
compensation fo r  an a cc id en t, as con trasted  w ith  the case where a
i
Workmen’ s Compensation Board i s  l i a b l e ,  th a t i s  not s u f f ic ie n t :  th ere
must be l i a b i l i t y  on the a lle g e d  wrongdoer, according to  the le x  lo c i  
d e l i c t i , to  pay fo r  damages fo r  a w rongful a c t .  j McMillan -  v -  Canadian 
Northern Hallway Co. 1923y A. C* 120* (^ rivy  Council) J 
Meaning o f  The le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  means th e law o f  the p la ce  where the
** lg x  l o c i  d e l i c t  occurred* When a wrongful act commences in  one country and ta k es  
e f f e c t  in  another, the lo cu s d e l i c t i , i s  the country where the e f f e c t  
o ccu rs. ^Bvans -  v -  fftein  1904j 7^F. 65j Thomson -  v -  Kinde l l  
(o . H.) 1910, 2  ^ S .L .T . 442} B. -  v -  N il 11ns (1884) 5% L. J.M. C* 157; 
B. -  v — Godfrey 1923, I K.B. 24; ” The Lotus1* f fe e lP it t  Cobbett 23$.
(permanent CoUrt o f  In tern a tio n a l J u stic e )
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Thus when two l e t t e r s  and a telegram  wfclehwrre a lle g e d  to  he defamatory 
w ere  sent from Scotland to England, the a lle g e d ly  defamatory statem ents 
V m a d e  In England, the lo c u s  d e l i c t i .^  Evans -  v -  S te in , supraj
—_  /fhe r a t io  o f  t h i s  ru le  i s  th at the o ffender p la c e s  h im se lf  
w ith in  the ambit o f  the law o f the country where the e f f e c t  occurs by 
in ten d in g  that e f f e c t  to  occur there and tak in g  d e lib e r a te  s te p s  to  bring  
i t  about. Cenooqu-en t ly  th io -4hoory io  not a p p lic able to th e o o l l io io n
through n eg lig en ce  o f  a sh ip  o f one n a t io n a li ty  w ith  a sh ip  o f another.
I t  i s  not v a lid  to argue, that when sh ip  A has been n e g lig e n t ly  n av igated  
so as to run down sh ip  B whereby a person on B i s  in ju red , th a t the lo c u s  
d e l i c t i  i s  sh ip  B where the e f f e c t  occurred, and th at th erefo re  the le x
to  the n a t io n a lity  o f  sh ip  B, altough
of
lo c i  d e l i c t i  i s  the law according
1
that would be v a lid  reason ing i f  s person on ship  A d e lib e r a te ly  shot a
erson on sh ip  B. £  The Queen -  v -
"The Lotus" 1 P i t t  Cobbett’ s Cas?
J u s tic e
Keyn (1876) 2 Ex. D. 63, dontra
s 230 |Permanent Court o f  In te rn a tio n a l
In th e  case o f  wrongful k i l l in g ,  the locu s d e l i c t i  i s  not 
the country where the death occurred , but the country where the impact 
on th e  body took p la e e . jliorenzen in  4 7 | L.Q.H. at p . 491, and American 
ca ses  quoted th erej Thus i f  a person standing in  country A f i r e s  a gun 
over th e border, and h i t s  someone in  country B | , who subsequently d ie s  
in  country Gj the lo cu s d e l i c t i  i s  B. Where a fa th er  su ing fo r  solatium  
fo r  the wrongful death o f h is  son l i v e s  in  country A,and^son i s  k i l l e d  
in  country B, the lo cu s d e l i c t i  i s  country B, although the e f f e c t  o f  
the wrong ( i .  e . in ju ry  to  the fa th e r ’ s f e e l in g s )  took p lace in  A.
^Convery -  v -  Lanarkshire Tramways Co. 1905, 8 .F . I I7J
A w rongful act may c o n s is t  o f a chain o f  component a c t s ,
vdLeit•that extend over a long  period and are capable o f  bein g  committed in  a 
number o f d if fe r e n t  c o u n tr ie s . In that case the p lace  where the  
m ajority  or most important o f  the component a c ts  took p lace  i s  the lo cu s  
d e l i c t i . In one a c tio n  o f damages for breach o f promise o f marriage and
se d u c t io n /
Ascertainment 
o f  damagess
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i rt a. py
sed u ction  in  the Court o f  S e s s io n » the Lord Ord^wlis faced  w ith
averments o f  promise o f marriage and blandishm ents in  Scotland
fo llow ed  by sexual connection  in  Bngland. The e x e r c ise  o f  w ile s
alone i s  not sed u ctio n , i t  must have culm inated in  in terco u rse ;
not
and carnal in terco u rse  w ithout the w ile s  seduction  . ToA
a sc e r ta in  the locu s d e l i c t i  regard had to  be taken both o f  the  
p lace  where the woman’ s bodywfos ev en tu a lly  surrendered and the  
p lace  where the prelim inary steps'4cre taken by the wrongdoer.
Lord OrmideleWAs o f the op in ion  that i f ,  as a lle g e d , the surrender 
o f  her personwis made a few hours a f te r  she l e f t  Scotland, where 
her a f fe c t io n  had been undergoing the process o f  fraudu len t capture 
fo r  months, that might be ^pund for  m aintain ing that the lo cu s  
d e l i c t i vfas S cotlan d , -and h e allowed - a ■protff-bctfore- answer .  
jsofctar -m -  P eters (O.H.) 1912. The I S. L. T. I l l ]
I f  an a c t io n  fo r  damages i s  m a in ta in ab le ,th e le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  
w i l l  determ ine what separate item s o f  rep aration  can be recovered . 
In H a fta lin  -  v ~ L.M.S. ,  £l933^ S. C. 259J a fathervJbs su ing  
in  Scotland in  resp ect o f  the death o f  h is  son in  a ra ilw ay  
accid en t in  Bngland due to the n eg lig en ce  o f  the Railway employees, 
an(* ih'fcer a l ia  he claim ed so latiu m . T h is ^ s  h e ld  not to  be 
recoverab le  because not adm itted by B n glish  law, the le x  lo c i  
d e l i c t i , Jcp. Kendrick -  V -  Burnett 1897^ 25^ ? B. 82J Horn -  v 
N.B. Rlwy Co. 1878^ 5^ B. 1055 has not been flollow edj^ — -— —
f d e n i  r
 —-Lord Pres^ Bobertson in  another case 1Hendrick -  v -
Burnett 1897y 25 . B. 82. at p . 86  ^ te s te d  the q u estion  thus*
**3?he s im p le s t , and , in  n*y o p in io n , a p e r fe c t ly  le g it im a te  way to
consider t h is  q u estio n  i s  to assume the case ----  o f  an a c t io n ,
ra ise d  s o le ly  to  recover so latium  • • • •  I s  the cla im  good bboanse 
i t  i s  sued fo r  in  a country to  the common law o f
su ch /
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such a r ig h t does  a r is e  out o f  such an act?  I t  seems to  me 
im p ossib le  to  support the a ffirm a tiv e  on any reasonable ground.
The q u estion  i s  not o f the remedy, i t  i s  whether a r ig h t  e x i s t s  or 
ever e x is te d ,  to  found an a c tio n  o f any kind?
The d e t a i l s  o f the measure o f damages however 
are to  be r e fe r r e d 'to  the le x  fo r i %on the p r in c ip le  th at th e le x  fo r i  
governs q u estio n s o f the remedy. The d is t in c t io n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
draw: ijl&ere the q u estion  i s  whether a Mseparable head o f  claim ”
j&endrick -  v -  B u rn ett, supra per Lord P res. Bobertson, at f&.87j
i s  nr  i s  not to  be included  in  the damages, the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i
r u le s ,  but where i t  i s  c le a r  what separable heads o f claim  are 
recoverab le  and the q u estion  i s  th e  q u a n tif ic a t io n  o f  the o b lig a tio n
in to  money, the le x  f o r iw i l l  r u le .  an example o f the la t t e r  case
i s  where th ere  has been d estru c tio n  o f cargo, and th e  o b lig a tio n  i s  
r e a t itu t jo n in  Integgum: the law o f  one country might p rescr ib e  as
the measure o f  compensation the p r ice  at which the owner could  supply  
h im self in  th e  n ea rest market, w h ile  the law o f the other country  
would g iv e  the co st p rice  o f  the goods p lus f a ir  m erahtile  p r o f i t .
The judge tr y in g  the case would q u an tify  the damages in  money according  
to  the law which he adm inistered, ^ en d r ic k  -  v -  B u rn ett, supra,per  
Lord McLaren at p.QflJ
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  R econcile McLarty -  v -  S te e le
with the
[ l8 8 1 , 8 . E. ♦ 3B3 a | None -M ille r  -  v -  3haughnessy (0 .H .) 1944 per
y p* R«p*r*tioiv
Lord B u s s e l l ,  op in ion  dated 9 th . Novembers 19441 w ith  —the o th er oaoe-a.
That, an actio n  o f  damages in  Scotland  between two Scotsmen fo r  ora l 
A
slander u ttered  in  Penang. According to the law o f  England which  
p rev a iled  in  Penang, no rep ara tion  4 s  due fo r  verbal slander u n le s s
4
■ s pec i al  damages are a lle g e d  and proved to  have been su sta in e d .
I
I t  Ire*held thaif an is s u e  should go to  a jury  to  determ ine the  
q u estion  o f  damages according to Scots law. Lord Young sa id  th a t i f  
th ere  '££  s u f f ic ie n t  evidence to  e n t i t l e  the pursuer to damage^ under
th e /
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the law o f  Scotland , th a t was enough, and I t  would n ot he re levan t  
to  prove th a t something elsevfcs necessary^  According to  the law o f  
Penang, T his d e c is io n ?th a t damages might be recovered although no 
damages are due by th e  le x  lo c i  del i c t i  seems contrary to  fundamental 
p r in c ip le .  T^ere i s  very l i t t l e  d iffe r e n c e  i f  the m atter i s  
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  examined, between the f a c t s  o f McCarty -  v -  S te e le g  and 
th ose  o f Evans -  v -  S te in  „ £l9C4£ 7-y P. 65j  where a d if f e r e n t ,  and i t  
i s  subm itted c o r r e c t , decisionvffis g iven*  " S itf tdtes an a c tio n  o f  damages 
brought in  Scotland fo r  defam ation which occurred in  England. The 
defamatory statem ents •k&S*'contained in  two l e t t e r s  and a telegram  
sSe' not published  to  th ir d  p a r tie d . According to  E nglish  law i t u i*  
n ecessary  to  prove p u b lic a tio n , but not according to  Scots law. I t  
h eld  th at th e a c t io n  would not be m aintained because the statem ent, not 
having been published ,w hs not an a c tio n a b le  wrong in  England!? the le x  
l o c i  d e l i c t i . There seems to  be l i t t l e  d iffe r e n c e  in  e f f e c t  from the
ru le  o f  E nglish  law / th a t to  obtain  rep aration  for  s lan d er sp e c ia l 
damage must be proved to  have been su ffe red , and the ru le  th a t p u b lic a tio n  
must be proved tq have occurred, and th e language o f Lord Kinnear in  the  
la t t e r  case £  at p . 7 l ]  seems eq u a lly  appropriate to  the former,
a-
* I f  th ere i s  no obligation ex d e l i c t o ,  by the law o f  th e  p lace  where the  
a lle g e d  wrong i s  done, and under which th e complainer i s  l i v in g ,  th ere  
i s  no a c t io n  anywhere. I th in k  th at p r in c ip le  a lso  goes to  meet the  
pursuer’ s argument th at the defence in  t h i s  case i s  founded upon the 
law o f  remedy, and not upon the law o f  o b l ig a t io n . . . That appears to  
me to  be a confusion  o f  th in g s  . , . . .  which ought to  be d is t in g u s ih e d .
The method by which a r ig h t  may be enforced  i s  a q u estion  o f procedure, 
but whether there i s  any remedy at a l l ,  or in  other words, whether there  
i s  a r ig h t  o f  a c t io n , i s  not a q u estio n  o f  procedure but a q u estion  o f  
le g g l riggk  depending on th e e x is te n c e  o f an o b lig a t io n  ex contractu  
or ex d e l ic to  and the q u estion  o f o b lig a t io n  must be determ ined f i r s t  
b e fo r e /
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before/', we can con sid er what the remedy i s ” I t  i s  s ig n if ic a n t
th a t  McCarty -» v -  S teele  wds one o f the ca ses  r e l ie d  on by th e Lord
iiuny _ ^
Ord  ^ in  N a fta lin  -  v -  L .M .3 .J  1935s S.C. 2591 and that $ i s  judgment
was reversed  by the Inner House*
Bert* totalis th e  ”o b lig a t io ” theory i s  the p r in c ip le
underly ing our law, the extreme a p p lica tio n  g iven  to  th a t theory
in  S la te r  -  v -  Mexican N ational Railway Co* j l9 4 | U*S* 120i for
summary o f the case see above ^  J  can not be approved. The resiklt
th ere  arrived  atvfiis th at the pursuer could oh tain  no remedy in  Texas
even though the act complained ofWfcs both  wrongful and a c tio n a b le  in
both the le x  f o r i  and the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  . . .  a r e s u lt  that one
im m ediately su sp ects  as wrong, because i t  s t u l t i f i e s  one o f  the main
purposes o f  In tern a tio n a l P rivate  Law,namely th e  ex tra - t e r r i t o r ia l
rec o g n itio n  tff r ig h ts  duly acquired under a fore ign  system  o f law.
hich W&5 '
The reason ing  by. t h i s  r e s u lt  ^ arrived at seems to  b e-th -o r o foro »> the 
n n
Texan Court could not make an award l ik e  the Mexican one, namely, a
decree fo r  a lim en t, v a r ia b le  on change o f circum stances, because i t s
p r o c e d u r e 's  not designed  to  such an end, nor could an award o f  a lump
sum be made fo r  that would be to  grant a r ig h t d if fe r e n t  from th a t
acquired under the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i . The fa l la c y  o f  t h is  reason ing
i s  th a t the r ig h t to rep aration  i s  f i r s t  o f a l l  considered  as a
q u estion  o f remedy which th e le x  f o r i  must ru le ,an d  then as a
q u estion  o f substance which the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  must r u le . The
bee*
correct r e su lt  would have^to det^ rM nei ithe exten t or quantity  o f  
rep aration  by th e  le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i , and to  g iv e  th is  in  a form 
perm itted by th e le x  f o r i . The value o f th e  Mexican alimamt as a 
lump sum should have been a s se sse d , and t h is  g iv en  in  a decree in  
common form by the Texan Court. M m itte d ly ,a s  the Cotrt poin ted  o u t, 
i t  would have been d i f f i c u l t  to  a s se s s  the c a p ita l value o f the  
Mexican a lim en t, but that i s  no excuse fo r  re fu s in g  to attem pt to  
a s s e s s /
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a s s e s s it#  Perhaps nowadays experience o f redeeming fu ture payments 
o f  Workmen’ s Compensation by agreed lump sums would m^ke lawyers
i s  b e t te r  m odified in  the words o f  another American Judge.'” When a
Court tak es cognizance o f  a to r t  committed elsew h ere , i t  i s  indeed
sometimes sa id  that i t  en forces the o b lig a tio n  a r is in g  under the law 
*
where the to r t  a r i s e s # . ,  however no Court can en force any law^ but 
th a t o f  i t s  own sover^fgif, and, when a su ito r  comes to  a ju r is d ic t io n  
fo r e ig n  to  the p lace  o f  the t o r t ,  he can only invoke an o b lig a tio n  
recogn ised  by th a t sovereign# A fo re ig n  sovereign  under c iv i l i z e d  law 
imposes an o b lig a t io n  o f  i t s  own as n early  homologous as p o s s ib le  to  
th a t a r is in g  in  th e  p lace  where the to r t  occurs” ^Guiness -  v -  H i l le r  
29 l j  Fed# 769, per Judge Learned Hand at p# 770J
th a t the wrongdoer i s  l ia b le  to a c la im  by the s u ffe r e r  b efore an 
a c tio n  w i l l  l i e ,  the q u estion  a r is e s ,  whether a l l  the sep rrate item s  
o f damages have to  be due by th e , le x  f o r i  as w e ll as th e le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i . 
C onsidering the p r in c ip le  underlying referen ce to  the le x  f o r i , the  
answer i s  probably no# I f  both the le a  f o r i  and th e le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  
agree as to  a c t io n a b i l i t y ,  the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  a lone w i l l  determ ine 
what separate item s Of damages are reco v era b le , su b ject o f  course to  
the over-r iftin g  co n sid era tio n  which i s  always present th a t our Courts 
w i l l  never enforce a fo re ig n  law , i f  to  do so would be contrary to  
m o ra lity , r e lig io fw  or the d is t in c t iv e  p o lic y  o f our law ./C hesh ire p .p
bolder in  approaching such a problem. The "O blig iatio*  theory
• iSince the le x  f o r i  must agree with the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i
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WORKMEN* 3 COMPENSATION
The A p p lic a b il ity  o f  the U nited  Kingdom Workmen*s 
Compensation A cts.
t The U nited Kingdom Workmen’ s Compensation Acts apply to  
a l l  a cc id en ts  a r is in g  oat o f  and in  course o f employment in  the U nited  
Kingdom. ^Hunter -  v ~ S ta d tisch e  e t c .  S e s e lls c h a f t  1925^ 2-jK.B. 493^J 
A person otherw ise e n t i t le d  to the b e n e f it s  o f  the Workmen’ s Compensation 
Acts i s  not deprived o f them m erely because he i s  an a lie n  £  Baird -  v -  
B lrzstan  1906^ 8$5\ 438jor» in  the case o f  a dependant, because he i s  
res id en t abroad, jgrzus -  v -  Crow’ s Nest Pass Coal Co. I»td. 1912^. A.C.
590. (P.C.J J  I f  the employment i s  in  the U nited Kingdom, the
employer w i l l  not ssca p t l i a b i l i t y  because he i s  res id en t abroad.
^Hunter -  v -  S ta d tisch e  etc . G e se llsch a ft 1925^ 2^ K. B. 492^
C onversely the Acts do not apply to a cc id en ts  occurring  
o u tsid e  the United Kingdom except where they s p e c i f i c a l ly  provide sp 
in  the case o f seamen, even though both employer and employee be B r it is h .  
jrom alin -  v -  Pearson 1909^ Z f  K.B. 61$ Schwartz -  v -  India Rubber 
e tc .  Co. L td. 1912, 2? K.B. 4 9 ^
The A p p lic a b ility  o f  Foreign Workmen’ s Compensation A cts.
The soundest view i s  to  regard a s ta tu to ry  o b lig a t io n  to
pay compensation as an im plied  term o f the contract o f  s e r v ic e  [  W.E. Beckettj
(1934) 1 5 |B .I .I .L .^ 6 2 . n . I f  a person su ffered  an accid en t in  a
country where he became e n t i t l e d  to  compensation fo r  the accident,
LvCI La~J
he should be able to  sue fo r  that compensation here^ He would sue o f  
course by the normal procedure, and not by our Workmen’ s Compensation 
p ro ced u re .* I t  has been sa id  th a t in  regard to  ouw own Workmen’ s
Compensation s ta tu te s ..*  The le g is la tu r e  by the Act has thought f i t  to
enact th a t i t  sh a ll be one o f the co n d itio n s  o f  the employment o f a
workman in  t h is  country, th at i f  in  such employment personal in ju ry  by
a c c id e n t /
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accid en t a r is in g  out o f and in  coarse o f  h is  employment i s  caused to
him, h is  employer sh a ll  in  general be l ia b le  to  pay compensation.
A fo re ig n  employer under such circum stances, (.Employing a B r it is h  wormaan
in  t h is  country) must in  my opin ion  be taken to  employ the workman
upon a l l  the terms and con d itio n s by which, under the laws o f th is
country , the employment i s  r e g u la te d ,in c lu d in g  in  p a r tic u la r  the conds
i i t i o n  e n t i t l in g  the workman to  compensation fo r  in ju ry  by a c c id e n t .”
^Hunter -  v -  S tad tisch e  e tc .  G resellschaft. 1925, 2.K .B . 443, per
Warrington L .J . at p . 5C£3j At f i r s t  s ig h t ,  McMillan -  v -  Canadian
Northern Bailway Cp.r £l923. a . C. 12oj a d e c is io n  o f the Privy C ouncil,
appears to  be ag a in st th is  view , but i t  i s  subm itted that on exam ination
th is  i s  not so . In th a t case a res id en t in  Ontario was injured  in  the
course o f  h is  employment in  O ntario, by the n eg lig en ce  o f a fe llo w  servant.
In Ontario the workman h a j a r ig h t to Workmen’ s Compensation from h is
em ployers, whichvfias recoverab le by a c tio n  aga in st the Workmen’ s
Compensation Board, and he had no r ig h t to  damages. He sued fo r  damages
in  Saskatchewan, the law o f which would have g iv en  him damages. Itvtos
h eld  th a t the a c t io n  could not be m aintained. As a r e su lt  o f  t h is  case
the con clu sion  has been drawn th at compensation can be recovered- only  
of Yf*r Country u/hepe the a.cft©n i* be-inf bp©ujKt> 
i f  the case somes w ith in  the compensation statutes^ and  a r ig h t to
compensation under the s ta tu te s  o f one country cannot be v in d ica ted
elsewher<M--frf  the oountry where th e a o ti-on i s  bein g  brought, jj)icey^(.
773(n)$ S . G. Lorenzen in  47 . L.Q.H. 483 at p . 495.} But i t  i s
• ex ceed in g ly  doubtful th at * t h is  i s  what the case decided* What was
sued fo r  in  Saskatchewan was damages fo r  a to r t ,  and i t  was h eld  th a t
th e  Saskatchewan Court could not g iv e  damages fo r  a .to r t  when no damages
fo r  a to r t  were due by th e le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i^  I f  the claim  in  the
Saskatchewan Court had been fo r  the eq u iva len t o f the compensation due
tk -e  O n-toci-io c « u ld  fia.ve b « « r >  j ’u . -
according to the law o f  O ntario,, would th a t cfoim  not .have succeeded?
K . f  u ,
Compensation i s  q u ite  d if fe r e n t  from rep a ra tio n . The f i r s t  i s  a r ig h t5**fe-
a
a r is in g  im p lied ly  ex co n tra ctu , w h ile  the second i s  a r ig h t a r is in g  ex °Knt^ /
d e lic to *  —-------------— ..............................................        ■
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The fa c t  that they are d if fe r e n t  i s  the r a t io  o f  the case . I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  see why, i f  e x t r a te r r ito r ia l  e f f e c t  i s  g iven  to  r ig h ts  
a r is in g  under other laws o f fo re ig n  c o u n tr ie s , i t  should not be g iven  to  
r ig h ts  a r is in g  under th e ir  workmen’ s compensation s ta tu te s .  That would 
be to hold th at e x tr a te r r ito r ia l  reco g n itio n  i s  on ly  to  be accorded to  
r ig h ts  a r is in g  from the old laws o f  fo re ig n  s ta tu te s  and not to r ig h ts  
a r is in g  from new s ta tu te s  w ith  an en ligh tened  purpose.
IMiICTS iff? SBA:
A d is t in c t io n  i s  taken between d e l i c t s  where damage i s  done to  property
by a sh ip , and where th ere i s  in ju ry  to  persons. | McMillan,rJ> ~
S c o tt is h  Maritime P ra ctice  160, 192l|. reason  fo r  the d is t in c t io n
i s  th a t cla im s fo r  damage to  property were form erly heard in  the
Admiralty Courts, u n t i l  they were absorbed by the S h e r if f  Courts and
the Court o f Session , ^Court o f S ession  Act 1830 th e lW ill.  17. c . 69 ,
s e c s  21-29j| and so were, and s t i l l  are , adjudicated  by maritime law ,
whereas cla im s fo r  personal in ju ry  have only had the b e n e f it  o f Admiralty
procedure, and the maritime r u le s  o f d iv is io n  o f lo s s  have only been
•applicable to them )since the Maritime Conventions Act 1911, £ 1 & 2 Geo 5 , 
57 -i
c.^SBI and so they w ere, and s t i l l  a re , su bject to  Common law r u le s .
(a) Damage to  Property by a Ship? Where damage i s  done to property
by s h ip s , whether on the fegh  sea s , in  S c o tt ish  t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters or 
n avigab le r iv e r s ,  ^Boettcher <9 v -  Carron Co. 1861, 23|D . 322^} or in  
fo re ig n  t e r r i t o r ia l  w a te r s^ r  n av igab le  r iv e r s ,^ ’’Owners of as; "Beresby*
Owil'CP© gf
-  v - ^ s . s .  Cobetasw/o,H.11923? S.L .T . 719 (C .H .), Contra, D icey pp. 987^990,
and a nunfcArrof E nglish  cases    ”The H ailey” 1868 L.B. 2 .P .C .
193 (damage to  another ship)j H The M. Moxham” (1876) l .P .  I©*;,; (damage 
to  a p ie r ))  Chartered M ercantile Bank o f India  -  v -  N etherlands Steam 
N avigation  Co. (1883) 1 0 | Q.B.D. 521 per B rett L .J . at p . 536) Carr -  v
-  F raois Times & Co. 1902 | A.C. 176) from which the con clu sion  might
w
be drawn th a t where damage i s  done to  property by a sh ip  in  fo re ig n  
t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters, the normal r u le s  o f  d e l i c t  app ly , namely th a t both  
the le x  f o r i & and the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  must be s a t i s f i e d  b efore a claim  
i s  e x ig ib le ,  the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i  being the law o f the l i t t o r a l  s t a t e .  
However the d e c is io n  in  “The H a iley11 though perhaps not some o f the d ic ta  
in  i t ,  i s  c o n s is te n t  w ith  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  the maritime law o f  the  
forum a lo n e . The nM. Moxhamn i s  a curious ca se , which i s  considered  in  
d e t a i l  below , and the statem ent in  the Chartered M ercantile Bank i s  an 
o b ite r  dictum in  referen ce  to  the M. Hoxham which does n o t do J u s t ic e  
to  the p e c u lia r  f a c t s  o f  th a t c a se . Carr -  v -  T racis Times & Co. 
was d is t in g u ish e d  by Lord Blackburn in  Owners o f s . s .  Reresby -  v .
Owners o f  s . s .  C obetas, supra, (a t  p . 722) as not d ea lin g  w ith  a 
maritime q u estio n , s im ila r  to  th a t a r is in g  from the c o l l i s io n  o f  a sh lp jj ' 
and ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f  the n a t io n a li ty  o f  the sh ip , the maritime law o f  
Scotland  a lone i s  applied.f^M arsden p.' 213; Cheshire p . ^06; D icey p . 778 
Contra: W estlake 202 to  205_ J  The maritime law o f  Scotland  i s  the o ld
g en era l maritime law as a lte r e d  by B r i t i s h  s ta t u t e s .
B efore maritime law was invaded by s ta tu te ,  as i t  i s  now, the maritime 
law o f Scotland  was our in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  a gen era l maritime law recogn ised  
by a l l  commercial n a t io n s . "From the e a r l i e s t  tim es the Courts o f  Scotland  
e x e r c is in g  J u r isd ic t io n  in  Admiralty causes have d isregarded  the m unicipal 
r u le s  o f  S c o t t is h  law and have in v a r ia b ly  p ro fessed  to  adm inister the lav/ 
and customs o f  the sea g e n e r a lly  p r e v a ilin g  among maritime s ta t e s ."  
f  Currie -  v  -  McKnight 1896 24 R. (H .L .) 1 per Lord Watson a t  p . 3_7  
In B e l l rs Commentaries J_ Comm, i ,  3*1?4J  where our maritime lav/ i s  s e t  
fo r th  in  some d e t a i l ,  some o f  the a u th o r it ie s  r e l ie d  on are our own 
I n s t i tu t io n a l  W riters, the Rhodian Laws, I I  Consolato d e l Mare a 
M editerranean com pila tion  o f  r u le s  o f  the 11th  to  the 13th  c e n tu r ie s , the  
laws o f  Oleron and Wisbuy, th e Ordonnances o f  the H anseatic Towns and o f  
Louis x i v . the d e c is io n s  o f  maritime and m ercantile  co u r ts , not only o f  
S cotlan d , but o f  Genoa, F riesla n d  and England and other co u n tr ie s , and 
the c i v i l  law and the commentators th ereon . The E n g lish  Admiralty Courts 
have proceeded on the same th eory , th a t they were applying the gen era l 
maritime law.*--------------------   — ..........     - ........
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^ *The Johann F ried erick n (1839) SfeelW.Bob. 36j flThe Z o llv ere in w 
1856 | 3Wa 96j "The Wild Banger* (1862) Lush. 553} " The Leon*
1881 P. 76? Chartered M ercantile Bank o f  India -  v -  N etherlands 
India Steam N avigation  Co. (1883) l(Sf £*.B.D. 521^| E n glish  and 
Scots maritime law th erefo re  are th e same. Boethcher -  w -  Carron Co.
23^D. 265y per Lord Pres. I n g lis j  Currie -  v -  McKnight. ^per Lord 
C hancellor Halsbury at p. 2. Lord Watson has pointed  out a cujjious 
in c id e n t which re su lte d  from t h is  theory in  1788* The Court o f  
S ession  in  a case r e la t in g  to a l i e n  fo r  fu rn ish in g s made to  a sh ip  
(Wood -  v «  Hamilton M. 6269) ordered the opinion o f E nglish  counsel 
and gave jud&raent in  accordance w ith  th a t op in ion , although i tw is
contrary to  previous d e c is io n s  o f  the Court o f  S ession  --------
Currie -  v -  McEhight, supra a t p . dj .and when a fr e sh  maritime 
q u estio n  arose in  regard to w h a lin g .it  i s  p la in  th at our Courts ap p lied  
the le g a l  custom which w halers o f  a l l  n a tio n s  had e s ta b lish e d  fo r  
them selves,and  ignored th e m unicipal r u le s  o f  law o f our country and
355)
o ther countries. [ S u tter  -  v -  Aberdeen A rtie Addison -  v -  Bow
- In short, b e f -r e  marit 
as i t  i s  now, the maritime law o f  
o f  a gen era l maritime law recogni
me law was invaded by s ta tu te ,  
Scotland was pur in te r p r e ta tio n  
sed by a l l  commercial n a tio n s .
Itw is  th erefo re  p e r fe c t ly  ju st  to  apply on ly  the gen era l
maritime law as i t  was understood in  our C ourts. Indeed no other law
could be ap p lied  because in  theory noother e x is te d . S in c e  the maritime
laws o f  a l l  s ta te s  were homogeneous, no c o n f l ic t s  could a r is e .
3 Jtabout the beginning o f  the 19thj cen tu ry , n a tion s began
to  pass s ta tu te s  a lt e r in g  the o ld  ge n era l maritime law. Thus B r it is h
s ta tu te s  were passed making p ro v is io n s  as to the l im ita t io n  o f the
,sef
l i a b i l i t y  o f shipowners in  case o f  c o l l i s io n , [ s 3 ^  (Jeo .l| and 
re g u la tio n s  as to th e r u le  o f the road at s e a , ( l 4  & 15 V iet. c . 79 ;
17 & 18^ V iet, c .  m i j  w hich \ture d if fe r e n t  from th ose  o f the o l|t gen era l
m aritim e/
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maritime la v  * T h en con flic tsitere  "bound, to  occur*
In t h is  country itv& s h eld  that th ese  s ta tu te s  
V€»re not a p p lica b le  when one o f  th e shipsVfes a fo r e ig n e r , because i t  
v i s  beyond the power o f  th e le g is la t u r e  to make r u le s  ap p licab le  * to  
fo re ig n  v e s s e ls  at se a , and in  th a t event the o ld  gen era l maritime 
law was en forced , £  "The a o llv e r e in "  1856, SS*ra 9 6 p  wThe Carl Johan* 
1821, c ite d  in  "The Dundee11 . Ittagg. Mm* 113 and "The Girolamo"
3 Hagg. Adra. 186j " Cope -  v -  Doherty" (1858) 4 . k & J . 367, affd*
1858, 2De G.& J . 614j H The Wild Banger** 1862, Lush, 553 J  even when 
th e  in c id en t occurred in  the S o len t. |"The Saxonia and the E c lip se ”
Lush. 410*4*SC^)j So fa r  as regards the r u le s  fo r  preventing  
c o l l i s io n s  a t sea ,th isV h s a grea t inconvenience to  sh ipp ing, fo r  i t  
meant th at when a B r it is h  sh ip  met another sh ip  on the h igh  s e a s , i t  
had to  adopt one course i f  the other sh ip  were B r it ish  and another i f  
i t  were foreign^ £ Marsden, C o llis io n s  at Sea p .216] and w ith  regard to  
the l im ita t io n  o f the l i a b i l i t y  o f  shipowners, i t  r e su lte d  in  such 
le g a l anom alies as th e  d ec is io n  in  the "ljj£Lld Banger” jl8 6 2  Lush. 553) 
a cause o f  c o l l i s io n  between a B r it is h  and an American ship  in  which 
the la t t e r  was at fa u lt ;  although by a B r it is h  jitatu te^ sh ipow ners, 
and by an American s ta tu te  a l l  shipowners haul a lim ite d  l i a b i l i t y ^  
th e  American defendantu&s not e n t it le d  to  lim ite d  l i a b i l i t y ,  butWfcs 
l i a b le  in  f u l l  according to  the o ld  genera l maritime lawj 
E h glish  Court had to  apply the o ld  maritime law except where i t  had 
been a lte r e d  by a B r it is h  s t a t u t e ,  and though i t  had been a lte r e d  by 
a B r it is h  s ta tu te  as regards B r it is h  shipowners, t h i s  had not been  
done as regards fo re ig n  shipow ners.
The confusion  about the reg u la tio n s  fo r  preventing  c o l l i s io n s
at sea and l im ita t io n  o f l i a b i l i t y  we*e reso lv ed  by th e  Merchant
4c 'X
Shipping Act 1862* [25 So 26^ V iet. c . 63/ whi-eh^provided, as regards  
reg u la tio n s  fo r  p reven tin g  c o l l i s i o n s ,  that whenever fo re ig n  sh ip s
j
w ere/
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were w ith in  B r it is h  ju r is d ic t io n ,  the reg u la tio n s  fo r  preventing  
o o l l l s i o n s  contained in  the Act should apply to such fo re ig n  sh ip s /  
and th a t in  any cas es a r is in g  in  any B r it is h  Court concerning  
m atters happening w ith in  the B r it is h  ju r is d ic t io n ,  fo re ig n  ships^be 
trea ted  as i f  they were B r it is h  sh ip s) fu r th er , that whenever any 
fo r e ig n  country was w i l l in g  that th e r eg u la tio n s  for  p reventing  
c o l l i s io n s  should apply to th e ir  sh ip s when beyond th e l im it s  o f  
B r it is h  j u r is d ic t io n ,  Her Majesty could by Order in  Council provide 
th a t the r eg u la tio n s  d id  so apply, £ Secs L f l l  and LVlllJ The
present Merchant Shipping Act o f  1894 [57 & 58 Viet* c . 6© sec 424jji 
h a £ ; s im ila r  p r o v is io n s . The e x is t in g  s ta tu to r y  reg u la tio n s  for  
p reven tin g  c o l l i s io n s  a t se a £ made under sec-418 o f  the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 by Order in  Council o f the 13th October, 191G*
Note th at during the war these'Hfee suspended by Defence (General) 
R egulation  4 3 , made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) A ct, 1939^ 
have been agreed to  by most maritime n a tio n s, and the King has provided  
by Order in  Council th a t the r eg u la tio n s  sh a ll apply to  th e ir  sh ip s *
( l3 th |;  October 191o)----------      -
----------- -— — I f  & c o l l i s io n  occurs between a B r it is h  v e s s e l and a
v e s se l o f  a S ta te  concerning Jh&f no Order in  Council has bejn  made, 
however* presumably our sta tu to r y  r u le s  would be ignored acd the o ld  
gen era l maritime law applied.. £"Th,e Z o llverein "  M The Saxonia and the  
Mol1paaw , supra; see M The Kaning Willem 1* 1903^ P. 114) D icey  
p# 780nf p .782) Marsden p .213J
The /Merohant Shipping Act 1862 provided , as regards 
l im ita t io n  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  th a t i t  should apply to  the owners o f  any 
sh ip , whether % it i s h  or fo re ig n  £sec  L iv j , and it\«®s h eld  to  apply
no m atter where th e  c o l l i s i o n  occurred . *The Amalia” 1863* 1 Mo®.
1,1
p.C. (N .S .) 484} Sec. 503 o f the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, th a t  
i s  th e  present s ta tu to r y  l im ita t io n  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  ift a lso  s ta te d  t o  
be a p p lica b le  to  the owners o f  sh ip s both B r it is h  and fo re ig n  and
t h e /
24 -
the d e c is io n  mentioned w i l l  be ap p lica b le  under i t .  [ s e e  a lso
Merchant Shipping (L ia b il i t y  o f Shipowners) Act 1898, 61 & 62
V ie t ,c .  I4j Merchant Shipping (L ia b i l i t y  o f  Shipowners and Others)
Aot 19€SO, 63 & 64^ V ie t , c . 32j and Merchant Shipping Act 1921,
11 & 12 Geo. 5 c 28. sec l j  The le g is la tu r e ,  having corrected
i t s  m istake by th e Merchant Shipping Acts 1862 and 1894, ha5 been
ca re fu l to  provide in  subsequent Acts which modify the o ld  general
apf* Iy
maritime law , th a t they sh ou ld^ u n iversa lly , Thus the
Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 [  48 & 49^ Viet, c* 49] en actin g  an
In te rn a tio n a l Convention on submarine te legrap h s signed
in  1884, a p p lie s  to  the whole o f  her M ajesty’ s Dominions, to  a l l
p la c e s  w ith in  the ju r is d ic t io n  o f the Admiral o f  England, and to
a l l  p la c e s  where l e r  M ajesty has ju r isd ic tio n ^  [Sec h J and the
p r o v is io n s  o f  the Maritime Conventions Act 1911., [ l  & 2 Geo V| c .
57j| which was passed  as a r e s u lt  o f  two In tern a tio n a l Conventions
on c o l l i s io n s  and sa lvage r e s p e c t iv e ly  which were signed at
B ru sse ls  in  1910, apply in  a l l  ca ses  heard and determined in  any
Court having ju r is d ic t io n  to  dea l w ith  the case and in  whatever w aters
the damage or lo s s  in  q u estion  was caused* or the sa lvage se r v ic e s
in  q u estio n  ren d ered .[sec  9 (3) Other A cts enacting  In tern a tio n a l
Conventions have a lso*  been passed^e. g .  Merchant Shipping
(In te r n a tio n a l Labour Conventions) Act 1925,15 & 16 Geo 5. c . 4 2 ,
en actin g  a Convention adopted by the In tern a tio n a l Labour O rganisation
o f  the League o f  N ations at the General Conference a t Genoa- in  1925
as to  our unemployment indem nity payable to  seamen on th e lo s s  o f  
w&sJ-th e ir  shij j^feferatt however a p p lie s  only to  sh ips r e g is te r e d  in  cer ta in  
p arts i f  the B r it is h  Empire i f  6)) and the Merchant Shipping Act 
1932; 22 & 23. Geo 5 c .9 ren actin g  a convention signed  a t London in
*1 VA-
193$ r e la t in g  to  load l in e s  e t c . /  B u ^ at le a s t  one com paratively
recen t instance^ a s ta tu to r y  change in  th e o ld  gen era l maritime
- 2  5-
law was not madia to  apply s u f f i c ie n t ly  u n iv e r sa lly  to  avoid c o n f lic t*  
The In tern a tio n a l Convention o f September 23^ 191® provided by .art* 5 
th a t " She l i a b i l i t y  Imposed by the preceding a r t i c l e s  a tta ch es  in  
oases where the c o l l i s io n  i s  caused by th e fa u lt  o f  a p i lo t  even when 
the p i lo t  i s  carr ied  by compulsion o f law” and the P ilo ta g e  Act 1913 Sue.
s o
15 { l)/venacted , which i s  contrary to the ru le  under the old  
maritime law and 3* 633 o f the Merchant Shipping A ct, 1894$ but See 61 
o f  the P ilo ta g e  Act 1913 confined  the a p p lica tio n  o f the Act to  the
U n i i v J
and the I s l e  o f  Man, and when a c o l l i s io n  occurred at G ibraltar  
when a compulsory p i lo t  was in  charge e# -4 4 , I t  was h eld  th a t as the  
old  law had not been changed th ere , i t  s t i l l  app lied  , and the owners 
Were not l ia b le .  ["The Arum” 1921 p. 12j Further, power was g iven  
in  the Merchant Shipping (Equivalent P rov ision s) Act 1925; f l5  & 16
Geo* 5* §*c.37| to make Orders in  Council where His M ajesty i s 
s a t i s f ie d  th a t th e  sh ips, o f a fo re ig n  country are required by th e ir  own 
law to  comply w ith any p ro v is io n s  which are su b s ta n t ia lly  the same 
as, or eq u a lly  e f f e c t iv e  w ith , the p ro v is io n s  o f  the Merchant Shipping  
Acts which apply to fo re ig n  sh ip s w h ile  they are w ith in  a port o f  the  
U nited Kingdom, and th a t that country has made p ro v is io n  fo r  the  
exemption o f  B r it is h  ip s  w h ile  in  a port o f  the fo re ig n  country from 
the corresponding requirement o f th e ir  law , to  th e  e f f e c t  that such 
p r o v is io n s  o f the Merchant Shipping Acts sh a ll  not apply to  the  
fo r e ig n  sh ip s  w h ile  w ith in  a port o f the United Kingdom i f  i t  i s  
proved that the sh ip  com plies w ith  the fo re ig n  law. (se e  1 . See 
Merchant Shipping (W ire less  Telegraphy) French Ships Order, S.R.& ® 
1926, No. 218£ Merchant Shipping (Passenger Steamers & Emigrant Ships) 
I ta l ia n  Ships Order S.R & O* 1929. No. 1154j
genera l maritime law as ap p lied  in  our Courts, as m odified  by B r it is h
“fvfla t * .
s t a t u t e s .  The s ta tu te s  th at modify i t  &«e now, g e n e r a lly  speaking,
To sum up, in  q u estion s o f  damage to  property by s h ip s} 
our Courts apply on ly  the S c o ttish  Maritime
u n iv e r s a l/
*4.
Meaning
o f
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u n iv ersa l a p p lica tio n  to  a l l  sh ip s in  a l l  w aters , [pee however "The 
Arumt>, supraj ju s t  as the o ld  gen era l maritime law ha^ u n iv ersa l 
a p p lic a t io n , so , In a l l  oaoe-g a r is in g  in  our Courto, the maritime -l aw
-of  the forum o n ly - i-9- ap p lio d , ---------  -       • —---------
------------  —  jj; may remarked th a t jwat as the a p p lica tio n  o f  the
o ld  maritime law o f Scotland could  be j u s t i f i e d  in  the past on the  
ground th a t itwfos our in te r p r e ta t io n  o f a g e n e r a lly  recognised  system  
o f  law , so now the a p p lica tio n  o f  the old  maritime law as m odified  
by B r it is h  s ta tu te s  can be j u s t i f i e d  in  p r in c ip le  by observing th a t  
the s ta tu to r y  a lt e r a t io n s ,  such as the l im ita t io n  o f the l i a b i l i t y  
o f  shipowners add the new r u le s  fo r  p reventing  c o l l i s io n s  at sea ,  
have now been made the su bject o f in te r n a tio n a l agreem ent. Our 
Courts s t i l l  apply the law o f the forum in  maritime q u estio n s , and i t  
i s  s t i l l  j u s t i f i e d  because i t  i s  s t i l l  our in te r p r e ta tio n  o f a 
homogeneous maritime law#
The npropertyrt need not be ahother sh ip  or cargo, but may be a  p ier  
or—land ing stage^ j"The V erita s” 19©1 P. 3©4, per Gtorell Barnes, J# 
at p. 311: McMillan p. 16lJ or a submarine ca b l^  ^Submarine Telegraph
-  v & Dickson (1864) 15# C.B. ( 1 ,3 .)  759jr. Cheshire p. 3B8f See 
the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, 48 & 49 Viet# c .  49j| or the case  
may be the in v a sio n  by one sh ip  o f  a r ig h t th at another sh ip  has 
acquired to  a sea animal l ik e  a whale, [  Su tter -  v -  Aberdeen ^ r ti c C6. 
1861^ 23f D. 465, Revd# 4 McQueen 355; Addison -  v -  Row. 1794^ 3?  P a t. 
334Jc D icey g iv e s  a d if fe r e n t  ru le  fo r  w h a les ,p . 77oJ or to  a wrecks 
o f which i t  had taken p o s s e s s io n ,£  ” The Tubantia” 1924^ P. 7 8 0  
But not a l l  in v a sio n s  o f r ig h ts  o f  property from sh ip s are 
comprehended, fo r  when an a c tio n  in  to rtw ia  brought ag a in st a B r it is h  
•aaval w ^ ic e r  fo r  the wrongful se izu re  o f  goods from a B r it is h  sh ip  
w hile w ith in  the t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters o f  Muscat, the House o f  Lords h e ld  
t h a t /
27
th a t the q uestion  was ru led  by the normal p r in c ip le s  in  cases o f  t o r t ,
were la id  down in  P h il l ip s  -  v -  Byres £carr -  v -  F racis Times
& Co* 1902|r A* C* 176j t h is  was not a maritime q u estio n , s im ila r
to  th a t a r is in g  from a c o l l i s io n  between ships. ^Owners o f  s*s*"Reresby
~ Y -  Owners o f s* s . "Cobetas", sfcpra, per Lord Blackburn a t p . 722^
To the ru le  that a l l  q u estion s o f  damage to  property by a
• sh ip  are to  be governed by the maritime law o f  Scotland a lon e, th ere
are two e x c e p tio n s :-
( i )  S p ecia l r eg u la tio n s  as to  navigation^  in  a fo re ig n  port
or r iv er ,w h ich  have been imposed by the l i t t o r a l  s t a t e ,  have to
be observed by a l l  sh ip s , in c lu d in g  B r it is h  sh ip s , fa i lu r e  to  observe
the reg u la tio n s  may be r e l ie d  on as showing f a u l t ,  and i f  one sh ip  i s
exempt from l i a b i l i t y  because i t  has observed the r e g u la tio n s , ou i
Courts could not hold th a t i t  i s  l ia b le  because o f some o f our ru les*
| ”The Chat wood” 1936^ P. 272; The Sheaf Steamship Co. Ltd -  v -  THE
Companla Transmedit Orrane ah 1930/: S*C* 666; "The Hagen " 1908jp
P. 189, at p . 263; "The Maria C ristina"  66|L1*L* Rep* 256; "The
M elrose Abbey" and the"Pan Europe" 63^ LI *LRep. 291J "The Polo"
It,I L X  0.^0}
^ "The Fairplay" XXVtR0*2) 63#  Ll.L* Rep. 210) "The Malhooa Maru"
6 1 / L l.L . 161, OEnrT* ffoOl 2 9 3 ] ---------  —..
----------------------  i t  should t>e n o ticed  th at i f  the cause o f  a c tio n  arose
in  fo re ig n  t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters and fo r e ig n  port reg u la tio n s  were an 
is s u e , i t  i s  q u ite  l i k e l y ; that the Scots Courts would refu se  to  
e x e r c ise  ju r isd ic t io n ,(a ssu m in g  th a t they had i t )  on the ground o f  
forum non con ven iens, e s p e c ia l ly  i f  both o f  the sh ip s were fo r e ig n .
jThe Sheaf Steamship Co.Ltd* s u p r j
e n b c P  o f  a  5h ni*  co r  po ra*
( i i )  When the q u estion  i s  w hether^the--defender i s  resp o n sib le
under the corporeCti on
fo r  the a c ts  o f  the actu a l wrongdoer, the law appropri a te  to the -s ta tu s
w*5 Incorporate
.e£-tho aofeader may have to  be examined* T|pis in  general Steam 
N avigation  Co* -  v -  G u illo u |{1845) 11. M & W* 877j an a c tio n  in  
England/^
England by B r it is h  A&ipowners aga in st a person whowaA a d ir e c to r  
and A^areholder o f  a French corporation  whose ship  had c o llid e d  w ith  
th e irs^  Itw iA  pled that by French law the defendantwas not resp on sib le
jLd
fo r  th e n eg ligen ce  o f  the master o f  the French sh ip , but on ly  th a tA
the m aster or the corporation  were. The Court o f Exchequer thought 
th a t , assuming t h is  p lea  to  mean that th e  defendantw&s not liab lfe  
at a l l  by the law o f France fo r  the Acts o f the master, thatw&s a good 
d efen ce. I t  i s  obvious th at the nature o f the C orporation, th e  r ig h t t  
o f  i t s  members in te r  s e , and the p o s it io n  o f th ird  p a r t ie s  v i s - a - v is  
the corporation , could only  be determined by referen ce to the law under
an
which the body was incorporated . But t h is  is ^ e n t ir e ly  d if fe r e n t  
is s u e  to  th a t ra ised  i f  the owner o f the defendant sh ip ,^ p led  th a t  
by h is  n a tio n a l law , or by the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  whether in d iv id u a l 
.at Crumpsny. hevjws not l ia b le  fo r  the d e l i c t s  o f h is  master and crew 
because the ru le  o f  respondeat superior was not recogn ised  by that law. 
That would be an ir r e le v a n t  d efen ce , fo r  the q u estion  whether the ru le  
respondeat superior a p p lie s  or n ot, i s  fo r  our own maritime law.
The heonH 1881^ P. 76> Mar&den p. 213J
In nThe M. Moxham” Jl876 1.P.D.107] An E nglish  Company, 
p ossessed  o f a p ie r  in  a port in  Spain, In s t itu te d  an a c tio n  o f  damages 
in  the E nglish  Courts a g a in st an E n glish  4$ip  fo r  n e g lig e n t ly  in ju r in g  
the p ie r .  The ^Aipowners r e p lie d  th a t by the law o f  Spain only  the  
master and crewwAre l ia b le  fo r  n eg lig en t n a v ig a tio n , and not the owners, 
and t h is  p lea  was upheld . This case i s  o ften  r e l ie d  on fo r  the 
p ro p o sitio n s  that i f  there i s  no l i a b i l i t y  by the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  
th ere i s  no l i a b i l i t y ,  and th a t the a p p lic a b i l i t y  or not o f  the ru le  
respondeat superior depends on the l ex l o c i  d e l i c t i . jMarsden pp 214, 21dj 
But in  tru th  the ease e s ta b lis h e s  no such r u le s .  The true p r in c ip le s  
ares fo r  d e l i c t s  occurring on land , th ere i s  no l i a b i l i t y  u n le ss  th ere  
i s  l i a b i l i t y  by the le x  l o c i  d e l i c t i , and the a p p lic a b i l i ty  or not o f  
the ru le  / respondeat su p e r io r »■ depends on the l ex lo c i  d e l i c t i ;  fo r
d e l i c t s /
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in  f o f ; tvrpj"tor*!a( iA/A?e/*>;
d e l i c t s  occurring at sea,^ (^Owners o f  s .  s.°R eresbyw — v -  Owners o f  
_8« s .  Cobetasw 1923 | S.L.T 719] the maritime law o f the forum alone  
i s  a p p lic a b le , and the a p p lic a b i l i ty  or not o f th e ru le  respondeat 
superior depends on the maritime law o f the forum. The d e c is io n  in  
wThe M. Moxham"^though adm itted ly  not some o f the d ic ta ,  does not 
tra n g ress , but a c ts  upon th ese  p r in c ip le s .  T^e E bglish  Courts haW 
no ju r isd ic t io n ,b e c a u se  itv& s an a c tio n  of d e l ic t  about fo re ig n  
immoveables, (see  post p. Jj But the sh ip  had been arrested  in  
Spain- and re lea sed  upi>n an agreement th a t a l l  rem edies aga in st the 
sh ip  and aga in st the owners should be tr ie d  in  th is  country. T&is
gave ju r is d ic t io n  by co n tra c t, and the E nglish  Courts had to  decide
the case as the Spanish Courts would have done. The defender  
adm itted that he could not succeed u n le ss  he showed th at i t  would 
have been the duty o f  the Spahish Courts to  apply th e E nglish  £&&•
Of course the Spanish Courts would have done no such th in g , but would 
have app lied  Spanish £&w/  e ith e r  on the ground th a t in  maritime
questions' only the maritime law o f  the forum i s  a p p lied , or on th e
ground that in  regard to  immoveables only th e law o f  the s i t u s  is  
applied*
(fr tp persons , The d e lic t  may have orig in ate  and have i t s
e f f e c t  w ith in  the same sh ip /as when one member o f a crew a ssa u lts  another. 
The e f fe c t  of th is  in  crim inal law i s  as fo llo w s:-
Gn the h igh  seas the country o f  the sh ip ’ s n a t io n a li ty  
has, raokfrsive ju r is d ic t io n  in  ctim in a l m atters , ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f  the  
n a t io n a lity  o f  the o ffen d er . T his ju r is d ic t io n  i s  claim ed fo r  our 
Courts in  resp ect o f  B r it is h  v e s s e ls  on the h igh  seas by the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1 8 9 4 .£  57 & 58 V ie t. c .  60 sec. 686] Our Courts a lso  have 
ju r is d ic t io n  in  resp ect o f  orimes committed by B r it is h  su b jec ts  on a 
B r it is h  sh ip  in  fo re ig n  t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters, ( ib id ;  B. -  v  -  Anderson 
L.R. Id* C .B . 161f B .~ v -C arr 1882 X  Q,.B. D.76j but j u r is d ic t io n  i s
not claim ed w ith  regard to  n o n -B r itish  su b jec ts  on board B r it is h  sh ip s
in  fo r e ig n /
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fo r e ig n  t e r r i t o r ia l  waters,{M acDonald, Criminal Law p . 280. In th e  
E nglish  case o f  B, ■ y ■ Anderson (1868) L.B. 1 I .6 .R . lfi^ how ever, 
itWbs held  that a l l  seamen, whatever th e ir  n a t io n a lity , serv in g  on 
board a B r it ish  sh ip  in  fo re ig n  t e r r i t o r ia l  w ater s,w ie*esubject to  
th e ju r is d ic t io n  o f  the E nglish  crim inal w ourts, because the 
E nglish  Admiralty ju r is d ic t io n  so extended^• Where our Courts have 
j u r is d ic t io n  over B r it is h  su b jec ts  on B r it ish  sh ip s  in  fore ign  
t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters, the l i t t o t a l  s ta te  has a lso  a concurrent 
j u r is d ic t io n ,  i f  i t  claim s i t M jf Regina -  v -  Anderson (1868) L.R.
over the non B r it ish  su b jec ts  on board w hile  in  th e ir  t e r r i t o r ia l  
w aters . Our crim inal Courts have ju r is d ic t io n  over fo re ig n  ships 
in  our owe t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters whatever i s  the n a t io n a lity  o f  the
claim s i t ,  there may be a concurrent ju r is d ic t io n  to i t s  C ourts. 
Whenevssraa Court has crim inal ju r is d ic t io n  i t  a p p lie s  i t s  own 
law .
The admitted ex is ten ce  o f concurrent ju r is d ic t io n s  r a is e s  
a d i f f i c u l t  problem o f  P rivate  In tern a tio n a l Law where the 
q u estion  i s  not crim inal r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  but c i v i l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .
I f  the in c id en t occurs on the high seas the m atter i s  sim ple, 
the law of the n a t io n a lity  o f the sh ip  i s  presumably the le x  lo c i
m aintainable botfiby the law o f the n a t io n a li ty  o f  the sh ip  and by 
the le x  f o r i .  But where the in c id en t occurs in  t e r r i t o r ia l  w aters, 
i s  the law to  be looked a t that o f  the l i t t o r a l  s ta te  or th a t o f  
the sh ip ’ s n a t io n a l i ty .?  The so lu t io n  o f  the m atter i s  probably  
in d ica te d  by the dictum  o f  an E nglish  judge s -  ” When v e s s e ls  go 
in to  a fo re ig n  port they must resp eet the laws o f  th a t n a tio n , to  
which the port b elon gs; but they must a lso  resp ec t th e  laws o f  the  
n a tio n  to  which th e  v e s se l belongs?  [  R. -  v -  Anderson |1 868) L.B.
l i t t o r a l  s ta te  o f course hajr ju r is d ic t io n
offender. { T e r r ito r ia l Waters ju r is d ic t io n  Act 1878^ Sec. 2 ,41 & 
4 2 | P lo t .  c .  73) I f  the law o f the n a t io n a lity  o f the ship
and any c la im ,to  be e x ig ib le ,  must bed e l i c t i
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L« R. 4Si»lC.C.R. ® o v i l l» C .J a t  p . 166j Thus a claim
for  rep aration  i s  e x ig ib le  i f  i t  i s  m aintainable e ith e r  by the law 
o f  the l i t t o r a l  s ta te  jor by the law o f  the n a t io n a lity  o f the sh ip , 
and i s  a lso  m aintainable by the le x  f o r i x However the d e l ic t  may 
have commenced on one sh ip  and taken e f f e c t  on another, as when one sh ip , 
through the n eg lig en ce  o f i t s  crew; rams another and in ju res  someone 
on board the o th er , ti/hen both sh ip s are o f  the same n a t io n a li ty ,  the  
law a p p lica b le  i s  that o f the common n a t io n a li ty .  ^A rticle  o f  the 
Antwerp Congress o f 1885, a f te r  quoted, which was adopted in  Kendrick
f
-  v -  Burnett 1897^ 25|R . 82 , and Convery -  v -  Lanarkshire Tramways Coy
1905 8 ,» .  117} and presumably the claim  would have a lso  to  be e x ig ib le
by the le x  f o r i . When the sh ip s are o f d if fe r e n t  n a t io n a lity ^ !  To 
found a cla im  there must be a concurrence between the law o f the country
o f  the in ju rer  and the in ju red    the person convened as defender
cannot be made l ia b le  u n le ss  th ese  two fa c to r s  concur: •ftjr.st th a t he
i s  l ia b le  to  the claim  made a g a in st him by the laws o f  h is  own country, 
and in  the seioojad p la c e , th at the in ju red  would be e n t it le d  by the law s  
o f  h is  country to what he claim s? ^Kendrick -  v -  Burnett 1897 25. R.
per Lord Robertson at 91• But see  Davi&sson -  v -  H ill  1901 
2 | K. B* 6 0 6 j. By"the laws o f  hjbs own country* Lord Robertson in  the
abotre passage meant the law o f the f la g  o f  h is  s h i p . |convery -  v -
Lanarkshire Tramways Coy 19C;5y 8 .F . 117 p er  Lord Pres. Dunedin at $  ^*^1 
a r t ic l e  o f  the Antwerp C ongress^i»-ae-^o 11 owe : -  nLf abordage en p le in  
mer, en tre deux n a v ires  de meme n a t io n a l i t e ,  e s t  roglo  par la  l o i  
n a t io n a ls . 3 i l e s  n a v ires  sont de n a t io n a li te  d if f e r e n te ,  chacun e s t  
o b lig e  dans la  l im it s  de la  l o i  de son p a v ilio n  e t  ne peut rec ev o ir  p lu s  
que c e t t e  l o i  lu i  a t t r ib u e * |.  I t  has not been la id  dpwn whether the  
claim  must a lso  be e x ig ib le  by the le x  f o r i  as w e ll as by the laws o f
th e f la g s  o f  both sh ip s , but probably i t  w i l l  have to  b e .
!
This ru le  i s  sound in  p r in c ip le .  A sh ip  on the High 3eas 
i s  fo r  many purposes to  be regarded as a f lo a t in g  is la n d  o f  the country  
to  which she belongs^, The law o f  the country to  which she belongs
p r e v a i l s /
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p r e v a ils  on board, and the persons on board are bound to obey th a t  
law# I t  i s  th erefore  proper th a t the r ig h tfu l, n ess  or w rongfulness
and the le g a l e f f e c t s  o f the a c tio n s  o f  persons on board should be 
judged by th a t law# But the law o f the o ther sh ip  must come in to  
co n sid era tio n  also# fo r  a d e l i c t  i s  considered  to  have happened where 
i t s  e f f e c t s  occu r, and persons on board the other ship  may w ell 
be sa id  to  have en trusted  them selves to  the laws o f  i t s  country.
The law o f the other country cannot be looked at s o le ly ,  fo r  i t  would 
be u n fa ir  to  the o ffender to  su bject him to  a law about which he may 
have known n oth in g?or w ith  which he may have had a b so lu te ly  no 
con n ection . In short the laws o f  both sh ips must be looked a t .
 ----------- — Perhaps, however, i t  would be sounder to  say th a t the
laws to  be looked at are the iaws o f the n a t io n a lity  o f  the sh ip s ,  
and n o t. the laws o f  the f la g s  o f the sh ip s , fo r  they are not always 
the same, and i f  the sh ip  were tr u ly  a B r it is h  sh ip  because the  
ownersufcre B r i t is h ,  the fa c t  th a t i t  carr ied  a fo re ig n  f la g  would not 
make the fo re ig n  law the one to  be looked a t .  ^Chartered M ercantile  
Bank o f  India -  v -  Netherlands India Steam N avigating  Co. (1883)
10^ Q .B#D .52lj^    -  — ............. ............... ...................... ............. ............. ...............
 _ The law o f  the n a t io n a lity  o f a B r it ish  sh ip  i s  the law
o f the country' to  which the ship  i s  attached  by r e g is t r a t io n .  Thus 
fo r  a B r it is h  sh ip  r e g is te r e d  a t London, the law o f  the n a tio n a lity  
i s  E nglish  £aw, and fo r  a B r it is h  sh ip  r e g is te r e d  at Glasgow, the law 
o f  th e n a t io n a lity  i s  Scots law. jp icey  p. 686^
D e lio ts  in  u n c iv il is e d  or u n se tt le d  C oun tries.
When a d e l i c t  i s  a lle g e d  to  have been committed in  u n se tt le d  
t e r r ito r ijH , the ru le  i s  su pp lied  by the p r in c ip le , that"Svery  
person carr ied  w ith  him in  such circum stances so much o f the laws o f  
h is  n a tiv e  country; as i s  n ecessary  for  the reg u la tio n  o f  the  
ordinary a f f a ir s  o f  l i f e ?  jkendrlck  -  k -  B u rn ett, 1897^ 25fR. 82^
per Lord McLaren at p . 88j Thus i f  a Frenchman d om iciled  in  France 
a s s a u l t e d /
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a ssa u lted  another Frenchman dom iciled  in  France in  an u n se tt le d  
country , the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  would be French and the le x  fo r i  
would a lso  have to be s a t i s f ie d  before a claim  became ex ig ib le *  
When the n a tiv e  co u n tr ies  o f  the two persons are d i f f e r e n t , e . g .  
i f  a Dutchman dom iciled in  Holland a ssa u lted  a Frenchman dom iciled  
in  France in  an u n se tt le d  country, two fa c to r s  would have to  concur*A
m  ^ the o ffen d er would have to  be l ia b le  to the claim  made aga in st  
him by the laws o f  h is  own country, and the in jured  party
would have to  be e n t it le d  by the laws o f  h is  country to  what he 
claim s, [ib id ; D icey p. 88 lj and the le x  f o r i , i f  d i f f e r e n t ,  wowld 
presumably a lso  have to  be s a t is f ie d ?  I f  the q u estion  has to be 
s e t t le d  “M e laws o f  h is  own country” means the laws o f h is
r
n a t io n a li ty  or o f h is  d o m ic ile , con sid erab le d i f f i c u l t y  w i l l  a r ise -  
In Kendrick -  v -  Burnett Jsupraj the judges are obv iou sly  th in k in g  
o f the law o f the d o m ic ile?but doubt e x i s t s  as to the correctn ess  
o f  t h e ir  view because o f a la t e r  case, ^Convery -  v -  Lanarkshire 
tramways Coy 1905 ByF. 117j per Lord Pres Dunedin at p 12lJ When 
B r it is h  su b jec ts  go to  u n se ttle d  co u n tr ies  they  would appear to  take  
E nglish  law w ith  them, no m atter Whether they are dom iciles/ in  
.Sbgland or iSobtland, fo r  i t  i s  always E nglish  $aw which has become
esta b lish e d  in  our c o lo n ie s . I t  i s  subm itted th a t aet'l the law o f  
h is  own country would mean the law o f  h is  n a t io n a li ty ,  and when the  
n a t io n a lity  i s  B r it is h ,  the law o f  England.
D e lic t s  aga in st Foreign Immoveablesi
Our Courts have no ju r is d ic t io n  to e n te r ta in  a c tio n s  fo r  damages -in
\
resp ect o f  d e l i c t s  to fo re ig n  immoveables, [ ir s k .  I n s t .  1 ,2 ,  17j
Duncan & Dykes pp 21 , 136} B r it is h  South A frica  Company -  v -  The
Companhia De Mocambique, 1893, k.C . 602 .(House o f Lords)} Cheshire p. 305
1 P. .
D iceyp.203} In wThe M. Moxham” 1876 *6  -page 107, the p a r t ie s  had 
consented to the ju r is d ic t io n  o f  the E nglish  Courts. In^The Golaa” 1926 p 103 
the p o in t was not tak enj
Dicey states that warlike operations undertaken by 
order of a foreign goveminent against British territory 
create no civil liability. / p. 2 1 5 He gives as an 
example /~*p» 218 Example 11 _J X, an alien enemy in 
charge of hostile forces, landing in England and 
destroying A's property. X revisits England after 
peace has been declared. A brings an action to 
recover damages for the injury done by X to his property. 
The Court, says Dicey, has no jurisdiction. Dow if X 
lands here and commits an act contrary to Public Inter- 
.'national Law he is, according to Public International 
Lai/jpunishable either in our Courts ,./~E-g. Art 29 of 
the Geneva Convention of 1929 provides: “The Governments 
of the High Contracting parties v/iul likewise adopt, or 
lay before their legislative assemblies for adoption, 
in the event of the inadequacy of their criminal laws, 
the necessary measures for the prosecution in war time 
of any action contravening the provision of the present 
Convention.” Cp . The Washington Conference 1921 Art. 5_J 
or in special International Courts set up for the purpose 
/~E.g. The Treaty of Versailles 1919 Articles 227, 228; 
The Treaty of St. Germain 1919 Art. 173; The Five 
Power Agreement of August 8th 1945 setting up the 
Nuremberg Court for the trial of the chief Nazi criminals 
The only reason for saying that X is not responsible in 
private law for a civil wrong is that his action is 
authorized by the state. But it is beyond the power 
of his state to authorise acts which are contrary to 
Public International Law. The question whether X is 
liable for delict therefore should depend on whether his 
act is contrary to Public International Law or not.
/“Op. F-A. Mann LIX L.Q..R. at p. 46_/ Any act contrary 
to the laws and usages of war such as the use of poison 
gas/
gas would, make X liable, and since an aggressive war 
can now be said to be contrary to Public International 
Law^ / Covenant of the League of Nations Art. 16; 
Briand-Kellogg Pact 1928; Five Power Agreement of 
August 8th 1945, Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal Art. 6 (a); Charter of the United Nations 
Organisation Arts. 1 and 2 (b) and (4) at passim;
Lord Wright 1946 62 L.^.R. 40^7 &ny act performed 
by X in pursuance of such a war which caused damage 
would be a delict.
THE REMEDY t
T h e  t-ex f o r i  g o v e r n s  a l l  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  r e m e d y ,  D o n -  v  -
L l p p m a n n  1 8 3 7  2 5 . &  llcL.682j C h e s h i r e  p. 63 2*  D i c e y  p. 8 4 9 *
&  ^W e s t l a k e ^ 3 4 1 ~  352$ B a r  pp. 8 4 5  e t  s e qo j  -
*  T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t a k e n  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o n t r a c t  a n d  t h e  r e m e d y *  W h a t e v e r  
r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  n a t n r e  o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  v - >  a d  v a l o r e m  c o n t r a c t u s , •’v 
i s  t o  b e  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  i t v ^ s  m a d e  1 ^ t h e  
l e x  l o c i ; w h a t e v e r  r e l a t e s  to t h e  r e m e d y ,  b y  s u i t s  t o  c o m p e l  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  
o r  b y  a c t i o n  f o r  a  b r e a c h  .-r- a d  d e c l s i o n e m  l i t i s , .:h. i s  t o  b e
g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  l e x  f o r i  t h a t  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  w h o s e  c o u r t s  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  m a d e  f o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  o r  f o r  d a m a g e s ?  - - - - - -
J D o n  -  v  -  L l p p m a n n  1 8 3 7  25. &  McL. 6 8 2  p e r  L d  B r o u g h a m  a t  p* 72 sJ
LtrTCI
T h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  r u l e  i s  s u c c i n c t l y  s t a t e d  b y gbdu B r o u g h a m
i n  t h e  c a s e  j u s t  q u o t e d  f r o m ; *  T h e  m a n i f e s t  i n c o n v e n i e n c e  o f  C o u r t s  
p r o c e e d i n g  i n  d i f f e r e n t  w a y s ,  a c c o r d i n g  a s  t h e  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  o f  e a c h  
s u i t ^  m a y  h a v e  o r i g i n a t e d  i n  o n e  c o u n t r y ^  o r  i n  a n o t h e r  a n d  h a v i n g  t o  
a s c e r t a i n  i n  e a c h  c a s e  w h i c h  c o m e s  f r o m  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  
t h e  c o u r t s  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,  r e n d e r s  i t  a b s o l u t e l y  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  s u c h  
q u e s t i o n s  o f  p r o c e d u r e  s h o u l d  b e  e x c l u d e d ,  a n d  t h e  r u l e  b e  a d o p t e d  
r e q u i r e s  a l l  s u i t o r s  t o  t a k e  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  t h e y  f i n d  i t . *  
[ P 7 2 S J ? - - - - - - - - -
  I t  w o u l d  b e  a b s u r d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  f o r  a  S c o t s m a n  s u i n g  a b r o a d
f o r  d a m a g e s  f o r  d e f a m a t i o n  t o  c l a i m  a  j u r y  t r i a l  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  
m e r i t s  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  i w ^ t o  b e  g o v e r n e d  b y  S o o t s  t a w ,  a n d  t h a t  i n  
S c o t l a n d  h e  w o u l d  o b t a i n  a  j u r y  t r i a l ,  w h e n  p e r h a p s  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  o f  t h e  
f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  has! n o  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  i m p a n e l l i n g  j u r i e s  a n d  k n e w  
n o t h i n g  o f  jurjr p r a c t i c e .
T h e  m o s t  h e l p f u l  w a y  o f  d e f i n i n g  " R e m e d y * , w i l l  b e  t o  e n u m e r a t e  
t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  l e g a l  r u l e s  w h i c h  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  
r e m e d y /
r e m e d y .  T h e y  a r e  f i v e  i n  nuJaber (I) R u l e s  l i m i t i n g  t h e  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n ,  
e i t h e r  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  (&) £ h e  t i m e  w i t h i n  w h i c h  a n  a c t i o n  m u s t  b e  
b r o u g h t ,  o r  (b) £ h e  g r o u n d s  o f  a c t i o n ;  (2) R u l e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
p r o o e d u r e  i n  b r i n g i n g  a n d  c o n d u c t i n g  a n  a c t i o n ;  (3) R u l e s  o f  e v i d e n c e ;
(4) R u l e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  r e m e d i e s  w h i c h  t h e  C o u r t s  w i l l  g r a n t  a n d  t h e  
m e a n s  o f  e n f o r c i n g  t h e  C o u r t s *  O r d e r s ;  (5) Q u e s t i o n s  o f  p r i o r i t y  a m o n g  
c o m p e t i n g  c r e d i t o r s .
(1) R U L E S  LIMITIMCr T H E  R I G H T  O P  A C T I O B  
ta} I n  A s p e c t  o f  t h e  t i m e  w i t h i n  w h i c h  a n  a c t i o n  m u s t  b e  b r o u g h t .
R u l e s  w h i c h  p r o v i d e  t h a t  i f  a c t i o n  i s  n o t  b r o u g h t  w i t h i n  a  
c e r t a i n  t i m e  e i t h e r  it c a n  n o t  b e  r a i s e d  a t  a l l ,  o r  t h a t  t h e  m o d e  o f  
p r o o f  i s  a l t e r e d  o r  t h e  o n u s  o f  p r o o f  s h i f t e d ,  a r e  a p p l i e d  i f  t h e y  a r e  
t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  l e x  f o r i , a n d  i f  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a r e  i g n o r e d .  £  S e e  
" P r e s c r i p t i o n ” p a g e  ]
(b) I n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  g r o u n d s  o f  n o t i o n .
M a n y  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  r u l e s  t h a t  n o  a c t i o n  m a y  b e  b r o u g h t  w h e r e  
t h e  g r o u n d  o f  a c t i o n  I d  o f  a  c e r t a i n  k i n d *  T h u s  i t  i s  a  r u l e  o f  S o o t s
£ a w  t h a t  g a m i n g  c o n t r a c t s  c a n n o t  b e  e n f o r c e d  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  s p o n e i o n e s
f >  •  6 3 a * ’ N o J L ^ ' x r !
l u d i c r a e ,  u n w o r t h y  t o  o c c u p y  j u d i c i a l  t i m e .  h S u c h  r u l e s  a r e  a p p l i e d  i f  itc &. ^
/ \  o aJUau/h.
t h e y  a r e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  l e x  f o r i » a n d  o t h e r w i s e  a r e  i g n o r e d .  B u t  a  l a w  
t h a t  a  g a m i n g  c o n t r a c t  i s  I l l e g a l  a n d  v o i d  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  
v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  a n d  t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  r u l e s .
(2) R D L E 3  R E L A T I N G  T O  T H E  P R O C E D U R E  I N  B R I N S I N G  A R P  
CO -N L U C T IN G  A N  A C T I O H ?
R u l e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  i n  b r i n g i n g  a n d  c o n d u c t i n g  a n  a c t i o n  
are  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  l e x  t&rik T h u s  t h e  l e x  f o r i  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  «jourt
3in which the action may be brought; /_ Bar p. 88l_J the form which it
may take; Z ~MacKenzie - v - Hall 1854 I7D. 164; Don - v - Kealey 12?D.
10l6_/; the citation of the defender and of witnesses; J_ Bar pp 851 et
secHl_/' bhe conduct of a proof; whether a counter-claim is competent;
jT_ Dicey p. 851: Westlake j* 346_7 the right of appeal. /~Mrs Steele
_
(0.H.) 1894, 1 S.L.Tjh Westlake ^ 352_/sf Whether an unincorporated 
firm can be sued socio nomine or only by suing the partners individually, 
r  Paton - v - Heill Edgar & Co. (O.H.) 1873 10* S.L.R. 46lJ7, whether 
the firm has to be sued before the partners can be sued, [ Bullock - v - 
Caird 1875 X.Q.B. 276; In re Doetsch 1896 2 Ch. 836J/ and whether a 
single partner or co-obligant can be sued without calling the other partners 
or co-obligants J_ Westlake ^  3-7? but the question whether the obligation 
of the partner or co-obligant is joint and several or each is only liable 
for his own share depends on the proper l a w  of the transaction, Westlake, 
ibidJ  are to be governed by the lex fori. The House of Lords has however 
held that the question whether the principal debtor lias to be sued before 
the cautioner^or whether both can be sued in the same action?is to be 
determined by the proper law of the contract of cautionry. /  Municipal 
Council of Johannesburg v. Stewart 1909 S.C., (H.L.) 53_/
In G-eneral Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou, /(l843 ) 11 M. & \'L % T ? J  
an action in England-by Shipowners against a person who was a director and 
shareholder of a French corporation, whose ship had collided with theirs,
/ it was pled that by French law the defendant was not responsible for the 
negligence of the tffeister of the French ship, but that only the master 
or the corporation weref. Parke B., speaking for the Court of Exchequer, 
laid down this distinction: n If the defendant is not liable for the
acts of that other by the law which governs this case, he has a good 
defence to the action .... On the other hand, the plaintiff contends 
that the plea only means, that in the French Courts the mode of proceeding 
would be to sue the defender jointly with the shareholders of the Company 
under the name of their association, and if this be the true construction 
of the plea, we all concur in the opinion that/
that the plea is badn. / p .  895_/ Whether the mother of an illegitimate 
pupil child has a title to bring an action on its behalf, /  Jones v.
Sj^er veil1 s, Trs. 1907 S.C. 545_7 and v;hether an assignee or s.ttorney can 
bring an action in his own name or only in the name of the assignor or 
constituent^/ Wolff v. Oxholm 1817 6 M. & S 92 per Lord Ellenborough at 
P» 99? Jeffrey v. McTaggart (1817) 6 M & S 126; Dicey
x
p. 849; Westlake 5 342. Most of the old English cases, however, are to 
the other effect, namely that such a rule is a question of substance, and tked 
the proper'law of the transaction rules:. Innes v. Dunlop 1800 8 T.R. 595;
0 1 Callaghan v. Thomond 3 Taunt 82; Trimbey v. Vignier 1834 1 Bing. (N.C.)
151; Alivon v. Furnival 1834 1 C.M. & R. 277? Suwerhop v. Schmanuel 1824
2 L.J. (O.S.) 150J7 are similarly governed by the lex fori. On the other7 
hand when the question is 'whether a person exists or not, and so whether that 
person can sue or not, the answer is supplied in the case of a corporation 
by the lav; of the country under which "it was incorporated^/ Bank 
Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. GoukasscW 1923 2 K.B. 682,
1925 A.C. I5O5 Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Comptoir drEscomote 
de Mulhouse 1923 2 K.B. 63O, 1925 A.C. 112; Lazard Bros, v. Midland Bank 
1933 A.C. 289; In re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, 1933 1 Ch. 745;
Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt 1937 1 Ch. 513? Westlake sec 
214(a); But see Lecouturier v. Rey 1910 A.C.'262_7 anl In "t*16 os.se of a 
natural person by the law of his last known domicile /  Bar p. 291_/
The effect of such prejiminarv pleas as "All parties not called",
"forum non conveniens", "competent but omitted", /  contra Hendly v. Gulllin 
1741 Mor. 4465V? are governed by the lex fori.
In some countries there is a rule that an agreement to refer to 
arbitration prevents the contracting parties having their rights adjudicated 
by the Courts, while in others such an agreement does not exclude the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. The lex fori will determine the effect of a cI«ms< 
of arbitration on the right of action, even though a different law may be 
applied to the construction and essential validity of the clause of 
arbitration. Thus in Hamiyn v. Talisker Distillery /  1894 21R. (H.L.) 21.
See also Robertson v. Brandes Schonwald & Co. 1906 8F.815; Styring v .
Borough of Qporovec 1931 ‘S.L.T. 493 Per Lord Pitman at p. 4 9 4 a contract 
between/
between an English and a Scots firm contained a clause that disputes arising 
out of the contract were "to be settled by arbitration by two members of 
the London C o m  Exchange, or their umpire, in the usual way". When the 
Scots firm sued the English ^ irm in the Court of Session, the defenders 
maintained that action was excluded by the clause of reference. It was 
argued in reply that the clause was invalid, because it was a reference 
to un-named arbiters, which at that time was ineffectual in Scots law. It 
was held, however, that the arbitration clause fell to be construed and 
governed by the law of England as the proper law of the contract, and that 
by English t*aw it was valid. In short, the proper law of the clause of 
arbitration determined its essential validity. But then the House of Lords 
applied the lex fori. Scots law, by holding that the valid clause of 
arbitration excluded the action. They did not say so in terms, but the 
English law then was that a reference to arbiters did not necessarily exclud 
the Courts, the Courts having a discretion under the Arbitration Act of I889 
as to whether or not to apply the arbitration clause.
It must be confessed however that'in The Municipal Council of 
Johannesburg v. D. Stewart & Co.. /  1909 S.C. (H.L.) 53»_/ also a decision 
of the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor, Loreburn, has a dictum directly 
to the contrary. /  About which Lord Dunedin in Sanderson v. Armour 1922 S.C 
(H.L.) at p. 127 reserved his opinion_7
Yiihen evidence has to be" taken on commission in a foreign country, 
the rules of the law of the country where the action is being conducted 
apply, and not the rules of the country where the evidence is taken. In 
two old cases when a commission had been granted to take the evidence of 
a witness abroad, and the deposition was returned not signed by the 
witness according to Scots law, but only by the Commissioner, according 
to the foreign law, this was held sufficient^ /  Burnet v. Lutgrue 1675 
Mor. 4433; Cuming v. Kennedy 1707 Mor. 4433 7  but these old.cases are 
doubtful, and when a commission was granted to a judge in Norway to refer 
to the defender's oath, and the deposition was not signed by the defender 
as required by Scots law, but only by the judge according to Norwegian law, 
it was held that the defender"had to be re-examined and that he should 
subscribe his oath according to Scots law. l Davidson v. Middleton 1673 
Mor. 4432; Dickson ii,£l802; Bar p. 84-5; Gillespie-in Bar p. 0p7_7
B u t  t h e  l a v  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  t h e  a c t i o n  i s  p r o c e e d i n g  w o u l d  n o t  
b e  a p p l i e d  s u c h  m a t t e r s  a s  w h e t h e r  a  w i t n e s s  c a n  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
a n s w e r  a n  I n c r i m i n a t i n g  q u e s t i o n *  o r  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  s u p p l y i n g  
w i t n e s s e s  w i t h  c o n d u c t  m o n e y *  r e l a t e  t o  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a n d  n o t  
t o  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e v i d e n c e *  a n d  t o ^ t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  
e v i d e n c e  w a s  b e i n g  t a k e n  w o u l d  a p p l y *  W e  h a v e  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n  
f o r  t h e  c a s e  w h e r e  f o r e i g n  c o u r t s  w a n t  e v i d e n c e  t a k e n  h e r e  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  
w i t h  a  c a u s e  p e n d i n g  b e f o r e  t h e m 7 £  19 &  2 0  V i e t .  G* Udj a n d  it is 
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  w i t n e s s  s h a l l  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  l i k e  c o n d u c t  m o n e y  
a s  f o r  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  a  t r i a l *  a n d  n e e d  n o t  a n s w e r  i n c r i m i n a t i n g  
q u e s t i o n s )  a s  i n  c a u s e d  h e r e *
(3) BEFLES 0 ?  E V I D E N C E !
A11 q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  e v i d e n c e  a r e  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  
l e x  f o r i  , ( T e a t s  -  v  -  T h o m s o n -  ft O p s*— 1 8 3 5  T h s ..-8 fc M o D- 79 5*  A f f g *
1 Tift. S 6 f t 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -      -.-. -----.. - .-- - - - -----_ _ _ _ _ _
 — - T h u s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a r e  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  l e x  f o r l t -
(a) T h e  a d m i s s i b i l i t y  o f  e v i d e n c e .  ^  M r s *  S t e e l e  (O.H.) 1 8 9 4  T h e f S . L * T *  
6 5 2 }  D i c k s o n i  1 0 0 3f W e s t l a k e  f  348^ j T h e  p r i v i l e g e  t h a t  o u r  l a v  a c c o r d s  
to a  w i t n e s s  t o  d e c l i n e  t o  a n s w e r  a  q u e s t i o n  l i s i  w o u l d  e n t a i l  h i s
a d m i s s i o n  o f  a  c r i m e ; a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  w h e r e  t h e  c r i m i n a l  p r o c e e d i n g s  
t h e  w i t n e s s  m i g h t  i n c u r  a r e  i n  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  
C o u r t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n f o r m e d  a s  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  l a w .  jjg.g.A. -  v  -  M c R a e  
( 1 8 6 7 )  L . R .  4  E q .  3 2 7 ,  3  & •  A p p.  79; W e s t l a k e  § 3 4 9 * ]
(b) W h e t h e r  c e r t a i n  f a c t s  e s t a b l i s h e s  p r e s u m p t i o n  o r  a r e  c o n c l u s i v e
o f  a n  issu e ,  f p w n e r s  o f  I m m a n u e l  -  v  -  D e n h o l m  &  C o . 1 8 8 7  1 5 B * 1 5 2 ;
JtLp ./ flwtcitK tgqy 33R. i'a'-t* nt l :t. 377-
^ G o r d o n  -  v  -  W o r l l e  1 6 2 3  M o r *  4460. i s  o v o r - r u l e d } /
(e) W h e r e  t h e  o n u s  o f  p r o o f  lies. |l lao%enaie v  -  B a l l  1 8 5 4 |  1 7 D.  164j
'{he l e x  f o r i  i s  a p p l i e d  a s  t o  o n u s  o f  p r o o f  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h i s  a l t e r s  t h e
o n u s  f r o m  t h a t  w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  a p p l i e d  b y  t h e  l e x  Sfltftae. — - - -
j V o r  a n  I n t e r e s t i n g  a r g u m e n t  f o r  t a k i n g  t h e  o n u s  o f  p r o o f  f r o m  t h e  
l e x  c a u a a e  s e e  W.W. C o o k *  T h e  L o g i c a l  a n d  L e g a l  B a s e s  o f  t h e  C o n f l i c t  
o f  L a w s  p . p .  1 6 6 -  1 6 9 , a n d  B a r  p. 8 6 9  et sequj
(d) T h e  m e t h o d  b y  w h i c h  f a c t s  c a n  d r  m a s t  b e  p r o v e d *  js t r a t h e r n  -  v- 
M a a t e r m a n  &  C o *  1 8 5 0  1 2 D.  1 0 8  7 j F r a s e r  -  v  -  L o o k u p  1 7 4 8  Mor, 4 5 9 0 s  
C r e d i t o r s  o f  G r a y #  -  v  -  g r a n t  1 7 8 9  M o r .  4 4 7 4 j  B o b e r t s o n  -  v  -
B u r  d e  k i n  1 8 4 3  6 D - l 7 ’j 5k. c*. H ■ a£* ] ....... ........
  T h i s  h e a d  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  s u c h  q u e s t i o n s  a s  w h e t h e r
c o r r o b o r a t i n g  e v i d e n c e  i s  n e c e s s a r y , a n d - w h e t h e r  w r i t t en  e v i d e n c e  t o  
r e q u i r e d  e r  p a r o l e  e v i d en c e  w i l l -be s u f f i c i en t. jw i e d e m a n n  -  v  -  
W a l p o l e  1 8 9 1  2 Q,.B. 534* D i c k s o n  % 1 0 0 3J ,  ^ e t k e p written
‘ev idence. i s ....................... .pof*/.- 
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  l a t t e r *  2 c o m m o n  c a s e s  a r e s -
(1) D o e 8 a  c o n t r a c t  e x i s t  —  e. g. h a s  t h e r e  b e e n
a  l o a n  o f  £ 2 0 0  b y  B  t o  A ?
(2) H a s  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  b e e n  d i s c h a r g e d  -  e. g .  h a s  a  l o a n  
o f  £200 b e e n  p a i d ?
(1) D O E S  A  C O N T R A C T  E X I S T ?  T h i s  f a c t  m a s t  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y
e v i d e n c e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  t h e  l e x  f o r i * a n d  i t  i s  o n l y  t h e  e v i d e n t i a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  l e x  f o r i  w h i c h  n e e d  b e  o b s e r v e d .  A  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  
h o w e v e r *  m a s t  b e  m a d e  b e t w e e n  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  w r i t i n g  a s  a  s o l e m n i t y  
i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  a  c o nt r a c t ,  a n d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  w r i t i n g  s i m p l y  
a s  fr- m a tt e r - o f  t h e? p r o o f  o f  a  c o n t r a c t .  I n  S c o t s  l a w  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  o b l l g a t i o n e s  U t e r i s , n a m e l y  c o n t r a c t s  r e l a t i n g  to 
h e r i t a g e ,  c o n t r a c t s  o f  s e r v i c e  f o r  m o r e  t h a n  a  y e a r ,  a n d  c a u t i o n a r y  
o b l i g a t i o n s ,  f o r  w h i c h  w r i t i n g  i n  a  c e r t a i n  f o r m  i s  n e c e s s a r y  as a  
s o l e m n i t y  o r  f o r m a l i t y  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  w i t h o u t  
p r o b a t i v e  w r i t i n g  t h e  d e b t o r  is n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  f i n a l l y  and f o r m a l l y  
t o  h a v e  c o n s e n t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  a n d  e v e n  t h o u g h  h e  a d m i t s  $ h a t  h e  
h a s  e n t e r e d  i n t o  t h e  A g r e e m e n t ,  h e  m a y  r e s i l e ,  i f  m a t t e r s  a r e  e n t i r e .  
O t h e r  c o n t r a c t s  i n  S c o t s  t a w ,  e. g. l o a n s ,  m a y  b e  e n t e r e d  i n t o  w i t h o u t  
a n y  f o r m a l i t i e s  b e y o n d  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  b u t  w h e r e  t h e  l o a n  
i s  o v e r  £ 8 . 6. 8d ^  S c o t s  l a w  d e m a n d s  t h a t  t h e  l o a n  b e  p r o v e d  b y  t h e
wri t i n g /
w r i t i n g  o f  t h e  d e b t o r  (or h i s  o a t h ) ,t h i s  b e i n g  p u r e l y  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
t h e  l a w  o f  e v i d e n c e *  W h e r e  w r i t i n g  i s  r e q u i r e d  a s  a  s o l e m n i t y  i n  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t *  t h e  l e x  jfoci c o n t r a c t u s  r u l e s *  T h u s  i f  
a  c o n t r a c t  is e n t e r e d  i n t o  b y  a  s i m p l e  w r i t i n g  w i t h o u t  w i t n e s s e s *  i n  a  
c o u n t r y  w h e r e  t h a t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  w i l l  b e  v a l i d l y  c o n s t i t u t e d ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  b y  S o o t s  l a w  c o n t r a c t s  
o f  t h a t  d e s o r p t i o n  h a v e  t o  b e  c o n s t i t u t e d  b y  a  f o r m a l  w r i t i n g G o v a n  -  
v  -  B o y d  1 7 9 C ,  M o r .  4 4 7 6 j  Ersk. Inst. 3, 2 , 4C: D i c k s o n i  f  9 9 7 ,  10 07 }
A n d  i f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  d o e s  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  l e x  l o c i  
c o n t r a c t u s  a s  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h a t  t y p e  o f  c o n t r a c t , t h e  c o n t r a c t  
i s  i n v a l i d *  e v e n  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  w h e r e  p e r h a p s  s u c h  a  c o n t r a c t  c o u l d  h a v e  
b e e n  e n t e r e d  i n t o  i n f o r m a l l y ,  jrayl-er -  v  -  S c o t t  1 8 4 7  9 D . 1 5 0 4 }
D i c k s o n ^  9 9 8 ,  1 0 0 7 .  T h e  l e x  l o c i  s o l u t i o n i s  i s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  
l e x  l o c i  c o n t r a c t u s , b u t  i s  n o t  m e n t i o n e d ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  s i m p l i f y  e x p o s i t i o n  
S e e  C o n t r a c t / F o r m a l i t i e s *  p. J  B u t  i f  w r i t i n g  is r e q u i r e d  o n l y  f o r
p r o o f ,  t h e  l e x  f o r i  r u l e s .  T ^ u s  i f  a  l o a n  i s  m a d e  i n  a  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  
a  l o a n  m a y  b e  p r o v e d  b y  w i t n e s s e s ,  a n d  it i s  s u e d  o n  h e r e ,  t h e  l e x  f o r i  
a p p l i e s ,  a n d  t h e  a c t i o n  w i l l  f a i l  t h r o u g h  f a i l u r e  t o  p r o v e  t h e  l o a n ;
|o r e d i t o r s  o f  G r a y  -  v  -  G r a n t  1 7 8 9 |  M o r .  4 4 7 4  $ L a r o u x  -  v  -  B r o w n  
(1852) 1 2  C . B .  8 0 1 }  D i c k s o n  #  l o o f j  a n d  c o n v e r s e l y  a  c o n t r a c t  e n t e r e d  
i n t o  a b r o a d ,  w h i c h  b y  t h e  l e x  l o c i  c o u l d  o n l y  b e  p r o v e d  b y  w r i t ,  w o u l d ,  
i f  S o o t s  t a w  a d m i t t e d  p a r o l e  f o r  t h e  p r o o f  o f  t h a t  c l a s s  o f  c o n t r a c t ,  
b e  p r o b a b l e  b y  p a r o l e . [  F r a s e r  -  v  -  L o o k u p  1 7 4 8 ^  Mor. 4 5 8 o j  T h i s  
r e s u l t  h a s  b e e n  c r i t i c i s e d  | S e e  W i l l e s  J. i n  W i l l i a m s  -  v  -  W h e e l e r
I86G 1 8 C . B.  ( N .S . )  2 9 9  a t  p. 3 16, a n d  i n  G i b s o n  -  v -  H o l l a n d  1865.,
/<0 *4 RaJL*Ar i f s o t 5"f;
L . B .  / C . P .  I. a t  p. 8 . J C h e s h i r e  p. 6 3 6 ®  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t o  r e f u s e  "f
} 7  A  * JUJ  p p ^ s -
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a  r i g h t  d u l y  a c q u i r e d  u n d e r  a  f o r e i g n  l a w ,  t h a t  i s  t h e
p r o p e r  l a w  o f  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n ,  is t o  s t u l t i f y  t h e  v e r y  p u r p o s e  o f
I n te r n a t io n a l  P r i v a t e  D a w .  B u t  Leroux -  v  -  B r o w n  h a s  b e e n  approved i n
t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s ,  £  M o r r i s  -  v  -  B a r r o n  &  Co. 191®«? A. C. 1 p e r  V i s c o u n t
H a l d a n e  a t  p. isj a n d  t h e  r a t i o  i s  d e f e n s i b l e  o n  p r i n c i p l e *  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f
a  c o n t r a c t  m a d e  a b r o a d  c a n n o t  b e  p r o v e d  h e r e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  s t r i c t e r
r e q u i r e m e n t s /
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r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  o u r  l a w  o f  e v i d e n c e , t o  s a y  t h a t  w e  a r e  r e f u s i n g  
r e c o g n i t i o n  to a  r i g h t  d u l y  a c q u i r e d  u n d e r  t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  
i s  b e g g i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  t h a t  is, w h e t h e r  a  c o n t r a c t  h a s  b e e n  e n t e r e d  
i n t o j .  A t  o n e  t i m e  it w a s  t h e  l a w  i n  M g l a n d ,  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  
w i t n e s s e s  t o  a  d e e d ,  w h e n  t h e  d e e d  w a s  p u t  i n  s u it ,  t h e  w i t n e s s e s ,  i f  
a l i v e ,  h a d  t o  a p p e a r  a n d  d e p o n e  to t h e i r  s i g n a t u r e s .  T h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  
o f  t h e  w i t n e s s e s  appearing<*/fcs a  m a t t e r  o f  p r o o f ,  n o t  f o r m a l i t y ,  t h e  l e x  
f o r i  r u l e d ,  a n d  so w h e n  a n  E n g l i s h  deedtVis p u t  i n  s uit i n  S c o t l a n d ,  t h e r e  
W d s  n o  n e e d  t o  b r i n g  t h e  w i t n e s s e s  i n t o  t h e  S c o t t i s h  C o u r t  t o  d e p o n e  t o  
t h e i r  s i g n a t u r e s ;  ^  C h a t  t o  -  v  - C&rd^ 1 7 G 2  Mor, 4 4 4 7 ^  c o n t r a  D i c k s o n  f  1 0 0 5 ,  
a n d  c e r t a i n  d i c t a  i n  E a r l  o f  H o p e t o u n  -  v  «  S c o t s  M i n e s  C o  1 8 5 6  1 8 D .  7 3 9 ]  
a n d  a  S c o t c h  p r o b a t i v e  d e e d  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e  e f f e c t  i n  E n g l a n d  w i t h o u t  t h e  
i n s t r u m e n t a r y  w i t n e s s e s  b e i n g  e x a m i n e d ,  { p i c k s o n ^  l O O d j
(2) H A S  A N  O B L I G A T I O N  B E E N  P I  S O U R C E D ?  T h i s  f a c t  t o o  m u s t  b e
e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  e v i d e n c e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  t h e  l e x  f o r i , a n d  i t  i s  o n l y  t h e
e v i d e n t i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  l e x  f o r i  t h a t  n e e d  b e  o b s e r v e d .  A
d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t i o n  f o r m e r l y  h e l d  s w a y  i n  S c o t l a n d .  Itwfcs b e l i e v e d
t h a t  a  d e b t  c o u l d  b e  p r o v e d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  d i s c h a r g e d  b y  e v i d e n c e  s u f f i c i e n t
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e x  l o c i  c o n t r a c t u s !  . T h u s  i n  G a l b r a i t h  -  v  -  C u n n i n g h a m y
£ l686 M o r .  4 4 3 0 ,  4440 4 e  a n  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  S e s s i o n  o n  a n  I r i s h
b o n d  p a y a b l e  i n  I r e l a n d ,  t h e  d e f e n c e  w a s  t h a t  t h e  b o n d  h a d  b e e n  p a i d , a n d
it w a s  o f f e r e d  t o  p r o v e  t h i s  b y  w i t n e s s e s ,  w h i c h  w a s  c o m p e t e n t  b y  I r i s h  £ a w
b u t  n o t  b y  S c o t s  £ a w .  It w a s  h e l d  t h a t  I r i s h  l a w  w a s  a p p l i c a b l e  a n d  t h a t
t h e  p a y m e n t  c o u l d  b e  p r o v e d  b y  w i t n e s s e s , " f o r  t h i s  b e i n g  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e
l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e ,  h e  h a d  r e a s o n  to t r u s t  t h e  p a y m e n t  t o  t h a t  s o r t  o f
n o t
e v i d e n c e ,  s i n c e  h e  e o u l d ^ f o r e s e e  t h e  c r e d i t o r  w o u l d  b e  so u n j u s t  a s  t o
» /  p
m a k e  a  d e m a n d  i n  a n o t h e r  country. £  M o r .  4 4 4 6 j S e e  a l s o  B a l b i r n i e  -  v  ~
I L L L  Mtrf. 4-441.
U r t i l l  1 6 3 3  M o r .  4 4 3 l j  H y d e  -  v  -  W i l l i a m s o n  1 6 3 4  M o r .  4 4 4 7 I n  
S c o t  -  v  -  H e n d e r s o n  1 6 6 4  M o r .  4 4 5 0 *  it i s  n o t  c e r t a i n  w h e t h e r  S c o t s  taw 
i s  a p p l i c a b l e  a s  t h e  l e x  f o r i  o r  a s  t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  o f  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n ,  
b u t  t h i s  m a y  b e  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e  o f  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  t h e  l e x  t o r l j
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It i s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  i n  m a n y  c o u n t r i e s ,  a s  it i s  i n  S c o t l a n d ^  w i t h  t h e  
B o o k s  o f  C o u n c i l  a n d  S e s s i o n ,  a n d  t h e  S h e r i f f  C o u r t  B o o k s ,  t o  r e g i s t e r  t h e  
o r i g i n a l s  o f  i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r a c t s  o r  b o n d s  i n  p u b l i c  r eg i o t o r e  o r  C o u r t  
o r  i n  t h e  Notaryft* P r o t o c o l  B o o k s ,  a n d  to u s e  e x t r a c t s  o r  a u t h e n t i c a t e d  
c o p i e s *  I n  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  t h e  s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s  s u c h  o f f i c i a l  e x t r a c t s  o r  
a u t h e n t i c a t e d  c o p i e s  a r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  e q u a l l y  g o d d  e v i d e n c e  a s  t h e  o r i g i n a l .
B u t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r u l e  t h a t  t h e  l e x  f o r i  g o v e r n s  e v i d e n c e ,  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  a n  e x t r a c t  f r o m  a  F r e n c h  r e g i s t e r  is g o o d  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t
I
i n  a  F r e n c h  C o u r t ,  d o e s n o t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  e x t r a c t  i s  g o o d  e v i d e n c e  i n  a 
S c o t s  C o u r t *  I f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o r  t e n o r  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  d i s p u t e d ,  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  w i l l  h a v e  t o  b e  p r o v e d  i n  a  m a n n e r  s a t i s f a c t o r y  to t h e  S c o t s  l a w  
o f  e v i d e n c e ,  w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  a c c o r d  f o r e i g n  e x t r a c t s  t h e  s a m e  p r i v i l e g e  a s  
i t  d o e s  e x t r a c t s  f r o m  t h e  B o o k s  o f  C o u n c i l  a n d  S e s s i o n *  T h e r e  a r e  e a r l y  
c a s e s  to t h e  c o n t r a r y *  T h u s  i n  o n e  c a s e  a n  e x t r a c t  o f  a  b o n d  f r o m  a  
R e g i s t e r  a t  B o r d e a u x  w a s  h e l d  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u s t a i n  a c t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  it w a s  
k n o w n  t o  t h e  C o u r t *  t h a t  it w a s  t h e  c u s t o m  o f  t h a t  p a r t  t o  m a k e  t h e  B o n d  
a f t e r  t h a t  form. £ L a m i n g t o n  -  v  -  K i n c a i d  1 6 E 7  M o r .  4 4 4 3 ^  , a n d  i n  a n ot h e r ,  
t h e  e x t r a c t  b y  a  B u t c h  N o t a r y  o f  a n  A s s i g n a t i o n  w a s  a d m i t t e d  i n s t e a d  o f  
t h e  p r i n c i p a l  d e e d ,  b e c a u s e  b y  t h e  c u s t o m  o f  H o l l a n d ,  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  w a s  k e p t  
b y  t h e  N o t a r y  w h e n  h e  g r a n t e d  t h e  Bx tr a c t . j^  D a v i d s o n s  -  v  -  T h e  T o w n  o f  
" Edinburgh 1 6 8 2 ,  M o r .  4 4 4 4 ^  D i c k s o n  o n  E v i d e n c e  jfii }  1 3 2 l J  t o o ,  s t a t e s  t h a t  
t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  S c o t s  C o u r t s  i s  to r e c e i v e  a n  e x t r a c t  o r  c o p y  c e r t i f i e d  
b y  t h e  Jfieeper o f  t h e  R e c o r d s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n  t e n d e r i n g  t h e  e x t r a c t  
p r o v e s  t h a t  it i s  a  f o r m a l  o f f i c e  c o p y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  E e g i s t e r  
f r o m  w h i c h  i t  w a s  t a k e n ,  [ i l s o  G i l l e s p i e  i n  B a r  p. 86sj T h e s e  c a s e s ,  
h o w e v e r ,  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  n o t  b e  f o l l o w e d  n o w,  £ S t o r y f ^  630^ 63 5j  * I n  a  m o r e  
r e c e n t  E n g l i s h  case, £  B r o w n  -  v  -  Th o r n t o n  1 8 3 7  6 M .  &  E. I8sj i t  w a s  
p r o v e d  t h a t  i n  B a t a v i a  c h a r t e r  p a r t i e s  w e r e  e n t e r e d  i n t o  b y  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  
b e i n g  w r i t t e n  i n  t h e  6o o k  o f  a  N o t a r y  a n d  t h e r e  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  p a r t i e s .  T h e  
N o t a r y  m a d e  c o p i e s  w h i c h  h e  s i g n e d  a n d  s e a l e d ,  a n d  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a c h  o f  t h e  
p a r t i e s .  I n  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  Java, t o  p r o v e  t h e  c h a r t e r  p a r t y ,  i t w d s
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n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o d u c e  t h e  N o t a r y ’ s b o o k ,  b u t  t h i s  b o o k  w a s  n e v e r  a l l o w e d  
t o  b e  t a k e n  o u t  o f  J a v a *  a n d  i n  D u t c h  C o u r t s  o u t  o f  J a v a »  f a i t h  w a s  g i v e n  
t o  t h e  copieS|f a s  t o  a n  o r i g i n a l .  It w a s  h e l d  t h a t  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  C o u r t s
s u c h  c o p i e s  w e r e  n o t  r e c e i v a b l e .  T h e r e  w a s  n o t h i n g  t o  g i v e  t h e  c o p i e s
t h e  w e i g h t  o f  e v i d e n c e ^  e x c e p t  t h e  D u t c h  l a w ,  a n d  t h e  E n g l i s h  C o u r t s  c o u l d  
n o t  a d o p t  a  r u l e  o f  e v i d e n c e  f r o m  f o r e i g n  c o u r t s ,  j p e r  L o r d  D e n m a n  C. J. 
a t  p. \ J  It i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  v i e w .  T h e
p r o c e d u r e  t h a t  s h o u l d  b e  f o l l o w e d  w h e n  it i s  d e s i r e d  t o  p r o v e  a  c o n t r a c t ,
b o n d ,  o r  a n y  e n t r y  i n  a  f o r e i g n  p u b l i c  r e g i s t e r ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o r  t e n o r  o f
w h i c h  i s  d i s p u t e d ,  is t o  o b t a i n  a  c o m m i s s i o n  f o r  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e
f o r e i g n  I t eg i s t r ar  a s  a  w i t n e s s ,  *  I f  t h e  e n t r y  i s  a  s h o r t  o n e ,  t h e  s i m p l e  
w a y  i s  t o  t a k e  it d o w n  i n  t e r m s  as p a r t  o f  t h e  w i t n e s s ’ d e p o s i t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  
e v i d e n c e  i s  t h u s  o b t a i n e d  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  e n t r y  i s  i n  t h e  b o o k ?
A s  r e g a r d s  o r i g i n a l s  o f  d e e d s . . .  " T h e  w i t n e s s  c a n  e x h i b i t  t h e  o r i g i n a l s ,  
a n d  i f  h e  i s  u n a b l e  t o  p r o d u c e  t h e s e ,  h e  c a n  g i v e  c o p i e s ,  w h i c h  w i l l  b e
e v i d e n c e  i n  t h e  c a s e  a n d  p a r t  o f  h i s  d e p o s i t i o n  a s  a  w i t n e s s ?  | M a i t l a n d  -  v -
-1
M a i t l a n d  1 8 8 5 ^  1 2 ^ B .  8 9 9  p e r  L o r d  B r e s ^  I n g l i s  a t  p a g e  9 0 4 j ^
T h e  E v i d e n c e  ( F o r e i g n  D o m i n i o n  a n d  C o l o n i a l  D o c u m e n t s )  A c t  1 9 3 3  £  2 3  G eo.
5 c. 4J p r o v i d e s  t h a t  i f ^ d o l o n i a l ,  D o m i n i o n  o r  F o re i g n ^  C o u n t r y  r e c i p r o c a t e s  
a s  t o  o u r  p u b l i c  r e g i s t e r s ,  it s h a l l  b e  l a w f u l  to s e c u r e  b y  O r d e r  i n  
C o u n c i l  t h a t  o f f i c i a l  e x t r a c t s  f r o m  t h e i r  p u b l i c  r e g i s t e r s ,  a u t h e n t i c a t e d  
a s  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  O r d e r ,  s h a l l  b e  r e c e i v a b l e  a s  e v i d e n c e , £  S e e  E v i d e n c e  
( B e l g i u m )  O r d e r  1 9 3 3 ; S . B  &  0. 1 9 3 3  N o .  3 8 3 }  N o r t h  -  v  -  N o r t h  1 9 3 6  5 2 ^
T . L . B .  3 8 0)  E v i d e n c e  ( F r a n c e )  O r d e r  1 9 3 7 ^  S . B  &  O .  1 9 3 7  N o .  515) E v i d n n c e  
( C o m m o n w e a l t h  o f  A u s t r a l i a )  O r d e r  1 9 3 8  S . B . &  0. 1 9 3 8  N o .  7 3 9 ^
W h e r e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  a n d  t e n o r  o f  t h e  e n t r y  i n  a  f o r e i g n  r e g i s t e r  
i s  n o t  c o n t e s t e d ,  b u t  it is s t i l l  n e c e s s a r y  to p r o v e  it, e. g. i n  d i v o r c e  
p r o c e e d i n g s ,  w h e r e  it i s  d e s i r e d  t o  p r o v e  t h e  r e g i s t r a t i o n  i n  a n o t h e r  
c o u n t r y  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  o r  o f  t h e  b i r t h  o f  c h i l d r e n ,  s o m e t h i n g  l e s s  t h a n  
t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  s u f f i c e s .  I t  i s  t h e  c u s t o m  i n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  to 
r e c e i v e  f o r e i g n  e x t r a c t s  o f  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  m a r r i a g e  o r  b i r t h  i f  c e r t i f i e d ,
s a :y/
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s a y  b y  a  N o t a r y  P u b l i c ,  t o  b e  f o r m a l  e x t r a c t s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l a w  o f  
t h e  r e g i s t e r  f r o m  w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  t a k e n ,  a n d  t o  r e c e i v e  e x t r a c t s  f r o m  t h e  
D o m i n i o n  o r  C o l o n i a l  r e g i s t e r s  i f  e x  f a c i e  r e g u l a r ,  e v e n  w i t h o u t  t h i s  
a u t h e n t i c a t i o n *  S u c h  e x t r a c t s  a r e  p r i m a  f a c i e  e v i d e n c e ,  v a l i d  u n t i l  
c h a l l e n g e d ;  i f  c h a l l e n g e d ,  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o v e  t h e m  i n  t h e  u s u a l  
w a y .
4, T H E  H B M E D I E S  W H I C H  T H E  C O U R T S  W I L L  O R A N T *  AflP ^  M E A N S  O F  
~  ~ ~ E N F O R C I N G  T H E  1 C O U R T S  ' A W A R D S  1 1 '
A  c o u r t  w i l l  g r a n t  t h e  r e m e d i e s  r e c o g n i s e d  b y  t h e  l e x  f o r i , a n d  t h o s e  
o n l y *  T h u s ,  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  w h e n  i t  w a s  c o m p e t e n t  b y  t h e  l e x  f o r i  to  
a r r e s t  a  d e b t o r ,  a r r e s t m e n t  w a s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a  d e b t  w h i c h  a c c r u e d  i n
r—
P o r t u g a l ,  a l t h o u g h  P o r t u g u e s e  l a w  d i d  n o t  a l l o w  a r r e s t ^ f o r  d e b t ;  I D e  l a  
V e g a  -  v  -  7 1  a n n a  1 8 3 0  tfee|B. &  Ad. 2 8 4 ;  W e s t l a k e  % 3 4 5 ]  s u m m a r y  d i l i g e n c e  
i n  t h e  S o o t s  m a n n e r  w a s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  S c o t l a n d  o n  a n  E n g l i s h  b i l l ;  j^D o n  -  v  
K e a l e y  1 2  D. 1 0 1 6 ;  M a c k e n z i e  -  v  -  g a l l  1 8 5 4  1 7  D* 164) a n d  f o r  i n f r i n g i n g  
a  f o r e i g n  c o p y r i g h t  b y  d i s t r i b u t i n g  c o p i e s  i n  E n g l a n d ,  t h e  E n g l i s h  C o u r t  
g r a n t e d  t h e  E n g l i s h  r e m e d y  o f  i n j u n c t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  
c o u n t r y  n o  s u c h  r e m e d y  w a s  c o m p e t e n t *  j B a s c h e t  - v  -  L o n d o n  t l l u s t r a t e d  
S t a n d a r d  C o  . 1 9 0 0  t h e l C h .  7 3J A n d  c o n v e r s e l y ,  a  f o r e i g n e r  c a n n o t  c o m e  
t o  t h e  S c o t t i s h  C o u r t s  a n d  a s k  f o r  a  d e c r e e  o f  s p e c i f i c  i m p l e m e n t  c o m p e l l i n g  
h i e  w i f e  t o  l i v e  w i t h  h i m ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h a t  b e  c o m p e t e n t  b y  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  
p l a c e  o f  c e l e b r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  t h e  l a w  o f  h i s  domicile,.
$K **y page 855)
T w o  s u b j e c t s  w i l l  r e p a y  m o r e  d e t a i l e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  n a m e l y
i n t e r d i c t  a n d  d a m a g e s *
IHTBRDICTl
-  1 3  -
T h e  C o u r t s  o f  a n y  c o u n t r y  h a v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  i n t e r d i c t  t h e  
c o m m i s s i o n  o f  a  w r o n g 1 w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y *  
e v e n  i f  t h e  w r o n g d o e r  i s  r e s i d e n t  o u t s i d e  it, a n d  c a n  g i v e  a
d e c r e e  f o r  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  p r e v e n t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  ( W a y g o o d  -  v  -
eg J=*d /Q oS’ *1 F  tf_7 7 1 1
B e n n i e  1 8 5 5  1 2  H. 6 5 3J ^  T h e y  c a n  g r a n t  i n t e r d i c t  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  a n y  t h i n g  w i t h i n  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y ,  a n d  p r e v e n t  i t s  r e m o v a l  
f r o m  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y ,  jj o n e s  -  v  -  S a m u e l  1 8 6 2  24^3). 3 1 9J 
T h e  C o u r t s  o f  a  c o u n t r y  m a y  i n t e r d i c t  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  a  w r o n g  
o u t w i t h  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y ,  i f  t h e  p e r s o n  o r  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  w r o n g ;  
s d o e r  i s  p r e s e n t ;  w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  t o  e n a b l e  t h e  d e c r e e  t o  
b e  r e n d e r e d  e f f e c t i v e .  It i s  q u i t e  comm o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  f o r  
i n t e r d i o t s  t o  b e  g r a n t e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  a c t i o n s  
i n  f o r e i g n  C o ur t s ,  ^ L i n d s a y  -  v  -  P a t e r s o n  1 8 4 0  2^3). 1 3 7 3 :
Y o u n g  -  v  -  B a r c l a y  1 8 4 ^ -  8 y D .  7 74? D a w s o n ^  T r s  -  v  -  M a c l e a n s  
1 8 6 0 ^  22jpD. 6 8 5;  L i q u i d a t o r s  o f  t h e  P a c i f i c  C o a s t  M i n i n g  Co. L t d  
-  v  -  W a l k e r , 1 8 8 6  1 3 j R .  8 1 6 ^  C a l i f o r n i a  R e d w o o d  Co. L t d  -  v  - 
M e r c h a n t  B a n k i n g  C o  o f  L o n d o n  1 8 6 6  1 3  H. 1 3 0 8 /  T h .  a c t s  
c o m m i t t e d  a b r o a d  w h i c h  a r e  s o u g h t  t o  b e  i n t e r d i c t e d  m u s t  h o w e v e r  
b e  s u c h ,  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  b e  w r o n g f u l  i f  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  c o m m i t t e d  
i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y f a n d  a l s o  t h e y  m u s t  b e  w r o n g f u l  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  
c o u n t r y  w h e r e  t h e y  o c c u r :  n o  i n t e r d i c t  w i l l  b e  g r a n t e d  w h e r e
t h e  a c t s  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  w r o n g f u l  i f  c o m m i t t e d  h e r e ,  b u t  a r e  n o t  
w r o n g f u l  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t & e  l e x  l o c i  d e l i c t i „ jpotttgjf &  Co, -  v  -  T H E
B r a p o  d e  Pfrata P r i n t i n g  C o .  L t d.  1 8 9 1  18 R. 5Xlj|- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
_  S i m i l a r l y  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  a  c o u n t r y  m a y  o r d a i n  a  p e r s o n  t o
p e r f o r m  a n  a c t  o u t w i t h  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y  i f  t h e  p e r s o n  o r d a i n e d  i s  
w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  so as t o  e n a b l e  t h e  d e c r e e  t o  b e  e n f o r c e d ,  
i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  b y  c o m p u l s i t o r  o f  i m p r i s o n m e n t ,  e v e n  w h e n  t h e  a c t
o r d e t e d  t o  b e  d o n e  a b r o a d  r e l a t e s  t o  l a n d  a b r o a d .  jR u t h v e n  -  v  -  
R u t h v e n  (O.H.) 1 9 0 5  4 3 ^  S . L.  R. lljj
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D A M A G E S :
As already mentioned! in te r d ic t  w i l l  be granted here ag a in st  
the in fringem ent in  th is  country o f  a r ig h t duly acquired under 
a fo re ig n  law , although by th a t fo re ig n  law, which i s  the one 
w ith  which th e  r ig h t has th e  n earest con n ection , in te r d ic t  i s  
not competent, [ -  v -  I l lu s t r a te d ,  e u p r j
What separate item s o f damages are recoverab le i s  determined by
k^® le x  f o r i , but the d e t a i l s  o f the measure
o f  damages are s e t t le d  by the le x  fo r i .^  -Slater -  v -» M exican
.Ma t i nnal B all road -Cey 194. -E. S. 120. £ £p . Cheshire ppp 654-662;
Story f 367j Contrast D icey p. 852] Thus where damages are claim ed
fo r  breach o f  c o n tra c t, the proper law o f  the c o n tra c t, and where
damages are claim ed fo r  d e l i c t ,  the le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i , w i l l
determ ine what "separable heads o f claim* ^Kendrick -  tr -  Burnett
1897^ 25B. 82 per Lord Pres. Bobertson at page 87 J  are recover:
:ab le£  |k a f t a l in  -  v -  L.M.S, 1933 S. C. 259; Kendrick -  v -
B u rn ett, supra; Convery -  v -  Lanarkshire Tramways Coy 1905
8 F. 117; S la ter  -  v -  Mexican N ational B ailroad  Coy. 194 |U .S . 120-
fc n tr a  Horn -  v -  N. B. Ballway Co. 1878 5 B. 1055; McLarty -  v -
S ts e le  1881^ 8 B. 435; Baschet -  v -  London I l lu s tr a te d  Standard
Co. lfOO thel$h*  73j Machado -  v -  Fontes 1897 2 Q,B. 231;
v" MO(e 23 l. L.R-. fj'O' _
S cott -  v -  Lord Seymour 1862 thef H. & C. 219, per Wightman
but where i t  i s  c le a r  what separab le heads o f  c la im  are recoverab le  
and the q u estio n  i s  the q u a n tif ic a t io n  o f  th e  o b lig a tio n  in to  
money, the le x  f o r i  w i l l  ru le . £  Kendrick -  v -  B urnett, supra, 
per Lord McLaren at page 88  ^ An example o f  th e  former case i s  
where a f a t a l  accid en t ha$ occurred abroad and an a c t io n  o f  
rep aration  i s  b e in g  sued here and the q u estion  a r is e s  whether the  
r e la t iv e s  o f  th e  deceased are e n t i t le d  to  in c lu d e in  th e claim  
f o r /
IS.
for damages a claim for so1st The ansv-ifer to this ques tion de sends
on whether solatium is or is not allowed by the lex causae, namely the 
ik°.pA. £_ jjaftalin — v — L.M.S., Kendrick — v — Burnett,
— v — Lanarkshire Tramways Co. supra. Contra; Horn — v — H.B.
or is not payable on a foreign debt, and the rate of interest, depends
i Brown’ s Sup. p. 141; Fergus son v. Fyffe 16 S. IO38, 1841 II Robin, 267; 
Palmer & Co. v. Glas 13 S. 3^5 Gillow - v - Burgess 3fS. 45? (new ed. 
p. 29); Campbell v. Ramsay 15th Feb. 1809 F.C.; Price v. Wise 1862 24 D. 
491; Evans - v - Earl of Buchan 8 D. 296; Wilkinson - v - Monies 1821 
1 S. 89; Hyslop - v - Gordon 1824 2 Shaw’s 4-pp. 451; Cochrane - v - 
Gilkison 1857 20 D. 213j over-ruling Savage - v - Craig 1710 Mor. 4530,
There are conflicting decisions as to whether the lex fori or the 
lex causae is to be applied to the question of allowing interest after an
action lias been brought: interest at the rate allowed by the lex fori was
given from the date of citation in 'Wood - v - Granger 1779? Mor. 4532;..
Gillow & Co. - v - Burgess 3 S. 45 ( Hew ed: p. 29); and Hyslop - v - 
Gordon 1824 2 Shaw1s App. 451; interest at the rate.allowed by the lex 
causae was allowed right up to the date of payment in Price - v - Wise 1862
24 D. 491, and Wilkinson - ■ v - Monies, 1821 1 S. 89; while in Graham v.
Keble 1020 II Bligh 126 interest was given at the rate 'allowed by the lex caigae 
up to the date of the judgement dn appeal, and thereafter interest at the 
rate of the lex fori. Hone of these courses seem &§em - to be founded on any 
obviousJprinciple. The position would be understandable if the interest 
were allowed at the rate of the lex causae <jip to the date of litis- 
contestation, and at the rate of the lex fori thereafter. Litiscon- • 
testation does not take place with the serving of the summons - see however, 
Stewarts* Exrx. - v - L.M.S. 1944 S.L.T. 13 (House of Lords)_/
~ Twy, Go._ supraJ7 Another example is that the question whether interest is
on the lex causae, the proper lav/ of the debt. Lauretan v. Kennedy 1627
Laming ton - v - Kincaid 1627 Mor, 4443 (lex for
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Hfri example o f the la t t e r  case i s  where there has been  
d estru c tio n  o f  cargo and the o b lig a tio n  i s  r e s t i t u t io  in  integrum^ 
the law o f  one country might p rescrib e as the measurement o f  compensation  
the p r ic e  at which the owner could supply h im self in  the n earest  
m arket, w h ile  the law o f  the other country would g iv e  the co st p r ice  
o f  the goods p lu s f a ir  m ercantile  p r o f it ;  She judge try in g  the case  
would q u an tify  the damages in  money according to the law which he 
adm itte d , |Kendriok -  v -  Burnett supra, per Lord McLaren at p, 881 
Another example o f  the la t t e r  case i s  the ru le  th a t a l l  d ecrees fo r  
damages must be g iven  in  B r it is h  currency at the ra te  p r e v a ilin g  when 
the damage occurred^ "The Yolturno " 1921 %  A.C. 544 (House o f  Lordsl;
Barry -  v -  Van de» Hurk 192© 2 K. B. 7©9; 3Di Ferdinando -  v -
Simon Smits & Oo 1920^ 3^ K, B» 409/ R a ll i  Bros -  v -  Comp'anhia
Navi era etc. 192©^ 1$ K, B. 614; Lebeaupin -  v -  C rispin^ 1920^
2^ K, B, 714/ Hyslop -  v -  Gordon 1824^ 2 Shaw’ s ^pp. 451; Contra 
Wood -  v -  Gyanger 1779^ Mor. 45 3 2 j• When the liq u id a te  sum o f  18,©35 
fran cs Whs payable in  P aris  under a French C ontract, the payment o f 18,035  
frands in  Francewfcs a good d ischarge o f the debt even in  the eyes o f  
the Courts in  t h is  Country where an a c tio n  fo r  payment in  S te r lin g  haef 
been commenced though the franc may harfe d ep recia ted
in te r n a t io n a lly  s in ce  the debt was incurred^ ^ S o c ie te  des H otels
Le Touguet Paris~P lage -  v -  Cummings 1922 Sfcel K,B. 4 5 1 but  when
• f . r  o n
an i l l iq p id a t e  claim  fo r  damagesj^hs in  is s u e  the le x  fo r i  r u le d  the  
q u estion  as to whether payment had been made.j^The Baarn" 1933 ff, 25lJ  
Damages in  r e la t io n  to  B i l l s  o f  Exchange (q .v .j  are in
a sp ec ia l p o s it io n ,  ^
The execution  o f  decrees and d ilig e n c e  on decree; i s  
governed by the le x  f o r i , j strfether - v -  Bead lstjc Ju ly , 18©3f  F.c)
Only the kinds o f  d ilig e n c e  recogn ised  by Scots tew  can be ca rr ied  out
in  S o tla n d , and Scots d ilig e n c e  cannot be carr ied  out abroad: thus
d
a m ed ita tion s fugae warrant could not be put in to  execution  fu r th  o f  
S cotland[Mam - v  -  Crowe 1887 14|- H. 8C*&) Cook -  v -  Saul 1 ere
S h e r if f  Court^ 0 , 1 ,  257^
• The prescription of diligence is governed by the lex fori, and 
accordingly the only prescription of diligence in Scotland is the 
quinquennial prescription imposed by the Act 1669 c. 9* Now 3 years, 
Personal Diligence Act 1838, 1 & Viet. c. 114, Sec. 22J
(5) PRIORITIES OF COMPETING CREDITORS
Priorities of competing creditors, whether in bankruptcy, £  q.v.;
Lusk v. Elder 1843 5 P» 12791 • Ex parte Melboum (1870) L.R. 6 Ch. 64;
The Colorado I923 f?. 102? per Scrutton L.J. at p. 109. Contra, Williamson 
v * Taylor 1845 8D. 156J  succession, £ q.v.; In re Kloebe 1884 28 Ch. D.I75 
Dicey p. 791 j Westlake 5*110; The Colorado, ibid; Contra, Lawson v.
Maxwell 1784 Mor 4473 (proper law of the debt)_7 or to the proceeds of the 
judicial sale of a ship, £ Clark v. Bo wring & Co. 1903^ S.C. 1168; The 
Colorado, 1927 P. 102; "The Tagus” I9O3 F- 44. Contra, Honevman v.
Actie sel kabet United 1910 26 Sh. Ct. Rep 243_/ are governed by the 
lex fori. £  Westlake ^351? Story 423# b ._/
If the matter is looked at realistically it will be appreciated that 
no other course would be practicable. There must be a single law to
t
determine priorities: they could not be settled by reference to the
proper law of the debts, for each debt might have a different proper law 
with a different order of priority: by the proper law of debt A, A might
be preferred to all debts, while by the proper law of debt B, B might be 
preferred to all debts including debts like A. — .................™ " ~ .
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T h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  o n l y  p r a c t i c a b l y  o p u r s e  is j u s t i f i e d  i n  p r i n c i p l e  
b y  s a y i n g  t h e s e  a r e  m a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  to t h e  r e m e d y *  However the 
r e w s o n  f o r  a p p l y i n g  t h e  l e x  f o r i  t o  q u e s t i o n s  o f  p r i o r i t i e s  i n  t h e  
j u d i c i a l  s a l e  o f  a  s h i p  i s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h i s :  0 u r  C o u r t s  a p p l y  t h e i r
o w n  l a w  i n  m a r i t i m e  c a u s e s  b e c a u s e  t h e  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  t h e  M a r i t i m e  
l a w  w h i c h  w e  e n f o r c e  i s  a  c o d e  g e n e r a l l y  r e c o g n i s e d  b y  a l l  t r a d i n g  
n a ti o n s .  £  T h i s  s e e m s  t o  b e  t h e  r a t i o  o f  C l a r k  -  v -  B o w r i n g  &  Co. 
s u p r a ,  t h o u g h  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  c a s e s ,  t h e  E n g l i s h  C o u r t s  s e e m  t o  b e  
a p p l y i n g  t h e i r  o w n  l a w  q ua/ t h e  l e x  f o r i , a s  b e i n g  a p p l i c a b l e  to t h e  
r e m e d y .  F o r  t h e  t h e o r y  t h a t  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  o u r  C o u r t s  e n f o r c e  i n  
m a r i t i m e  c a u s e s  is a g e n e r a l  m a r i t i m e  l a w  o f  a l l  n a t i o n s ,  s e e  
C u r r i e  -  v  -  M c K h i g h t  1 8 9 6 *  2 4 .R. (H.L) 1 p e r  L o r d  W a t s o n  a t  p. 3 • 
B o e t t s h e r  -  v  -  C a r r  o n  C o . 23. D. 26ilJ
T h i s  t h e o r y  a l s o  e x p l a i n s  w h y , t o  q u e s t i o n s  o f  l e g a l  
h y p o t h e c s  o v e r  a  s h i p ; ( o f t e n  c a l l e d  m a r i t i m e  l i e n s )  o u r  C o u r t s  
a p p l y  t h e i r  o w n  l a w  s o l e l y .
A l e g a l  h y p o t h e c  i s  a  r i g h t  o f  s e c u r i t y ,  w i t h o u t  
p o s s e s s i o n ,  a r i s i n g  n o t  b y  c o n t r a c t ,  b u t  b y  o p e r a t i o n  o f  la w.  S e a m e n ,  
a n d  p e r s o n s  w h o  h a v e  s u p p l i e d  n e c e s s a r i e s  to a  s h i p  i n  a  f o r e i g n  p o r t ,  
h a v e  a  h y p o t h e c  o v e r  t h e  s h i p  f o r  t h e i r  w a g e s  a n d  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  O t h e r  l e g a l  h y p o t h e c s  i n  S c o t s  l a w  a r e  t h o s e  o f  a  
l a n d l o r d  o v e r  h i s  t e n a n t s  i n v e c t q  et i l l a t a  f o r  r e n t ,  o f  a  s u p e r i o r  o v e r  
h i s  v a s s a l ’ s I n v e e t a  et i l l a t a  f o r  f e u d u t y ,  a n d  o f  a s o l i c i t o r  o v e r  
e x p e n s e s  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  a w a r d e d  t o  h i s  c l i e n t  f o r  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  t h a t  
h e  h a s  m a d e .  O n  p r i n c i p l e  t h e  m o s t  r e a s o n a b l e  w a y  o f  r e g a r d i n g  a  
h y p o t h e c  w o u l d  b e  t o  c o n s i d e r  it a s  a n  imjblied c o n t r a c t ,  v a l i d  a n d  
e n f o r c e a b l e  e v e r y w h e r e  i n  i t s  o r i g i n a l  e x t e n t .  Tjg&s we w h o u l d  h a v e
t h o u g h t  t h a t  a  s e a m a n  e n g a g e d  i n  a  F r e n c h  p o r t  o n  a  F r e n c h  s h i p  w o u l d  
h a v e  b y  F r e n c h  l a w  a  c e r t a i n  h y p o t h e c  o v e r  t h e  s h i p  f o r  h i s  w a g e s .  I h i s  
r i g h t /
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t r i g h t  o f  s e c u r i t y w h s  n o t  c o n v e n t i o n a l » b u t  it w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  a s  e f f e c t i v e  
a s  i f  it h a d  b e a n y  a n d  it c o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  i m p l i e d  t e r m  o f  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  o f  s e r v i c e ^  t h a t  h e  s h o u l d  h a v e  a  r i g h t  o f  s e c u r i t y  ovfcr t h e  
s h i p  f o r  h i s  w a g e s .  0 ^  t h i s  v i e w  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  a n d  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  
s e a m e n * s  h y p o t h e c  w o u l d  b e  t h e  s a m e y  i. e. a s  f i x e d  b y  F r e n c h  l a w ,  n o  
m a t t e r  w h e r e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a r o s e ,  w h e t h e r  i n  a  F r e n c h  C o u r t  o r  a  S c o t s  
one. A d m i t t e d l y  o n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  f e a t u r e s  o f  a  hjrpothee i s  t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e  t h a t  i t  g i v e s  t o  t h e  h o l d e r  o v e r  t h e  h o l d e r s  o f  p o s t p o n e d  
h y p o t h e c s ,  a n d  o v e r j a o r tg a g e es  a n d  o r d i n a r y  c r editors, a n d  , a s  w e  h a v e  
s e e n .  I t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  r e g u l a t e  p r i o r i t i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  b y  t h e  l e x  
f o r i » a n d  so a l l  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  t o  w h i c h  t h e  
h d l d e r  o f  a  h y p o t h e c  is e n t i t l e d  m u s t  b e  d e c i d e d  b y  t h e  l e x  f o r i *
B u t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o r  n o n - e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  h y p o t h e c  — -  e. g. w h e t h e r  t h e r e  
i s  a  h y p o t h e c  o v e r  t h e  f r e i g h t  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  sh ip ,  o r  o n l y  o v e r  
t h e  s h i p ^ a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  -  e. g .  w h e t h e r  o n e y e a r ’ s 
p a s t  w a g e s  a r e  s e c u r e d  o r  all p a s t  w a g e s  —  c o u l d  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  
t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  H o w e v e r  it i s  c l e a r l y  s e t t l e d  t h a t  
a l l  q u e s t i o n s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  m a r i t i m e  h y p o t h e c s ,  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e ^  a n d  
e x t e n t |  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e i r  d e g r e e  o f  p r i o r i t y ,  a r e  r u l e d  b y  t h e  l e x  f o r i *
•Thus i n  C l a r k  -  v  -  B o w r i n g  [190&^  s * c * l 1 6 8 / at P* 1 1 7 4 . J  L o r d  President 
D u n e d i n  s a i d  *  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  v e r y  m u c h  t h e  l a r g e s t  s u m  phey c l a i m ,  
t h e y  a v e r ,  a n d  o f f e r  to p r o v e ,  t h a t  b y  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  w o u l d  a p p l y  i n  
t h e  A m e r i c a n  C o u r t  i n  N e w  Y o r k ,  t h e y  h a v e  a  g o o d  m a r i t i m e  l i e n #  B u t  
i t  i s  a d m i t t e d  b y  b o t h  s i d e s  o f  tjie B a r r  t h a t , a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  m a r i t i m e  
l a w  a p p l i e d  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  m a r i t i m e  l i e n  f o r  t h e s e  
p a r t i o u l a r  s u ms #  T h a t  b e i n g  so, I t h i n k  t h e  L o r d  i s  p e r f e c t l y
r i g h t ,  w h e n  h e  p r a c t i c a l l y  d i s p o s e d  o f  t h i s  m a t t e r  i n  a  s e n t e n c e  i n  h i s  
f i r s t  J u d g m e n t , w h e r e  h e  s a i d  -  *  I c a n  o n l y  a p p l y  o u w  o w n  l a w  i n
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  r a n k i n g  o f  c l a i m a n t s  o n  a  B r i t i s h  s h i p ,  l o c a l l y  s i t u a t e d  
i n  S c o t l a n d ,  a n d  t h e y  (i#e. t h e s e  c l a i m a n t s )  m u s t  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  
u n s e c u r e d /
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u n s e c u r e d  c r e d i t o r s  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t  owner*'* I n  * t h e  M i l f o r d *  
j l 85 8  1 &/?&, 36s] i n  a  s uit i n  Eaglitui L a w  b y  a n  A m e r i c a n  m a s t e r  a g a i n s t
t h e  f r e i g h t  f o r  h i s  w a g e s *  itwfes h e l d  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  
f r e i g h t  w | s  liablentAs t o  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  E n g l i s h  a n d  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
t h a t  b y  A m e r i c a n  law, t h e  l e x  l o c i  c o n t r a c t u s m a s t e r  h a s  n o  h y p o t h e c  
o v e r  t h e  f r e i g h t  f o r  w a g e s y l s  i r r e l e v a n t .  A g a i n , i n  * T h e  t a g u s* [l9fc3 
p . u } i n  p r o c e e d i n g s  i n  r e m : i n  E n g l a n d  b y  t h e  m a s t e r  o f  a n  A r g e n t i n e  
v e ss e l ,  it w a s  h e l d  t h a t  t h o u g h  b y  the l e x  l o c i  h e  c o u l d  o n l y  c l a i m  h i s  
w a g e s  a n d  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  l a s t  v o y a g e  a s  a  p r i v i l e g e d  d e b t ,  t h e  
l e x  f o r i  a p p l i e d  so a s  to e n a b l e  h i m  t o  c l a i m ,  i n  p r i o r i t y ,  t h e  w h o l e  
o f  h i s  w a g e s  a n d  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  a s  m a s t e r .
These d e c is io n s  can only be j u s t i f ie d  on the theory  
th at our Courts when applying th e ir  own maritime law are applying a
g e n e r a l  m a r i t i m e  l aw. — — — -    ..
 - - „ — it is s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  i f  a n  i s s u e A e v e r  a r i s e j t
i n  o u r  C o u r t s  o n  a  f o r e i g n  l e g a l  h y p o t h e c ^  whichufes n o t  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
s h i p s ?a n d  t o  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  a  g e n e r a l  m a r i t i m e  l a w  h a s / n o
a p p l i c a t i o n ^  t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  s h o u l d  a p p l y  t o  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o r  n o n - e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  h y p o t h e c ,  a n d  to 
t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  i t s  e x t e n t ,  a n d  t h e l ex  f o r i » sh o u l d  o n l y  b e  ap p l i ed - 
to t h e q u e o t i o n  o f  I t s  d eg r e e - o f  p r i o r i t y .
P R B a C B I P 5! I 0 Hi
P o s it iv e
P r e sc r ip tio n
P r e c r i p t i o n  i s  o f  t w o  k & n d s t  T h e  p o s i t i v e ,  w h e r e b y  a  t i t l e  is 
g a i n e d  o v e r  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o r  p e r s o n  o f  a n o t h e r )  t h e  n e g a t i v e ,  
w h e r e b y  o n e  l o s e s  h e s  o w n  r i g h t s  o r  p r i v i l e g e s -  ^Harness B s s a y s ,  
o n  P r e s c r i p t i o n , p .  1©6) S a l m o n d ,  J u r i s p r u d e n c e ,$ I6&j
A s  to t h e  p o s i t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s ,  t h e  £ & e s p r i p t i o h s  o f  t h e  l a w
o f  t h e  s i t u s  o f  t h e  o b j e c t  a r e  a p p l i e d ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  o b j e c t  i s  
■g.c- k f . r * !  *  i T V e s .  8 l ]
i m m o v e a b l e ^ o r  m o v e a b l e ,  a s J t h e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  all o t h e r  l a w s  
i g n o r e d .  So f a r  a s  t h i s  r u l e  a f f e c t s  i m m o v e a b l e s ,  it is i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  o v e r - r i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e  l e x  s i t u s  
g o v e r n s  a i l  q u e s t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  i m m o g e a b l e s  .The r u l e  i s  e q u a l l y  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  m o v e a b l e s ,  s o m e  c o u n t r i e s ,  u n l i k e  S c o t l a n d ,  h a v i n g  
r u l e s  o f  p o s i t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n  w h i c h  a f f e c t  m o v e a b l e s .  T h i s  i n  
W a t e r s  -  v -  B a r t o n , jjJ.S . 45h«l C o l d w e l l  45©j 3 |  B e a l e  8©j a  p e r s o n  
w h o  r e s i d e d  i n  T e x a s W b s  g i v e n ,  w h i l e  i n  T e n n e s s e e ,  t w o  s l a v e s ,  
w h i c h  h e  k e p t  i n  h i s  p o s s e s s i o n  i n  T e x a s ,  c l a i m i n g  to b e  t h e  owner, 
f o r  m o r e  t h a n  $ w o  y e a r s ,  a f t e r  w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  e n t i c e d  b a c k  to 
T e n n e s s e e .  H e  b r o u g h t  a n  a c t i o n  i n  T e n n e s s e e  f o r  t h e  r e c o v e r y  o f  
t h e  s l a v e s .  I t w h s  u n c e r t a i n  w h e t h e r  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  i n  T e n n e s s e e  
w a s  a  g i f t  o r  a ^ l o a n ,  a n d  h e  p l e d ;  t h e  f e x a n  2  y e a r s  p r e s c r i p t i o n ^  
w h i c h  h a i t  t h e  e f f e c t  n o t  o n l y  o f  b a r r i n g  t h e  rightfl o f  a c t i o n  o f  
t h e  f o r m e r  o w n e r ,  b u t  o f  e x t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e  r i g h t  i t s e l f  a n d  v e s t i n g  
t h e  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  a d v e r s e  p o s s e s s i o n ,  so t h a t  a f t e r  &£% 
y e a i s o f  t h e  p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  i f  t h e  f o r m e r  o w n e r  s h o u l d  r e g a i n  t h e  
p o s s e s s i o n ,  t h e  p o s s e s s o r  m i g h t  m a i n t a i n  a n  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  h i m  f o r  
t h e  r e c o v e r y  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  ^ i n  s h o r t  a  p o s i t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n .
T h e  T e n n e s s e e  l aw, whiehvJts at o n c e  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e  o f  t h e 
t r a n s a c t i o n  ( t h e  h a n d i n g  o v e r  o f  t h e  s l a v e s ) ,  t h e  l e x  f o r i  ySnd t h e  
l a w  o f  t h e  o t h e r  c l a i m a n t s  r e s i d e n c e / p r o v i d e d  t h a t  a n  a d v e r s e
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p o s s e s s i o n  o f  3  years«fts r e q u i r e d *  T h e  T e n n e s s e e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t
h e l d  t h a t  t h e  l a w  o f  T e x a s  s h o u l d  a p p l y ,  a s  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  s i t u s
o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y *  " E v e r y  s o v e r e i g n t y  p o s s e s s e s  t h e  u n d o u b t e d  p o w e r  to
\
r e g u l a t e  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  p r o p e r t y  s i t u a t e  w i t h i n  i t s  o w n  j u r i s d i c t i o n •• • 
i f  a  p o s i t i v e  t i t l e  to p r o p e r t y  b e  t h e n  a c q u i r e d ,  a n d  p e r f e c t e d  
b y  the l o c a l  l a w  o f  t h e  p l a c e ,  w h e r e  s i t u a t e  at t h e  t i m e ,  u p o n  w h a t  
s o u n d  p r i n c i p l e  c a n  it b e  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  s u c h  t i t l e  c a n  b e  
a f f e c t e d  o r  d e f e a t e d  b y  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t o  a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y ^  
b y  t h e  p o s s e s s o r *  o r  b y  i t s  r e m o v a l ' b y  a n o t h e r  w i t h o u t  h i s  c o n s e n t ? "
£3 B e a l e ^ 8 2 |  T h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  c o u r s e  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  l i e  w i t h i n
t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  s i t u s  /  d u r i n g  t h e  w h o l e  p e r i o d  
o f  i t s  p r e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  t h a t p r e s c r i p t i o n  t o  a f f e c t  it.
N e g a t i v e
N e g a t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  a d m i r a b l y  c l a s s i f i e d  b y  D i c k s o n  i n t o  
P r e s c r i p t i o n s  r  1
t h r e e  t y pe s . - f Di e k s on ,  E v i d e n c e ,  iff£  5 3 1  -  5401
(1) B u i e s  w h i c h  d o  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  r i g h t  o r  o b l i g a t i o n ,  b u t  l i m i t  t h e  
r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n ,  b y  p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  i f  a c t i o n  is n o t  b r o u g h t  w i t h i n  a  
c e r t a i n  t i m e ,  e i t h e r  it c a n n o t  b e  r a i s e d  at a ll, o r  t h e  m o d e  o f  
p r o o f  i s  a l t e r e d  o r  t h e  o n u s  of p r o o f  s h i f t e d  j p i c k s o n  i f  53sJ
. T h e s e  m i g h t  b e  m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y  d e s c r i b e d  a s  " l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  A c t i o n s "
i n s t e a d  o f  " p r e s c r i p t i o n s "  E x a m p l e s  o f  s u c h  r u l e s  i n  S c o t s  &aw
a r e  t h e  t r i e n n i a l ,  q u i n q u e n n i a l ,  £  p r e s c r i p t i o n  i m p o s e d  b y  t h e  A r t i c l e
1 6 6 9  c . 9*  T h e d a s  r e g a r d s  d i l i g e n c e  i s  n o w  3 y e a r s *  P e r s o n a l  D i l i g e n c e
A
A c t  1 8 3 8 ,  I &  2  Viet. c. 1 1 4  % ssj sexe n n i a l,  a n d  v i c e n n i a l
p r e s c r i p t i o n ^  o f  h o l o g r a p h  m i s s i v e  l e t t e r s  a n d  h o l o g r a p h  b o n d s  a n d  
s u b s c r i p t i o n s  i n  c o m p t  b o o k s  w i t h o u t  w i t n e s s e s ^  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  
/dot 1 6 6 9  e. 9 3 l i m i t a t i o n s ,  a n d  t h e  s i x  m o n t h s  l i m i t a t i o n ^  i m p o s e d  b y  
t h e  f h b l i o  A u t h o r i t i e s  P r o t e c t i o n  A c t  1 8 9 3 , £  5 6  &  57 V i e t  c. 6lj
(2) B u i e s  w h i c h  e x t i n g u i s h  t h e  r i g h t  o r  o b l i g a t i o n  i t s e l f  t h o u g h  a n  
e x  p o s t  f a c t o  o p e r a t i o n  a n d  n o t  t h r o u g h  t h e  m e d i u m  o f  a n  i m p l i e d  
c o n d i t i o n  l i m i t i n g  i t s  d u r a t i o n .  m  e x a m p l e  o f  s u c h  a  r u l e  i n  S c o t s
w/
4*aw i s  t h e  l o n g  n e g a t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n * ,  £  It i s  r e a s o n a b l y  c e r t a i n  
t h a t  t h e  l o n g  n e g a t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n  e x t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  r i g h t  i t s e l f ,  
a n d  n o t  s i m p l y  t h e  r i g h t  o f  a c ti o n *  N a p i e r  -  v  -  C a m p b e l l  1703,
M. 1 0 6 5 6 ;  E r s k .  In st .  3, 7, 8. y B e l l ’ s E r in e .  # # 6 0 7 ,  6 1 4 y  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  a c t  1 6 1 7  c « 1 2 «  p r o v i d e s  ** T ^ b t  a l l  a c t i o n s  c o m p e t e n t  
o f  t h e  l a w ,  u p o n  h e r i t a b l e  B o n d s ,  R e v e r s i o n s ,  C o n t r a c t s ,  o r  o t h e r s  
w h a t  s o e v e r *  •• • s h a l l  b e  p u r s u e d  w i t h i n  t h e  s p ac e  o f  f o r t y  y e a r s  
a f t e r  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  s a m e *  t$w2t^seems t o  b e  a  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n ,  t h e  A c t s  1 4 6 9 ^  c. 2 8  a n d  1 4 7 4 c .  5 4 ,  w h i c h  e s t a b l i s h e d  
t h e  p r e s c r i p t i o n * , a r e  i n  t h e s e  t e r m s ;  *-=Shall f o l l o w  t h e  s a i d  o b l i g a t i o n  
w i t h i n  t h e  s p a c e  o f  f o u r t l e  y e i r e s ,  a n d  t a k e  d o c u m e n t  t h e r e u p o n .  A n d  
g i f  h e  d o i s  n o t ,  it s a i l  b e  p r e s u r i v e d  ato4 b e  o f  n a n e  a v a i l ew . . . . . .
*A11 a u l d  O b l i g a t i o n s  m a i d  o f  b e f o r e ,  t h a t  i s  e l d e r  t h a n  t h e  d a i t  
o f  f o u r t i e  y e i r e g , . . .  s a il  b e  p r e s c r i b e d  a n d  o f  n a  s t r e n g t h ;  a n d  i n  
l i k e w i s e  i n  t i m e  t o  cu m,  a l l  d b l i g a t i o n e s  m a i d ,  o r  to b e  m a i d ,  t h a t  
b e i s  n o t  f o l l o w e d  w i t h i n  f o u r t i e  y e i r e s ,  sa il  p r e s c r i v e / a n d  b e  o f  n a n e  
a v a i l e % -y whfeh. i n d i c a t e s  t h e  e x t i n c t i o n  o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n ^
(3) L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r i g h t  o r  o b l i g a t i o n  i t s e l f ,  w h i c h  e n t e r  i n t o  
** ab> An e x a m p l e  o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  r u l e  i n  S e o t s  l a w,  i s  t h e
s e p t e n n i a l  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  c a u t i o n a r y  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  i m p o s e d  b y  t h e  A c t  
1 6 9 5  c . 5  I n  t h e s e  w o r d s ;  w T h a t  n o  m a n  b i n d i n g  a n d  e n g a g i n g  f o r  
h e r e a f t e r ,  f o r  a n d  w i t h i a n o t h e r  c o n j u n e t l y  a n d  s e v e r a l l y ,  i n  a n y  b o n d  
o r  c o n t r a c t  f o r  s u m s  o f  m o n e y ,  s h a l l  b e  b o u n d  f o r  t h e  s a i d  s u m s  f o r  
l o n g e r  tHaft 7 y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  b o n d ,  b u t  t h a t  f r o m  a n d  
a f t e r  t h e  s a i d  7 y e a r s ,  t h e  s a i d  c a u t i o n e r  shall b e  eo^ i p s o  f r e e  o f  
h i s  c a u t i o n *  ^ A l e x a n d e r  -  v  -  B a d e n a c h  1 8 4 3  6D, 322J ——— ...
L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  t y p e  m a y  be p r e s e n t  i n  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  m a k e  r e p a r a t i o n .  T h u s  i n  E n g l a n d  b e f o r e  L o r d  C a m p b e l l ’ s Act.
(9 a n d  1 0  Viet. c. 9 s j , w h i l e  a  p e r s o n  w h o  s u s t a i n e d  i n j u r y  t h r o u g h
\
a n o t h e r ’ s
ano tu ior' s Q6 .Xicb naci a c laim  "Pot1 rh'Ti^ D'AO'' -rrc-1- ■? -p i 1 • 1 < 1 • ^■L°I. images, yeo, ix tne injured party diea,
tnere was no claim against the wrongdoer by his representatives or 
relatives. Lord Campbell’s Act provided that an action could be brought 
within 1c. calendar months of* the death in the name of the deceased's 
executor or administrator for damages, for behoof of the relatives. "The 
case is not one of a statute introducing a limitation or prescription on 
a previously existing common law right. The statute for the first time 
gave the rignt. it gave a limited right only viz, a right for 12 months".
GppAra&n v. L.IhW.R. (O.H,) 1877 14. S.L.R. 449, per Lord Shand at p.450_7 
Tne English writers in Private International Law, due perhaps to 
their having a less varied range of prescriptions than we have in 
Scotland, distinguish only two types of negative prescriptions, namely 
rules which extinguish or restrict the right of action after a certain 
time, and rules which extinguish the rights or obligations themselves 
after a certain time. /"Cheshire p. 640} Dicey p. 852_J But there 
is a fundamental difference between rules which extinguish the right or 
obligation by an ex post facto operation, and those which limit the 
duration of the right or obligation by entering into the contract ab 
initio, although both extinguish the right itself, and attention to this 
difference is necessary both on principle and to harmonise perfectly the 
precedents.
The principles applicable to each of the 3 types of negative 
prescriptions are as follows:
(l) Rules which provide that, if action is not brought within a certain 
time, either it cannot be raised at all, or that the mode of proof is 
altered or the onus of proof shifted, are. applied if they are the ru_i.es 
of the lex fori, and if they are not, are ignored. It is submitted 
that this principle applies even to actions relating to immoveables 
situated in another country, / Dicey p. 601_J although certain English 
cases suggest that the lex situs and not the lex fori applies in such a 
case./~Pitt v . Dacre 1876 3 Oh. D. 295; la IS Peat's Trusts 1869 L.R.
7 Equ. 302; Hi cks v. Powell 1869 L.R. 4 Ch. App. 741J
The Scots cases have wavered between three principles in the matter 
of limitation of actions: (i) that the prescriptions of the proper law 
of the contract, and of it only (ii) that the prescriptions of the law
of the/
the debtors domicile or forum, and of it only, W
(iii) f & a t  t h e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t h e  l e x  f o r i  onljr, s h o u l d  b e  a p p l i e d .
T h e  p r o p e r  l a w  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  w a s  f i r s t  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  
i s  t h e  p r e d o m i n a n t  r a t i o  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  u p  to 17 67 #  £  G r a d e n
-  v  -  R a m s a y  1 6 6 4  M o r .  4 5 0 3 $  P h i l i p s  -  v  -  S t a m f i e l d  1 6 9 5  M o r .  4 5 0 3 ;  
R o g e r s  -  v  -  C a t h c a r t  &  H e r  1 7 3 2  M o r .  4 5 0 7 $  F a l k s  -  v  -  A l k e n h e a d
1 7 3 1  M o r .  4 5 0 7 $  R u t h e r f o r d  -  v  -  C a m p b e l l  1 7 3 8 ^  M o r .  4 5 0 8 ;  d r o v e  -  v  -
G o r d o n  1 7 4 0 f M b r.  4 5 1 0 $  L o v a t  -  v  -  F o r b e s  1 7 4 2  M or. 4 5 1 2 $  C a t h c a r t
I W
-  v  -  M i d d l e t o n  1 7 4 2  M o r .  4 5 1 4 $  R e n t o n * s T r s *  -  v  -  B a i l l i e ^ 4 5 1 6 $  
M a o N e i l  -  v  -  M a c N e i l  1 7 6 1  M o n  4 5 1 7 $  S w a r t  -  v  -  G o a r  l a y  1 7 6 7  Mor, 4 5 1 9 j
f t j c k m a n n  -  v  -  Mlaclac h l a n  5 S h a w  &  R u n b o p  6 5 3 (N ew  Ed}/ a l t h o u g h  it
U r  ~ J
m a y  h a v e  b e e n ^ a s  r e g a r d s  m e r c a n t i l e  c o n t r a c t s  a n d  not g e n t l e m e n *  s p e r s o n a l
a c c o u n t s ,  t h a t  t h e  rulewirs c o n s i d e r e d  t o  a p pl y .  £  P h i l i p s  -  v  -  S t a n f i e l d
1 6 9 5 ^  M o r .  4 5 0 3 $  Hay*ft* S x o r s  -  v  - L i n l i t h g o w  1 7 0 8 ^  M o r .  4504,' c o n t r a
R u t h e r f o r d  -  v  ~  C a m p b e l l  1 7 3 8  M o r .  4 5 0 & |  W h e r e  t h e  a c t i o n v A s  o n  a
d e l i c t ,  i n s t e a d  o f  a  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  p r e s c r i p t  ions o f  t h e  l e x  l o c i  d e l i c t i
w e r e ; b y  p a r i t y  o f  r e a s o n i n g ; a p p l i e d .  ^ Rae -  v  -  W r i g h t  1 7 1 7  M o r .  4506j[
-th e  l a w  o f  t h e  d e b t o r * s d o m i c i l e  s u p p l i e d  t h e  r u l e  (R o b e r t s o n  - ~ v  -
-M a r q u i s  o f  1 7 4 9 .  1. Pat^-29-5> B u t  t h e  p r o p e r  l a w  o f  t h e
c o n t r a c t  d i d  n o t  r e i g n  u n c h a l l e n g e d ,  - a n d  i n  at l e a s t  o n e  c a s e  i n  t h i s
p e r i o d  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d e b t o r ’ s d o m i c i l e  s u p p l i e d  t h e  r u l e , { R o b e r t s o n  -  v  -
M a r q u i s  o f  A n n a n d a l e  1 7 4 9 . 1 Pat. 2 9 3 J
B e t w e e n  1 7 6 8  a n d  1 7 7 2  t h e r e  a r e  c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e  l e x
f o r i  g o v e r n e d ,  jg & y l o r  -  v  -  I n n e * s  Sxors, 1 7 6 8  Mor. 4 5 2 0 $  K e r r  -  v  -  E a r l
o f  H o m e ,  1 7 7 1  M o r .  4 5 2 2 $  B a r r e t  -  v  -  E a r l  o f  H o m e  1 7 7 2  M o r .  4 5 2 4 J  
' & ' r
T h e n  t h e  l a w  o f  d e b t o r ’ s d o m i c i l e  c a m e  i n t o  f a v o u r M T o r k  B u i l d i n ^ 6 - * 0 n ^—  -v *
C h e s s w e l l  1 7 9 2  M o r .  4 5 2 8 $  A s s i g n e e s  o f  R o s s  &  O g i l v y  -  v  -  R o s s ’s T r s
1811j> H u m e  4 7 3 $  C a m p b e l l  -  V  -  S t e i n  1 8 1 8  6 D o w .  116/ iiffg 2 3  N o v .
1 8 1 3 ^  F. C.$ T h o m s o n  -  v  -  L o r d  D u n c a n  1 8 0 8  H u m e  4 6 6 $  F r a s e r ’ s T r s
-  v  -  F r a s e r  1 8 3 0  9 S. 174$ G i b s o n  -  v -  S t e w a r t  1 8 3 1  9f  S. 5 2 5 $  
a l s o  R o h e r t f t o n  —  v  —  1 7 4 9  1 Pat. 2 9 3 .  - I n  t h e
p e n u l t i m a t e  c a s e  L o r d  G i l l i e s  c h o s e  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  d o m i c i l e  o f  t h e
d e b t o t /
debtor, because th a t must be considered the le x  lo c i  s o lu t io n is , so t h is  
case may be an a u th o r ity  fo r  the proper law o f  the contract in stea d  o f  
^he la w  o f  th e debtor* s dom icile^
*n - on ” v ~ Lippmann , in  the House o f Lords in  1837,
£l837 2 3, and MoL.682^ revg4, 14 5, 24 lj Lord Brougham, a fte r  a review  
o f  th e  a u t h o r it ie s ,  made a c lea r  and reasoned e le c t io n  o f the le x  f o r i .
s^> th e ruXe• He considered  both tf $£at the le x  fo r i  i s  the ru le  where the  
q u estion  a r i s e s  upibn th e remedy, and th a t lim ita tio n , o f  a c tio n s  belongs to  
the head o f  remedy? jo t . p . 724) This ;« ^ +have been thought s u f f ic ie n t  
to  s e t t l e  th e m atter, but in  1839 in  Parrar -  v -  L eith  Banking Co» [*1839 
1 D. 936j th e whole £ourt was s t i l l  debating the matter* They chose the  
law o f  th e  forum, but not because i t  was the forum o f th e  cause, but 
because i t  was th e  forum o f the debtor  ^ i .  e* the r a t io  o f  th e ir  decision ,- 
y /d s the law o f  the d eb to r fs  dom icile.
Parrar » -v— L e ith  Banking Co.---- — Thing"is-an ac tio n  for  repet i t io n--of
the p r ic e  o f  goods surrendered in  
Agent o f  a S cots Bank. The grounc
England by an E nglish  Debtor to  th e  
of the actio n  i s  that the ^Transaction
i s  i l l e g a l  by E n glish  Law, which g-ave the r igh t o f  r e p e t it io n , although
i t  i s  not i l l e g a l  by Scots law. 
pleaded in  d e fen ce , and i t  i s  argu
sued in  England during the whole 0 
but had n ot been  sued, and so the  
The Court however considered  th a t
The E nglish 3 ta tu te  o f  L im itation s i s  
ed in te r  a l i a , th at English Law should  
apply as th e proper law o f  the traasaction s Also th at the agent o f the  
Bank in  England i s  a partner o f the bank, that the bank could have been
f the period o f the E nglish  p r e sc r ip t io n ,  
right o f  a ction  are p rescribed .
;he agent i s  purely a ctin g  as an agent
fo r  th e  Scotch bank, the s i t e  o f whose b u sin ess  and whose dom icile a l l
a long i s  in  Scotland . Scotland i,
Scots Law i s  a p p lied  because i t  i s  
deml-e l  1-e—o f  ■ -th e deb to r .----- The l aw-e)
s the bank's p r in c ip a l forum, and
because the r ig h t  o f  a c tio n  ex istec  in  a subsid iary forum, that did mot 
mean th e  p r e sc r ip tio n  o f the subsid iary  forum i s  to be looked t o .
both the le x  f o r i  and the law o f the  
f  th e -domici l a -o f . the debtor I t g t U l
r-egarded as an Im portant fa c to * . Lord MaeKehzie went as fa r  as to
e x p r e s s /
- 7 -
express h im se lf  in  th ese  words; " i f  e f fe c t  on p rescr ip tio n  i s  to  be 
g iven  to the dom ioilium  d e b ito r ls , which seems to  be the r u le , at 
l e a s t  where th a t i s  a lso  the forum of a c tio n , i t  i s  the more n ecessary  
to  req u ire a proper and complete dom icile o f  the debtor fo r  t h is  purpose? 
jp . 955j I iff the ru lo  wao o loar ly  held  at that time that the lim i t at i on 
o f a o tio n s  ru led  by the le x  fOTi j as such, that in o f  Pon -  v -
Lippmann, then th ere  would have 1
which would have required  the consideration  o f the whole Court
Farrar -  v -  L e ith  Banking Co, t i  
c le a r n e ss  o f  the p r in c ip le  that 1 
a c t io n s  as i t  does other questior  
c o n s is te n t  w ith  the view , that i f
een no argument fo r  the defender,
erefore seems to  r a ise  doubt as to  the  
he le x  f o r i  governs p rescr ip tio n  o f  
s r e la t in g  to  the remedy. I t  i s  
the a c tio n  has been ra ised  in  Sngland,
Scota -law as to  p rescrip t io n  shouud st i l l  have been applied," whl'utr  1-s 
n o t  p o s s ib le in  Lon v - - Lippmami Considering the whole course o f  
the S c o t t is h  d e c is io n s  in  f a c t ,  the p o s it io n  i s  fa r  from s a t is fa c to r y .
f«ei 1
There can be no sueh doubt however, th a t the le x  f o r i  governs the 
l im ita t io n  o f  a c t io n s , that Don -  v -  Lippmann i s  the a u th o r ita tiv e  
c a se , and th a t Farrar -  v -  L eith  Banking Co. w hile co rr ec tly  d ecid ed , i s  
based on a most doubtful r a t io .  I t  i s  to  be remarked th a t the very  
judges who, in  the la t t e r  case , paid a tte n tio n  to  the dom icile or forum 
o f  th e d eb tor , in  a Ufcer case seem to  assume that i t  i s  the le x  fo r i  
as such , th a t governs a l l  m atters r e la t in g  to  the remedy, [  — -Alexander 
-  v -  Badenach 1843^ 6 . D. 322j£, See a lso  Fergusson -  v -  fo f f e  16^3. 
1038j (1841} & » £  Bobin* 267J Wemyss -  v -  A ustralian  Co. o f Edinburgh 
1856f  19fD . 122j Banner -  v -  Gibson* 18 30^ 9^3. 61* Ersk. In s t . 3 ,7 ,  
48£ Karnes, E q u ity , 3 ,8 ,  6; Diekson i f  5 3 2 ,in  favour o f  the le x  f o r i  .
In Engl and, H u b e r v -  S te in er  1835^ 2 . Bing. (N.Gj 2Qzj
T h iis ,if  the a c tio n  i s  being brought in  a S c o ttish  Court, 
the t r ie n n ia l ,  quinquennial, sex en n ia l, and v icen n ia l l im ita t io n s  can 
be a p p lie d , no m atter what i s  the le x  causae, and no fo re ig n  l im ita t io n s
o f /
of t h is  nature can be a p p lied . Even when an aotion  has been bVrrJd*
by n 1 Im itat i on a f  ao tio n e in  the Oourte o f the country where the
con tract v is  en tered  in to , and w ith  which I t  had the nearest connection ,
AtiA h * S  h e ld  ^ b a r f e d  w .  a I*
^ i f  i t  i s  not barred by our ru les  o f lim ita tio n  o f a c t io n s , i t  w i l l  be 
m aintainab le here. ^ H arris -  v -  Tg&uine 1869£ 1?^ $.B . 653jj Miere 
Scotland i s  th e  le x  f o r i ,  and Scots law i s  being app lied , there i s  no 
ru le  o f  S cots law that the debtor must have resided  w ith in  Scotland  
during the p eriod  o f the p rescrip tion . [  Dickson i  f  535$ contra  
gp-SS " v “ Watt*a C reditors l l th ^  Dec, 1800^ F.C.; JSrsk In s t . 3 ,7 ,4 8 r  
These contary a u th o r it ie s  date from a time when the le x  f o r ivfts not 
c le a r ly  acknowledged as the r u le . Perhaps itw ts  not seen th a t the is su e  
was: do out own in tern a l r u le s  o f  law demand that the debtor should
be r e s id e n t  in  Soot land throughout the period o f the p reecrip tion ?
In England i t  has been the ru le  o f the in tern a l law, Since 4 Ann c .1 6 .  
th at th e  .debtor must be resid en t in  .England for  p rescr ip tio n  to run 
a g a in st  th e  debtor^ But although a foreign  lim ita t io n  of action  i s  not 
regarded in  our C ourts, i f  the debtor has been resid en t w ith in  the
kf/iith tKc C»upX* of
ju r is d ic t io n  o f  the fo re ig n  Courts, th at l -s^the proper law o f the  
c o n tr a c t , fo r  the whole o f the period o f the foreign  p rescr ip tio n ,
S fiis  may r&ise a presumption o f payment, which can be rebutted by 
contrary proof or in feren ces  from the circum stances. j^ames, E quity,
3 , 8 ,  6$ Ersk I n s t .  3 , 7r 48$ Dickson i f  536.J
(2) I f  th e  p r e sc r ip tio n  ex tin gu ish es the r igh t or o b lig a tio n  i t s e l f
through an ex post fa c to  operation , and not through the medium o f an
im p lied  co n d itio n  lim it in g  i t s  duration; i t  i s  applied  i f  i t  i s  a •
i f' fL * , tfre l^* <•« 4 ^
(■eot C A M S O C  (*.«. tk* * C»*e a c«5<
p r e sc r ip t io n  o f  th e  ^ proper law o f the contract^ an£ the ob ligant has a«l.* 
re s id e d  w ith in  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f th at law during the course o f  
the p r e s c r ip t io n , and otherw ise i s  ignored, j jion -  v -  Llppmarm, sugra f 
per Lord Brougham at p . 730j Richardson -  v -  Lady, Hadinton March,
6th* 1821 F. C., 2 3h. 4pP* 406; Huber -  v -  S teiner 1835 2 Bing. (N.C,) 
202 per T indal C .J. a t p. 211^  Dickson i f 5 3 7 $  Story 48
Cheshire c r i t i c i z e s  the proviso that the ob ligant roast have resid ed  
w ith in  th e ju r is d ic t io n  o f the p rescr ip tio n  during i t s  course, before i t i s  
a p p lica b le , [p . 640 saying  that i t  i s  su ff ic ie n t  that the p r e sc r ip t io n  
b elongs to  th e proper law o f  the con tract. I t  i s  s u ff ic ie n t  in  the  
th ir d  type o f  n e g a tiv e  p rescr ip tio n  th a t the p rescr ip tio n  should belong to 
the proper law; ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f the residence o f the o b lig a n t, but th ere  
i s  a g rea t d if fe r e n c e  between the 3rd and 2nd types o f negative p rescr ip tio n s , 
between^ e* g*j th e  sep ten n ia l lim ita t io n  o f cautionary ob ligation s*  and the  
long n e g a tiv e  p r e sc r ip t io n . In Cautionary o b lig a tio n s  the p a r tie s  know, 
i f  S cots law i s  the proper law, ^W^ ie o b lig a tio n  cannot la s t  fo r  more than
/ n
7 y e a r s , no m atter what they do by way o f d ilig en ce  or acknowledgment 
(sh o rt or renew ing th e o b lig a tio n ^  and the 7 years lim ita t io n  en ters in to  
the co n tra ct from the beginning and i s  a term of i t  throughout ju st  as i f  
i t  had been exp ressed  in  a clause* But in  regard to  other co n tra c ts , i t  
cannot be sa id  to  be an im plied term where Scotland i s  the proper law , thfct 
the co n tra ct i s  lim ite d  to  20 y ea rs , fo r  i t  may la s t  for  2©0 years i f  kept 
a l iv e  by d il ig e n c e  or payment o f in tere st.T £ e  long n egative p rescr ip tio n  
ex tin g u ish ed  th e  o b lig a t io n  v l ju r is  by an ex post facto  op eration , and 
the o b lig a n t must have resid ed  w ith in  Scotland so that the law a c tu a lly  
operated in  th e c a se .
(3) I f  th e  p r e sc r ip t io n  i s  a lim ita t io n  o f the duration o f the r ig h t  
or o b lig a t io n  enteralS in to  i t  ab i n i t i o , i t  i s  applied  i f  i t  farms 
part o f  th e  le x  Causae^i* e* the proper law o f the contract in  a case  
o f  c o n tr a c t , f Alexander  -  v -  Baden a ch 1843y 6 D* 322 j Dickson $(,§5410
L 4? r V
and th e  le x  lo c i  d e l i c t i  in  th e  case o f d e l i c t 4,!  Goodman -  v -  L*N*W*R»
(O.H.) 1877j 14 S.L#R. 4 9 0  and otherw ise i s  ignored* There i s  no need  
fo r  the o b lig a n t to  have resid ed  w ith in  the te r r ito r y  o f  the le x  causae 
during th e  running o f  the p rescr ip tio n . |D ick so n ,ib id J «
Where d eb ts  o f  d if fe r e n t  $inc s^at d iffe r e n t  tim es , the le x  fo r i  
and not th e  o f  th e debts w i l l  determine in to  which category
a debt comes. Thts in  The A llian ce  Beak o f  Simla -  v -  ffareg jl880  ^ 5 “C#P.D.
4 2 0  i t  Whs proved^in India s p e o ii l t y  debts hare no h igher le g a l m lu e
Please regard the Material within 
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ADD PUBLIC xOLICY
A foreign penax / Cheshire p p . 133-135; Dicey 
Rule 54; Wolff ^163; Goodrich^* 9y^ 
revenue / Cheshire pp. 135, 136; Dicey Rule 54;
Wolff ^ 144_7 or political /~Dicey Rule 54; In re 
Amand 1941 2 K.B. 239 per Viscount Caldecote C.J. at 
p. 254; In re Amand (ho. 2) 1942 1 K.B. 445 per Croom- 
Johnson J . at p . 451__7 is effective only within the 
territory of the foreign country.
Penal Laws "The penal laws of one country cannot be tahen
■notice of in another". /~~Ogden v. Foil tott 1790 3 T.R.
726 per Buller J . at p. 733_/ Penal laws may he either 
punishment for crimes or confiscatory laws.
i) P. uni shment The first class of ±.-enal laws includes "all branches
for crimes
of public. law punishable by pecuniary mulet or otherwise, 
at the instance of the State Government, or of some one 
representing the public." ".... no proceeding, even in 
the shape of a civil suit, which has for its oodect the 
enforcement by the State, whether directly or indirectly, 
of punishment imposed for such breaches .... ought to be 
admitted in the Courts of any other country."
L  Huntingdon v. Attrill 1893 A.C. 150 per curiam at p.!56_/ 
Monetary penalties however are only "penal" where they are 
recoverable at the instance of the State, or of an official 
duly authorized to prosecute on its behalf, or a member 
of the public in the character of a common informer,
/~~Ibid p. 158_7 and not where a right of action is given 
to the party agrieved. /  p • 161J  If a foreign judgment 
includes both penal and remedial elements, as where a fine 
is payable to the state and damages to the party agrieved, 
these elements are separable and the party agrieved may
the
enforce in this country part of the judgment which awards 
him damages. /"Raulin v. Fischer 1911 2 K.B. 93_J 
The first class also includes a penal status such as 
outlawry/
(ii) Confisc­
atory laws
Revenue
Laws
outlawry, infamy, civil death, and that resulting from 
attainder. Such a status is only effective within the 
country which created it. /~Lee n3tatusf'_y Also 
included are prohibitions which are imposed for purposes 
of punishment, such as a prohibition against adulterers 
marrying. /"See ’Marriage ....  Essential Validity’ /^7
As explained elsewhere /"~8ee ’Assignation of 
koveabj.esT _J7 the confiscation of property by a de facto 
government is effective and recognised by our Courts sis 
regards property of its own subjects within its juris­
diction, but the requisition or "nationalisation” with 
payment of compensation of property would be effective 
and recognised as regards the property of foreigners 
within its jurisdiction, and as regards the property of 
its own subjects both within and outwith its jurisdiction.
T h e  revenue laws of a foreign state can not be 
enforced in our Courts. So there can be no action in 
our Courts to recover taxes imposed by a foreign state,
L  1921 P. 454; In re V isser 1928 1 Ch. 877;
Cotton v. Rex 1914 A.C. 176 per curiam at p. 195;
Indian & General Investment Trust v . Borax Consolidated Ltd 
1920 1 K.B. per Sanxey J. at p. 550_/ or a foreign 
municipal authority, /"Municipal CoUuci1 of Sydney v . Bull 
1909 1 K.B. 1J  or even the expenses awarded against a 
party in a foreign revenue suit.. /"Attorney-General for 
Canada v. Schulze 1901 9 S.L.T. 4.J/ The Dominions are 
just as much foreign governments for the purposes of this 
rule as countries which are not under the Crown. 
/"Attorney-General for Canada v . Schulze, Municipal 
Councii of Sydney v . Bull, supra_/ Another app1ication 
of this principle is the rule that there can be no 
objection to a deed on the ground that it has not been 
properly stamped according to a foreign law, even although 
that law is the lex loci contractus. /~~See ’Contract ... 
Stamping of Deeds._J
Political/
Political 
Law s
no conscription for military service by the law 
ox a foreign power of a subject of power within the
A
United Kingdom can be enforced against him while he is 
in this country, unless specially permitted by statute. 
P i s  £0 Amand 1941 2 K.B. 259; Wolff p. 17 5 J
^Al^,hough a foreign law would normally be applicable 
under our rules for choice of law it will not be applied 
if an Act of our Parliament exists which was intended to 
have extraterritorial effect and to extend to and govern 
the case in question, /~3ee ’Contract ... Essential 
Validity’; marriage ’Essential Validity’; Dicey 
General Principle II (A; . O p . mortensen v . Peters 
1906 8 F. (j) 93; Peters v. Olsen 190 5 7 F. (j) 86/[
or where application of the foreign law would be 
contrary to morality / Penton v. L ivingstone IP59 21 Dv 
(H.L.) 9; Edmonstone v. Ed mo nstone June 1st 1816 F.C. 
per Lord Robertson at p. 148; Humphrey v. Humphrey’s 
Trs. (O.H.) 1895 58 3.L.R. 99 per nord moncreiff at 
p. 100; Kaufman v. Gerson 1904 1 K.B. 591; In. re 
L uck’s Settlement Trusts 1940 1 Ch. per Scott L.b. at 
p. 908; Dicey, General Principle II (d) ; V;/estlaxe £  215; 
Cheshire p. 1 4 2 or to a fundamental principle of our 
law founded on considerations of public policy,
Z Hamlyn v. Talislcer Distillery 1894 21 R« (H.L.) 21 
per Lord Chancellor at p. 23 and Lord Watson at p. 27; 
Rousillon v. Rousillon 1880 la Ch. D. 551 per Fry J. 
at'p. 369; In re Macartney 1921 1 Ch. 522; Dicey, 
General Principle II (b); Westlake £ 215; Goodrich^ 8__7 
or to our notions of natural justice /  Administrator 
of A ustrian Property v . Von Lorang 1927 3.C . (H.L.) 80; 
Gladstone v. Lindsay 1868 VI 8.L.R. 71; Scott v. Scott 
(O.H.) 1937 S.L.T. 632; Ro binson v. Fenner 1915 3 K.B. 
835; Cheshire p. 142_7 on our notions of the fundamental 
human lioerties. Cheshire p. 144J  
Under/
Under this heading would undoubtedly come the 
case of a contract with a courtesan for the price of 
her services, which however uegal it might be by the 
proper law of the contract, the lex lo_cJ. contractus, 
and the lex jjo^ u/tionis, would not be enforceable here* 
zTSofeiason v - Bland 1760 2 Barr. 1077 per Wilmot J • 
at p. 1084; Cheshire p. 142, Dicey p * 27 
Other instances are not so certain, but a foreign divorce 
on the ground of the mutual consent of the parties
£  See fDivorce*_7 m ight come within the principle*
In Benton v. Livingstone /~1859 21 D * (H.L.) 9J  
the House of Lords considered that a marriage between a 
man and his deceased wife's sister, which was then 
characterized by Scots law as "vile, filthy and 
abominable in the presence of God” and was prohibited 
and punishable by death, was so contrary to religion and 
morality that the Scots Courts should not recognise such 
a marriage as valid even although it were valid by the 
law of the matrimonial domicile* This opinion was 
obiter, since the marriage was also invalid by the law 
of the matrimonial domicile and it is submitted that it 
gives too wide an application to the principle* However 
since such a marriage is now legal in Scotland, the 
decision is only of historical interest.
The confiscation without payment of compensation 
by a de facto, government of property belonging to its 
own subjects which is within its jurisdiction is not so 
immoral and contrary to the principles of justice that 
our Courts will refuse to recognise it; Ho lb in & dons 
v. Kinnear 1930 8.C. 724 per L.j*C. Alness at p. 738; 
Luther v. Sagor 1921 3 K.B. 532- But such confiscation 
of property belonging to foreigners might "be recognised- 
F.A. ilann 1943 LIX L.Q,.R. at p* 171J7 nor is the lending 
of money for gaming which has been done in a country
wh©re/
£.9JLtrary_jbp__a 
f und ame rita 1 
principle]]of 
our iaw founded 
on consideration? 
of public policy
where it is legal./ Saxby v. Fulton 1909 2 K.B. 208.
But see ’Remedy//
A foreigner who was a traveller in England, and 
ocotland for a French champagne firm agreed with the 
firm while on a temporary visit to France that if he 
left the firm he would not represent any other 
champagne house for two years or establish himself in 
the champagne trade for 10 years. Even if this 
contract was governed by the law of France and was 
valid by that law our Courts would have refused to 
enforce it, because they "will not enforce a contract
against the public policy of this country, wherever it
may be made." /“"Rousillon v . Rousillon 1880 1* Ch. 1). 85: 
per Fry J. at p. 369J  It is part of the public policy 
of this country to protect freedom of trade here among 
both native subjects and foreigners. However if the 
traveller had been a Frenchman who travelled for 
champagne only in France, and had made such a restrictive 
.00venant there which was binding by the law of France 
our Courts would not have refused to recognise the 
contract, because it cannot be part of our public policy 
to protect freedom of trade in France, and the question 
always must always be whether the contract in issue is
contrary to public policy and not whether a similar
contract to^  be performed in this country would have been 
contrary to public policy. / Cheshire pp. 188,139_/7 
A contract which is invalid according to the lex loci 
contractus because contrary in its view to public policy 
is enforceable here if valid according to the proper law 
and not contrary to the public policy of the forum.
£~In re Missouri Steamship Co. 1889 42 Ch. D . 32l_y
The prohibition of commercial intercourse with 
alien enemies rests upon public policy and so a contract 
which involves thi3 will not be recognised by our Courts 
even although the proper law of the contract is a 
foreign/
toreign law and the contract is valid and enforceable 
oy that law. / Uynamit A.tt. v. Rio linto Ltd. 1916 A.C.
“"7
has been suggested that Foster v. Driscoll,
/ 19^9 1 K.B. 470_7 where a partnership agreement which 
had for its purpose the running of whisky into the United 
States during the Prohibition era was held not to he 
eniorceaole in an English Court, rests on the ratio that 
to eni orce that obligation was contrary to public policy 
as involving a breach of international comity, / F.A. Mann, 
1937 18 B.Y.I.L. at p. 109; Cheshire pp. 143, 4J  but the 
decision can also be explained by the rule that a contract 
which is illegal by the lex loci solutionis will not be 
enforced. / See "Contract - Illegality." This seems to 
be the tenor of Lord Justice Sankey’s opinion at p. 321. 
Contrast however Lord Justice Lawrence at p. 310J  
A contract to supply funds to an insurgent government 
not recognised by the Crown is not enforceable in our 
Courts, / j ones v. Garcia Dei Rio 1823 T. & R. 297 per 
Lord Eldon’: Westlake j* 305, Cheshire pp. 143, 4_y but
here again the contract would also be void on other 
grounds.
In Re Macartney /"l92l 1 Ch. 522J  an English 
Court held that it was contrary to public policy to 
enforce a Maltese judgment again&t the deceased father s 
estate for the perpetual maintenance of an illegitimate 
child, although by Maltese law the maintenance awarded 
might be varied from time to time or terminated, 
according to the circumstances of the child. It is 
submitted that this pushes the principle of public policy 
too far. The Maltese judgment was unenforceable in the 
English Courts in any event since it was not final and 
conclusive as to the amount payable. When it is said 
that a contract valid by the law of the country in which 
it is made cannot be enforced because it is contrary to 
public policy or the policy of the law of the forumf it
it is meaut that the contract conflicts with what are 
deemed in the forum to be essential public or moral 
interests - not merely that it woulu be invalid under 
English lav, , In re Fitzgerald 1904 1 Ch. bVbJ7 Almost
any rule of law could be said to rest on public policy, 
but to give public policy that extended meaning in this 
principle would result in the abolition of all Inter- 
:national 1'rivate Law.
A. foreign judgment will not be enforced if the 
procedure ha3 been contrary to Scottish notions of
fvatu fat I
:otantaa-i justice, as, for example, where no notice of 
the foreign proceedings wa3 given to the defender^ 
/""Crabtree v. Crabtree (O.H.) 1929 S.L.T. 675; Scott v. 
Scott 1937 S.L.T. 62H; Rudd v. Rudd 1924 1. 72- For the 
limits to this plea Gladstone v . Lindsay, supra__/ 
or where there was a refusal to receive evidence or to 
hear the parties / Let fforske J3jergnings etc. v » McLaren 
1885 22 L.L.R. 861; Jacobson v. Frachon 1928 138 L.T.R. 
386J  The plea of no notice however will not avail a 
party who has agreed either expressly or impliedly to 
accept notice at some place other than where he is, or 
notice to some other person, as where a shareholder in a 
French company became bound by the articles of association 
that if he provoked a contest during a liquidation and 
failed to elect a domicile for the purpose of service, 
summonses might be validly served on him at the office 
of the imperial procurator of the civil tribunal of .the 
department in which uhe office of the company is situatea. 
L Copia v. Adamson 1874 L.R. 9 Ex. 345; Gp • Gladstone v.
Lindsay 1868 VI S.L.R. n j
Our Courts will not recognise foreign rules of law
which contravene our notions of fundamental human
liberties. Thus they will not enforce any prohibition
of the law of the matrimonial domicile which prevents
marriage/
marriage simply because one of the parties is of a certain 
religion or caste, or is in holy orders, or can only marry 
within a selected group of persons. /~See ’Marriage ...» 
Essential Validity’^ / It is submitted that nowadays, 
although it was not the case formerly, no right arising 
out of slavery, even one arising from a transaction 
which occurred wholly within the territory of a law 
which recognised slavery as .Legal, would be recognised 
or enforceable here. </~See ’ Status \ _/
